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1  Introduction 
 
 
Tears begin to well up in the corner of his eyes as the camera captures his gaze. 
He holds up his hand before he faintly whispers ‘a moment’ as he collects himself 
to continue the story. Several seconds later, the National Ombudsman of the 
Netherlands appears before the camera. He describes the story of a single citizen 
who stands powerless against a State which appears ignorant of its own actions. 
For more than thirteen years, Ron Kowsoleea was known as a dangerous drug 
criminal. At first, he received a phone call from the Amsterdam police in 1994, 
asking him to come to the station. Once there, Kowsoleea discovered how a 
former schoolmate of his used his identity to escape prosecution for drug charges. 
The police officers register his story, but to no avail. Despite repeated attempts to 
clear his records, the problems continue. Several years later, on October 6, 2003, 
35 armed police officers barge into his house and push him up against the wall in 
an effort to arrest him. Time and again Kowsoleea tries to demonstrate his 
innocence and explain the story of how someone else is using his identity; yet, all 
the charges and interaction with the police lead to the detriment of his name and 
reputation. The caption below the excerpt of the episode captures the essence of 
the story.1 Identity theft, according to the caption, is no longer just an American 
problem. And there, at long last, was the victim to contradict those who 
considered identity theft a problem exclusively reserved for the United States.    
 
1.1  Background 
 
1.1.1  The Emergence of a Problem 
 
Identity theft first appeared on the scene in the United States during the nineties. 
This is not to say identity theft did not exist prior to that. To the contrary, in the 
preface to his Identity Theft Handbook, Martin Biegelman reflects upon his 
experiences with ‘identity theft’ several decades ago.2 Biegelman first became 
acquainted with identity theft in 1978, as a newly hired United States Postal 
Inspector. He describes how he heard fellow postal inspectors “…tell stories of 
fraudulent credit card applications and the resulting credit card frauds, the ease of 
obtaining personal information and phony identification to perpetrate this crime, 
how foreign nationals were behind many of the schemes, and how much money 
the banks and growing credit card industry were losing.”3 Based on these stories, 
Biegelman states how identity theft seemed like such a simple crime to commit. 
Several years after his initial encounter with the problem, Biegelman became part 
                                                
1 On October 23, 2008, EenVandaag, a daily current affairs show broadcast on public television, 
devoted part of its episode to the story of Ron Kowsoleaa, a victim of identity theft. Kowsoleea, who 
received media attention as a result of the response offered by the National Ombudsman, was falsely 
accused of 43 criminal offenses. The excerpt of the show is available online at  
http://www.eenvandaag.nl/buitenland/34037/tientallen_slachtoffers_identiteitsfraude (last accessed 
on July 4, 2010).  For the full report of the National Ombudsman see 
http://www.nationaleombudsman.nl/rapporten/grote_onderzoeken/2007demonstreren/Dossier_hul
p_voor_slachtoffer_fraude_metgestolenidentiteitskaart.asp (last accessed July 12, 2010).  
2 Biegelman, M. T. (2009). Identity Theft Handbook: Detection, Prevention, and Security. Hoboken, NJ: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
3 Ibid: xix.  
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of a team of federal agents assigned to investigate mail theft involving credit cards, 
checks, and other valuables sent via the post. Through his participation in the 
team of federal agents Biegelman received first hand experience with the 
perpetration of identity theft. A sense of urgency began to grow. Biegelman, 
together with his colleagues, tried to reach out in an effort to develop an 
awareness of the problem, since mere investigation and prosecution of 
perpetrators proved to be insufficient means to turn the tide. Despite several 
arrests, other perpetrators easily replaced those caught by the investigation team. 
Biegelman writes how it felt as though they were fighting a losing battle. On a 
video for employees of the TransUnion credit bureau, titled Crime of the 80s, 
Biegelman found another outlet for his outreach efforts. “I said things like ‘It’s a 
major problem throughout the country; the problem is growing so much that it is 
overwhelming law enforcement agencies; cooperation between banks, credit 
bureaus and law enforcement is essential to address the problem; and it’s a 
growing problem and can destroy the credit industry as we know it if we don’t 
stop it.’”4  
The outreach continued during a United States Senate hearing in 1986 where 
Biegelman received the opportunity to testify and speak of the evolving threat of 
identity theft. Interestingly, the concept of identity theft is never mentioned by any 
of the witnesses; yet, as Biegelman notes, everyone was describing it during their 
testimony.  
Several years after the United States Senate hearing, the problem of identity 
theft finally erupted. While those directly involved with the problem demonstrated 
an awareness of its existence, others failed to recognize the symptoms until the 
official diagnosis. Identity theft began to manifest itself in the media as an 
important topic worthy of daily attention, much the same as an epidemic. From a 
crime of the 80s, as noted above, identity theft had become the crime of the new 
millennium.5 This label appears to be in large part the result of the intricate 
connection between its anticipated proliferation and the incorporation of advances 
made in the field of digital technology. Identity theft received and continues to 
carry the label of the nation’s fastest growing crime.6 Various newspapers began to 
describe how identity theft occurred7 and how particular practices in society led to 
the enablement of the crime.8 Perhaps the greatest impact came as a result of the 
stories of victims of identity theft. The media managed to eloquently capture the 
experiences of victims and transform them into stories which attracted the 
attention of readers.9 These stories also invited the consideration of the public 
policy arena and served as an impetus to pass legislation (see section 3.1.1). Several 
years earlier, Biegelman already reflected on the experiences of victims during his 
testimony. In particular, he recognized, even then, how despite the acceptance of 
financial losses by the financial services sector, victims still experienced a negative 
                                                
4 Ibid: xix-xx.  
5 Hoar, S. B. (2001). Identity Theft: The Crime of the New Millennium. Oregon Law Review, Vol. 80: 
1423 – 1447.  
6 Shadegg, J. B. (1999). Statement to the U.S. House Committee on Commerce & the House 
Subcommittees on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection, and on Finance. Identity 
Theft: Is There Another You? Joint Hearing, April 12, 1999 (Serial 106-16).  
7 Oldenburg, D. (1997). Identity Theft and Other Scams. Washington Post, November 3, 1997: D05. 
8 O’Harrow, R. (1998). Who’s Got Your Number? Data Access Feeds a New Breed of Crime. 
Washington Post, March 10, 1998: A08.  
9 Hansell, S. (1996). Identity Crisis: When a Criminal’s got Your Number. New York Times, June 16, 
1996: 1.  
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impact as a result of the ‘crime.’ During his testimony, he specifically stated: “I 
know of cases where the people, a year or two after the fraud, and after they have 
contacted the credit bureaus to clear up their name, they still have problems 
getting credit, including credit cards, mortgages, and other loans.”10   
The enormous attention devoted to the topic of identity theft also came 
accompanied by many questions. As Biegelman noted above, hardly anyone used 
the concept of identity theft prior to the nineties. When identity theft, both as a 
concept and as a phenomenon became the center of attention, everyone 
demanded answers. What is identity theft? How big is the problem? Neither 
question proved easy to answer, for the ‘novelty’ of the crime meant answers were 
simply unavailable. The first question, what is identity theft, remains a topic of 
discussion (see chapter 2). This study uses the following definition: “‘Identity 
‘theft’ is fraud or another unlawful activity where the identity of an existing person 
is used as a target or principal tool without that person’s consent.”11  
The diverse types of identity theft also increase the complexity of the 
phenomenon. The most familiar type of identity theft is financial identity theft, 
which is the primary focus of this study.12 Financial identity theft refers to the 
misuse of the identity of another person in an effort to unlawfully obtain financial 
benefits. Just as disagreements or variations exist about the definition of identity 
theft in general, they do about financial identity theft in particular as well. From a 
restricted perspective, financial identity theft refers exclusively to true name 
fraud.13 This refers to an activity where perpetrators obtain sufficient personal 
information to open an account, request a credit card or apply for a mortgage in 
the name of the victim. A more comprehensive or broad approach to financial 
identity theft also includes account takeover, which refers to the misuse of existing 
account information in an effort to drain its assets. This study includes both types 
of financial identity theft, since with true name fraud as well as account takeover 
the identity of another person is the primary instrument used to obtain the 
financial assets.  
Besides financial identity theft, other types of identity theft stand in its shadow. 
Even so, these types certainly deserve a brief moment of reflection. The second 
type is criminal identity theft. The story of the victim in the introduction provides 
an example of a case of criminal identity theft. With criminal identity theft the 
perpetrator commits a (serious) violation and provides a ‘stolen’ identity to escape 
the subsequent process or prosecution. When individuals become victims of 
criminal identity theft they may, for example, be initially stopped for a minor 
traffic violation, but upon checking their records the police officer finds a warrant 
out for their arrest for a serious crime like murder.14 The lack of attention granted 
to criminal identity theft receives criticism from various sources.15 Especially with 
                                                
10 Biegelman (2009): xx. 
11 Koops, E. J. & R. E. Leenes (2006). ID Theft, ID Fraud and/or ID-related Crime: Definitions 
matter. Datenschutz und Datensicherheit, Vol. 30 (9): 556. 
12 Newman and McNally (2005) have suggested that research should focus on each separate type of 
identity theft rather than attempt to understand, or empirically assess, identity theft as a solitary 
construct or singular phenomenon. 
13 This does not include the usage of a fictious ‘identity’ since this type of identity-related crime does 
not involve an individual victim whose identity has been ‘stolen.’ 
14 Binder, R. & M. Gill (2005). Identity Theft and Fraud: Learning From the USA. Perpetuity Research & 
Consultancy International Ltd. 
15 Perl, M. W. (2003). It’s Not Always about the Money: Why the State Identity Theft Laws Fail to 
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respect to legislation proposed or passed which ignores the consequences of 
criminal identity theft for its victims.16  
In addition to the problems associated with financial and criminal identity 
theft, the establishment of medical identity theft depicts yet another side to the 
problem. Medical identity theft occurs when the perpetrator uses the personal 
information, including the insurance details, of another person to obtain medical 
goods and services. The most dangerous consequence of medical identity theft is 
the inclusion of erroneous entries into existing medical records of the victims. The 
World Privacy Forum notes how despite the profound risk carried by medical 
identity theft, “...it is the least studied and most poorly documented of the cluster 
of identity theft crimes. It is also the most difficult to fix after the fact, because 
victims have limited rights and recourses. Medical identity theft typically leaves a 
trail of falsified information in medical records that can plague victims’ medical 
and financial lives for years.”17 The World Privacy Forum brought medical identity 
theft to the attention of the public through its research18 and continues to 
emphasize its importance during the discussion of legislation proposed in the 
Congress.19   
To develop a better understanding of how perpetrators carry out acts of 
identity theft, whether financial, criminal, or medical, Graeme R. Newman & 
Megan M. McNally identify three different stages.20 The first stage is the 
acquisition of personal information. The second stage is the use of the previously 
acquired personal information in order to obtain, for example, financial assets in 
the name of the victim. The third, and final, stage of identity theft concerns the 
discovery of the crime by the victim21. The actual act of identity theft concerns the 
first two stages, for the third stage is purely focused on the aftermath once the 
crime has already occurred. To accomplish both stages, perpetrators of identity 
theft incorporate various modus operandi. For the first stage, the acquisition of 
personal information, an extensive repertoire of methods exists. The main 
distinction made throughout the literature is between methods which either 
include or exclude means of (digital) technology. The distinction is often referred 
                                                                                                        
Adequately Address Criminal Record Identity Theft. Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, Vol. 94: 169 
– 208.  
16 Linnhoff, S. & J. Langenderfer (2004). Identity Theft Legislation: The Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act of 2003 and the Road Not Taken. Journal of Consumer Affairs, Vol. 38 (2): 204 – 216.  
17 World Privacy Forum (n.d.). The Medical Identity Theft Information Page. Available at:  
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/medicalidentitytheft.html (last accessed July 4, 2010).  
18 Dixon, P. (2006). Medical Identity Theft: The Information Crime That Can Kill You. Available at: 
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/wpf_medicalidtheft2006.pdf (last accessed July 4, 2010). 
19 The World Privacy Forum emphasizes the applicability of the Red Flags rule for the Health Care 
sector. See Gellman, R. & P. Dixon (2009). Red Flag and Address Discrepancy Requirements: Suggestions for 
Health Care Providers. Available at: 
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/WPF_RedFlagReport_09242008fs.pdf (last accessed July 4, 
2010). 
20 Newman, G. R. & M. M. McNally (2005). Identity Theft Literature Review. Research report submitted to 
the United States Department of Justice. Available at:  
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/210459.pdf (last accessed July 4, 2010).  
21 There is another third stage which is rarely recognized or discussed. This is the stage where 
perpetrators of financial identity theft make the gains of the second stage liquid. Basically, perpetrators 
must turn credit cards or credit card numbers into actual financial gain, i.e. cash. This is generally a 
labor intensive process since credit cards can be used for purchases which must then in turn be sold 
again in an effort to actually make a financial as opposed to just a material profit. For more information 
see http://www.wired.com/techbiz/people/magazine/17-01/ff_max_butler (last accessed October 
24, 2010).    
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to as high versus low tech methods. These methods are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive for hybrid forms certainly exist. Familiar methods used by perpetrators 
before the onset of the digital era include dumpster diving and stealing mail from 
mailboxes. Dumpster diving refers to the act of rummaging through the trash of 
others in an effort to potentially collect personal information. This could be done 
both for residential as well as business trash.  
Throughout the years, other methods evolved. The incorporation of social 
engineering techniques proved a popular means for information acquisition. Since 
social engineering maintains different meanings in different fields, it is important 
to clarify that social engineering with respect to (computer) security refers to a 
practice whereby information is obtained under false pretenses. Phishing remains a 
prime example of social engineering in contemporary society. During a phishing 
attempt, perpetrators of identity theft send an email in the name of an 
organization, usually a financial service provider, and claim the recipient must 
follow a link or download an executable file in order to reconfirm the personal 
information maintained by the organization. 
Besides social engineering techniques, perpetrators also incorporate the usage 
of malicious software which provides them with the ability to capture all 
keystrokes through the installation of, for example, keyloggers, which in turn give 
perpetrators the desired personal information. Such usage of malicious software 
allows perpetrators to capture the personal information stored and processed by 
government agencies, financial service providers, payment processors, information 
brokers, and consumers. This demonstrates the exponential growth of the amount 
of personal information perpetrators of financial identity theft could capture 
through the usage of digital technology.  
The second stage, on the other hand, focuses on the misuse of the previously 
acquired personal information. Based on the information captured during the first 
stage, perpetrators of financial identity theft attempt to either acquire a new credit 
card, loan, or mortgage or drain an existing bank account or credit card.    
Overall, the existence of different types of identity theft demonstrates its 
complex and multi-faceted nature. This also increases the challenge of the 
establishment of a definition of the problem. Even so, through the Identity Theft 
Assumption and Deterrence Act of 1998 (see section 3.1.1) the United States 
managed to fill the void and provide a definition of the phenomenon. The 
establishment of a legal, albeit criminal, definition of the problem provided an 
instrument to answer the subsequent question which proved to be on the minds 




The first official indications of a problem came from TransUnion LLC which 
received 35,235 consumer complaints about identity theft in 1992.22 Years later, 
the passage of the previously mentioned Identity Theft and Assumption 
Deterrence Act of 1998 also led to the establishment of a consumer complaint 
center. On November 1, 1999 the Identity Theft Data Clearinghouse began to 
receive consumer complaints via a toll-free telephone number, 1-877-ID THEFT 
                                                
22 Katel, P. (2005). Identity Theft: Can Congress Give Americans Better Protection? The CQ Researcher, 
Vol. 15 (22): 517 – 540. 
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(438-4338).23 Since 2000, the Identity Theft Data Clearinghouse has published its 
statistics on the complaints received from consumers.24 During its first 
publication, the Identity Theft Data Clearinghouse recorded a total of 31,140 
victims. The following years this number of complaints began to grow (see Table 
1.1). 
 
Table 1.1  
Identity theft consumer complaints received per year (United States25) 
 












The steady escalation of the number of complaints seemed to confirm the earlier 
statements made by Biegelman about the existence of a growing problem. The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO)26 noted in 2002 how the prevalence of 
identity theft appeared to be on the rise.27 Yet, the most recent number of 
complaints recorded in 2009 and published in 2010 demonstrates the first decline 
in a decade. Whether this is merely a fluke as opposed to the start of a promising 
trend is difficult to assess at the moment. Despite the decline, identity theft 
remains the number one consumer complaint received by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC).28    
Besides the consumer complaint data, various other studies attempted and 
continue to attempt to shed light on the prevalence of the problem. Several studies 
came out in 2003. The first was the Privacy & American Business Survey which 
                                                
23 Federal Trade Commission (2003). REPORT: Federal Trade Commission Overview of the Identity Theft 
Program. Available at:  
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/downloads/ftc_overview_id_theft.pdf (last accessed 
July 4, 2010).  
24 Federal Trade Commission (2001). Identity Theft Victim Complaint Data. Available at:  
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/downloads/clearinghouse_2000.pdf (last  accessed 
July 4, 2010).  
25 Federal Trade Commission (2010). Consumer Sentinel Network Data Handbook for January – December 
2009.  
26 Until 2004, the Government Accountability Office was known as the General Accounting Office. 
Throughout the main text in the book (excluding footnotes), I refer to the agency as the Government 
Accountability Office regardless of the year in which the report was published. 
27 General Accounting Office (2002). Identity Theft: Prevalence and Cost appear to be Growing. Report to 
Congressional Requesters, GAO-02-363.  
28 The Federal Trade Commission also receives other (fraud) complaints from consumers.   
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concluded how a total of 33.4 million29 individuals in the United States had 
become a victim of identity theft since 1990, and over 13 million since January 
2001.30 The study build on previous surveys held to assess the size of the identity 
theft problem.31 Nearly parallel to the publication of the Privacy & American 
Business Survey, Gartner, Inc. reported a total of seven million victims of identity 
theft, through a mail survey of 2,445 households.32 For the FTC, Synovate 
conducted more than 4,000 telephone interviews in an effort to develop an 
estimation of the number of identity theft victims. Based on the interviews, 
Synovate concluded how 27.3 million Americans had become a victim of identity 
theft during the previous five years.33 Of that number, nearly ten million became a 
victim during the previous year alone.34  
The studies continued during the following years. Javelin Strategy & Research 
became engaged in the debate and reported in 2005, in conjunction with the Better 
Business Bureau, how identity theft had established 9.3 million victims during the 
previous year.35 This was a decrease in comparison to the results published by 
Synovate in 2003 and as such led certain sources to conclude how “…fears of 
identity theft being a rapidly growing problem are exaggerated.”36 This became the 
start of a zesty debate over the reliability of the results provided. The original 
decrease published in 2005 continued the following year, when Javelin reported 
how 8.9 million individuals had become a victim of identity theft during the 
previous year.37 This trend returned in 2007 when Javelin updated its study and 
concluded how the total number of victims had once again declined to 8.4 
million.38 This in contrast to other results published around the same time. 
Gartner, Inc. returned in 2007 with a prevalence study on identity theft and 
concluded a fifty percent increase over its 2003 results. The total number of 
identity theft victims grew from seven to fifteen million.39 Simultaneously, the 
FTC published its yearly consumer complaint data which indicated how identity 
theft remained the leader in terms of consumer complaints received by the 
clearinghouse. The proximity of publication accompanied by the diverse and 
conflicting nature of the results led many to question the reliability and the validity 
of the data. Especially the reports published by Javelin became the object of 
increased scrutiny since Javelin Strategy & Research receives financial support 
from organizations active in the financial services industry.40 Whereas Javelin 
                                                
29 This estimation is based on a representative sample of respondents of which 16% reported being a 
victim of identity theft in the past.  
30 Harris Interactive (2003). Identity Theft New Survey & Trend Report. Commissioned by Privacy & 
American Business. 
31 The 1998 and 1999 surveys asked respondents the following question: 
“Have you or any member of your family ever been the victim of identity fraud? This is where 
someone uses a lost or stolen credit card or false identification to obtain merchandise, open credit or 
bank accounts or apply for government benefits in someone else’s name?” In 1998, 20% provided an 
affirmative answer and the following year the percentage (21) was nearly identical.  
32 Gartner (2003). Gartner Says Identity Theft is up Nearly Eighty Percent. Press Release, July 21, 2003.  
33 Synovate (2003). Federal Trade Commission – Identity Theft Survey Report. 
34 Ibid.   
35 Javelin Strategy & Research (2005a). 2005 Identity Fraud Survey Report. Consumer Version. 
36 Lenard, T. M. & P. H. Rubin (2006). Much Ado About Notification. Regulation, Vol. 29 (1): 44.  
37 Javelin Strategy & Research (2006). 2006 Identity Fraud Survey Report. Consumer Version. 
38 Javelin Strategy & Research (2007a). 2007 Identity Fraud Survey Report. Consumer Version. 
39 Gartner (2007). Gartner Says Number of Identity Theft Victims Has Increased More Than 50 
Percent Since 2003. Press Release, March 6, 2007.  
40 CheckFree, an electronic payment company, is a sponsor of Javelin’s research and in its reports 
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prides itself as an independent organization, such financial support leads to an 
inevitable suspicion for the industry maintains a vital interest in the publication of 
prevalence data. As Chris Jay Hoofnagle notes, “[i]dentity theft is a high-stakes 
issue in the public policy world. It is a popular issue for political candidates, who 
have proposed many laws with serious implications for lending institutions. 
Because identity theft brings regulatory attention to lending institutions, there is a 
great pressure to redirect the attention elsewhere.”41 As a result, Hoofnagle argues 
how the press releases published by research corporations like Javelin are a tactic 
to provide an indication for a decline in identity theft cases. This published decline 
subsequently helps the survey’s sponsors to redirect the attention of policy 
makers. The projected decline of identity theft cases by Javelin came to an end in 
2008 when identity theft began to rise and the total number of victims estimated 
was nearly ten million.42 When Javelin published its most recent conclusions in 
2010, the number of identity theft victims reached an all time high. More than 11 
million individuals became victims of identity theft in 2009, according to Javelin’s 
research.43  
The increase of identity theft cases published over the previous two years 
appears to mitigate the arguments against Javelin, but there are other aspects 
discussed in the conclusions provided by the research organization which do 
support Hoofnagle’s notion of attention diversion. Javelin writes how “[m]any 
identity thefts can occur through traditional methods such as stolen wallets and 
‘friendly frauds,’ in which the crime is committed by a person known to the 
victim. In fact, among the victims who knew how their data was taken, lost or 
stolen wallets, checkbooks, or credit cards accounted for nearly two times as many 
instances of theft as all online attack methods combined. Identity theft 
occurrences are often the result of the most remedial and simple ways to steal 
information, not through hacking or elaborate Internet schemes.”44 This is not the 
first time Javelin came to this conclusion. The ‘controversial’ study published in 
2007 made similar claims, which Hoofnagle recognizes and rightfully challenges.45 
The problem with the statements made by Javelin about the origin of the personal 
information misused for identity theft purposes is its reliance on victims who 
actually think they know how perpetrators obtained the information. This group is 
a minority of those used for the data collection which Javelin bases its conclusions 
on. Even so, Javelin uses this information to draw broad conclusions and neglects 
the remainder and majority of victims who are unaware of the method of 
information collection used by the perpetrators. The diversion of attention 
accomplished through these statements is successful, since Javelin aims to 
demonstrate how predominantly consumers maintain the ability to control 
incidents of financial identity theft. Others accept this information as a ‘fact’ and 
use the conclusions to support their own arguments.46 
                                                                                                        
Javelin recommends consumers to transfer to electronic banking, as a means to reduce the risk of 
financial identity theft. This recommendation, however, does not appear to be based on the actual data 
collected and analyzed by Javelin.  
41 Hoofnagle, C. J. (2007). Identity Theft: Making the Known Unknowns Known. Harvard Journal of 
Law and Technology, Vol. 21 (1): 119. 
42 Javelin Strategy & Research (2009). 2009 Identity Fraud Survey Report. Consumer Version.  
43 Javelin Strategy & Research (2010). 2010 Identity Fraud Survey Report. Consumer Version.  
44 Ibid: 7.  
45 Hoofnagle (2007): 100.  
46 Fred H. Cate (2004), for example, stated during his testimony for the U.S. House Subcommittee on 
Social Security of the Committee on Ways and Means how “[w]hile we do not know as much as we 
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This discussion leads into a more vital aspect of prevalence studies. This is the 
investigation of how perpetrators manage to complete the act of financial identity 
theft. The importance of this research is the development of an understanding of 
how the crime occurs and as a result to reveal the vulnerabilities present in 
contemporary society. Even so, the near obsession with the accumulation of 
prevalence data on identity theft often overshadows the importance of this type of 
research. Moreover, an actual determination of how financial identity theft occurs, 
especially how perpetrators acquire the personal information needed to move on 
to the second stage of the crime, is particularly difficult to determine (see section 
1.4).  
 
1.1.3  Victims 
 
Besides the attention devoted to the statistical prevalence of the problem, interest 
groups began to investigate the experiences of the victims of the crime. The 
horror stories of victims described by the media demonstrated the consequences 
of the problem. These stories led identity theft to receive the label of a crime 
which is “...insidious, complex and potentially devastating.”47 The media attention 
devoted to the stories of victims of identity theft proved to be in stark contrast to 
the neglect demonstrated by the law enforcement community. For victims of 
identity theft encountered significant challenges during the early years to receive 
recognition as victims of a crime. This was mainly due to the ‘novelty’ of identity 
theft and its absence in the code of criminal law. The United States changed this 
discrepancy in 1998 through the Identity Theft Assumption and Deterrence Act.   
The Australasian Centre for Policing Research (ACPR) recognizes three 
different types of impact: direct and indirect financial impacts and the 
psychological impact of the crime.48 The experiences of victims with regard to 
these different types of impact return in various studies.49 The Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse paved the way through an overview study of victims and their 
experiences in 2000.50 The organization spoke to 66 victims of identity theft and 
produced a groundbreaking document, Nowhere to Turn. In its findings, the Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse describes how victims of identity theft spent an average of 
175 hours actively trying to resolve their case. Victims generally need to contact 
the creditor, the debt collector, and the consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) in an 
attempt to remove the bad credit charges from their records. The inaccurate bad 
credit charges ignite the most problems because they generally prevent victims 
from obtaining a new credit card, opening a bank account, renting an apartment, 
or even finding a job. These findings are not extraordinary as later studies prove. 
Since 2003, the Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC) produces a comprehensive 
                                                                                                        
need to know about identity theft, thanks to the efforts of FTC and others, one important fact we are 
learning is that much—perhaps most—identity theft is not committed by a stranger but by a family 
member, friend, or co-worker.” 
47 Crenshaw, A. B. (1996). Identity Crisis: the theft that’s tough to thwart. Washington Post, 25 August 
1996: H01.  
48 Australasian Centre for Policing Research (ACPR) (2006). Review of the legal status and rights of victims of 
identity theft in Australasia. 
49 Important to note is the selection bias present in the studies since the victims who contact the 
respective organizations tend to be worse off than most.  
50 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (2000). Nowhere to Turn: Victims Speak Out on Identity Theft - A Survey of 
Identity Theft Victims and Recommendations for Reform. Available at: 
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/idtheft2000.htm (last accessed July 5, 2010).  
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and thorough analysis on a periodic basis about the long-term impact of identity 
theft on its victims. Through in-depth surveys, the ITRC attempts to surpass 
previous studies conducted by the FTC, the GAO, and consumer groups to 
explore other areas of victimization.51  
 According to the 2003 analysis provided by the ITRC, victims of identity theft 
spent an average of 600 hours to resolve or at least try to resolve their case – 
considerably longer than the 175 hours reported by the Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse.52 This number began to fluctuate and decrease throughout the 
following years, from 330 hours in 200453 to 141 hours in 2009.54 The decrease in 
hours spent by victims in an effort to repair the damage caused by perpetrators of 
identity theft proved to be a source of positive support for the ITRC, which 
actually commenced its report in 2010 by stating how “[f]or the first time in seven 
years, the Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC) can state that it is encouraged by 
the findings of the Identity Theft: The Aftermath 2009.”55  
 Besides hours spent on damage recovery, studies also demonstrate an interest 
in the emotional or psychological impact of the crime on its victims. Tracy Sharp 
et al. conducted an exploratory study to assess the psychological and somatic 
impact of identity theft, as well as the coping mechanisms used by victims.56 For 
their study, Sharp et al. recruited 37 identity theft victims and placed them in six 
focus groups. The researchers provided the victims with two victim impact 
questionnaires. The first was administered two weeks after the victims discovered 
the incident of identity theft and the second six months after the discovery. The 
results of the first questionnaire indicated the following common reactions: 
irritability and anger, fear and anxiety, and frustration. During the second impact 
measurement, the results demonstrated how “…the emotional responses shifted 
such that the majority (26%) of participants indicated that they were distressed and 
desperate, 24% stated that they were irritated and angry, and 14%...endorsed 
feelings of anxiety, fear, mistrust and paranoia.”57 Victims of identity theft thus 
experience similar feelings as victims of other crimes. Consequently, they generally 
need and deserve treatment which other victims have a right to during the 
aftermath of a crime. Sharp et al. recognize how “[t]he results of this study suggest 
that psychological impact is indeed great on victims of identity theft. Not only are 
there immediate emotional and physical consequences to the victimization, but 
also lasting effects are seen, especially in cases that have not met resolution.”58 The 
ITRC demonstrates similar results since the organization found many victims who 
in the short term felt defiled (37%) and betrayed (60%).59 Victims also 
acknowledged feelings of a loss of innocence (21%), and a sense of powerlessness 
(63%). Long-term feelings experienced by victims included the inability to trust 
people (30%), suicidal thoughts (4%), being ready to give up the fight (25%), and 
the belief to have lost everything (10%).60 The ITRC results of 2009 did, however, 
                                                
51 Identity Theft Resource Center (2004). Identity Theft: The Aftermath 2003. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Identity Theft Resource Center (2005). Identity Theft: The Aftermath 2004.  
54 Identity Theft Resource Center (2010a). Identity Theft: The Aftermath 2009. 
55 Ibid: 2.  
56 Sharp, T., Sherver-Neiger, A., Fremouw, W., Kane, J. & S. Hutton (2004). Exploring the 
Psychological and Somatic Impact of Identity Theft. Journal of Forensic Science, Vol. 49 (1): 131 – 136.    
57 Ibid: 132 
58 Ibid: 133 – 134. 
59 Identity Theft Resource Center (2009). Identity Theft: The Aftermath 2008.   
60 Ibid.  
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indicate a decrease in internal negative attitudes held by victims, such as guilt, 
shame, being undeserving of help, or feeling captive or suicidal.  
 Whereas victims of identity theft demonstrate similar emotional expressions as 
victims of other crimes, they are simultaneously subject to a particular breed of 
secondary victimization. This is an aspect which is inherent to fraud victims and 
the way society perceives them. Henry Pontell et al. describe how “…elements 
inherent in fraud victimization may reinforce public and victim perceptions that 
they acted foolishly, and are therefore more blameworthy with regard to their own 
victimization.”61 This can in turn increase the psychological impact of the crime.  
 
1.1.4  Beyond the United States 
  
As the United States expanded its experience with identity theft and increased its 
knowledge about the crime, other countries also began to open their eyes as the 
threat of identity theft began to spread much like the contamination of an 
infectious disease.62 Whereas originally other countries delighted in a sense of 
immunity, identity theft proved to be something other than an expression of 
American exceptionalism. The United Kingdom63 began to devote attention to the 
topic, just as Canada64 and Australia.65 Besides the Anglo-Saxon countries, others 
such as the Netherlands also referred to and identified identity theft as a problem 
of public policy.66 On a transnational level, the European Union,67 the United 
Nations,68 the Council of Europe,69 and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD)70 all became involved.  
The questions which dominated the debate in the United States also returned 
in other countries and transnational organizations. The discussion about the 
definition proved to be a source of major attraction as did the quest for empirical 
data to assess the size of the problem.71 For the United Kingdom, the Credit 
Industry Fraud Avoidance System (CIFAS) has collected consumer complaints 
since 1999 (see Table 1.2).72  
                                                
61 Pontell, H. N., Brown, G. C. & A. Tosouni (2008). “Stolen Identities: A Victim Survey,” in Megan 
M. McNally and Graeme R. Newman (eds.), Perspectives on Identity Theft. Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 23. 
Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press: 58. 
62 See van der Meulen, N. S. (2007). The Spread of Identity Theft: Developments and Initiatives within 
the European Union. The Police Chief, Vol. 74 (5): 59 – 61.  
63 United Kingdom Cabinet Office (2002). Identity Fraud: A Study. United Kingdom: Cabinet Office 
Publications. 
64 See for example Cavoukian, A. (1997). Identity Theft: Who’s Using Your Name? Information and Privacy 
Commissioner/Ontario.  
65 Cuganesan, S. & D. Lacey (2003). Identity fraud in Australia: an evaluation of its nature, cost and extent. 
Standards Australia International.  
66 Kamerstukken II 2001 – 2002, 17050, nr. 234.  
67 Europol (2003). 2003 European Union Organised Crime Report; Mitchison, N., Wilikens, M., Breitenbach, 
L., Urry, R. & S. Portesi (2004). Identity Theft: A Discussion Paper. European Commission Joint Research 
Center.   
68 The United Nations Crime Commission has established an Intergovernmental Expert Group on 
Fraud and the Criminal Misuse and Falsification of Identity.   
69 Gercke, M. (2007). Project on Cybercrime: Internet-related identity theft. Discussion paper Economic Crime 
Division Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs.  
70 Organisation of Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) (2009). Online Identity Theft, 
OECD Publishing. See also OECD (n.d.). Report on Identity Fraud: Tax Evasion and Money Laundering 
Vulnerabilities. Centre for Tax Policy and Administration.  
71 Van der Meulen, N. S. & E. J. Koops, eds. (2008). D 12.7: Identity-related crime in Europe – Big Problem or 
Big Hype? Available at: http://www.fidis.net.  
72 Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance System (CIFAS) (2010). Is ID fraud serious? Available at:  
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Table 1.2  
Identity theft consumer complaints received per year (United Kingdom73)  
 












The number of cases recorded by CIFAS demonstrates a steady increase until 
2006. The following years, 2007 and 2008, instead demonstrate a state of relative 
stability. Other sources of data which provide an indication of the problem come 
from cost estimates provided by the Cabinet Office. The Cabinet Office of the 
United Kingdom published a report in February 2006 which determined how their 
economy suffered a financial loss of £1.7 billion per year as a result of identity 
fraud.74 Several years prior, in 2002, the Cabinet Office estimated a loss of £1.3 
billion per year. The Cabinet Office emphasizes the limited nature of the statistical 
data since the data relies exclusively on available figures which fail to provide an 
accurate reflection of the entire figure.75  
The Home Office also published statistics on plastic card and identity fraud in 
2007. These statistics are the findings of the 2005/06 British Crime Survey.76 Of 
all the respondents using plastic cards, four per cent became a victim of fraud 
during the previous year. The survey also provides data on identity fraud through 
the misuse of personal information. According to the findings, two per cent of 
respondents became a victim to this type of identity fraud.77 
 Other countries maintain limited indications of the size of the problem. For 
Canada, PhoneBusters, an organization which analyzes and reports on incidents of 
identity theft, reportedly received 13,359 consumer complaints in 2003 as 
compared to 8,187 in 2002.78 During later years, the number of identity theft 
                                                                                                        
http://www.cifas.org.uk/default.asp?edit_id=968-56 (last accessed July 5, 2010).   
73 It is unclear whether these numbers contain both true name fraud and account take over cases.   
74 United Kingdom Home Office (2006). Updated Estimate of the Cost of Identity Fraud to the UK 
Economy. Available at:   
http://www.identitytheft.org.uk/cms/assets/cost_of_identity_fraud_to_the_uk_economy_2006-
07.pdf (last accessed July 5, 2010).  
75 United Kingdom Cabinet Office (2002).  
76 Home Office Statistical Bulletin (2007). Mobile phone theft, plastic card and identity fraud: Findings from the  
2005/06 British Crime Survey. Available at:  
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs07/hosb1007.pdf (last accessed July 12, 2010).  
77 Ibid.  
78 Perrin, S. (2006). PIPEDA and Identity Theft: Solutions for Protecting Canadians. BC Freedom of  
Information and Privacy Association.  
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complaints demonstrates a marginal fluctuation from 10,637 complaints in 2007 to 
12,232 in 2008, and back down to 11,979 in 2009.79   
In the Netherlands, the lack of registration of identity theft as an individual 
crime complicates the collection of prevalence data. Despite the absence of 
statistical data on the prevalence of the problem, various sources identified identity 
theft as a rising phenomenon80 or a growing concern.81 This primarily concerned 
the potential proliferation of financial identity theft in the Netherlands; yet, its 
criminal counterpart demanded the most attention after Jan Grijpink stated how 
more than 101.000 identity fraudsters could be located in the automated 
fingerprint system Havank of the Dutch police.82 Through the provision of this 
empirical data, all eyes turned to the criminal justice system. For the thought of 
criminals on the loose in the Netherlands invited the interest of the media.83 The 
Lower House in turn also found itself compelled to respond and demand action. 
The Ministry of Justice responded to the increased attention by describing its 
awareness of the problem and its ongoing efforts to reduce it.84  
For financial identity theft, the Dutch tide with respect to prevalence data 
began to turn a couple of years later when at the start of 2010, the National 
Complaint Center, which commenced its operation at the end of 2008, published 
its final report on the pilot study conducted during the previous year.85 This study 
provides perhaps the first official indication of the size of the problem. During the 
year 2009, the complaint center received 349 consumer ‘complaints.’86 This total 
number includes consumers who merely contacted the center for information. 
The actual number of complaints which concerned identity theft or at least the 
suspicion of its existence was 241. The generalizability of this number is difficult 
to establish, since the complaint center aimed to maintain a low profile throughout 
its pilot year. This mainly as a result of the lack of financial resources invested in 
the project which led to a limited staff and as such limited capabilities. The 
potential impact of the low profile maintained by the complaint center became 
evident when the center received media attention in October 2009.87 In October, 
the number of complaints received by the center reached its peak which appears 
to be directly related to the attention granted to the center by the media and the 
rise in awareness among the public about its existence.  
Prior to the existence of a public consumer complaint center, a private 
initiative aimed to get a grip on the prevalence situation. Fellowes, a company 
which grants substantial attention to the problem of identity theft as a result of its 
marketing of paper shredders, conducted a study and published data on the 
                                                
79 Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre Criminal Intelligence Analytical Unit (2010). Mass Marketing Fraud & ID  
Theft Activities. Annual Statistical Report 2009.  
80 Rabobank Groep (2009). Maatschappelijk jaarverslag 2008: Verantwoord bankieren voor een duurzame 
toekomst: 32.  
81 Maatschappelijk Overleg Betalingsverkeer (MOB) (2006). Rapportage Maatschappelijk Overleg 
Betalingsverkeer 2005; Kamerstukken II 2003 – 2004, 29 200 VI, nr. 166; Openbaar Ministerie (OM) 
(2006). Perspectief op 2010.  
82 Grijpink, J. H. A. M. (2006). Identiteitsfraude en overheid. Justitiële Verkenningen, Vol. 32 (7): 37 – 57.  
83 See for example de Witt, R. (2006). Veel criminelen laten anderen straf uitzitten. Elsevier.  Available 
at: http://www.elsevier.nl/web/Nieuws/Nederland/98552/Veel-criminelen-laten-anderen-straf- 
uitzitten.htm (last accessed July 12, 2010).  
84 Directoraat-Generaal Rechtspleging en Rechtshandhaving (2006). Identiteitsvaststelling in de 
strafrechtketen. 
85 Centraal Meldpunt Identiteitsfraude (2010). Jaarrapportage 2009. 
86 Ibid.  
87 Ibid.  
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prevalence of identity theft.88 Fellowes surveyed 500 citizens in 2009 and 1000 
citizens in 2008. Based on the responses to the surveys, Fellowes estimated how 
130.000 citizens have been a victim of identity theft in the Netherlands.89 Whether 
this number refers to the total number of identity theft victims ever or to a 
particular time period remains unclear. Due to the commercial interest of 
Fellowes, its publication of data on the prevalence of identity theft is difficult to 
gage in terms of reliability and validity. Much the same as the problems associated 
with the publication of the results provided by Javelin Strategy & Research in the 
United States.   
As a result, public prevalence data on financial identity theft in the Netherlands 
remains scarce; yet, there is an overall air of potential urgency about identity 
theft.90 The focus therefore should be on an analysis of the presence of 
vulnerabilities in the Netherlands which can facilitate the occurrence of financial 
identity theft. Such an analysis can in turn provide a necessary reflection on the 
potential for the development of a problem despite the absence of prevalence data 
on the phenomenon. The lack of such an analysis shall otherwise allow opponents 
to render claims about the potential for identity theft as a rising phenomenon or a 
growing concern as merely speculative and as such without value.  
 
1.2  Theoretical Framework and Research Question 
 
The original focus of criminological theory in an effort to develop an 
understanding of the causes of crime was on offenders. The primary spotlight was 
on the why as opposed to the how. This changed during the 1970s and 1980s when 
a variety of different but complementary perspectives emerged which shifted the 
focus away from offenders and onto society. These perspectives came largely in 
response to the vain impact of conventional criminology in the area of crime 
prevention and crime control. As Ronald V. Clarke notes, “…the dispositional 
bias remains and renders criminological theory unproductive in terms of the 
preventive measures it generates.”91 David Garland refers to this new genre as 
“the new criminologies of everyday life” and recognizes how this “new style of 
criminological thinking” proved particularly successful in attracting the attention 
of government officials.92 The new criminologies of everyday life refer to a 
collection of related theoretical perspectives. The main premise shared by all 
perspectives is the view of crime as a normal and commonplace aspect of 
contemporary society. This in contrast to earlier theoretical perspectives used in 
criminology, which maintained the premise of crime as a deviation from normal 
civilized conduct and explained its occurrence via individual pathology or faulty 
                                                
88 Fellowes (2009). Nederlander niet bewust van risico identiteitsfraude. Press Release.  
Available at:  
http://www.fraudevoorkomjezelf.nl/downloads/Nederlander_niet_bewust_van_risico_identiteitsfrau
de.pdf (last accessed July 8, 2010). 
89 Ibid.  
90 See Prins, J. E. J. (2003). Het BurgerServiceNummer en de strijd tegen de Identiteitsfraude.  
Computerrecht, (1): 2-3; Prins, J. E. J. (2006). Variaties op een thema: van paspoort- naar identiteitsfraude. 
Nederlands Juristenblad, Vol. 81: 9-14. 
91 Clarke, R. V. G. (1980). ‘Situational’ Crime Prevention: Theory and Practice. British Journal of 
Criminology, Vol. 20 (2): 137.  
92 Garland, D. (2001). The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: 127.  
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socialization.93 Since the emergent perspectives departed from a different premise, 
the explanations developed for the causes of crime also differed. The explanations 
offered focus on the situational context of crime which provides information on 
measures to take in an effort to reduce the likelihood of specific crimes to occur.    
Various complementary perspectives play a role in ‘unconventional’ 
criminology. As Clarke recapitulates, “[e]nvironmental criminology, the rational 
choice perspective, and routine activity and lifestyle theories have all helped to 
strengthen situational prevention in different ways, reflecting their different origins 
and the purposes for which they were developed.”94 All together these theoretical 
perspectives provide assistance for the development of an opportunity structure 
for crime. The routine activity approach, developed by Lawrence E. Cohen and 
Marcus Felson, specifically concentrates on the circumstances in which 
perpetrators of crime carry out their activities. The main argument set forth by 
Cohen and Felson is how structural changes in routine activity patterns have the 
potential to influence crime rates. This influence occurs through the impact of 
such changes on the ‘convergence’ in space and time of three elements of direct-
contact predatory violations. These elements include motivated offenders, suitable 
targets, and the absence of capable guardians against a violation. The suitability of 
targets is based upon four components derived from a human ecological 
background. These four components are value, visibility, access, and inertia.95 The 
concept of a target refers both to potential victims and to material objects. Cohen 
and Felson write how “…the probability that a violation will occur at any specific 
time and place might be taken as a function of the convergence of likely offenders 
and suitable targets in the absence of capable guardians.”96 The absence of any 
single element leads to possible prevention of the violation. This demonstrates the 
interdependency, as Cohen and Felson note, between illegal acts and routine 
activities in everyday life. Such interdependency leads Cohen and Felson to apply 
concepts from human ecological literature to the analysis of crime and crime rates. 
The ecological nature of illegal acts requires them to feed upon other activities. 
Cohen and Felson state how “[s]ince illegal activities must feed upon other 
activities, the spatial and temporal structure of routine legal activities should play 
an important role in determining the location, type and quantity of illegal acts 
occurring in a given community or society.”97 Whereas Cohen and Felson 
acknowledge how their ideas presented in their work are not new, theoretical 
literature in criminology has often overlooked such ideas. As such Cohen and 
Felson develop a framework of previously unconnected analyses of criminological 
aspects in society. 
The framework set forth by Cohen and Felson establishes a connection 
between illegal and legal activities through a consideration of how everyday life 
brings together the three elements identified above in space and time. Felson 
added a fourth element to the equation which he terms the absence of ‘the 
                                                
93 Ibid: 128.  
94 Clarke, R. V. (1995). ‘Situational Crime Prevention,’ in M. Tonry & D. P. Farrington (eds.) Building a  
Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 101.  
95 Felson, M. & L. E. Cohen (1980). Human Ecology and Crime: A Routine Activity Approach. Human 
Ecology, Vol. 8 (4): 393. 
96 Cohen, L. E. & M. Felson (1979). Social change and crime rate trends: a routine activity approach. 
American Sociological Review, Vol. 44: 590.  
97 Ibid.  
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intimate handler.’98 The intimate handler is someone ‘close’ to the offender and 
who is in a position to exert informal social control in an effort to prevent the 
crime. The idea of the intimate handler as an additional element is derived from 
the fundamentals of the social control theory as described by Travis Hirschi.99 The 
four fundamentals of Hirschi’s control theory are commitments, attachments, 
involvements, and beliefs. Felson subsequently combines these four elements and 
captures them through a single concept: handle. This handle is a necessary 
condition, according to Felson, for the occurrence of informal social control.100  
Clarke in turn developed an argument to add a fifth element to the routine 
activity theory in an effort to enhance its contribution. This fifth element is crime 
facilitators, which includes diverse tools or features of everyday life which enable 
crime.101 Examples provided by Clarke include automobiles, credit cards, and 
weapons, which, according to the author, are essential tools for various specific 
forms of crime.102  
Many years after its introduction, the routine activity theory continues to 
demonstrate the applicability of the approach in contemporary society. Cohen and 
Felson foreshadowed such applicability through writing how “…one can analyze 
how the structure of community organization as well as the level of technology in 
a society provide the circumstances under which crime can thrive.”103 The 
reference to technology, in particular its usage and organization, is especially 
relevant to the topic of financial identity theft.104   
 Parallel to the introduction of the routine activity theory, Clarke introduced the 
‘situational’ crime prevention theory.105 Clarke described how practical options for 
prevention managed to arise from a greater emphasis placed on the situational 
features of crimes. Such an emphasis occurred during previous ‘situational’ 
research, which Clarke categorizes into two categories based on the measures 
introduced in light of prevention. The first category focuses on the reduction of 
physical opportunities for offenders and the second category places an emphasis 
on the increased risk for offenders to be caught for their crimes. Despite the 
distinction made by Clarke, he recognizes how certain preventative measures 
demonstrate attributes which allow them to fit into both categories.106 Unlike 
previous theoretical perspectives in criminology, the situational crime prevention 
framework tailors its analysis and measures toward specific forms of crime, rather 
than criminality in general.  This framework includes a standard action research 
methodology which consists of five sequential stages. These stages include the 
collection of data about the nature and dimensions of a specific crime problem, an 
analysis of the situational conditions which facilitate the commission of the crimes 
in question, and a systematic study of potential means to block opportunities for 
                                                
98 Felson, M. (1986). ‘Linking Criminal Choices, Routine Activities, Informal Control, and Criminal 
Outcomes,’ in D. B. Cornish & R. V. Clarke (eds.) The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on 
Offending. New York: Springer-Verlag: 119 – 128.  
99 Hirschi, T. (1969). Causes of Delinquency. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
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101 Felson, M. (2006). Crime and Nature. SAGE Publishing: 71.  
102 Clarke (1995):  101.  
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104 This connection is eloquently demonstrated by Daniel J. Solove through his description of the  
architecture of vulnerability. See Solove, D. J. (2003) Identity Theft and the Architecture of 
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the specific crime problems. The last two stages focus on the implementation of 
the most promising countermeasures and the monitoring of results.107 
Throughout the years, Clarke considerably expanded the situational crime 
prevention approach. He added another category of measures introduced to 
prevent the occurrence of specific crimes. This category focuses on reducing the 
rewards. Based on these three categories, Clarke identified a total of twelve 
techniques which together compose a framework for situational crime 
prevention.108 Under the umbrella of increasing the effort, Clarke identified the 
following options: target hardening, access control, deflecting offenders, and 
controlling facilitators.109 For increasing the risks, Clarke introduced the following 
four groups of measures: entry/exit screening, formal surveillance, surveillance by 
employees, and natural surveillance. And the last category of reducing rewards 
includes target removal, identifying property, removing inducements, and rule 
setting. The expansion continued when Clarke added another category to his 
existing framework in 1997.110 This fourth category identifies the potential for 
removing excuses as a means to reduce opportunities. Removing excuses can be 
accomplished through four separate techniques, including rule setting, stimulating 
conscience, controlling disinhibitors, and facilitating compliance.111 This 
situational prevention framework is an important source of guidance for the 
analysis of existing and potential countermeasures, but also works in the opposite 
direction to observe how the absence of such techniques develop and enhance the 
existence of an opportunity structure for specific crimes.   
 Earlier applications of the complementary theoretical perspectives to 
terrorism112 and e-commerce crimes113 demonstrate the relevance of this 
theoretical framework to financial identity theft. Moreover, Graeme R. Newman 
writes how, “[a]ny attempt to reduce the extent of identity theft must be aimed at 
the source of the problem, which lies not with the motivation of likely offenders 
but with the technological, business, and economic arrangements that create 
opportunities for identity thieves to carry out crimes and at the same time provide 
the factual basis for their rationalizations.”114 As a result, the development of an 
opportunity structure, or rather a facilitation framework, of identity theft has been 
selected as the point of departure of the current research project. Based on the 
framework developed by the above discussed theories, this study aims to answer 
the following central research question:  
 
How do states, financial service providers, consumers, and others facilitate the occurrence of 
financial identity theft in the United States and the Netherlands? And what are the implications 
for existing countermeasures and how do these fit into the situational crime prevention 
framework?  
                                                
107 Clarke (1995). 
108 Clarke, R. V. (1992). ‘Introduction,’ in R. V. Clarke (ed.) Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case 
Studies.  Albany, NY: Harrow and Heston Publishers: 3 – 36.  
109 Ibid: 13.  
110 Clarke, R. V. (1997). ‘Introduction,’ in R. V. Clarke (ed.) Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case 
Studies. Second edition. Albany, NY: Harrow and Heston Publishers: 1 – 43.  
111 Ibid: 18.  
112 Clarke, R. V. & G. R. Newman (2006 ). Outsmarting the Terrorists. Praeger Security International.  
113 Newman, G. R. & R. V. Clarke (2003). Superhighway Robbery: Preventing e-commerce crime. Willian 
Publishing.  
114 Newman, G. R. (2009). Policy Thoughts on “Bounded rationality of identity thieves.” Criminology & 
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1.3  Approach 
 
The charm of situational crime prevention as an approach and a theory is the fact 
that it is not bound by any particular discipline. As Newman and Clarke note, “[i]t 
focuses on situations, which, depending on where they arise, are best understood 
from many different perspectives.”115 As a result, the theoretical framework can be 
combined with an approach from another discipline. Before describing the 
specific methodological background developed to answer the central research 
question, the introduction of a classification scheme is necessary. This 
classification scheme is indispensable to provide a clear order for the search of 
facilitating factors in a more manageable way. These factors can be derived from a 
number of classifications, such as technical, organizational, and legal. This type of 
classification appears to be a popular scheme; yet, for this research I propose a 
different type of classification, which shall incorporate all of these aspects but 
approach them from an actor-centered perspective. The actors included as objects 
of analysis are the state both as protector and provider, financial service providers, 
consumers, and a small selection of others including internet service providers, 
money mules, data brokers, etc. This perspective also takes into consideration the 
interests of the actors which assists in the establishment of a background for the 
facilitating factors developed in the opportunity structure of financial identity 
theft. These interests must be analyzed alongside, or perhaps as part of, the 
opportunity structure in an effort to develop a realistic perspective on the room 
for improvement with regard to (existing) countermeasures. Parallel to the 
classification scheme runs the distinction between the facilitation of the first and 
the second stage. As indicated in the introduction, financial identity theft can be 
separated into a first and a second stage, which are facilited in different ways. This 
distinction runs through the research as a red thread and often remains implicit 
rather than explicit.   
This study carries a comparative nature through the inclusion of the United 
States and the Netherlands. The decision to conduct a comparative study rather 
than a single case study rests in the ability to derive scientific and societal value 
from the different experiences held by both countries. The selection of the United 
States as an object of analysis is self-evident due to its vast experience with the 
problem of financial identity theft. This experience has led to the accumulation of 
a significant amount of information which allows the United States to serve as a 
guide for the exploration of financial identity theft in other countries. The 
selection of the Netherlands as the second case is based primarily on the necessity 
for academic research to determine the validity to previous warnings about the 
potential for financial identity theft to evolve into a major social problem. The 
structural comparison then between the United States and the Netherlands can 
contribute to an assessment focused on whether financial identity theft is a viable 
threat to Dutch society. This comparison deviates from the best known and still 
dominant variant of the comparative method which is controlled comparison.116 
Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett describe controlled comparison as 
“…the study of two or more instances of a well-specified phenomenon that 
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resemble each other in every respect but one.”117 Despite the considerable appeal 
of controlled comparison, especially due to its resemblance of a scientific 
experiment, its application is difficult to accomplish. As an alternative to 
controlled comparison, George and Bennett identify within-case analysis. This 
type of analysis steers away from the ‘variable-oriented’ approaches, as Charles 
Ragin has labelled them, and instead turns to a more holistic approach of single 
cases.118 As George and Bennet describe, “[t]his alternative approach focuses not 
on the analysis of variables across cases, but on the causal path of a single case.”119 
These within-case analyses can nevertheless be used for cross-case comparisons 
on a small scale, as occurs in this study, which limits itself to two cases. This 
limitation is vital in an effort to ensure both cases receive sufficient attention and 
in-depth analysis in order to increase the value of the conclusions. More cases 
shall lead to a more superficial treatment of the material which inherently defeats 
the approach used within this dissertation.  
To accomplish a within-case analysis, George and Bennett identify two distinct 
methods: the congruence and the process-tracing method. “The essential 
characteristic of the congruence method”, George and Bennett note, “is that the 
investigator begins with a theory and then attempts to assess its ability to explain 
or predict the outcome in a particular case.”120 In the congruence method, the 
investigator does not have to trace the ‘causal process’ which leads the 
independent to the dependent variable. This is the main difference with the 
process-tracing method, which “…attempts to identify the intervening causal 
process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent 
variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”121 Since the 
main aim of this study is to identify the intervening ‘causal’ process, the latter 
method seems most appropriate. This is also due to the recognition of process-
tracing as “…a methodology well-suited for testing theories in a world marked by 
multiple interaction effects, where it is difficult to explain outcomes in terms of 
two or three independent variables—precisely the world that more and more 
scientists believe we confront.”122  
This identification of ‘causal’ or rather facilitation processes occurs across two 
dimensions. The first dimension is the identification of the connection between 
the presence of facilitating factors and the occurrence of financial identity theft. 
This coincides with the primary aim of the situational crime prevention approach 
to analyze the situational conditions which facilite the commission of a specific 
crime. As shall became clear in the section below on limitations, it is difficult to 
factually determine how an incident of financial identity theft occurs. Even so, in 
abstract terms there is an awareness of how perpetrators of financial identity theft 
aim to accomplish the crime. This is precisely where the distinction between the 
first (the collection of personal information or instruments) and the second stage 
(the misuse of such information or instruments for financial gain) returns to serve 
as a guiding principle through the research of facilitating factors.  
The second dimension traces the causal process of how such facilitating 
factors came into existence in the first place. This historical analysis on the 
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background of facilitating factors is essential to place both the factors specifically 
and the opportunity structure generally in their proper context. The situational 
conditions which may facilitate financial identity theft also play other, often more 
positive, roles in contemporary society which must be borne in mind when 
reflecting upon the introduction of potential countermeasures.  
To carry out the method of process-tracing, this study primarily relies on 
publicly available documents, including both primary and secondary sources. In 
particular for the Netherlands, the study shall also rely on a select number of 
interviews to complement the available documentation. The interviews primarily 
serve an exploratory function to guide the research and gain background 
information about relevant developments.   
 
1.4  Limitations 
 
To avoid misguided expectations from the start, several limitations are in order. 
Due to the lack of empirical information, especially in the Netherlands, on cases 
of financial identity theft, much of the research remains in the hypothetical arena. 
To some extent, this limitation is a more general restriction on academic research 
conducted on the topic of financial identity theft since the establishment of a 
causal process is difficult to accomplish due to the diverse modus operandi 
incorporated by perpetrators of the crime.  
Besides the limitation introduced as a result of the lack of empirical 
information on actual incidents of financial identity theft, the rapid developments 
in the field also offer complications. Financial identity theft is very much a fluid 
topic. During the writing of this dissertation, several aspects changed which made 
certain conclusions obsolete or irrelevant. This research project was finalized on 
June 1, 2010 and as such only incorporated developments after this date in an ad-
hoc manner. 
Other limitations concern the air of secrecy surrounding the topic of financial 
identity theft, for especially the financial services industry remains hesitant to 
release information out of fear of reputation damage or the loss of consumer trust 
in the more advanced methods of payment. This complicates the development of 
a comprehensive story about the facilitation of financial identity theft in both the 
United States and the Netherlands. 
 
1.5  Roadmap for Readers 
 
This book commences its journey through a chapter on definitional dilemmas 
introduced as a result of the introduction of the concept of identity theft into 
contemporary society. This chapter sets the tone for the versatile and complicated 
nature of identity theft and therefore sets the stage for the remainder of the book. 
After the chapter on definitional dilemmas, each actor is individually analyzed 
based on its contribution to the opportunity structure of financial identity theft. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the connection between the state as protector of the people 
and financial identity theft. This chapter mainly reviews the countermeasures 
either in place or introduced to combat identity theft, and as such maintains a 
different character from the other chapters. Chapter 4 reviews the state as 
provider. As provider, the government establishes an identification infrastructure 
which both the public and the private sector use to identify citizens and clients 
alike. Chapter 5 turns to the industry of financial services and evaluates the role 
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played by financial service providers, consumer reporting agencies, and financial 
supervisory organs in the potential facilitation of financial identity theft. Chapter 6 
provides an overview of the role played by consumers as facilitators, but the 
chapter also reflects in a more critical manner on the ongoing debate about the 
ability and the responsibility of consumers to reduce the risk of financial identity 
theft. Chapter 7 observes the potential facilitation of other actors, including 
information brokers, payment processors, merchants, Internet Service Providers, 
and money mules. In conclusion, chapter 8 develops an overarching opportunity 
structure for financial identity theft based on the previous chapters and also 
reflects on existing countermeasures based on the opportunity reduction 





2  Definitional Dilemmas 
 
 
The introduction of identity theft into contemporary society caused considerable 
conceptual confusion. The mere terminology became the source of vivid 
discussions, especially since individuals with a legal background questioned the 
usage of the word ‘theft’ in association with identity. The main question from the 
legal front became: can someone steal an identity? Traditional definitions of theft 
in criminal law conflicted with the meaning of the term as used in the concept of 
identity theft. Certain sources labelled identity theft therefore a misnomer123 or 
refer to the concept as ‘awkward.’124 Some even demonstrate a complete disdain 
for the term.125 Others, on the other hand, embrace the concept and its 
accuracy.126 Clare Sullivan supports the usage of the concept of identity theft and 
states “[d]ishonest use of an individual’s token identity by another person is a 
denial of the individual’s right to the exclusive use of his/her transactional identity, 
and its use by another person fundamentally damages the integrity of the 
individual’s token identity.”127 The acceptance of identity theft as a concept 
requires a stretch of the term theft and also a more progressive approach to the 
idea of property, which is a considerable challenge due to traditional meanings in 
the legal arena.128 The availability of a popular alternative—identity fraud—
provides those opposed to the use of identity theft as a concept an opportunity to 
circumvent the problem.129 Even so, the problems associated with the usage of 
identity theft as a concept only proved to be the proverbial tip of the iceberg. The 
much larger challenge remains. This is the challenge of the problem definition. To 
address this challenge, this chapter shifts the discussion from the ‘legal’ to the
                                                
123 The Model Criminal Law Officers’ Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General 
(2008: 14) states in its Final Report Identity Crime, “[t]he phrase ‘identity theft’ is a misnomer, as identity 
theft does not actually deprive a person of their identity. The offence of theft or larceny traditionally 
involves an appropriation of the personal property of another with the intention to deprive him or her 
of that property permanently. Wrongfully accessing or using a person’s personal information or forging 
proof of identity documents, without taking any physical document or thing, would not deprive the 
person of the ability to use that information.”  
124 Koops, E. J. & R. E. Leenes (2006: 5) write how “‘[i]dentity theft’ is a rather awkward term, since 
identity is not something that is typically stolen. A characteristic of theft, after all, is that the owner no 
longer possesses the stolen thing. With identity, this is usually not the case: the victim of identity 
takeover still retains her identity. We should therefore speak of ‘identity “theft”’ rather than of ‘identity 
theft.’”  
125 James Van Dyke, President and Founder of Javelin Strategy & Research, published a blog entry on 
April 14, 2010 with the title “‘Identity theft’: the sooner this term goes away the faster we’ll make the 
problem do the same.” In the post, he states “I’ve long disdained the term ‘identity theft’, but because 
it’s stranglehold on the untapped power of higher understanding is supported by the highest laws of 
the land (the last two presidents have created ‘identity theft task forces’ and every federal, state and 
local law enforcement agency uses this same label) it won’t disappear anytime soon.” 
126 See for example Le Lievre, E. & R. Jamieson (2005: 7) who note how despite the difficulty with 
regard to criminal law aspects identity theft has more of a personal emotive impact than identity fraud 
because it presents the idea of identity ownership which is then stolen by another individual. 
127 Sullivan, C. (2009). Is Identity Theft Really Theft? International Review of Law, Computers, and Technology, 
Vol. 23: 85.  
128 This challenge maintains a more extensive history through the discussion of data as property. See 
Prins, J. E. J. (2006). ‘Property and Privacy: European Perspectives and the Commodification of Our 
Identity,’ in L. Guibault & P. B. Hugenholtz (eds.), The Future of the Public Domain, Kluwer Law 
International: 223 – 257.   
129 Identity theft and identity fraud are used both interchangeably by some and as separate concepts by 
others.   
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public policy arena in an effort to develop a more thorough understanding of the 
definitional dilemmas. This shift of arena provides for a more comprehensive 
approach to the issue of problem definitions since it surpasses the rigidity of legal 
debate.  
 
2.1 Problem Definition 
 
The importance of problem definitions in the development of public policy is 
evident through the attention devoted to the topic. Problem definitions play a 
prominent role in the shaping of political agendas and their substance therefore 
often become the focus of extensive debate.130 David A. Rochefort and Roger W. 
Cobb describe how “[a]s political discourse, the function of problem definition is 
at once to explain, to describe, to recommend, and, above all, to persuade.”131 
These different functions of problem definitions heighten the pressure on those 
involved to ensure their interests are reflected in the problem definition used 
during policy debates. Janet A. Weiss specifically emphasizes the aspect of 
persuasion of the problem definition when she writes, “...participants in the policy 
process seek to impose their preferred definitions on problems throughout the 
policy process. Much policymaking, in fact, is preoccupied with whose definitions 
shall prevail.”132 To successfully persuade others to accept a definition also grants 
the persuader the power to play a prominent role in the determination of the 
subsequent course of action with regard to the problem. This is because 
“[p]roblem definition is a process of image making, where the images have to do 
fundamentally with attributing cause, blame, and responsibility.”133 The causes 
reflected by the definition assist in the distribution of blame and responsibility. 
Rochefort and Cobb therefore consider culpability the most prominent aspect of 
problem definitions.134 Even so, Rochefort and Cobb do acknowledge how 
“...problem definition is about much more than just finding someone or 
something to blame. Further disputes can surround a situation’s perceived social 
significance, meaning, implications, and urgency. By dramatizing or downplaying 
the problem and by declaring what is at stake, these descriptions help to push an 
issue onto the frontburner of policymaking or result in officials’ stubborn inaction 
and neglect.”135 This theoretical background assists in the development of an 
understanding of the discussions about the problem definition with respect to 
identity theft. Moreover, such an understanding also places the responses to the 
problem in perspective.  
 
2.2 The Search for a Definition  
 
The preoccupation with a definition of identity theft ‘officially’ began in 1998 
when the Government Accountability Office (GAO) of the United States 
                                                
130 Rochefort, D. A. & R. W. Cobb (1994). ‘Problem Definition: An Emerging Perspective,’ in D. A. 
Rochefort & R. W. Cobb (eds.) The Politics of Problem Definition: Shaping the Policy Agenda. University Press 
of Kansas.  
131 Ibid: 15. 
132 Weiss, J. A. (1989). The powers of problem definition: The case of government paperwork. Policy 
Sciences, Vol. 22: 98. 
133 Stone, D. A. (1989). Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas. Political Science Quarterly, 
Vol. 104 (2): 282.  
134 Rochefort & Cobb (1994): 15. 
135 Ibid: 3. 
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identified the lack of a standard definition of the problem on several occasions.136 
The GAO literally states how “[t]here is no one universally accepted definition of 
identity fraud.”137 This conclusion appears based in part on testimonials provided 
by officials from the law enforcement community138 as well as the credit card 
industry.139 Michael D. White and Christopher Fisher identify the inconsistency in 
defining the problem as the primary challenge in the fight against identity theft.140 
Despite the introduction of a legal definition of identity theft, through the Identity 
Theft Assumption and Deterrence Act of 1998,141 the United States Department 
of Treasury highlighted the definition problem in 2005 and wrote, “[t]he lack of a 
standard definition makes it difficult to collect comprehensive, accurate data for 
quantifying the costs and incidents of identity theft.”142 The Department cites 
various examples, mainly from the financial services sector which demonstrate the 
discrepancy among definitions used in the United States. Identity theft, according 
to the Department, is a definition in progress for certain sources in the financial 
services sector.143  
Along similar lines, the Fraud Prevention Expert Group (FPEG) of the 
European Commission writes, “[t]he first difficulty is to define the scope of the 
problem as there is no clear common definition of what should be understood by 
identity theft or identity fraud.”144 Such a “...common definition of what the 
problem is appears desirable: talking of the same thing facilitates preventing and 
combating it.”145 Despite the importance granted to the issue, the FPEG notes 
how “[f]or the purposes of this paper, however, no attempt to find a common 
definition will be undertaken. The problem will be referred to as ‘identity 
theft/fraud.’”146            
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also 
states how there is a lack of a common definition among OECD countries which 
“...may complicate efforts to combat the problem in a comprehensive, cross-
border fashion.”147 Further along, the OECD once again notes the lack of a 
common definition and its potential to “…stymie efforts to address the 
problem.”148 The Australasian Centre for Policing Research (ACPR) describes the 
need to establish “...some form of consensus in relation to definitions of identity 
                                                
136 General Accounting Office (GAO) (1998). Identity Fraud. Information on Prevalence, Cost, and Internet 
Impact is Limited. Briefing Report to Congressional Requesters.  
137 Ibid: 11.  
138 The GAO (1998: 20) states how, “[i]dentity fraud is difficult to track. Generally, the law 
 enforcement officials we contacted told us that their respective agencies historically have not tracked 
identity fraud for various reasons. One reason is the lack of a standardized definition of identity fraud.” 
139 The GAO (1998: 43) states how, “[a]ccording to an official we contacted at VISA U.S.A., Inc., 
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140 White, M. D. & C. Fisher (2008). Assessing Our Knowledge of Identity Theft: The Challenges to 
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crime terms, at least within Australasian law enforcement and revenue protection 
agencies, to assist with:  
 
ü policy development; 
ü Research; 
ü Training; 
ü Marketing and community education; 
ü Victim assistance measures; 
ü The treatment and measurement of this phenomenon; and 
ü The eventual development of comparable national statistics.”149  
 
The Ministry of Justice in the Netherlands also underscored the need for a 
demarcation of the concept of identity theft. This decision came as a result of the 
written commitment made by the Minister of Justice in 2004 to develop a policy 
framework in response to identity theft after the Royal Constabulary published a 
study on identity theft and travel documents.150 Part of the development of such a 
policy framework was a workable demarcation of the problem of identity theft. 
This led to a study in 2007, which aimed to provide the government with a 
definition of the problem and an analysis of the applicability of existing 
instruments of criminal law.151 
 Through a comprehensive overview of the available literature and the various 
perspectives, the researchers needed to determine whether identity theft required a 
separate legal provision. Bald de Vries et al. provide an overview of definitions set 
forth in the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
Belgium, and the European Union. The exclusion of Australia is remarkable due 
to the availability of and the effort made by certain actors to create a more 
consistent approach toward a definition of identity theft, as noted above. Even so, 
the report produced by de Vries et al. is substantial152 and provides a thorough 
dissection of all the definitions discussed. In their report, de Vries et al. propose 
the following definition of identity fraud. According to the researchers, “[i]dentity 
fraud is obtaining, taking, possessing or creating false means of identification 
intentionally (and) (unlawfully or without permission) and to commit with them 
unlawful behavior or: to have the intention to commit unlawful behavior.”153 
Important to note is how the usage of false means of identification in the 
definition refers to means of identification “…when they do not truthfully identify 
the person who uses it.”154 The value of the study is difficult to determine for the 
definition set forth by the authors fails to surface in discussions on the topic.155 
On a different dimension, the Ministry of Justice used the results to strengthen its 
decision not to criminalize identity theft for the foreseeable future (see section 
                                                
149 Australasian Center for Policing Research (ACPR) (2006): 13.  
150 Koninklijke Marechaussee (2003). Rapport identiteitsfraude en (reis)documenten. 
151 De Vries, U. R. M. Th., Tigchelaar, H., van der Linden, M. & A. M. Hol (2007). Identiteitsfraude: Een 
afbakening. Een internationale begripsvergelijking en analyse van nationale strafbepalingen. Wetenschappelijk 
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152 270 pages.  
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154 Ibid.  
155 Representatives from the consumer complaint center and the expert center for identity theft 
described how they used the definition as a (rough) guideline. Otherwise, the definition seems to not 
have been embraced in the policy debate in the Netherlands.  
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3.1.2). The definition also became the object of criticism, albeit limited.156 There is 
merit to such criticism for the outcome of the study fails to surpass previous 
attempts and as such makes little to no contribution to the discussion.  
Other academic attempts do manage to successfully accomplish such progress. 
Bert-Jaap Koops & Ronald E. Leenes defined identity theft as “…fraud or 
another unlawful activity where the identity of an existing person is used as a 
target or principal tool without that person’s consent.”157 There is a simplicity to 
the definition which is absent in the definition provided by de Vries et al. This 
simplicity embodies the craving for a broad range of the concept. As John Gerring 
notes, “[a] concept that applies broadly is more useful than a concept with only a 
narrow range of application. A good concept stretches comfortably over many 
contexts; a poor concept, by contrast, is parochial – limited to a small linguistic 
turf.”158 Other academic contributions to the discussion on definitions are more 
specific for these contributions focus on the highly contested definition of 
financial identity theft (see section 2.3).  
From the above, it becomes obvious how a general consensus exists about the 
lack of a standard definition of identity theft. This is partly a result of the versatile 
nature of identity theft. The connection between identity theft and other crimes 
demonstrates this versatility and supports the complexity of the problem. 
Individuals misuse identities, whether real or fabricated, in an effort to carry out 
acts of terrorism, illegal immigration, human trafficking, and money laundering. 
The connection between identity theft and these other categories of crime 
challenges the establishment of policy ownership. As Joseph R. Gusfield notes, 
“[o]wnership constitutes one piece of the structure of public problems. It indicates 
the power to define and describe the problem.”159 This power is not clearly 
delineated with respect to identity theft due to the lack of explicit policy 
ownership.  
Another part of the complexity is the ‘novel’ character of the problem. 
Whereas disagreements exist about the novel character of the phenomenon, many 
contend the incorporation of digital technology certainly provided the 
phenomenon with innovative aspects which make the overall problem display a 
sense of novelty. Rochefort and Cobb identify the aspect of novelty in relation to 
problem definitions and describe how “...issues that have not been seen before are 
difficult to conceptualize and they lack familiar solutions. Thus a tension arises as 
the issue is publicized and onlookers expect resolution, yet no consensus exists 
within the political system on how to tackle the problem.”160 This observation 
made by Rochefort and Cobb is particularly important in light of the continued 
emphasis on the lack of a standard definition.  
                                                
156 In an epilogue to his Master thesis, Peter van Schijndel reflects on the research conducted and the 
conclusions offered by de Vries et al. Van Schijndel recognizes the comprehensive character of the 
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acceptance and subsequent implementation of the definition by the Ministry of Justice dangerous. The 
definition set forth by de Vries et al. is, according to van Schijndel, a poor imitation or a bad copy of 
the definition presented by the Identity Theft Assumption and Deterrence Act of 1998 in the United 
States. 
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When the GAO identified the lack of a standard definition in 1998, this 
seemed logical due to the ‘novelty’ of the problem. More than ten years later, the 
preoccupation with the lack of a standard definition might demonstrate a lack of 
consensus about the approach to the problem rather than the problem itself. Julia 
S. Cheney remarks how “[a]fter much discussion, Lois Greisman, of the FTC, 
suggested that perhaps the definitional debate is not the real roadblock, and in 
fact, such debate may be primarily about semantics.”161 The ‘real roadblock’ 
concerns the approach to the problem, which might be the underlying reason 
reflected in the statements made about the lack of a standard definition. This 
observation also receives support from the discrepancy between the reiteration of 
the absence of a definition despite considerable efforts made by the academic 
community to clarify the meaning of the concept and its related terminology.162  
  
2.3 Financial Identity Theft 
 
Since the focus of this research is on financial identity theft, this section shall 
concentrate on the problem definition issues specifically related to financial 
identity theft. Unlike the previous sections, which demonstrate how many sources 
emphasize the absence of a definition or a general consensus about the meaning 
of the concept, the definitional challenges of financial identity theft are more 
concrete. These challenges mainly originate from the distinct interest of the 
relevant parties, including governments, especially the law enforcement 
community, financial service providers, and in more limited capacity interest 
groups. The problem definition of financial identity theft is of vital importance for 
financial service providers, especially since the definition provides a reflection of 
causation and responsibility. The starting point for the United States is the legal 
definition established through ITADA, which states that identity theft occurs 
when someone “…knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, a means 
of identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, 
any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes 
a felony under any applicable State or local law.”163 This definition takes a 
comprehensive approach to identity theft in general and therefore includes various 
types of fraud.164  
Such a broad definition became an object of resistance for the financial 
services industry after the passage of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions 
Act in 2003, when the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) received the opportunity 
to establish, among other things, identity theft definitions.165 Whereas ITADA 
established a criminal definition of identity theft in 1998, the FTC needed to 
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establish civil definitions of identity theft as a result of FACTA in 2003. The 
definition set forth by the FTC embraced the previously identified broad 
character. As such the FTC defined identity theft in its final rule as “…a fraud 
committed or attempted using the identifying information of another person 
without authority.”166 The definition set forth by the FTC is the result of the 
Commission’s intent to cover “…all bona fide victims and conduct...”167  
The financial services industry offered its disapproval through its comments 
on the proposed rule and the definition therein. The disapproval concerned the 
broad character of the definition and especially the inclusion of attempted fraud. 
Wells Fargo & Company expressed its dissatisfaction with the definition and 
wrote, “[w]e are concerned that defining ‘identity theft’ to include ‘attempted’ 
fraud would greatly expand the scope of conduct that entities must take steps to 
prevent and would significantly increase the number of consumers authorized to 
take advantage of the rights that the FCRA confers upon identity theft victims.”168 
Furthermore, by “[e]xpanding the definition of identity theft beyond the 
traditional notion of an individual opening an account or obtaining a loan in 
another person’s name would divert significant resources away from actual identity 
theft and its victims in order to assist those who have avoided any meaningful 
harm of identity theft.”169 Here the issue is mainly the inclusion of account 
takeover as part of the definition which also concerns others who claim how the 
broad definition leads to a dilution of the industry’s efforts because such a 
definition provides victims of account takeover with the same benefits and priority 
as victims of true identity theft.170 Such a dilution of efforts is unbeneficial to 
victims of ‘true’ identity theft since they fail to receive a higher priority in 
comparison to victims of ‘less debilitating crimes’ such as account takeover. This 
assertion of account takeover as a less debilitating crime is (highly) subjective since 
such a crime can still contain the necessary consequences for the victim, especially 
if such a takeover concerns a checking or savings account which may leave the 
individual (temporarily) without any funds.  
Overall, Julia S. Cheney summarizes the position of the financial services 
industry when she writes, “[t]o optimize strategies to combat identity theft, the 
industry wants more nuanced definitions as determined by the specific form of 
fraud and by the process used to identify and respond to its losses and its 
customers.”171 The ‘nuanced’, or better yet restricted or limited, definitions 
therefore serve as tools for strategy optimization. This could be because more 
restrictive definitions limit their applicability to particular products within the 
sector of financial services. As Rodger Jamieson et al. note, “[p]rivate organisations 
interviewed saw identity fraud, identity theft and identity deception acts in much 
narrower focused terms than government agencies.”172  
The specificity of the form of fraud is also important in the Netherlands, 
where the Dutch Banking Association described how banks categorize fraud 
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according to the specific type of ‘product’ involved.173 Banks in the Netherlands 
therefore often speak of skimming174 and Internet banking fraud, which clearly 
indicate which product perpetrators misused to obtain the victim’s financial assets. 
This categorization occurs because different products reveal diverse vulnerabilities. 
Moreover, identity theft or the misuse of identities or identifying information is a 
common thread through most, if not all, types of fraud which take place in the 
banking industry.175 The Dutch Central Bank therefore refers to the concept of 
identity theft as a containerbegrip or umbrella term.176 
Still, the controversy witnessed about the term in the United States appears 
largely absent in the Netherlands with respect to the financial services sector. The 
National Forum on the Payment Systems reflects on the substance of identity 
theft and dissects the problem according to the stages identified in section 1.2. 
The Forum states how identity theft can be divided into two actions which include 
the acquisition and collection of information and the subsequent misuse of such 
information.177 Whether the Forum also incorporates account takeover as part of 
this definition remains unclear, especially since the Forum, along with its 
participants, exclusively refer to specific types of or rather methods used to 
accomplish account takeover, such as skimming and phishing.178   
Whereas the providers of financial services primarily frame their preference or 
need for more restricted and specific definitions in light of strategy optimization, 
others focus on ulterior motives held by the industry. As sergeant Ed Dadisho 
indicates, many financial service providers object to the usage of a broad definition 
by the FTC in particular and the government in general because such a definition 
“…trigger certain duties for the financial institutions, thereby allocating additional 
resources and system changes to respond to new identity theft complaints by 
consumers. This is purely a financial concern that would not merit any reason to 
change how law enforcement agencies report and investigate identity theft 
crimes.”179  
Moreover, the application of a broad definition carries the potential for 
unintended consequences, such as the development of unwarranted fears among 
consumers about the use of electronic payments and commerce.180 Such 
unwarranted fears may occur as a result of the publication of statistical data on the 
problem. Fragmentation, or the publication of data based on specific banking 
products, circumvents this problem since such data makes the problem appear less 
dramatic. The Netherlands provides statistics specifically on skimming and on 
internet banking fraud. This exemplifies the fragmented approach.  
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In the United States, the publication of prevalence data by the FTC heightened 
the industry’s concerns. Certain sources, including the American Bankers 
Association Senior Federal Counsel Nessa Feddis, claimed the figures associated 
with identity theft exaggerated the problem since all kinds of fraud were 
‘redefined’ as identity theft.181 The inclusion of all forms of unauthorized credit 
card use by the FTC also received criticism from Avivah Litan, a research director 
at Gartner, Inc. Litan describes how “[n]obody ever did it that way before.”182  
This is rather peculiar given that the GAO published a study in 2002 and reported 
how “[t]he two major payment card associations, MasterCard and Visa, use very 
similar (although not identical) definitions regarding which categories of fraud 
constitute identity theft. Generally, the associations consider identity theft to 
consist of two fraud categories—account takeovers and fraudulent 
applications.”183 This appears to be contradictory since the conventional meaning 
of account takeover concerns the unauthorized use of existing credit cards. The 
explanation is concealed in a footnote where the GAO states, “[o]ther fraud 
categories that the associations do not consider to be identity theft-related include, 
for example, lost and stolen cards, never-received cards, counterfeit cards, and 
mail order/telephone order fraud.”184 The exclusion of all of these types of fraud 
leads to confusion about the payment association’s definition of account takeover 
since many of the fraud categories mentioned in the footnote certainly fall under 
the account takeover umbrella. The inclusion of account takeover is a form of 
‘definition creep’ which may lead to ‘public confusion.’ Rosie Lombardi claims 
how identity theft “...is now being used to sex up crimes reported in the media 
that were considered plain ordinary fraud in the past.”185 This is problematic for 
the industry since the more encompassing the definition of identity theft becomes 
the more prevalent the problem appears to be. As Stacey L. Schreft notes, lumping 
new account fraud together with existing account fraud makes identity theft 
appear more prevalent, which might raise more alarm among the public than 
financial service providers find necessary. Schreft furthermore writes, “[t]he latter 
argument, along with a desire of financial institutions to minimize the perceived 
prevalence and seriousness of the crime, is likely driving the objections to the 
ITADA’s definition...”186  
Whereas the financial services industry actively lobbies for a limited definition 
of financial identity theft, the government, especially law enforcement, continues 
to embrace a broad definition. Interest groups also express a preference for the 
usage of a broad definition. These interest groups represent the plight of victims 
of identity theft which enhances their preference for a broad definition in an effort 
to assist all victims rather than a selected group. The Identity Theft Resource 
Center (ITRC) in particular aims to capture the experiences of all types of victims 
of identity theft, including financial and criminal. For the victims of financial 
identity theft, the ITRC includes both victims of account takeover and true name 
                                                
181 O’Sullivan, O. (2004). ID Theft Overstated? Some Think So. ABA Banking Journal, Vol. 96: 8 – 9. 
182 Ibid: 8.  
183 General Accounting Office (2002). Identity Theft: Prevalence and Cost Appear to be Growing. Report to 
Congressional Requesters, GAO-02-363: 6.  
184 Ibid. 
185 Lombardi, R. (2006). Myths about identity theft debunked by experts. Available at:  
http://www.itworldcanada.com/news/myths-about-identity-theft-debunked-by-experts/98501 (last 
accessed July 4, 2010).    
186 Schreft, S. L. (2007). Risks of Identity Theft: Can the Market Protect the Payment System? Economic 
Review, Fourth Quarter: 7 – 8.  
32 FERTILE GROUNDS 
 
 
fraud. The ITRC demonstrates its inclusion of both forms of financial identity 
theft, when the interest group writes “[d]ue to the constant availability and 
exposure of financial account information and Social Security Numbers, it is 
relatively easy for an identity thief to either open new lines of credit or 
use/takeover existing accounts.”187 Along similar lines, the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center describes the many different types of identity theft on its 
website. For financial identity theft, the Electronic Privacy Information Center 
(EPIC) refers to credit card fraud as well as new account fraud.188 The Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse also captures both account takeover and application fraud as 
types of financial identity theft.189 All three of the interest groups involved in 
consumer and victim advocacy demonstrate an all-encompassing approach to the 
problem of financial identity theft. This appears to be a logical result of their focus 
on consumers and victims of identity theft.  
From the academic arena more fruitful efforts aim to develop an approach 
which provides both the specificity of the different aspects often grouped together 
as financial identity theft, but also maintains the umbrella perspective. Megan M. 
McNally provides a continuum of victimization which demonstrates the degrees 
of financial identity theft and the potential severity for its victims.190 The 
continuum increases in terms of severity from left, existing accounts, to right, new 
activities. McNally places account takeover in the middle of her continuum. The 
left side of the continuum concerns fraudulent transactions on existing accounts 
which has as its worst case scenario account takeover. The right side of the 
continuum on the other hand reflects on the more serious form of financial 
identity theft, true name fraud. This continuum demonstrates how the definition 




The treatment of the problem definition of identity theft in general and financial 
identity theft in particular sets the stage for its future in the realm of public policy. 
For many years, the main message has been that there is an absence of a standard 
or universally accepted definition of identity theft. This message is important, for 
its truth value is rarely questioned. Nor is the message about the need for such a 
standard definition ever challenged. As such, the definition of identity theft 
remains an object of preoccupation, despite the availability of academic literature 
which attempts to unravel its complexity. Even so, through maintaining the 
message of a lack of a standard definition, those involved managed to steer away 
from difficult choices. These choices must occur when they select a definition 
which inevitably identifies causes and distributes blame and responsibility. Not 
everyone in the arena is oblivious to this. In the minutes of the second meeting of 
the core group of experts on identity-related crime, the rapporteur notes how in 
relation to the discussion on definition, prevalence, and related matters “…Ozaki 
compared some of these issues to a ‘chicken and egg’ problem. Without 
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legislation, there is no definitional basis for data gathering and an analysis and 
without data there was often no basis or perceived need for policy development 
and legislation.”191 As such, the reasoning remains circular and the absence of a 
definition functions as a vehicle to professionalize the art of procrastination. 
Interesting to note is how the minutes furthermore reflect on how Ozaki noted 
that the lack of a definition “…was not necessarily an insurmountable obstacle, 
however. There is no global definition of terrorism, but a reliable typology has 
been developed of some of the more problematic types, and international legal 
instruments, statistical analysis and technical assistance work had all been 
successfully carried out based on that typology.”192 This can be done for identity 
theft as well.193 
 Another reason to refute the preoccupation with the need for a standard 
definition of identity theft in an effort to respond to the problem is the (near) 
tradition of the existence of multiple definitions in the policy arena. Weiss notes, 
“[a]s policymakers struggle through the process of authoritative decision making, 
they typically face not only multiple options for addressing a given problem, but 
multiple definitions each implying its own family of solutions.”194 These multiple 
definitions, according to Weiss, “…may survive to haunt the implementation 
process...”195 Therefore, while standard definitions may serve to optimize 
strategies they are not required to take action, unless such absence is a convenient 
justification to disguise the absence of ideas about how or a willingness or capacity 
to tackle the problem. Edgar A. Whitley and Ian R. Hosein write, “[g]iven this 
complexity in even identifying identity fraud, it is not immediately obvious which 
branch of government should be responsible for implementing measures for 
combating the problem.”196 And as such, the emphasis placed on the absence of a 
definition by stakeholders manages to postpone culpability and responsibility.  
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3  State as Protector 
 
 
At its most fundamental level, the idea of the state as protector of the people can 
be traced back to Cicero’s salus populi suprema lex esto, which translates into ‘let the 
good of the people be the supreme law’ or ‘the welfare of the people shall be the 
supreme law.’197 John Locke, in the Second Treatise on Government, cites Cicero’s 
statement when he writes “Salus populi suprema lex is certainly so just and 
fundamental a rule, that he, who sincerely follows it, cannot dangerously err.”198 
The role of protector, therefore, is often considered to be the fundamental 
function of government. Such protection can come about through various means. 
The diversity of means is in part a reflection of the variety of threats which people 
face in contemporary society. Simultaneously, such diversity is also a manifestation 
of the multi-faceted nature of the state, even in its function as protector of the 
people. For financial identity theft, this diversity is apparent, especially since 
identity theft is a versatile problem which implicates many different segments of 
the state. Throughout the literature on identity theft, nevertheless, certain aspects 
consistently return. Several sources discuss the legislative developments in the 
criminal law arena,199 whereas others place an emphasis on data protection 
mechanisms in connection with identity theft.200 Both of these elements of the 
state’s effort to protect its people shall therefore receive extensive attention in this 
chapter. Furthermore, other sources also review the activities of the state as 
protector through its regulatory initiatives and supervisory organs with regard to 
business practices in connection to identity theft.201 These shall receive 
considerable attention in chapter 5, where the financial services industry is 
discussed. The last part of this chapter focuses on diverse organizational features 
introduced to respond to aspects of identity theft, including its victims.   
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3.1 Criminal Legislation 
 
3.1.1  United States 
 
When financial identity theft first surfaced in its current form in the United States, 
which was during the mid-nineties, many victim complaints fell on deaf ears with 
law enforcement officials. The law enforcement community did not recognize 
these individuals as crime victims, due to the lack of a specific legal provision 
which criminalized identity theft in general and financial identity theft in particular. 
Criminals proved to be acutely aware of this legal loophole. Robert Hartle, a 
victim of identity theft, testified before the United States Senate and described 
how “[i]t wasn’t enough that this criminal stole my identity, but he actually called 
me on the phone and told me that there was not a law enforcement agency in the 
United States, not a police officer, not an FBI agent, nobody, not a judge, that 
would consider this crime as a crime against me.”202 Through his experiences, 
Hartle decided to use his situation to attract political attention to the fate of 
identity theft victims. He authored the Arizona State Law203 which officially 
criminalized identity theft in the State of Arizona.204 After drafting the bill, Hartle 
approached Arizona State Senator Tom Smith, who provided the necessary 
political assistance to get the bill passed and signed by the governor in 1996.205 As 
a result, Arizona became the first State to pass such a provision and was later on 
followed by California206, before other States joined the ‘movement.’  
 After the successful action at the State level, Hartle continued his mission to 
criminalize identity theft at the Federal level and contacted Jon Kyl, a United 
States House of Representatives member from Arizona. Kyl, along with 
Congressman John Shadegg, worked endlessly, according to Hartle, to get the bill 
passed in Congress.207 The introduction of the Identity Theft and Assumption 
Deterrence Act (ITADA) in 1998 became the ultimate reward for their hard work. 
ITADA states that an individual commits identity theft when he or she: 
  
“knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, a means of 
identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or 
abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or 
that constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local law.”208  
 
During the congressional hearing on the bill, Kyl proclaimed how “[w]hile the 
results of identity theft can be very costly for its victims, the law recognizes neither 
the victim nor the crime.”209 This remained the main argument in favor of a legal 
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provision to officially criminalize identity theft. The introduction of ITADA 
successfully led to an increase in recognition for identity theft victims from the law 
enforcement community.210 Kurt M. Saunders & Bruce Zucker call the previous 
lack of criminalization of identity theft surprising, especially since “[u]nder federal 
law, anyone who obtains, uses, or transfers false identification for the purpose of 
committing a fraudulent act without the consent of the holder of the identification 
commits a felony.”211 Yet, up until ITADA no federal statute criminalized the 
assumption of another person’s identity without the involvement of false 
identification documents.  
 In addition to victim recognition, the law is also an attempt to align the legal 
landscape in the United States with society’s advances. In contemporary society, 
false documentation is no longer a necessary condition to commit any type of 
identity theft, let alone financial identity theft. Instead, identification information 
alone became a convenient tool used by perpetrators to commit identity theft. Yet, 
such identification information did not receive protection under original criminal 
law. As Kyl stated, “[m]y bill recognizes technological advances by extending 
protection to identification information.”212 
 Furthermore, the government also introduced the law to serve as a means of 
deterrence for future acts of identity theft. Perpetrators appeared rather well aware 
of the legal ambiguity of their actions. The phone call received by Hartle provides 
an exemplary indication of how his perpetrator knew about the lack of legal 
repercussions. The introduction of a separate criminal offense, as a result, also 
aimed to increase the risks for perpetrators engaged in identity theft. Deterrence, 
as an argument in defense of criminalization, however, remains a contested topic. 
As Miriam H. Baer notes, “[l]awmakers routinely invoke ‘deterrence’ as a reason 
for expanding criminal law, increasing penalties, or promising greater enforcement 
of white collar crimes. Scholars, however, have either downplayed or completely 
dismissed the value of deterrence theory for predicting, much less controlling, 
criminal conduct.”213 More specifically with regard to identity theft, Heith Copes 
and Lynne Vieraitis conducted interviews with incarcerated identity thieves in 
which they inquired about risk perception of the prisoners’ actions.214 Copes and 
Vieraitis conclude that most of the interviewed identity thieves devoted little 
thought to the possibility of getting caught. Those who did take such possibility 
into consideration deemed the actual risk low and the expected punishment to be 
minimal at most.215 Certain interviewees indicated how the classification of 
identity theft as a white collar crime meant the risk of detection remains low and 
the potential punishment far from severe, at most a slap on the wrist.216 As a 
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result, ITADA can be seen as more functional with regard to the victims than as a 
means of deterrence with respect to the perpetrators.217    
 Hartle’s case along with the political assistance of both State and Federal 
representatives developed a policy window for political action. With Tom Smith at 
the State level and Jon Kyl at the Federal level as policy entrepreneurs, identity 
theft became an important topic on Washington’s political agenda. John W. 
Kingdon speaks extensively about the role of policy entrepreneurs in Agendas, 
Alternatives, and Public Policies. In reference to Capitol Hill, he writes “[o]ne goal of a 
senator or representative is satisfying constituents. Publicity is essential, and one 
way to get publicity is to push for new policy initiatives.”218 Whereas policy 
entrepreneurs played a vital role in the introduction of ITADA, subsequent 
legislation benefited from the development of a different policy window.   
Through the increased political momentum of the events of September 11, 
2001, the United States Congress decided to introduce and subsequently pass 
additional legislation. In 2004, Congress passed the Identity Theft Penalty 
Enhancement Act (ITPEA), which outlines the issue of aggravated identity theft. 
ITPEA states that “[w]hoever, during and in relation to any felony violation 
enumerated in subsection (c), knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without 
lawful authority, a means of identification of another person shall, in addition to 
the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
of 2 years.”219 And that, “[w]hoever, during and in relation to any felony violation 
enumerated in section 2332b(g)(5)(B), knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, 
without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person or a false 
identification document shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such 
felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 5 years.”220 The House of 
Representatives report describes how “[a]s international cooperation increases to 
combat terrorism, al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations increasingly turn to 
stolen identities to hide themselves from law enforcement.”221  
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In addition to the fight against terrorism, the lack of deterrence capacity with 
respect to identity theft also became an incentive for the development of 
additional legislation. Under existing law, many perpetrators received either little 
or no prison time as a result of their actions. According to the report, such a lack 
of punishment became a tacit encouragement to those arrested to carry on such 
crimes.222 The above discussion on the conclusions of Copes and Vieraitis on 
deterrence with respect to perpetrators of identity theft validates this concern. To 
strengthen its claim, the Report also cites various cases in which perpetrators 
received little or no prison time.223 The Department of Justice, along with other 
government agencies, voiced strong support in favor of the Act. Yet, dissenters 
argued against the introduction of mandatory minimum sentences. During a 
Committee hearing, Scott states “[m]andatory minimum sentences not only defeat 
the rational sentencing system that Congress adopted, but make no sense in our 
separation of powers scheme of governance. Moreover, the notion that mandating 
a 2- or 5-year sentence to someone who is willing to risk a 15-year sentence 
already is not likely to add any deterrence.”224  
Whereas ITPEA in concept received considerable criticism, its application also 
became an object of controversy. The contentious nature of the Act and its 
application became the topic of a Supreme Court case in 2009. The case concerns 
the unlawful use of social security and alien registration numbers, which, 
unbeknownst to petitioner Flores-Figueroa, belonged to another individual. In 
2000, Ignacio Flores-Figueroa, an illegal immigrant from Mexico, used, without 
lawful authority, a false social security and alien registration number to secure 
employment.225 Flores-Figueroa also used a fabricated date of birth and provided 
his employer with a false alien registration card. Neither the social security nor the 
alien registration number belonged to a real individual. Several years later, in 2006, 
Flores-Figueroa wanted to use his real name and issued a different social security 
and alien registration number to his new employer. Flores-Figueroa provided alien 
registration and social security cards with his real name, but numbers which turned 
out to belong to actual individuals.226 The employer handed the information over 
to the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement office (ICE). ICE 
subsequently discovered that the numbers and the documents issued by Flores-
Figueroa belonged to others. The discovery led the United States to charge Flores-
Figueroa with two predicate crimes, namely, entering the United States without 
inspection, 8 U.S.C. §1325(a), and misusing immigration documents, 18 U.S.C. 
§1546(a).  
Furthermore, the United States charged him with aggravated identity theft 
through ITPEA.227 Flores-Figueroa requested a judgment of acquittal on the last 
charge, aggravated identity theft. In his motion, Flores-Figueroa claimed the 
government could not provide any evidence to demonstrate that he knew the 
numbers issued belong to real individuals. The government, in return, denied the 
need to prove such knowledge. The District Court, after a bench trial, accepted 
the argument set forth by the government to consequently convict Flores-
Figueroa on the aggravated identity theft charge. Flores-Figueroa appealed, but the 
                                                
222 Ibid: 5.  
223 Ibid.  
224 Ibid: 27. 
225 United States v. Flores-Figueroa (U.S. Supreme Court No. 08-108, 2009).  
226 How the defendant obtained these numbers is not mentioned.  
227 18 U.S.C. §1028A(a)(1)) 
40     FERTILE GROUNDS      
 
 
Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the District Court.228 The Supreme Court 
accepted the case due to the difference of opinions held among various courts in 
the past on this specific matter. Three court decisions229 upheld the knowledge 
requirement, whereas three others230 decided that the knowledge requirement in 
the Act did not apply to the element ‘of another person.’  
The Supreme Court unanimously voted in favor of the petitioner. In the 
Court’s opinion, Justice Breyer writes “[t]here are strong textual reasons for 
rejecting the Government’s position. As a matter of ordinary English grammar, it 
seems natural to read the statute’s word ‘knowingly’ as applying to all the 
subsequently listed elements of the crime.”231 The government’s main argument 
had been that the word ‘knowingly’ only applied to the verbs in the Statute and 
remained indifferent to the subject’s knowledge of the object. Basically, the 
government claimed ‘knowingly’ applied to all but the last three words ‘of another 
person.’ From a grammatical point of view, the Court denied its claim. The Court 
therefore concluded the government needs to prove knowledge on the part of the 
petitioner. This was a requirement which the government failed to fulfil.  
The government refers to another provision, section 2332b(g)(5)(B), within the 
Statute which specifically addresses perpetrators charged with terrorism as the 
predicate crime and goes beyond stating ‘a means of identification of another 
person’ and also lists ‘or a false identification document.’ Under this provision, 
Flores-Figueroa would have no claim. But 2332b(g)(5)(B) is not applicable, and 18 
U.S.C. §1546(a) does not state anything about false documents. The text is clear 
for the Court; yet, Breyer takes a peek at the legislative history to go beyond the 
language in the Act. At least in one statement in the Report associated with the 
Act, identity theft and identity fraud are used interchangeably. Due to this 
interchangeable use of both terms, Breyer writes “[a]nd, in equating fraud and 
theft, Congress might have meant the statute to cover both—at least where the 
fraud takes the form of using an ID that (without the offender’s knowledge) 
belongs to someone else.”232 This notion, however, is subsequently dismissed 
when Breyer notes how Congress clearly distinguishes ‘the fraud crime’ in 18 
U.S.C. §1028 from ‘the theft crime’ in 18 U.S.C. §1028a. Accordingly, the 
knowledge requirement stands. This discussion of semantics which is inherent to 
the problem of identity theft (see chapter 2) overshadows the underlying issue of 
its victimization.  
The Statute and its subsequent interpretation in judicial circles also influence 
other policy areas. Matthew T. Hovey claims how the pervasive issue surrounding 
the judiciary’s decision on how the interpret ITPEA provides the United States 
Congress with a viable opportunity to implement immigration reforms.233 
Furthermore, Hovey claims how reading the Act in a way which requires the 
government to prove the defendant’s knowledge of the authenticity of the 
numbers used for identification purposes renders ITPEA “...impotent in dealing 
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with the common situation of an illegal immigrant utilizing a random identification 
number or card that actually belongs to a real person.”234 While Hovey emphasizes 
the impact of identity theft on its victims, and therefore draws attention to a 
crucial aspect of the crime, he merely uses this element of the problem to further 
an argument against illegal immigration and the inability of Congress, according to 
him, to adequately respond to that problem. This virtually hijacks the core of 
identity theft and shifts the policy debate toward another issue. Such hijacking 
activities are rather typical for identity theft especially in its relation to other public 
policy issues, as becomes evident throughout the rest of the book.  
Janice Kephart also criticizes the decision and proposes statutory language 
fixes in an effort to reverse the political implications of the Supreme Court 
decision. According to Kephart, the decision crippled the longstanding practice of 
prosecutors due to the requirement of proving the defendant knew the 
identification information belonged to another person. Kephart aims to 
demonstrate how the decision of the Supreme Court goes against congressional 
intent. While Kephart recognizes how “...nowhere in the House report is the issue 
addressed of whether a defendant has to ‘know’ his victim is a real person or not”, 
she nevertheless claims “...it is clear that the House intended to widen the breadth 
of prosecutors’ ability to vigorously pursue identity fraud.”235 Kephart draws this 
conclusion based on her interpretation of congressional intent, when she writes 
“...it seems relatively clear that a knowledge requirement of the victim was not 
intended, as that reading creates an outcome that inoculates some defendants and 
not others, which is clearly not what Congress was intending when it added man-
datory sentencing guidelines designed to ‘broaden the reach of’ the identity theft 
statute.”236 This conclusion, nevertheless, remains based on her interpretation of 
the text rather than an explicit expression made by Congress. Just as Hovey, 
Kephart mainly ties her concern about the decision to the policy issue of 
immigration. She also refers to the victims of identity theft, but the main argument 
expresses a fear about the inability of prosecutors to fully prove their case due to a 
requirement which is difficult to adhere to due to the complexity of proving 
‘knowledge.’  
The connection of illegal immigration returns when Kephart writes, “[w]hen 
illegal aliens use third parties to purchase ID documents or information, they 
should not be immune to a charge of aggravated identity theft. Fraudulent ID 
rings earn millions from criminals and illegal aliens whose only purpose in 
obtaining such documents is to misrepresent themselves and further assimilate 
into the United States. While the federal government works on these rings to bring 
them to justice, their clients — who knowingly buy their products — should not 
be let off the legal hook because they don’t ‘know’ their victims.”237 To reverse the 
political implications of the decision, Kephart suggests the replacement ‘of 
another person’ with ‘other than his own.’ This eliminates the duty of the 
government to prove the defendant knew the information belonged to another 
person. Toward the end Kephart strengthens her case when she describes how 
Flores-Figueroa did not argue he did not know the information belonged to 
another person rather that the government was incapable of proving he knew. 
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This is crucial because this hurdle may be a recurring feature for public 
prosecutors in the future, which obviously creates apprehension for some since 
such a requirement renders the legislation less useful than anticipated or desired.  
Even after the introduction of ITADA in 1998 and ITPEA in 2005, certain 
members of Congress continued to pursue identity theft legislation. Senator 
Patrick Leahy and Senator Arlen Specter introduced the Identity Theft 
Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2007 (S. 2168) in the Senate. During the floor 
speeches, Senator Leahy emphasized the need for better protection for American 
consumers. Through the introduced bill, Leahy and Specter primarily aimed to 
provide victims of identity theft with the ability to seek restitution for indirect 
costs incurred as a result of identity theft and especially the reparation of its 
consequences. Furthermore, Leahy and Specter wanted an expansion of the list of 
predicate offenses for aggravated identity theft. The Senators also wanted passing 
counterfeit securities, mail theft, and tax fraud to become predicate crimes. In 
addition, penalties awarded to convicted perpetrators of identity theft needed to 
become more severe and crime appropriate, according to the Senators.  
While the bill passed in the Senate, its House of Representatives version (H.R. 
6060 introduced by Adam Schiff) stranded in Committee. The proposal, however, 
became part of an omnibus bill238 and found its way into law as a result shortly 
after. The Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008 became part of 
the Former Vice President Protection Act, which President George W. Bush 
signed into law on September 26, 2008. The Act incorporated a selection of its 
original aspects. First, victims now have the ability to receive restitution for 
indirect costs incurred from the perpetrators of the crime. The Act states that an 
offender “…in the case of an offense under sections 1028(a)(7) or 1028A(a) of 
this title, pay an amount equal to the value of the time reasonably spent by the 
victim in an attempt to remediate the intended or actual harm incurred by the 
victim from the offense.”239 Among other things, the Act also issues a directive to 
the United States Sentencing Commission. The Act requests that the Sentencing 
Commission “…shall review its guidelines and policy statements applicable to 
persons convicted of offenses under sections 1028, 1028A, 1030, 2511, and 2701 
of title 18, United States Code, and any other relevant provisions of law, in order 
to reflect the intent of Congress that such penalties be increased in comparison to 
those currently provided by such guidelines and policy statements.”240 Moreover, 
the Act states that “in determining its guidelines and policy statements on the 
appropriate sentence for the crimes enumerated in subsection (a), the United 
States Sentencing Commission shall consider the extent to which the guidelines 
and policy statements may or may not account for the following factors in order 
to create an effective deterrent to computer crime and the theft or misuse of 
personally identifiable data.” 241 The Act outlines an extensive list of factors, which 
allows those who issue the sentence a great sense of liberty to increase the 
penalties for the crime. The likelihood of the inability to associate a factor listed in 
the Act with a specific incident of identity theft appears slim. The expansion of 
predicate offenses with regard to aggravated identity theft, as Leahy and Specter 
desired, however, failed to become part of the Act.            
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3.1.2 The Netherlands 
 
The historical background with regard to the topic of criminalization of identity 
theft in the Netherlands is less extensive and quite different in comparison to the 
United States. The topic of criminalization received attention from the Ministry of 
Justice in 2007 when the Ministry commissioned a study to establish a workable 
definition of identity theft and to examine whether additional legislation was 
needed with respect to identity theft (see section 2.2).242 Based on the analysis of 
many definitions from various sources, the researchers turned to the correlation 
between the definitions and the available instruments of criminal law in the 
Netherlands. The relevant offenses in Dutch criminal law “…consist of so-called 
‘falsehood offences’ (such as written falsehoods in documents, fraud with travel 
documents and payment cards), ‘active and passive fraud’, computer crimes, 
human trafficking and smuggling as well as theft, buying and selling stolen goods 
(‘fencing’), embezzlement, general fraud (‘oplichting’), and money laundering 
offences.”243  
 The so-called ‘falsehood offenses’ are particularly relevant to identity theft 
when perpetrators falsify documents or alter authentic documents. These 
documents can be quite diverse including payment stubs, birth certificates, or 
other official documents, which are subsequently used to obtain financial benefits. 
Furthermore, criminal law in the Netherlands also specifically criminalizes fraud in 
connection with travel documents (which are official identification documents). 
This criminal offense is particularly relevant, according to the researchers, since 
many perpetrators of identity theft use travel documents as a ‘source document’ to 
continue their operations.244 In the physical world this certainly appears likely, but 
in the digital world its importance becomes less relevant. In particular the 
connection between human trafficking and travel documents relates to this 
criminal offense. More relevant for this research project is the criminal offense 
which describes the falsification of bank and credit cards. This criminal offense 
responds to, for example, skimming activities of perpetrators.  
 Despite the availability of relevant criminal offenses which either respond to 
the first or the second stage of identity theft, the researchers still find particular 
gaps in the Dutch criminal law framework.245 These gaps relate to ‘horizontal 
fraud’246 and in particular to the ability of perpetrators of identity theft to obtain 
services through the use of false or falsified personal data. With regard to specific 
criminalization of identity theft, the researchers emphasize the benefit of clarity 
which accompanies such an offense. Such clarity can increase the willingness to 
report and improve means of registration. This in turn can assist in the 
development of a more accurate picture of the problem and the necessary 
countermeasures, according to the researchers.247  
After the publication of the study, discussions about the potential to introduce 
a separate criminal offense continued. The Ministry of Justice initiated expert 
                                                
242 De Vries, U. R. M. Th., Tigchelaar, H., van der Linden, M. & A. M. Hol (2007). Identiteitsfraude: Een 
afbakening. Een internationale begripsvergelijking en analyse van nationale strafbepalingen. Den Haag: 
Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek en Documentatie Centrum (WODC).  
243 Ibid: 19.  
244 Ibid.  
245 Ibid: 260. 
246 Horizontal fraud refers to fraud between private parties, whereas vertical fraud concerns fraud 
between a citizen and the state.  
247 Ibid. 
44     FERTILE GROUNDS      
 
 
meetings in 2007 and 2008 to catalogue the diverse perspectives held by those 
involved. There is no publicly available documentation of these expert meetings 
and there is no genuine clarity on their impact on the decision making process. 
The following year, in 2009, the topic remained on the agenda and became more 
concrete through the delivery of two separate recommendations addressed to the 
Minister of Justice. Both of these recommendations are confidential. Insiders, 
however, were at liberty to disclose on a more abstract level how these 
recommendations described ‘opposing viewpoints.’ One recommendation 
stemmed in favor of a separate criminal offense, whereas the other opposed it.  
In January 2010, the Minister decided to hold off on the criminalization of 
identity theft.248 The Minister based his decision on the outcome of the WODC 
study cited above and another more policy oriented study conducted by the 
Directorate on Law Maintenance, Order and Crime Fighting (DRC). The WODC 
study, according the interpretation of the Ministry of Justice, did not indicate a 
legal necessity for additional legislation.249 The DRC study provided similar 
conclusions with respect to the lack of necessity of additional legislation from a 
policy oriented perspective.250 Moreover, there is no investigation priority and the 
current availability of legal instruments is deemed sufficient.  
Overall, the Minister of Justice based his decision on the lack of immediate 
cause as reflected by other contextual developments.251 These developments 
include the Minister’s goal to amend article 231 of the Dutch Criminal Code 
(Wetboek van Strafrecht, hereafter: DCC) which concerns fraud with travel 
documents. This amendment to the article will expand the coverage of documents 
and as such surpass those previously mentioned in the article. The amendment 
includes all documents which individuals can use as identification documents to 
adhere to the identification obligation as listed in article 1 of the Identification 
Duty Act (Wet op de identificatieplicht). This amendment has as its primary goal to 
criminalize those who issue false or falsified identification documents and also 
those who purposefully use an authentic identification document of another 
person (the so-called look-a-like fraud).  
 With respect to identity theft on the digital highway, the DRC aims to monitor 
identity theft on the Internet. To accomplish this task, the Directorate aims to 
hold various expert meetings throughout 2010 with individuals from law 
enforcement agencies, the public prosecutor’s office, and the academic arena. The 
Directorate also aims to incorporate the information available from a comparative 
study commissioned by the European Commission, which is being carried out in 
2010. Simultaneously, the Council of Europe also plans to publish a discussion 
nota.  
 The European Commission alluded to criminalization several years ago in 
2007 in its Communication ‘Towards a general policy on the fight against 
cybercrime.’252 In its Communication, the European Commission notes how “EU 
law enforcement cooperation would be better served were identity theft 
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criminalized in all Member States.”253 The issue might be more complex than 
envisioned, however, since views within the European Union appear to be diverse. 
France, for example, rejected the introduction of additional legislation to 
criminalize identity theft.254 Whilst the Minister of Justice in the Netherlands 
appears to be in anticipation of transnational and European developments, these 
may take longer than expected, especially since the discussion at the European 
level seems to have been (temporarily) postponed. The draft of the 18 month 
program issued for the Spanish, Belgian and Hungarian Presidencies do, however, 
refer to the issue of identity theft. The program specifically states “[i]dentification 
and recovery of criminal assets and the fight against money laundering will remain 
a key priority. The issue of identity fraud will be given particular attention and in 
this context, initiatives will be launched with regard to the verification of the 
authenticity of identity documents at the European level.”255 
 Besides international developments, the Netherlands also passed an 
amendment in 2009 which concerns identity theft related activities. The Lower 
House passed an amendment to the criminalization of fraud in article 326 DCC.256 
The provision previously included fraudulently tricking persons into handing over 
data, but only data ‘with monetary value in business transactions’, i.e., on the legal 
market. This did not cover passwords, credit-card numbers, etcetera, which cannot 
be traded on the legal market. The amendment eliminated the part ‘with monetary 
value in business transactions.’ As a result, it now also criminalizes practices where 
individuals aim to obtain information, whether passwords, pin codes, or other 
valuable information, which in and of itself do not carry a monetary value in 
lawful business transactions. This amendment mainly appears to criminalize social 
engineering practices such as phishing.  
 Overall, the Minister believes how, in addition to the amendments listed 
above, good communication about the applicability of existing legislation can 
contribute to the prevention and suppression of identity theft. The Minister 
therefore recommends the development of a pamphlet which can assist law 
enforcement during the management of identity theft cases and its victims. This 
pamphlet will provide law enforcement with information on the relevant 
legislation in the DCC. The Ministry of Justice shall soon start with the 
development of this pamphlet. To develop a more comprehensive picture of the 
nature and prevalence of identity theft, an aspect which also receives attention 
during the discussions on criminalization, the Minister suggests the introduction of 
identity theft as a subcategory for the registration systems of law enforcement 
agencies.257     
 From an empirical point of view on identity theft, the information on the 
experiences of victims of financial identity theft in the Netherlands is less mature 
than in the United States which makes it more challenging to demonstrate the 
need for additional criminal legislation in light of victim assistance. Nevertheless, 
the limited information which is available indicates problems encountered by 
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victims when they attempt to resolve their problems through approaching law 
enforcement agencies. Maarten Kunst and Jan van Dijk examined the impact of 
financial-economic crimes on various types of victims of fraud, including victims 
of identity theft.258 Based on a focus group, Kunst and van Dijk concluded how 
the victims involved in the study felt as though they had nowhere to go with their 
stories. All victims described how they received the sense that the relevant 
authorities suffered from a lack of knowledge about the topic of identity theft. 
One victim in particular described the process in detail about his attempt to report 
the problem at his local police station. The law enforcement officer at the station 
looked at him and stated: “You cannot file a report. You are not a victim. The 
credit card company is the victim.”259 The man pleaded with the officer and 
explained how he needed the report in order to prove his innocence to the credit 
card company. “She became infuriated,” he told Kunst, “you don’t even want to 
know how angry she became. But I told her, I am not leaving without a report.”260 
Due to the victim’s persistence, he finally obtained the police report, but his story 
provides an indication of the difficulty victims may face when they attempt to 
approach law enforcement officials in an effort to resolve the problem of identity 
theft.   
 The experiences of other victims also demonstrate the challenges faced by 
victims of identity theft, whether criminal or financial. The introduction of chapter 
1 reflected on the heartbreaking story of Ron Kowsoleea and how the response 
provided to him by law enforcement proved particularly negative.261 Whether the 
criminalization of identity theft can provide assistance to victims of the ‘crime’ is 
not supported by everyone. When asked whether she supported criminalization, 
the legal representative of Kowsoleea responded, “to answer that question, I need 
to think would that have helped my client and the answer is no. Because 
everything the perpetrator did is already criminalized. And criminalization of 
identity theft once again places the focus on the offender rather than the 
victim.”262    
 
3.2 Criminal Law Enforcement 
 
3.2.1 United States 
 
The role of the state as protector in the criminal realm extends beyond the mere 
introduction of substantive legislation to combat financial identity theft. Such 
legislation also needs to find its value in a world outside of Capitol Hill, primarily 
through its implementation by the law enforcement community. Enforcement of 
identity theft legislation presents a variety of challenges, especially as acts of 
identity theft occur in cyberspace. Those most often confronted by victims of the 
crime, State and local law enforcement officials, repeatedly acknowledge these 
challenges. Moreover, local and State law enforcement stress how “…the nature 
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of identity theft investigations is generally beyond the technical capability and 
jurisdictional authority”263 of lower level departments. Federal involvement is a 
requirement for identity theft cases, which federal agencies recognize. Various 
Federal agencies concern themselves with identity theft investigations, including 
the Department of Justice, the United States Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations, and the United States Postal Service.  
 In March 2010, the United States Department of Justice Office of the 
Inspector General published an audit report on the Department’s efforts to 
combat identity theft.264 The Deputy Assistant Attorney General demonstrated his 
awareness of the prevalence of identity theft and its status as the fastest growing 
crime in the United States during a congressional hearing.265 Nevertheless, the 
Department of Justice does not maintain an internal identity theft strategy nor 
does the Department hold a person or entity with the responsibility of 
coordinating the identity theft efforts within the Department. More specifically the 
report states, “...the DOJ’s approach to addressing identity theft has not been 
coordinated, resulting in identity theft not being treated as a DOJ priority.”266 The 
audit report also provides statistical data on the efforts made by the 94 United 
States Attorneys’ Offices, who serve as the principal litigators and hold the 
responsibility of prosecuting federal criminal cases. The accumulation of statistical 
data on the number of identity theft cases charged and convicted is a result of a 
change in the case management of the Executive Office for United States 
Attorneys (EOUSA) which allowed Federal prosecutors to track identity theft 
cases via a specific subsection. This change occurred in December 2006 and the 
available data might therefore suffer from the time needed to adjust. As the report 
states, “...EOUSA officials stated that many USAOs were slow to adapt to this 
change and that, as a result, the more specific reporting category for identity theft 
likely understates the number of identity theft cases for FYs 2007 to 2009 because 
some such cases were likely reported under the broader offense code.”267  
  
Table 3.1  




















2007 269 103 532 272 744 365 
2008 296 144 620 338 882 467 
2009 239 138 578 296 769 432 
 
The table above demonstrates the number of defendants charged in both 
categories of identity theft, along with convictions obtained. The available data 
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appears to depict a state of relative stability with respect to defendants charged 
and convicted. The information collection also appears a bit premature to draw 
reliable conclusions on the meaning of the number of defendant charges and 
convictions. In comparison to the statistics available on victims of identity theft, 
the totals do seem to reflect the complexity involved in the actual enforcement of 
the law due to the challenges invoked by the crime.  
 Perhaps the most important conclusion offered by the audit report is the lack 
of priority granted to the topic of identity theft by the Department of Justice. The 
issue of priority within an agency also deserves attention with respect to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), especially since its priorities experienced a 
crucial transformation after the events of September 11, 2001. The events of 
September 11, 2001 became widely viewed as a systemic intelligence failure of the 
United States Intelligence Community. This intelligence failure required 
organizational changes in the various components of the community, including 
the FBI. As the largest investigative agency, the FBI is responsible for the 
enforcement of more than 200 federal laws.268 Before September 11, the FBI 
combined its national security responsibilities with other concerns such as criminal 
conspiracy, as its top priority. After the attacks, Robert Mueller III, Director of the 
FBI, initiated various changes including a reprioritization process.269 Several 
months later, in May 2002, the FBI published its new list of priorities. 
Counterterrorism and counterintelligence topped the list. The FBI needed to be 
more equipped to combat imminent terrorist threats and to prevent other terrorist 
attacks against the United States. To accomplish its new counterterrorism 
objective, the FBI Director formally transferred more than 500 field agents from 
traditional crime areas to terrorism-related programs. The Director primarily 
transferred these resources from the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division (CID), 
which addresses traditional criminal areas such as narcotics trafficking and 
white-collar crime.  
 The third priority of the FBI became the protection of the United States 
against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes. A distant third priority, 
according to Brian Krebs.270 For a third place on the priority list, cybercrime 
receives relatively few resources. In its Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Request, the 
Justice Department demanded $258.5 million in funding and approximately 659 
field agents for the ‘third priority.’ Out of a total of 11,868 FBI agents nationwide, 
659 comes down to approximately 5.5 per cent. A closer look, however, provides 
even more important indicators about the dedication of agents and funds. The 
‘Innocent Images National Initiative’ receives the involvement of nearly one third 
of the agency’s cyber agents. This program is a child pornography initiative which 
aims to catch those who look at or facilitate the production of such pornography. 
Despite the importance of such a program, the remaining resources for other 
types of cybercrime paint a dismal picture. Less than 4 per cent of all field agents 
dedicate their time to the fight against other types of cybercrime. Whether this is a 
direct result of the focus on terrorism is difficult to determine. 
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 After the implementation of the reprioritization process, the Office of the 
Inspector General (OIG) conducted audits to examine the effects, both internal 
and external, of the changes. The decrease in financial crime cases dealt with by 
the FBI is drastic. The FBI handled 17,402 cases in 2000 in comparison to 10,463 
in 2004.271 Other crimes, namely violent crimes, also demonstrate a substantial 
decrease in the number of cases. Identity theft data is less readily available due to 
the lack of registration prior to 2003. Yet, as the OIG notes, “…identity theft is 
often part of larger fraud schemes and the FBI may have been involved in many 
more identity theft investigations through cases tracked under different 
investigative classifications.”272 In general, the actual influence of the 
organizational changes introduced after the events of September 11 remain 
difficult to establish. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported in 
2004 how the data proved inconclusive with respect to the effects of the 
reprioritization on the efforts to combat drug, white-collar, and violent crime.273 
 The OIG Audit Report in 2005, on the other hand, concluded how there was a 
significant reduction in the FBI’s investigative efforts with regard to fraudulent 
activities involving financial institutions.274 In particular, lower dollar cases 
suffered as a result of the reduction. A similar investigative gap exists for 
telemarketing and wire fraud. Prior to its official registration, identity theft cases 
most likely found themselves included in any of the various categories described 
above, such as financial or white-collar crime.  
 Despite the dispute about the actual priority granted to criminal areas outside 
of the national security realm, the FBI managed several moments of success with 
regard to identity theft cases. Since 2003, when official registration began, the FBI 
has been involved in thousands of identity theft cases. Of the 1255 pending cases 
in 2006, the FBI managed to secure 457 indictments and 405 convictions of 
perpetrators of identity theft. Furthermore, the FBI also obtained $156.5 million 
in Restitutions, $4.3 million in Recoveries, and $1.2 million in Fines.275 The 
previously cited audit report of March 2010 describes a more positive reflection of 
the prioritization process within the FBI with respect to identity theft. As the 
report notes, ““[a]lthough the specific crime of identity theft is not a top FBI 
priority, the FBI frequently addresses identity theft through the Cyber Division’s 
criminal intrusion program, which is currently a top FBI priority. According to a 
senior FBI official, the FBI determined that it must prioritize the use of its 
resources, and he believed that the FBI would have the greatest impact on identity 
theft by primarily addressing the crime through its Cyber Division.”276 Not 
everyone within the agency agreed with this approach.277  
 Unfortunately, the FBI no longer collects statistical information on 
investigations and convictions related to identity theft which makes it difficult if 
not impossible to assess its impact and the actual priority granted to the problem 
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by the agency. The audit division of DOJ underscores this complexity and 
expresses its concerns when it writes, “[w]e are concerned about the FBI’s lack of 
identity theft data and mandatory comprehensive assessments on the threat of 
identity theft. Without such data and comprehensive assessments the FBI cannot 
maintain a current understanding of the threat presented by identity theft or 
properly coordinate its approach to a crime that cuts across multiple FBI program 
areas, including counterterrorism, and victimizes millions of Americans each 
year.”278 Nevertheless, the Cyber Division managed to conduct its own assessment 
through examining the 1,180 pending computer intrusion investigations between 
FYs 2007 and 2009. Through its examination, the division concluded how 62 per 
cent of the pending cases mentioned above concerned the crime of identity 
theft.279   
The FBI rarely operates alone. As previously noted, the Secret Service also 
holds an important position in the enforcement of identity theft legislation. 
Officially, under 18, U.S.C. Section 1028, the Secret Service is the primary Federal 
agency tasked with the investigations of identity theft cases. In FY 2008, the Secret 
Service arrested over 5,600 suspects of crimes related to identity theft.280 The 
Secret Service maintains 35 Financial Crime Task Forces and 24 Electronic Crime 
Task Forces that investigate identity theft cases, along with various other crimes. 
Since July 2009, there are three new Electronic Crime Task Forces. In the press 
release announcing the additional Task Forces, Secret Service Director Mark 
Sullivan proclaimed “[o]ne of the top priorities for the Secret Service continues to 
be combating the computer related crimes perpetrated by domestic and 
international criminals that target the U.S. financial infrastructure.”281 Sullivan’s 
statement coincides with the United States Secret Service Strategic Plan (FY 2008-
2013), which lists protecting the nation’s financial infrastructure by reducing losses 
due to counterfeit currency, financial and electronic crimes and identity theft as its 
primary strategic goal.282  
Besides the FBI and the Secret Service, the United States Postal Inspection 
Service also plays a role in identity theft investigations, especially when 
perpetrators used the postal service to commit their crime. The last update on the 
number of arrests made by the United States Postal Inspection Service with 
respect to identity theft came in 2007. During that year, the Postal Service 
reported 2,071 identity theft arrests.283    
 
3.2.2 The Netherlands  
 
Enforcement of identity theft cases is difficult to assess due to the lack of a 
separate criminal offense in the Netherlands. This section shall therefore review 
the treatment of identity theft in policy documents of the law enforcement 
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community and also describe activities in other related areas of crime, such as 
cybercrime and financial-economic criminality. The discussion of law enforcement 
priorities provides a valuable indication of the importance granted to identity theft 
in the community. The Ministry of the Interior published the National Police 
Services Agency Priorities for 2008-2011 in 2007.284 These priorities reflect the 
government’s goals with regard to crime in society. Its main goal is to decrease 
crime by 25% in 2010 in comparison to the percentage of crime in 2002. To 
achieve its goal, the government demands a dominant focus on violent crimes, the 
development of safe neighborhoods, juvenile delinquency and youth at risk. In 
contrast to the previously mentioned priorities, the last priority, which is to 
improve both the quality of investigations and the quantity, discusses certain 
relevant areas. The policy document mentions cybercrime along with organized 
and financial crimes. Identity theft displays characteristics which fit in all of these 
categories; yet, identity theft is never specifically mentioned during the description 
of the above types of crime. Instead, in the category cybercrime child pornography 
explicitly receives the highest priority for the national police.285 For organized 
crime, the primary focus appears to be on human trafficking, prostitution, money 
laundering and illegal drug production and trade. The description of financial 
crimes refers to fraud, but fails to specifically identify identity theft as a priority in 
that category. The focus herein is on national priorities and therefore excludes 
potential variations on local levels of the law enforcement community. Important 
to note still is how certain local departments are in pilot programs which intensify 
the fight against financial economic crimes. This intensification which is referred 
to as ‘program financial economic crimes’ is the result of the government’s aim to 
visibly reduce organized crime by the end of 2011.  
 Moreover, the government specifically wants to prevent the threatening link 
between the underground world and the legal or ‘upper world.’286 The government 
announced its plan at the end of 2007 and specifically identified human trafficking, 
the infiltration of illegal activities in the real estate sector, and the grand 
production of soft drugs as focus areas of the program. The intensification of the 
investigation of financial economic criminality and the reduction of criminal 
money are also aspects of this umbrella plan. For financial economic crimes, the 
government mentions money laundering, fraud, and corruption. In order to 
establish an effective fight against organized crime, the government emphasizes 
the need for cooperation among the various parties involved in the area of crime 
prevention and repression. The government recognizes how financial economic 
criminality is an umbrella term but all of the crimes which fall within the category 
maintain a dominant financial and business aspect. In the policy plan, the 
government refers to identity theft briefly in the description of fraud in general.287  
 The results of the overarching program which focuses on security through 
prevention provide a promising outlook, according to the government. For the 
area of serious and organized crime, the focus is on the reduction of opportunity 
structures in an effort to produce obstacles for the occurrence of such crimes. 
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Main examples include the successful investigation of real estate fraud and human 
trafficking, along with large soft drug production operations.288  
 More relevant is the intensified cooperative effort between law enforcement 
and the public prosecutor’s office in the fight against fraud. This cooperation also 
includes the private sector, such as the Dutch Banking Association especially with 
regard to credit card fraud. Together these parties aim to establish societal barriers 
to complicate the efforts of perpetrators to commit various crimes, including 
account takeover of credit cards.289  
 Despite the lack of direct attention granted to identity theft in the most recent 
list of police priorities discussed above, other sources do mention identity theft. A 
headline in 2008 described an intensified approach to identity theft by the Dutch 
police. Wim van Vemde, police superintendent, issued a warning for the potential 
spread of ‘American experiences.’ Van Vembe recognizes how the United States 
certainly faces more significant numbers and more severe cases of identity theft, 
but he acknowledges how experience teaches the Netherlands that whatever 
happens in the United States ultimately comes our way.290   
 Positive news about investigations and reduction of criminal operations related 
to identity theft provide a representation of this intensified approach. Several years 
ago, in 2007, the Team High Tech Crime (THTC) began its operations as part of 
the National Police Services Agency (KLPD). After only one month, a Dutch 
bank arrived at the doorstep of the THTC with a case. Through a sophisticated 
phishing scam, perpetrators managed to successfully carry out a Man in the Middle 
Attack291 and drain accounts of 200 clients. The bank involved asked the THTC 
team to investigate the case.292 The investigation led to Hong Kong, but traces of 
those behind the operation died soon upon arrival. The THTC managed to 
proceed with the investigation after the incorporation of a particularly innovative 
method. A colleague within the team received a money mule recruitment email. 
Money mules, as shall become more obvious in chapter 7, function as a transfer 
channel for criminal proceeds in an effort to divert and confuse the audit trail. 
Basically, money mules receive the money from the victim’s account and transfer 
it to an offshore account. For their effort, mules generally receive a small 
percentage of the money. The THTC responded to the recruitment email and as a 
result received the money taken from the accounts of the victims. 
 During the following years, the THTC used previous experiences to expand its 
capacity and knowledge about identity theft operations. Whereas the first year 
predominantly dictated a case based approach which meant the team reacted to 
events rather than initiating proactive measures to reduce crime, the latter years 
demonstrate progress. From case to phenomenon based, the THTC aims to 
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anticipate innovative means used by perpetrators to commit identity theft.293 
THTC specifically targets the top of the criminal pyramid, which represent the 
innovators of methods used to carry out their criminal activities.294     
 Other initiatives also target identity theft operations through an overarching 
approach to cybercrime. The public prosecutor’s office mentions identity theft 
during its discussion of cybercrime in its ‘perspective on 2010’ which the office 
published the previous year. The public prosecutor’s office acknowledges how the 
increased use of information-and communication technology develops a more 
significant opportunity structure for crime to occur. The office mentions identity 
theft as an example of a crime which can occur as a result of such an opportunity 
structure.295 Further along, the public prosecutor’s office returns to identity theft 
and identifies the problem as part of the ‘new themes’ which the office shall 
encounter during the upcoming years.  
 The public prosecutor’s office together with law enforcement commenced a 
program which specifically focused on an intensified approach to cybercrime. As 
part of this program, both parties introduced ‘experimental gardens.’ These 
gardens focus on specific areas of cybercrime such as child pornography, fraud on 
the Internet, and ICT as a target of crime. Within these experimental gardens, 
various organizations, including the public prosecutor’s office, law enforcement, 
municipalities, and private parties, work together and ‘experiment’ through the 
usage of new investigation methods which they apply to genuine criminal cases. 
The focus of the gardens extends beyond the mere prosecution of suspects in a 
single case, instead the cooperative effort also aims to develop an understanding 
of the underlying structures which facilitate and subsequently maintain the 
existence of such criminality. This is why gardens work with a ‘barriermodel.’296   
 The interesting aspect of the criminal law enforcement approach presented in 
the Netherlands with respect to cybercrime in general is the incorporation of the 
situational crime prevention framework. This becomes apparent since much of the 
discussion of the initiatives demonstrates the focus on opportunity reduction. As a 
result, criminal law enforcement surpasses the more traditional approach of crime 
fighting through ‘catching the criminal’ and also implements means to potentially 
alter the opportunity structure of financial identity theft.   
 
3.2.3 Transnational Enforcement  
 
As noted in the overview above, identity theft and cybercrime demonstrate a 
significant connection in contemporary society. Such a connection means the 
challenges law enforcement units face with respect to cybercrime are also 
applicable to financial identity theft. In particular the transnational challenges 
which complicate the efforts made by law enforcement professionals. The 
investigation of identity theft cases which incorporate digital technology require 
particular expertise along with considerable time and resources. The international 
aspect of the problem in particular complicates the investigation and subsequent 
prosecution of cases. To mitigate these challenges and complicating factors, the 
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Council of Europe introduced several initiatives in the fight against cybercrime. 
After two non-binding recommendations – about substantive criminal law in 1989 
and procedural criminal law in 1995 – turned out to have insufficient impact on 
national legislation, the Council took the initiative for a binding legal instrument, 
which led to the Convention on Cybercrime of 2001.297 
 The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime has three principal aims.298 
The first aim is to harmonize domestic criminal substantive law elements of 
offenses and related provisions in the area of cybercrime. The second aim is to 
provide for domestic criminal procedural law powers necessary for the 
investigation and the subsequent prosecution of such offenses as well as related 
offenses. The third aim is to establish a fast and effective regime of international 
cooperation. The Convention classifies the offenses into five areas of substantive 
criminal law including computer-related offenses such as computer-related forgery 
and computer-related fraud, but also offenses against the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of computer data and systems, which include illegal access, 
interception, data and system interference, and misuse of devices.299 Other, for 
identity theft less relevant, offenses include child pornography and offenses related 
to the infringement of copyright and related rights. The Convention calls for the 
adoption of legislative and other measures where necessary in order to establish 
the above mentioned offenses as criminal offenses under domestic law. This call is 
a response to the need for criminal law to “...keep abreast of these technological 
developments which offer highly sophisticated opportunities for misusing facilities 
of the cyber-space and causing damage to legitimate interests. Given the cross-
border nature of information networks, a concerted international effort is needed 
to deal with such misuse.”300   
The collection of evidence is a particularly complex issue for cybercrime in 
general and identity theft conducted via the Internet in particular. This is because 
of forensic problems which accompany the collection of ‘digital evidence.’ As the 
United Nations notes in its background paper on measures to combat computer-
related crime, “[p]art of the problem in reconstructing an incident involving a 
cybercrime is that much of the evidence is intangible and transient. Rather than 
physical evidence, cybercrime investigations seek out digital traces that are often 
volatile and short-lived.”301 Moreover, digital traces usually provide evidence of a 
link between the offense and a computer or IP address, but not necessarily a link 
between the offense and a person behind the computer. Identifying individual 
perpetrators is one of the major challenges for digital investigations. Closely 
related to the difficulty of actually capturing the digital evidence is the need for 
particular resources and expertise. As Deputy Assistant Attorney General Malcolm 
notes, “[w]e are clearly no longer in an age where law enforcement agents can 
defeat criminals with a badge, a flashlight, and a gun.”302 All of these complexities 
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are magnified due to the cross-jurisdictional nature of cybercrime in general, and 
financial identity theft in particular.  
The Convention therefore provides ‘instruments’ or at least intends to do so in 
an effort to stimulate cooperation. Article 35 of the Convention establishes the 
24/7 network which requires each party to designate a point of contact which is 
available on a twenty-four hour basis for seven days a week. Such a network is 
designed to ensure immediate assistance for investigations or proceedings with 
regard to criminal offenses related to computer systems and data, or for such 
assistance in connection to the collection of evidence of a criminal offense, in 
electronic form. The Convention specifies the type of assistance to include the 
facilitation of technical advice and the preservation of data pursuant to Articles 29 
and 30.   
Furthermore, the 24/7 network can also provide assistance with the collection 
of evidence and through providing legal information, and through locating 
suspects. Due to the volatile nature of digital evidence along with the challenges 
associated with the investigation of cross-border crimes, the network is an 
essential feature of the overall transnational approach to cybercrime. The drafters 
of the Convention therefore considered the network to be one of the most 
important means for an effective response to the challenges encountered by law 
enforcement as a result of cybercrime. Moreover, the drafters based their decision 
for the network on the demonstrated effectiveness of a previously functioning 
network.303    
The Convention also requires parties to adopt legislation which facilitates the 
investigation of cybercrime cases. Such facilitation is intended to occur through 
the expedition, preservation, and production of electronic evidence.304 Other 
means of investigation facilitation can occur through the application of search and 
seizure law to data stored on computer systems, the authorization for law 
enforcement agencies for real-time collection of traffic data, and the interception 
of content data.305  
The provisions set forth in the Convention provide valuable assistance, 
especially through the 24/7 network and investigative powers for mutual 
assistance, but challenges remain. These challenges partly occur due to the 
existence of data havens. As Jeremy N. Geltzer writes, “[a] data haven provides a 
safe harbor beyond the reach of any government’s jurisdiction, and offers its users 
maximum security and minimal regulation.”306 Important countries with respect to 
cybercrime such as Russia and China have not signed or ratified the Convention. 
This demonstrates the limited applicability of the Convention to those countries 
who have demonstrated their commitment to the problem through their 
ratification.307 Susan W. Brenner notes how the pace of ratification is surprisingly 
low which complicates the assessment of its impact for the fight against 
cybercrime. As Brenner states, “[t]he prime movers behind the Convention have 
ignored it for three years; ratification and implementation are obviously not a high 
priority for these countries. Their inaction is puzzling and somewhat unsettling. It 
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may be, as the conference speaker suggested, that the Convention is falling prey to 
its own ambitions—that the nature and extent of the effort required to implement 
it is discouraging countries from ratifying it.”308 The success of the Convention 
rests on the ratification of the document by countries around the world. For such 
ratification is imperative, as Brenner notes, otherwise the ‘haven’ scenario remains 
unaddressed.309         
 
3.3 Data Protection Legislation 
 
In The Digital Person, Daniel J. Solove describes how “[t]he underlying cause of 
identity theft is an architecture that makes us vulnerable to such crimes and unable 
to adequately repair the damage. This architecture is not created by identity 
thieves; rather, it is exploited by them. It is an architecture of vulnerability, one 
where personal information is not protected with adequate security, where identity 
thieves have easy access to data and the ability to use it in detrimental ways.”310 
Solove emphasizes and demonstrates the importance of data protection, or the 
lack thereof, in light of the facilitation of identity theft. Through his description of 
the architecture of vulnerability, he reveals how the treatment of personal 
information by both the public and the private sector merit attention due to their 
connection with the facilitation of identity theft. Perpetrators of identity theft need 
personal information of potential victims to carry out their activities en route to 
financial profits. Such information is often maintained by various organizations in 
both the public and the private sector and therefore attractive for perpetrators. 
The access to such information is largely dependent on the protection offered by 
the state through its role as protector. As the Identity Theft Task Force 
acknowledged in its strategic plan, “[i]dentity theft depends on access to consumer 
data. Reducing the opportunities for thieves to get the data is critical to fighting 
the crime. Government, the business community, and consumers have roles to 
play in protecting data.”311    
 
3.3.1 United States 
 
The concept of privacy is far more commonly used than the notion of data 
protection in the United States. Every day speech along with relevant legislation 
refers to privacy rather than data protection. Privacy in a broad sense, however, 
also encompasses informational privacy, which is the functional equivalent of data 
protection. The common perception credits the legal origin of privacy, or rather 
the right to privacy, to its ‘founding fathers’ Samuel Warren and Louis Dembitz 
Brandeis. More than a century ago, in 1890, Warren and Brandeis published ‘The 
Right to Privacy’ in Harvard Law Review. The piece continues to receive much 
admiration for its landmark contribution to the privacy debate. Benjamin E. 
Bratman, for example, notes how “[i]n the more than 110 years since its 
publication, Brandeis and Warren’s article has attained what some might call 
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legendary status. It has been widely recognized by scholars and judges, past and 
present, as the seminal force in the development of a ‘right to privacy’ in American 
law.”312  
 Warren and Brandeis commence their plea through the description of the 
actions of journalists, especially photojournalists, who were, according to the 
authors, overstepping the apparent boundaries of propriety and decency. More 
specifically, the authors indicate how “[r]ecent inventions and business methods 
call attention to the next step which must be taken for the protection of the 
person, and for securing to the individual...the right ‘to be let alone.’”313 This ‘next 
step’ represents a logical continuance in the expansion of the scope of legal rights 
of individuals to have full protection in person and in property. Warren and 
Brandeis trace the evolution of these legal rights in order to determine “...whether 
the existing law affords a principle which can properly be invoked to protect the 
privacy of the individual; and, if it does, what the nature and extent of such 
protection is.”314 To demonstrate how existing law affords such a principle, 
Warren and Brandeis draw analogies to the law of slander and of libel, the law of 
(intellectual) property and the law of trade secrets. Robert Ellis Smith describes 
how the analogies drawn by Warren and Brandeis allowed them to develop the 
right to privacy. Smith summarizes: “[i]f the common law of slander and of libel 
provide damages for injury to one’s reputation, why not a remedy for damage to 
one’s feelings even if what was said or published is true? If one can control 
publication of one’s intellectual property through copyright and other restrictions 
in the law, why not a right to control publication of one’s other intimacies? If 
organizations can protect trade secrets, why can’t individuals protect personal 
secrets?...If the law of other countries recognizes the right to privacy, why not the 
United States?”315  
 The persuasive power of Warren and Brandeis altered the privacy landscape in 
the United States. Nevertheless, Alan F. Westin provides a different sound and 
states “...the notion put forward by legal commentators from Brandeis down to 
the present—that privacy was somehow a ‘modern’ legal right which began to take 
form only in the late nineteenth century—is simply bad history and bad law. Pre-
Civil War America had a thorough and effective set of rules with which to protect 
individual and group privacy from the means of compulsory disclosure and 
physical surveillance known in that era.”316 At the same time, Westin clearly states 
how “[t]his discussion is not intended to minimize the value of the Warren-
Brandeis approach between 1890 and 1950 as a path-breaking contribution to 
modern conceptions of privacy as a legal right of the individual.”317 Westin 
especially notes how the ‘common-law movement’ led by Warren and Brandeis 
assisted in the analysis of the importance of privacy in American society, the 
proper claims of personal privacy, and the assessment of the importance of the 
right to privacy in competition with other social interests. Through this 
contribution, Warren and Brandeis assisted in the establishment of legal sensitivity 
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to privacy as an independent interest, rather than a dependent adjunct of property 
or liberty.   
 Warren and Brandeis influential work is most valuable in privacy-related 
discussions; yet, on a more abstract level, their line of legal reasoning also 
illustrates the need for government officials, whether policy makers or those in the 
judiciary branch, to accept and subsequently promote the inherent fluidity of law. 
Such fluidity is crucial in light of changes and additional demands introduced into 
society, which lead to novel challenges. This became particularly evident during 
the second half of the twentieth century. During that era, the introduction of and 
subsequent use of the computer along with its increased storage capacity 
presented a new privacy chapter with its accompanying challenges. In 1965, the 
House of Representatives Committee on Government Operations created a 
special subcommittee to investigate the invasion of privacy.318 The special 
subcommittee held a variety of hearings throughout the following years.319 In a 
similar vein, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary activated its Subcommittee on 
Administrative Practice and Procedure to hold numerous hearings on the Invasion 
of Privacy. From hearings about the more general invasion of privacy, the various 
subcommittees began more specific investigations into the role of the computer in 
relation to privacy and the potential for invasions.320  
 Around the same time, Westin published his Privacy and Freedom, which, 
according to James B. Rule et al., “…shaped virtually all current thinking about 
privacy as a public issue.”321 Westin describes how privacy’s rise to the top of the 
political agenda is a result of political officials “[r]eaching to each other from 
opposite ends of the American political spectrum, conservatives and liberals 
united in alarmed reaction at ‘computerized Big Brother.’”322 Whereas he credits 
the common-law movement initiated by Warren and Brandeis, he also recognizes 
how “[t]he seed was there, but in this era the warmth of public support to nurture 
it was lacking.”323 The importance of Westin’s contribution rests in his eloquent 
description of privacy and its place in the United States, both in the past as well as 
in the present. In his final chapter, he describes “[t]he explorations of surveillance 
technology and techniques, public reactions to these pressures, the functions that 
privacy serves for individuals and society, and the concept of privacy in American 
law—all these have been attempts to acquire a firm understanding of privacy in 
contemporary America. With such a basic understanding, the hard problems of 
balance and choice can be met; without such knowledge, both the public and the 
legal specialists might be tempted to seek simplistic formulas which will neither 
control intrusive technology nor set a proper balance of privacy.”324 Through the 
understanding set forth by Westin, he develops criteria which assist weighing 
conflicting interests. The development of these criteria allows privacy to receive its 
proper weight when conflicting interests require the establishment of a balance.  
 In addition to Westin’s groundbreaking contribution and the many 
Congressional hearings came a report ‘Records, Computers, and the Rights of 
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Citizens.’325 Due to the growing concern about the potential consequences 
resulting from the uncontrolled application of computer and telecommunications 
technology to collect, store, and use data about individual citizens,  former 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), Elliot L. Richardson 
established ‘the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data 
Systems.’326 The Advisory Committee received the task to analyze and make 
recommendations about “[h]armful consequences that may result from using 
automated personal data systems; Safeguards that might protect against potentially 
harmful consequences; Measures that might afford redress for any harmful 
consequences; Policy and practice relating to the issuance and use of Social 
Security numbers.”327 The Committee’s insights with regard to the last task will 
receive considerable attention in section 4.2.1. With respect to the other tasks the 
Advisory Committee concludes, “[u]nder current law, a person’s privacy is poorly 
protected against arbitrary or abusive record-keeping practices. For this reason, as 
well as due to the need to establish standards of record-keeping practice 
appropriate to the computer age, the report recommends the enactment of a 
Federal ‘Code of Fair Information Practice’ for all automated personal data 
systems.”328 This Code is based on the following five principles: 
 
ü There must be no personal data record keeping systems whose very 
existence is secret.  
ü There must be a way for an individual to find out what information 
about him is in a record and how it is used.  
ü There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him 
that was obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for 
other purposes without his consent.  
ü There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of 
identifiable information about him.  
ü Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records 
of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for 
their intended use and must take precautions to prevent misuse of the 
data. 
 
Particularly due to its uncanny ability to illustrate the dangers along with the most 
promising safeguards, the HEW Report maintains an important place in the 
history of information privacy in the United States. The HEW Report alone, 
however, may never have generated as much attention if its publication had not 
occurred around the same time as a crucial political event. Rule describes how 
“[t]he Watergate drama, with its many twists and subplots, did perhaps more than 
anything else to force official treatment of personal data into the arena of public 
controversy.”329 Colin Bennett coincides with this perspective and also emphasizes 
how the Watergate crisis provided the necessary climate to open a policy window 
for the privacy issue. Bennet states, “[t]he many and various cases of political 
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bribery, corruption, malpractice, intrusiveness, and abuse of personal data that are 
captured by the emotive term ‘Watergate’ gave the privacy advocates the perfect 
horror story.”330 Whereas the HEW Report described the potential harmful 
consequences, Watergate managed to provide the powerful illustration to ‘back up 
the story.’ The subsequent legislative action and especially the rate at which the 
legislation passed both the Senate and the House of Representatives became a 
direct result of the political momentum going on in Washington. The enactment 
of the Privacy Act of 1974 is, according to Bennett, “...part of a wider effort to 
open up the executive establishment and cleanse the government of the murky 
and conspirational influences of the Nixon White House.”331 Ironically, former 
President Richard Nixon, perhaps in an attempt to conduct necessary damage 
control, held a radio address on February 23, 1974, about the American right to 
privacy.332 In his address, Nixon says: 
 
 “At no time in the past has our Government known so much about so 
many of its individual citizens. This new knowledge brings with it an 
awesome potential for harm as well as good—and an equally awesome 
responsibility on those who have that knowledge. Though well-
intentioned, Government bureaucracies seem to thrive on collecting 
additional information. That information is now stored in over 7,000 
Government computers. Collection of new information will always be 
necessary. But there must also be reasonable limits on what is collected 
and how it is used.”333   
 
Further along, he acknowledges the harmful consequences, when he states: 
 
 “In some instances, the information itself is inaccurate and has resulted 
in the withholding of credit or jobs from deserving individuals. In other 
cases, obsolete information has been used, such as arrest records which 
have not been updated to show that the charges made against an 
individual were subsequently dropped or the person found innocent. In 
many cases, the citizen is not even aware of what information is held on 
record, and if he wants to find out, he either has nowhere to turn or else 
he does not know where to turn.”334  
Nearly four decades later, Nixon’s words still hold value. The situation he depicts 
contains frightening similarities with the consequences experienced by victims of 
financial identity theft. His radio address, coincidentally, was not the first time 
Nixon came to defend the right to privacy. As a private attorney in 1966, before 
his presidency, Nixon appeared in the United States Supreme Court. In Time, Inc. 
v. Hill, Nixon represented the Hill family against Life magazine. Based on his 
personal conviction and agreement with Warren and Brandeis, about the ‘right to 
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be let alone’, Nixon decided to represent Hill.335 Time, Inc. won the case in the 
end. And Nixon appeared devastated. His behavior in public, however, was in 
stark contrast with his actions behind the scenes. Rachel Brady describes how 
during the years in the White House, “...Nixon learned a great deal from the way 
Johnson treated personal privacy. Amongst other things, he adopted Johnson’s 
use of the FBI and other investigatory agencies to further his political ends while 
publicly behaving like a crusader for personal privacy protection. To the public, 
still recoiling from Johnson and the FBI, Nixon was a champion of personal 
privacy protection.”336 Nevertheless, in an indirect way, Nixon’s actions ultimately 
led to an increase in privacy legislation. As previously noted, the Privacy Act of 
1974 passed rapidly after Watergate. The Act incorporates many of the 
recommendations made by the HEW Report. Its focus is exclusively on personal 
information maintained by the public sector. The Act is “...the only omnibus act 
that protects informational privacy.” 337 
 The Privacy Act of 1974338 remains the most important piece of legislation 
with regard to information privacy for the public sector.339 The Privacy Act states, 
among other things, how “[n]o agency shall disclose any record which is contained 
in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to 
another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written 
consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains.”340 The Act makes several 
exceptions to this requirement.341 Robert Gellman writes “[i]n some ways, the 
Privacy Act was a tremendously influential piece of legislation. It was the world’s 
first attempt to apply the principles of fair information practices...This does not 
mean the Privacy Act was a success at home. There is a big difference between 
adopting good policies and implementing them well. A review of the act under the 
framework of fair information practices illustrates the statutory and administrative 
shortcomings.”342  
 Additional legislation with regard to information privacy for the public sector 
is more specific and therefore maintains limited applicability. Main examples 
include the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974 which 
establishes and regulates the conditions under which educational agencies may 
disclose information about their students to others with or without the prior 
consent of the individual343, and the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPPA) of 1996, which regulates the protection of 
                                                
335 Brady, R. (2007). From Court to Country: A Legal, Social and Political Analysis of Privacy in the U.S., 1965-
1974. Unpublished thesis. Available at:  
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=poli_honors (last 
accessed July 12, 2010).  
336 Ibid: 73.  
337 Shaffer, G. (1999). The Power of EU Collective Action: The Impact of EU Data Privacy Regulation 
on US Business Practice. European Law Journal, Vol. 5 (4): 422.  
338 5 U.S.C. § 552a 
339 Important and interesting to note is how the Privacy Protection Study Commission which published 
its report Personal Privacy in an Information Society in 1977 recommended an extension of the Privacy Act 
to include the private sector, and the regulation of Social Security Numbers, but the United States 
Congress ignored these recommendations.  
340 Ibid.  
341 See Conditions of Disclosure.  
342 Gellman, R. (2001). ‘Does Privacy Law Work?’ ’ in P.E. Agre & M. Rotenberg (eds.) Technology and 
Privacy: The New Landscape. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 196.  
343 20 U.S.C. § 1232g 
62     FERTILE GROUNDS      
 
 
individually identifiable health information in the health care sector and establishes 
penalties for wrongful disclosure of such information.344 
 In addition to data protection for educational and health records, the 
government also established the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994345 
(DPPA) which prohibits the release or use of personal information by any State 
Department of Motor Vehicles (or any officer, employee, or contractor thereof) 
about an individual obtained by the Department through a motor vehicle record. 
The background story which led to the introduction of the DPPA is particularly 
imperative for the demonstration of the reactive nature of data protection in the 
United States. The main event leading up to the DPPA was the death of actress 
Rebecca Schaeffer in 1989.346 An obsessed fan hired a private investigator to 
discover Schaeffer’s private address. The investigator managed to obtain 
Schaeffer’s address from the California Department of Motor Vehicles. The fan 
subsequently used the address to stalk and kill Schaeffer. Still, several years later, 
during a Senate Hearing on the Identity Theft Assumption and Deterrence Act in 
1998, Special Agent Mari Riley described how the Washington Post issued a series of 
articles in March 1998 in which the Post elaborated on how various State and local 
government agencies released personal information to marketers, database 
managers, and other interested parties. The Post furthermore reported how 
numerous Department of Motor Vehicle Agencies provided personal information 
in the form of mailing lists. Interested parties paid a fee to request the DMV to 
conduct a customized search of driver’s license and car registration records, which 
generally contain detailed personal data including unlisted addresses and medical 
conditions. One state agency earned approximately $12.9 million in revenue in 
exchange for motor vehicle agency generated mailing list information, according 
to the Post.347  
 For the private sector, the United States Congress introduced legislation in 
1970 through the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which promotes the 
accuracy, fairness, and privacy of information in the files of consumer reporting 
agencies (see chapter 5). Other initiatives intended to protect personal information 
from individuals within the private sector include the Cable Communications 
Policy Act (CPPA) of 1984, which intends to protect the personal information of 
clients of cable service providers.348 The CPPA requires cable service providers to 
inform their clients about the nature and the uses of the information collected 
about them. Disclosure of personal viewing habits of clients is prohibited through 
the CPPA, but disclosure about clients is permitted when such disclosure is 
“…necessary to render, or conduct a legitimate business activity related to, a cable 
service or other service provided by the cable operator to the subscriber.”349  
 Four years later, the United States Congress passed the Video Privacy 
Protection Act (VPPA) of 1988. This initiative was a response to reporters who 
managed to obtain the videocassette rental data of Supreme Court Justice 
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Nominee Robert Bork.350 The VPPA therefore prohibits the disclosure of titles of 
videocassettes which people have either bought or rented from videotape service 
providers. Whereas the content of the VPPA is largely irrelevant to the issue of 
financial identity theft, its background story is interesting to mention due to its 
expression of the ‘reactive nature’ of privacy policy in the United States.  
 For financial identity theft, the most relevant legal instruments with respect to 
data protection are the previously mentioned FCRA of 1970, the Fair and 
Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of 2003 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act (GLBA) of 1999. FACTA demands the truncation of credit card and debit 
card account numbers. FACTA specifically states how “...no person that accepts 
credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of business shall print more than the 
last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt provided 
to the cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction.”351 This part of FACTA 
applies to merchants and is an important amendment in light of dumpster diving, 
a method used by perpetrators to obtain sensitive information to commit identity 
theft. The GLBA includes provisions established to protect the personal financial 
information of consumers maintained by financial institutions.352        
 Overall, the privacy framework established in the United States receives both 
support and criticism. Selected sources support the available framework present in 
the United States with regard to information privacy, or rather data protection. 
Jonathan M. Winer testified how “[u]nlike the EU’s lax enforcement of its privacy 
directive, the U.S. systematically enforces its privacy laws. The U.S. also has a high 
level of self-regulation. U.S. regulators have issued detailed regulations governing 
privacy in the financial services sector, and they examined financial institutions for 
compliance with U.S. privacy laws.”353 Primarily based on a 2001 study conducted 
by Consumers International, Winer claims how “[o]ur system protects privacy in 
practice better than the EU system...We have a system in this country of 
regulation and enforcement that is very aggressive. You go over to the EU they 
have got soft guidelines, and they have got much less enforcement. They don’t 
have regulations for the most part.”354  
 Other arguments set forth by those in support of the privacy framework in the 
United States center around the importance of the market. Shaun A. Sparks claims 
how ‘Internet consumers’ in the United States receive similar protection to 
consumers in the European Union. Sparks furthermore states how the approach 
in the United States “...allows for the unfettered development of online business 
models...”355 The importance of such development is used in support of self-
regulation. Sparks writes how “[t]he argument for self-regulation is not an 
argument against all regulation; it is an argument that online businesses should 
have the freedom to expand the boundaries of a dynamic new medium without 
artificial limitations.”356 This argument in favor of self-regulation is familiar to the 
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United States and returns in chapter 5 during the discussion of the introduction of 
Internet banking. Other important proponents of the available framework include 
Thomas M. Lenard and Paul H. Rubin.357 
 Other sources, on the other hand, criticize the information privacy framework 
in the United States. Fred H. Cate summarizes the framework in the United States 
as follows, “[t]he protection for information privacy in the United States is 
disjointed, inconsistent, and limited by conflicting interests. There is no explicit 
constitutional guarantee of a right to privacy in the United States.”358 Furthermore, 
he states that “[t]he U.S. privacy principles are silent on the enforcement of 
privacy rights against data collectors and processors, and the constitutional 
commitment to a government of limited powers, particularly when expression is 
involved, poses a substantial obstacle to the creation of a government privacy 
authority.”359 The European approach taken instead receives more favorable 
reviews when authors draw a comparison between both the United States and the 
European Union. Joel R. Reidenberg notes, “[w]hile there is a consensus among 
democratic states that information privacy is a critical element of civil society, the 
United States has, in recent years, left the protection of privacy to markets rather 
than law. In contrast, Europe treats privacy as a political imperative anchored in 
fundamental human rights. European democracies approach information privacy 
from the perspective of social protection.”360  
 With regard to self-regulation, Jonathan P. Cody claims how such an approach 
received ample time to prove its effectiveness on the Internet. After three years, 
Cody claims, self-regulatory mechanisms have failed to catch on in the online 
environment. Unlike Sparks, Cody considers the approach in the United States to 
be void of the core principles expressed in the European Union.361 Taken as a 
whole, Colin Bennett succinctly captures the failure of the information privacy 
framework in the United States when he writes, “[t]he approach to making privacy 
policy in the United States is reactive rather than anticipatory, incremental rather 
than comprehensive, and fragmented rather than coherent. There may be a lot of 
laws, but there is not much protection.”362 The reactive character of the approach 
with respect to privacy policy is certainly demonstrated through the introduction 
of the DPPA and the VPPA, and to some extent the manner through which the 
Privacy Act came about after Watergate and its political implications. The lack of a 
comprehensive approach to privacy policy appears to be the result of American 
fear for excessive government intervention in private activities and a dislike for 
broad industry regulations, according to Reidenberg.363 
 Another important criticism raised against the privacy framework in the 
United States is the Third Party Doctrine, which is an important limit of the 
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Fourth Amendment right to unreasonable search and seizures. Once information 
is relinquished to a third party, such information no longer receives the protection 
of the Fourth Amendment rights. As a result, any information provided to third 
parties, whether banks or Internet Service Providers, is available to the 
government.  
 The Third Party Doctrine is a source of support and criticism. Solove provides 
an alternative proposal for the Third Party Doctrine which requires law 
enforcement to obtain probable cause in order to obtain access to information 
held by third parties.364 Another alternative comes from Christopher Slobogin 
who argues in favor of a proportionality principle.365 Slobogin criticizes the 
alternative introduced by Solove due to its ‘overinclusive’ nature, since Solove fails 
to distinguish between the types of information held by third parties and as such 
the proposal requires law enforcement to have probable cause for all information 
before they can gain access. The proportionality principle introduced and 
defended by Slobogin distinguishes between various categories of information. 
These include organizational vs. personal, private vs. public, and content vs. 
catalogic records.366    
 According to Stephen E. Henderson, the Third Party Doctrine is not the 
universal constitutional rule in the United States. Henderson notes how eleven 
States reject the Third Party Doctrine and provide some Fourth Amendment 
protections to information held by third parties.367  Henderson provides a more 
nuanced approach to the Third Party Doctrine and identifies various factors which 
he considers relevant to the decision of whether law enforcement ought to have 
access to the information. The first factor is the purpose of disclosure. Henderson 
writes how if the disclosure is necessary for societal participation, then such 
disclosure weighs in favor of restricted access to the information by law 
enforcement officials.368 The second and third factors focus on the personal 
nature and the amount of the information respectively.  
 Whereas Solove, Slobogin, and Henderson all aim to develop an alternative to 
the practice of the Third Party Doctrine in contemporary society, Orin S. Kerr 
defends the Third Party Doctrine. Generally, Kerr states how those whom have 
attacked the Third Party Doctrine have failed to observe its benefits. And these 
critics have also in turn overestimated the weaknesses of the Doctrine. More 
specifically, Kerr writes how “[t]he third-party doctrine serves two important roles: 
blocking substitution effects that upset the technological neutrality of Fourth 
Amendment law and furthering clarity of Fourth Amendment rules.”369   
 The criticism against the sectoral approach used in the United States does not 
automatically lead to support for a comprehensive federal omnibus privacy law, 
such as the European Union maintains. Paul M. Schwartz describes the possible 
negative effect of the introduction of a federal omnibus information privacy law in 
the United States. Throughout the years, individual States “...have been especially 
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important laboratories for innovations in information privacy law.”370 As 
laboratories States have played a pivotal role in the evolution of information 
privacy law, particularly due to the ability of the various States to identify a need 
for legislation early on. Furthermore, States have demonstrated innovative 
approaches to challenges posed by societal changes, according to Schwartz, and 
through the varying nature of approaches States have also allowed for 
simultaneous experimentation which leads to a more insightful look on the most 
promising types of information privacy law. The emphasis of the argument set 
forth by Schwartz is on the relation between the Federal nature of the United 
States and its implications for legislation. A Federal omnibus privacy law may 
negatively impact the benefits of individual state action due to the issue of 
preemption. The innovative character of individual state action often increases the 
level and quality of consumer protection. Preemption then trumps the state’s 
ability to offer heightened consumer protection and to experiment with more 
innovative approaches than available at the Federal level.  
 Another concern expressed by Schwartz is the potential that the Federal 
government is unlikely to revisit the statute to amend certain aspects. This could 
pose a problem because of the continuously evolving landscape of information 
privacy. Especially as societal developments introduce new risks and challenges for 
consumers.  
 Patricia L. Bellia partially criticizes the argument set forth by Schwartz. In her 
contribution to the debate, she writes “[s]trong preemption is unproblematic if the 
resulting regulation strikes the right privacy balance; the real concern is that federal 
law will be broadly preemptive and will under regulate.”371 While Bellia shares this 
apprehension, she claims it is not a concern of federalism or comprehensive 
federal legislation. “I am not confident that we can credit state experimentation 
with privacy successes or that we can blame federalization for its failures.”372   
 
3.3.2 The Netherlands  
 
On the other side of the ocean, the privacy and data protection debate began 
during the sixties. The initial debate mainly took place outside of the public eye. A 
television show about the Second World War accompanied by various 
publications describing the role of the near perfect record-keeping activities used 
to isolate and subsequently eradicate the Jewish population slowly began to 
illustrate potential problems.373 The government nevertheless maintained a 
positive outlook on the possibility of automated record-keeping and yearned for 
the most efficient usage of such tools. To accomplish its mission, the Minister of 
the Interior initiated a research committee to investigate the redesign and 
automation of public record keeping. In particular, the government expressed 
interest in the possibility and desirability of the usage of other methods and tools 
to conduct record-keeping.374 The government also desired to discover, through 
the Committee, how to most efficiently guide the communication of information 
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between the information provider and the agencies receiving the information. 
Several years after its installation, in 1968, the Committee Simons published its 
report and provided several recommendations.  
 In its report, the Committee claims how it would be a testament to bad policy 
if the government were to fail to fully profit from the benefits offered through 
modern electronic machines for administrative purposes.375 Furthermore, the 
Committee emphasizes the increased benefit of massive information collection 
and storage, and uses this idea as a lead into its recommendation for the 
establishment of a central database.376 Such centralized data collection, storage and 
processing requires a tool to facilitate its usage and efficiency. The Committee 
therefore introduces an administrative number which assists the codification of 
the information maintained by the central database. This was to also facilitate the 
information exchange between the information providers and the recipients. And 
makes information easier to store and find. The usability of the number is most 
extensive when all government agencies along with a selected group of private 
sector organizations are allowed to use the number.  
 Throughout the discussions of its recommendations, the Committee 
continuously emphasizes the efficiency and convenience benefits attached to the 
introduction of a central database and an accompanying administration number 
for citizens. The security aspect is mentioned more as an afterthought than as an 
essential element of the system. The Committee identifies the sensitive nature of 
the information maintained in the database and claims the government maintains 
the responsibility to ensure the safety of the information and to prevent access to 
third parties.  
 After the publication of its findings and recommendations, the government 
called upon another committee to follow up on the research conducted by the 
Committee Simons. The follow up was to investigate the desirability of the 
introduction and broad implementation of a general administrative number.377 The 
Committee Westerhout expressed its support for the introduction and subsequent 
implementation of a general administrative number for all citizens in the 
Netherlands.  
 Parallel to these committee developments began the preparations for the 
census of 1971. The preparation of the 1971 Dutch census, which occurred during 
the summer of 1970, became the instigator for the subsequent public outrage. 
Through reports from a more critical media, the public became interested and a 
sense of unrest commenced. As a result, the period leading up to the 1971 census 
became one of awareness raising, both among the public as well as the media.378 
The census discussion placed the topic of privacy firmly on the map. According to 
Frank Kuitenbrouwer, “[o]ur country lost its innocence on Sunday 28 February 
1971 when precisely at midnight the official start sign of the fourteenth general 
population census (since 1829) rang.”379 The census inspired an enormous number 
of action groups who engaged in protests. Kuitenbrouwer notes how it is not as 
surprising as it may initially appear that the statistical research caused such public 
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outrage and unrest. Statistical research can lead to statements about certain groups 
of people which means individuals within those groups can experience the 
consequences of such conclusions. While the individual may enter anonymously, 
the results become personal.380  
 Due to the protests which incorporated doom scenarios as portrayed in 
George Orwell’s 1984 along with Kafka’s The Trial, emotions or rather emotion-
filled speech dominated the debate.381 Public officials welcomed this ‘emotional 
character’ because they claimed how rational reasoning was absent from the 
discussion since emotions played such a vital role. Furthermore, the examples used 
during the discussions of the contested developments and their associated dangers 
mainly came from the United States. The government front subsequently managed 
to easily dismiss these examples as ‘horror stories from the United States.’382 In 
addition, the debate surrounding the incorporation and subsequent usage of 
personal identification numbers often included references to the personal 
identification card used during the Second World War. Public officials perceived 
and labeled this reference yet again as emotional.  
 Still, the interest of the public created sufficient political pressure and 
momentum to force the political arena to investigate the potential for dangers 
associated with the automation of personal record-keeping. On 16 March, 1972, 
the Minister of Justice introduced the State Committee Koopmans. During the 
induction of the Committee, the Minister of Justice described how only recently 
the potential for invasions of privacy through the use of the computer came to 
light. In particular, the ability to combine various sources of personal information 
along with the opportunity to access such personal information from a distance 
are risks which remained unknown until the early seventies, according to the 
Minister.383 The potential dangers formed the primary reason for the 
establishment of the Committee and its assignment to conduct background 
research. The Minister furthermore notes how the potential dangers associated 
with accumulating, storing and processing personal information should be 
analyzed both with regard to the public as well as the private sector. The mere 
possession, according to the Minister, of information about others can provide 
individuals or agencies with the power to significantly influence the lives of others. 
The government gave the Committee Koopmans considerable freedom to 
elaborate upon the assignment as the Committee saw fit for the occasion. Despite 
the freedom, the government emphasized the need to examine the dangers 
associated with automated registration systems. In its final report, the Committee 
acknowledges the desirability for additional legislation with regard to the 
protection of personal information in automated systems.384 
 Parallel to the discussion on proposing legislation to develop a data protection 
framework, the government introduced an amendment to the Dutch Constitution 
on February 17, 1988 which officially recognized the right to privacy.385 This 
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amendment came years after the peak of the political debate on privacy. This peak 
occurred during the mid-seventies when the Prime Minister described the right to 
privacy as an essential condition for a humanitarian existence and as a 
fundamental principle of the rule of law.386  This description of privacy therefore 
required its incorporation into the constitution in an effort to demonstrate its 
fundamental importance to the State and its citizens.  
 After years of political discussion and research, the government introduced the 
Wet persoonsregistraties (WPR) or the Dutch Data Protection Act, which came into 
effect on July 1, 1989. This extended time frame between the publication of the 
conclusions of the Committee Koopmans and the actual introduction of 
legislation with respect to data protection is partly the result of alternative 
methods of data protection implementation. The Netherlands used most of the 
seventies and the eighties to experiment with self-regulation and sectoral 
legislation. The Bureau for Credit Registration and the direct marketing sector 
developed codes of conduct in 1965 and 1975 respectively in the absence of 
government regulation for data collection and processing. In addition, banks, 
insurance corporations, and publishers also maintained codes of conducts to guide 
their data protection efforts. Peter Blok describes how these two decades can be 
observed as an experiment of American implementation mechanisms in a Dutch 
context.387 The existence of sectoral laws, before the introduction of the WPR, 
demonstrates how the Netherlands did have a range of applicable laws which 
regulated a number of important data registration systems.388  
 Despite the experimentation, the actual development of an overarching data 
protection act occurred slower than anticipated. This delay occurred despite the 
proclamation of the Minister of Justice about how the design of a data protection 
act received the highest priority within the Department.389 As Blok notes, the 
legislative process clearly did not demonstrate the same pace as the technological 
developments. Pressure from outside sources, such as developments within the 
Council of Europe, increased the necessity for the introduction of a data 
protection act. The initial design of the data protection act proved remarkably 
similar to the recommendations made by the Committee Koopmans, which led to 
an increased level of irritation about the delay of the design.390 The initial design of 
the data protection act did not distinguish between the public and the private 
sector and primarily focused on automated personal data registration. Various 
sources voiced their criticism about the bill.391  
 The second attempt introduced by the Minister of Justice on July 25, 1985 
provided a radically different bill. Despite the differences, the bill maintained the 
original ideas of the Committee Koopmans. The bill maintained the character of 
an omnibus law and introduced a central supervisory organ. The revised bill did 
distinguish between the public and the private sector. The bill still proved 
applicable to both sectors, but obligated the public sector to implement a 
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framework of self-regulation whereas the bill merely encouraged the private sector 
to implement self-regulatory mechanisms.     
 Party as a result of developments at the European level, the WPR became the 
object of extensive evaluation. The Ministry of Justice initiated two evaluations. 
The first focused on the effectiveness of the law and paid particular attention to 
the incorporated system of self-regulation within the Act.392 The second 
evaluation shed a different light on the WPR through its social scientific analysis 
of the law.393 Both research evaluations published particularly negative conclusions 
about the effectiveness of the WPR.  
 The legal evaluation concluded how there is a lack of compliance with the 
administrative mandates anchored in the law. Especially the mandate to notify the 
central supervisory organ of data registration activities is approached and observed 
as “a one-time obligation of a purely administrative manner.”394 Many ignore the 
mandate and fail to notify the Registration Chamber altogether. The initial period 
of implementation demonstrates a quantitative peak of notifications. According to 
Overkleeft-Verburg, “[t]he curve of notification shows that observance of the 
obligation of notification was concentrated in the first phase of the 
implementation of the WPR, the period from January 1st 1990 to July 1st 
1991.”395 Soon thereafter, notifications from the private sector quickly dropped, 
whereas for the public sector the decline proved more subtle and gradual.  
 Besides the quantitative neglect, the quality of the notifications also failed to 
meet the standards as identified by the WPR. Overkleeft-Verburg calls the overall 
results with respect to notification and self-regulation disappointing. “It is ignored 
by many, or only taken as a token of obligation. Even an active enforcement 
policy by the Registration Chamber cannot be expected to change this 
radically.”396      
 The social scientific evaluation captured the essence of the WPR when the 
authors write, “[a] law for outsiders and a law for insiders: this is how the DPA 
can be characterised. During its five-year existence, this act has generally eluded 
the attention of those it was intended for: the data subjects. Outsiders are those 
who in every day terms have to work with a rules system that is complicated, 
difficult to access and substantially only usable in a limited way. Therefore, it 
remains an act for outsiders.”397 The main aim, according to the authors, especially 
in light of societal developments, ought to be to make the ‘outsider’ an ‘insider’ 
with respect to the protection of personal data and the protection of autonomy 
and identity.   
 The sequel to the WPR, Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens (Wbp), came about in 
part as a result of the negative evaluations. The government acknowledged the 
inadequacies of the WPR and also realized the need for change. The other main 
development which compelled the government to initiate new legislation was the 
introduction of the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Union. Just as 
developments with respect to data protection, or information privacy, occurred in 
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the Netherlands and the United States, other governmental organs also observed 
changes in society and responded accordingly. The Directive 95/46/EC is a 
product of these observations and concerns. David Smith states how “[t]he EU 
Data Protection Directive is designed to harmonize European laws and to remove 
barriers to the flow of information within Europe. It essentially takes the Council 
of Europe Convention further, makes it a mandatory requirement, and modifies it 
in relation to EU member states.”398 Smith refers to the Council of Europe 
Convention which finds its roots in the early 1970s as the Council of Europe 
recognized the need to “establish a framework of specific principles and norms to 
prevent unfair collection and processing of personal data.”399 This conclusion 
came as a result of the rapid changes with regard to electronic data processing and 
the introduction of extensive data banks during the 1960s. During the early 1970s, 
the Council adopted Resolutions (73) 22 and 74 (29), which are viewed as the first 
building blocks of the current supranational data protection regime. These 
resolutions introduced principles for the protection of personal data in automated 
data banks both in the private and the public sector.400  
 The Council’s main aim for the resolutions was to inspire national legislation 
of a similar fashion. Through the development process of the resolutions, 
however, the Council came to realize how thorough data protection could only be 
effective through the inclusion of both national and international legislation and 
enforcement. In 1972, the Conference of European Ministers of Justice concurred 
with the Council’s conclusion. After several years of negotiation, the Council 
presented the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data in 1981. Several years later, in 1990, the 
European Commission wrote “[t]he increasingly frequent recourse to the 
processing of personal data in every sphere of economic and social activity and the 
new data-exchange requirements linked to the strengthening of European 
integration necessitate the introduction in the Community of measures to ensure 
the protection of individuals in relation to the processing of personal data and to 
enhance the security of information processing in the context, notably, of the 
development of open telecommunications networks.”401 The need for a separate 
Directive within the European Union therefore became apparent. Especially since 
the Commission also received calls from the European Parliament to take action 
through a proposal for a directive to harmonize laws across the Member States 
since 1976.402 Some years after 1976, the Commission recognized the need for 
data protection across all Member States in the European Union. As such the 
Commission encouraged all Member States to ratify the Council of Europe 
Convention, for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data 1981, before the end of 1982.403   
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The Commission, however, also acknowledged the need to go one step beyond 
recommending Member States to ratify the Council’s Convention. As the 
Commission stated in 1990, “[t]he diversity of national approaches and the lack of 
a system of protection at the Community level are and obstacle to completion of 
the internal market.”404 Especially during a time when the cross-border flow of 
data became more important for businesses, research bodies and the cooperation 
of various authorities in the Member States it was essential to ensure the 
protection of the fundamental right of all EU citizens to privacy. The Strasbourg 
Council of 8 and 9 December 1989 also emphasized the primary need to ensure 
the protection of individuals in personalized data banks as part of the promotion 
of the movement of people and products. The growing pressure assisted in the 
introduction of the ultimate product which came about in 1995 through the 
Directive 95/46/EC. The Member States received the mandate to implement the 
Directive at the national level within three years after its introduction.  
 The Dutch government failed to meet its deadline in October 1998. Instead, 
the government only presented the first draft of the bill in February 1998.405 The 
bill received fierce criticism from various stakeholders, especially since they all 
held different, and at times, conflicting interests.406 Due to the complications 
associated with the criticism, the Minister decided in November 1998 to introduce 
substantial changes to the bill. These changes once again led to criticism from 
unhappy stakeholders which forced the government to spend the following year in 
search of a compromise.407 Certain changes needed to be reversed as a result of 
objections posed by the Lower House. Perhaps in an effort to meet the needs of 
many stakeholders, the government developed a complicated piece of legislation, 
which made its unpopularity soar.408  
 The Wbp came into force on September 1, 2001. The Wbp differs from its 
predecessor in a number of respects. The most prominent difference appears to 
be that the legislative focus extends beyond the mere registration of personal data 
to include any and all ways of dealing with personal data such as collecting, 
organizing, adjusting, changing, spreading, processing, and destroying personal 
information.409 This expansion is a direct response to societal developments and 
demands with regard to the handling of personal information. Especially since the 
mere registration of such information was no longer the central aspect of personal 
information and its protection.410 Other differences include the elimination of the 
distinction of personal data protection in the public and the private sector.  
 The main elements, on the other hand, of the Wbp coincide with its 
predecessor and the ideas discussed by the Committee Koopmans. The Wbp 
introduces several open standards with regard to data protection which require 
individual organizations to introduce specific self-regulation. Due to the 
elimination of the distinction between the sectors, the standards became even 
broader than in the WPR. The law guarantees the right to all data subjects to view 
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and correct their personal information. And data subjects can also resist the 
processing of personal data in the realm of direct marketing.   
 Since Article 80 of the Wbp calls for an evaluation, the Minister of Justice 
commissioned a dual evaluation in 2007.411 The first evaluation was to discover 
the ‘bottlenecks’ of the Wbp based on a literature study. The second evaluation, 
on the other hand, was to focus on a more empirical analysis of the law based on 
field research. The literature study which focused on the bottlenecks provided the 
following conclusions.412 The first bottleneck is the lack of clarity provided by the 
law itself. This is because such unclarity complicates compliance and might 
obstruct technological developments. This conclusion is not shared by all authors 
of the evaluation since others support the ‘broad’ character of the law and as such 
view the preservation of such broadness as imperative. The omnibus nature of the 
law, according to the authors, leads to challenges related to the complexity of 
interpretation and a lack of flexibility. Despite these challenges, the omnibus 
nature of the law is still preferred over a sectoral approach.413   
 The second evaluation, which maintained a more empirical character, came 
about in September 2008.414 The results indicated how the implementation of the 
legislation was yet to be fully realized. The image developed as a result of the 
research conducted demonstrated how the law was not really alive in legal 
practice.415 The open standards required time to be more specifically defined. 
Furthermore, because of the different challenges encountered in various sectors, 
specification of standards required jurisprudence and context specific knowledge. 
The evaluation states how the Wbp is a young piece of legislation. Yet, the team 
also recognizes the existence of its predecessor, which means its youth is hardly an 
argument in support of its disappointing implementation. The mere existence of 
open standards as a core element of the WBP is in itself not a problem or a 
stumbling block. Such an existence becomes problematic when the development 
of specific norms and codes of conduct fails to occur in the various relevant 
branches.416 At the time of the evaluation, approximately half of the relevant 
organizations had established a privacy code; as such, the other half had not.  
 The role of the Data Protection Authority (DPA) received mixed reviews.417 
Whereas some expressed their contentment with regard to the work of the DPA, 
in particular the publications, others desired more from the agency. Those who 
wanted more action from the DPA specifically wanted the agency to play a larger 
role in compliance assistance, information delivery, and advice. There appears to 
be a significant demand for assistance with regard to the interpretation and 
explanation of the law. 
 In January 2008, the deputy Minister of Justice along with the Minister of the 
Interior installed the Committee Brouwer-Korf in order to assess the possibilities 
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for a faster and more responsible method of data exchange among various parties 
including aid workers, crime fighters and prevention workers.418 The Committee 
Brouwer-Korf speaks of an intensification of the government’s battle with respect 
to small and large forms of criminality. The worldwide fight against terrorism 
functions as a driver for legislation where the collective security forms the primary 
objective. Others, including citizens and the private sector, also appear to 
demonstrate a growing demand for a more active state to establish a secure society 
and to eradicate unsafe situations. Privacy and security have become opposite 
concepts during the intensification of the government’s role as protector in its 
fight against all forms of criminality. The Committee describes a situation 
throughout which privacy and security are used as catch-all phrases without the 
necessary specification of what either concept implies throughout the debate. The 
concept of security appears to be claimed by those who wish to protect society 
from all potential risks, including terrorism, crime, and abuse of personal data.419 
Privacy, on the other hand, appears to be defended by those who aim to secure 
the democratic values required for a society to thrive.420  
 The most accurate reflection of the debate set forth by the Committee is their 
description of the one sided usage of both concepts. Such a one sided depiction of 
privacy and security leads to a situation where the concepts become enemies 
rather than cooperative partners in a complex society.421 Discussions speak either 
of security or privacy rather than presenting a more overarching approach which 
encompasses both aspects. This is problematic in light of the position of collective 
security as a top priority for public policy.422 The Committee eloquently describes 
how “[t]he depiction of security therefore occurs in absolute terms whereas 
privacy remains relative and therefore adjustable to the other interests at stake in 
society. Law enforcement along with various politicians focus on the less positive 
aspect of privacy which generally hinders certain actions they wish to take. Such 
less positive aspects are, however, the cost of liberty. To treat privacy or data 
protection as a conditional right opens the door to abuse.”423  
 The Committee acknowledges the lack of attention granted to the need to 
strike a meaningful balance between privacy and security. More recently, the idea 
of striking a balance has demanded more attention from the political arena 
through the publication of academic research.424 The segregated debate about 
privacy and security fails to stimulate an understanding or realization about how 
the right to privacy in itself is a form of security, albeit individual security.   
 All of the various developments through the past decades have increased the 
tension between privacy and security. The Committee sets forth six general criteria 
which ought to be applied to situations where a balance must be found between 
security and privacy. These six criteria include: 
 
1 Transparancy, unless… 
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2 Select before you collect – the main aim of this condition introduced by 
the Committee is to minimize data collection down to the bare necessity. 
The Committee also pleads for a risk assessment before data is collected 
and stored by officials. 
3 In case necessary for security purposes, you must share – If it is clear 
individuals are in danger or at risk of being endangered, and the sharing 
of personal information can reduce the danger or its accompanying risk, 
then relevant officials must share personal information.  
4 Ensure integrity of data, systems, and the handling of users – During the 
development of systems, privacy-related risks must be taken into 
consideration during the early stages.  
5 Provide education and facilitation – Best and good practices must be 
available for those out in the field. 
6 Ensure compliance and internal supervision. 
 
In its reaction to the report presented by the Committee Brouwer-Korf, the 
government recognizes the limited effectiveness of the current legal framework 
available. The government therefore presents several proposals to approach the 
‘causes’ of the problem.425 These proposals are diverse and include both legal and 
incentive related policy. This is, according to the government, a first step toward a 
new approach in its effort to protect the privacy of the citizens of the 
Netherlands. To carry out these proposals, the government plans to install a 
‘program organization’ which shall include representatives of all relevant parties. 
Furthermore, the government intends to introduce amendments to the current 
data protection law, which shall include the recommendations set forth by the 
Committee Brouwer-Korf, the evaluation report of the data protection law, and 
input received by other parties such as the DPA. 
 During the parliamentary debate in response to the reaction offered by the 
government, certain members of the Lower House referred to critical aspects of 
the reaction. Alexander Pechtold reflected on the select before you collect 
recommendation set forth by the Committee. He describes how various 
intelligence agencies are nearly drowning in the information they collect and there 
is a low ‘gold to garbage ratio’ as the Americans say.426 Pechtold states how in 
response to the recommendation the government claims it only collects 
information which is absolutely necessary to accomplish an objective. This 
reaction, according to Pechtold, lacks self-criticism especially in light of the 
collection of SWIFT and PNR data.  
 This remark is of vital importance for the overall approach to and treatment of 
data protection, including data collection, processing, and storage by government 
agencies. As the above demonstrates, the primary focus, when the computer came 
into the picture, was on the capabilities of automated systems to improve record 
keeping activities. The potential vulnerabilities only received attention as a result 
of public pressure. Moreover, the tension between collective and individual 
security, or privacy, is evident, especially in light of the continuous pressure put on 
data protection requirements and the near obsession expressed by government 
agencies to collect and store personal information.  
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3.4 Data Security Breach Legislation 
 
3.4.1 United States 
 
Changes in the privacy and data protection landscape inevitably led to a search for 
additional means of protection. The general story traces the historical background 
of data security breach notification initiatives in the United States back to 2002, 
when hackers gained access to the State of California’s government payroll 
database, which contained sensitive personal information of over 250,000 state 
employees.427 The members of the California legislature were among the 
employees whose personal information was exposed through the data security 
breach. According to Benjamin Wright the onset for the notification requirement 
occurred because “[m]any employees, including the legislators, felt the California 
government was too slow to notify them about the burglary.”428 As a result, the 
State of California passed two separate initiatives in 2002. First, the California 
Security Breach Information Act429 which requires any company which stores 
customer data electronically to notify its California customers of a security breach 
to the company’s computer system when the company knows or has reason to 
believe that unencrypted information about customers has been disclosed. The 
second law, commonly known as the California Financial Information Privacy 
Act,430 establishes new limits on the ability of financial institutions to share 
nonpublic personal information about their customers with affiliates and third 
parties.  
 The actual story, as told by California State Senator Joseph Simitian, 
demonstrates the strange confluence between politics and news media. In his own 
words, Simitian writes how “Assembly Bill 700, the security breach notification 
legislation…is the law today only because of a spelling error, an afterthought, an 
unrelated concern with digital signatures, a page three news story, the rule of 
germaneness, the intellectual quirks of a lame-duck Senator, the personal 
experiences of 120 State legislators, and another bill altogether, Assembly Bill 
2297.”431  The California Security Breach Information Act became the first of its 
kind and paved the way for many successors. These successors began after the 
media extensively reported on a data security breach at ChoicePoint in 2005 (see 
chapter 7). Consumers in California received notifications of the incident because 
of the statutory obligation imposed as a result of the California Security Breach 
Information Act, however the company refused to notify residents of other States 
which created the controvery that led to the spread of breach notification 
obligations.  
 Throughout the years, the number of States introducing data security breach 
notification requirements continued to grow. As of December 9, 2009, 45 States, 
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have enacted 
legislation requiring notification of security breaches involving personal 
information. Proposals for legislation at the Federal level of government are 
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presently under consideration. On December 8, 2009 H.R. 2221 the Data 
Accountability and Trust Act passed in the House of Representatives. The Act 
requires the Federal Trade Commission to promulgate regulations which require 
each person engaged in interstate commerce that owns or possesses electronic 
data containing personal information to establish security policies and 
procedures.432 Furthermore, the Act also authorizes the FTC to require a standard 
method or methods for destroying obsolete non-electronic data, and to require 
information brokers to submit their security policies to the FTC in conjunction 
with a security breach notification or after a request issued by the FTC. Moreover, 
the Act requires the FTC to conduct or require an audit of security practices of 
information brokers when a breach occurs which the broker must issue a 
notification of. The Act also authorizes additional audits after a breach. With 
respect to information brokers, the Act requires them to “…(1) establish 
procedures to verify the accuracy of information that identifies individuals; (2) 
provide to individuals whose personal information it maintains a means to review 
it; (3) place notice on the Internet instructing individuals how to request access to 
such information; and (4) correct inaccurate information.”433 Other aspects of the 
Act prescribe procedures for notification to the FTC and affected individuals of 
information security breaches, and set forth special notification requirements for 
breaches.434 If the Data Accountability and Trust Act also manages to successfully 
pass in the United States Senate, then its provisions shall preempt all State 
legislation with regard to data security breach notification. 
 Other Federal attempts with regard to data security breach notification 
occurred several years ago in 2005 when the FFIEC agencies issued their 
Interagency Guidelines on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to 
Customer Information and Customer Notice. Satish M. Kini and James T. Shreve 
describe how, “[i]n brief, the Security Guidelines required banks to adopt 
comprehensive, risk-based information security programs designed to ensure the 
confidentiality of customer information, to protect against anticipated threats to 
such information, and to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such 
information that could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to 
customers.”435 This approach differs from the Californian approach, according to 
Schwartz and Edward J. Janger, since the guidelines set forth an idea where the 
breach letter ought to be send out to the applicable public when the likelihood of 
harm is significant.436 This demonstrates the diversity in approaches with regard to 
data security breach notification.  
 Schwartz and Janger identify three different models. These include the model 
one which refers to statutes such as the Californian Security Breach Information 
Act. In model one, the threshold for notification is low. And the notification letter 
send to the victim must indicate the source of the breach. Schwartz and Janger 
describe model one as a pure notification model since a coordination structure 
which oversees the notifications is absent. The second model identified by 
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Schwartz and Janger is the paradigm followed by the Interagency Guidelines. This 
model provides for greater flexibility for organizations through a two-tier 
approach. The first tier concerns notification to the oversight agency of the 
financial institution. Such notification maintains the same low threshold as model 
one. The difference between both models rests with the threshold introduced for 
consumer notification. This threshold is higher for the interagency guidelines, as 
noted above. The third model is a response to and as such an alternative for the 
approach introduced through the interagency guidelines. The Chicago Federal 
Reserve Board (FRB) suggested the idea of an intermediary third party in response 
to the issued guidelines. Such a trusted third party is to coordinate the response 
after a security breach and also alleviate the disincentive of disclosure. Schwartz 
and Janger note how “[t]his third model highlights the fact that breach notification 
serves both an ex ante and an ex post function.”437  
 The spread of data security breach notification initiatives across the United 
States demonstrates their popularity as a means to provide for additional 
protection of consumers. This popularity stems from a selection of arguments set 
forth by proponents about the benefits and the necessity of such notification. 
These arguments in favor of notification focus on both consumers and the 
organizations which maintain their personal information. With respect to 
consumers, proponents reason how notification provides them with the necessary 
knowledge to take action in an effort to reduce the risk of identity theft.438  
 With respect to the organizations, the requirement to notify provides them 
with an incentive to prevent the occurrence of data security breaches through 
increased information security. This is because theoretically organizations want to 
prevent the potential reputation damage which might come about after sending 
the required notification. Such anticipated improved information security 
subsequently leads to a reduced opportunity for perpetrators of financial identity 
theft to access personal information. As Lilia Rode states, “[t]he duty to notify 
consumers about security breach inflicts tremendous costs on businesses. These 
costs inevitably induce behavioral changes that result in more sound privacy 
policies and improved data-security safeguards—thereby reducing identity 
theft.”439 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) also notes in a more 
hesitant manner how “[r]equiring consumer notification of data breaches may 
encourage better data security practices and help deter or mitigate harm from 
identity theft.”440   
Another argument made in favor of a statutory obligation to provide 
notification of a data security breach is the ability to collect data on security 
breaches in an effort to develop a more coherent picture about the events 
themselves.441 This includes both quantitative information, such as data on the 
prevalence of security breaches, but also qualitative data about the background of 
the breach and the vulnerabilities which led to its occurrence. This argument is 
less prevalent in the literature, but deserves attention especially since such 
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information about breaches can provide assistance in the examination of areas of 
improvement with respect to information security.   
Just as data security breach notification initiatives receive support, such 
initiatives also become the source of ample opposition. This opposition is posed 
both against the general idea of notification but also against the particulars of 
certain approaches, such as the threshold of notification maintained by the legal 
framework. The effectiveness of notification in light of consumer protection and 
empowerment is called into question. Thomas M. Lenard and Paul H. Rubin write 
“…in the best of circumstances, notification means that consumers might be able 
to respond more quickly to identity theft, not to avoid it altogether.”442 This 
conclusion is based on the inability of consumers to prevent or otherwise reduce 
the occurrence of financial identity theft once perpetrators manage to access the 
necessary personal information. As a result, the best case scenario is earlier 
detection in an effort to reduce the consequences of identity theft. This is 
nevertheless recognized by other sources and used to support notification rather 
than oppose its existence. Lenard and Rubin’s opposition is still relevant due to 
the statements made by others.443  
Elizabeth L. Garner expresses other concerns about the effective nature of 
notification for consumers.  Garner states how “[b]reach notifications have the 
potential to be the next credit card junk mail—the piece of mail received two to 
three times a week, which is ripped up immediately upon receipt with no attention 
paid to its contents.”444 Michael G. Oxley expresses similar worries when he states, 
“[o]ne of my concerns in this regard is that given the dramatic rise in recent 
reports on data breaches, there will be a headlong rush toward notification in 
every instance. When no evidence surfaces to indicate that their information has 
been misused, consumers may begin to ignore these notices as just that many 
more pieces of unsolicited junk mail.”445 This hypothetical disregard by consumers 
also calls into question another argument set forth in defense of notification, 
which is the incentive provided for organizations to improve their information 
security practices. If consumers disregard the notification, organizations no longer 
fear reputational damage or potential loss of clients as a result of such notification. 
 The validity of arguments made both in favor of and against notification 
depends on empirical assessments of the influence of notification requirements on 
the incidence rate of identity theft. Sasha Romanosky et al. concluded how the 
adoption of data security breach notification initiatives demonstrates a marginal 
effect of just fewer than 2% on the rate of identity theft cases.446 Despite this 
marginal effect, the authors emphasize the other benefits associated with data 
security breach initiatives, such as reducing the average victim’s losses and 
improving an organization’s security and operational practices. Other remarks 
made by Romanosky et al. refer to the obstacles faced to carry out their analysis. 
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These obstacles include the inability to obtain high-quality information on the 
incidence rate of identity theft from sources such as the financial service 
providers, a concern which others support.447 The connection between data 
security breaches and actual incidents of identity theft remains an area of 
uncertainty, which also complicates the ability to measure the effectiveness of 
interventions such as data security breach notifications. The GAO aimed to 
determine the causal relationship between data security breaches and incidents of 
identity theft and concluded how “[c]omprehensive information on the outcomes 
of data breaches is not available. Several cases have been identified in which a data 
breach appears to have resulted in identity theft, but available data and 
information from law enforcement and industry association representatives 
indicated that most breaches have not resulted in detected incidents of identity 
theft.”448 More specifically, the GAO states how of the 24 large security breaches 
investigated only 4 turned out to have resulted in incidents of identity theft.449  
ID Analytics, in turn, also conducted a study several years ago in 2007 and 
came to a number of key findings.450 According to ID Analytics, smaller breaches 
maintain a higher rate of misuse than larger breaches. Moreover, the actual misuse 
of personal information ranged from one in 200 identities for breaches of fewer 
than 5,000 individuals to a misuse rate of less than one in 10,000 identities for 
breaches of more than 100,000 individuals. Those using the obtained personal 
information demonstrate a high rate of turnaround. Fraudsters generally used a 
single identity for no more than two weeks before moving on to the next identity.  
Javelin Research & Strategy also published a report on the connection between 
identity theft and data security breaches. Hailed as “the first ever nationally 
representative report that shows the true known relationship between data 
breaches and actual occurrences of identity theft”, Javelin described how only a 
small percentage of data breaches led to actual incidents of identity theft. Through 
its results, Javelin determined the publicity granted to the breaches to be 
counterproductive as such publicity misdirect consumers about the ‘causes’ of 
identity theft. Overall, James Van Dyke notes how “[g]overnments and 
corporations must ensure that their data breach ‘cures’ do not cause more 
problems than the breach.”451 Oddly enough, Javelin published another study 
several years later which concluded how “ [i]f a consumer gets a data breach 
notification letter, they are four times more likely to suffer identity theft within the 
next year.”452 Perhaps there is a greater connection between data breaches and 
identity theft than Javelin desired to acknowledge previously. Javelin uses its 
results to demonstrate how notified consumers fail to take appropriate action to 
‘prevent and protect’ themselves from identity theft. This conclusion seems 
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shortsighted since the options for consumers to protect themselves are limited and 
severely decreased after a data breach (see chapter 6). 
 
3.4.2 The Netherlands 
 
The introduction of a data security breach notification mechanism in the 
Netherlands came about mainly through the influence of developments in other 
countries, especially the United States, but also through developments at the 
European level. The first call for the introduction of a data security breach 
notification framework came in 2005 by representatives of the Socialist and the 
Labor Party. This call came during the evaluation process of the law on computer 
crime. The discussion as a result of this proposal for a data security breach 
notification initiative stranded as it never went beyond the stage of discussing 
arguments in favor of and against its introduction. The government parties, the 
Minister of Justice, along with the consumers union expressed views against the 
introduction of a notification requirement. The Minister of Justice believed self-
regulation within the private sector proved sufficient.  
 Several years later, as officials at the European level already found themselves 
in the midst of a debate on the issue, the discussion also returned on the political 
agenda in the Netherlands. During the general meeting of the Lower House on 
the protection of vital infrastructures held on April 3, 2008, the Labor party 
proposed the idea of a notification requirement for large corporations.453 Other 
events which stimulated the discussion and call for the introduction of a 
notification requirement include the airing of an episode of Zembla454 in November 
2008, where officials of the public prosecutor’s office along with those from the 
DPA emphasized the need for such an initiative in the Netherlands. Through the 
airing of the episode, the issue began to receive more attention from the media 
and to a lesser extent from the public. On January 25, 2010, Bits of Freedom 
issued a position paper in favor of data security breach notification legislation.455 
The organization bases its position on the following points: the increase of storage 
of personal data in databases, the correlated increase of risks associated with 
potential leaks of such data, and the potential consequences of such data leaks for 
those involved. Therefore, those involved ought to have the right to be notified of 
such a leak. Bits of Freedom considers all parties to be responsible for notification 
when they suffer a leak. These notifications ought to go to the ‘victims’ as well as 
to an independent government agency.456  
 In order to develop a more comprehensive background on the topic, the 
Minister of the Interior promised the Lower House an exploratory study on the 
issue of data security breach notification mechanisms. Through an international 
quickscan, the study457 provides a coherent and concise overview of the arguments 
made in favor of as well as in opposition to the introduction of a notification 
requirement. Especially the arguments listed against the notification requirement 
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deserve a brief moment of attention. Apparently, certain opponents use, or 
perhaps abuse, the financial crisis as an argument against the notification 
requirement. Since the financial crisis, according to these opponents, has already 
caused considerable damage to the trust consumers hold with regard to the 
financial sector, the introduction of a notification requirement shall only lead to a 
further decrease of trust in the sector. Closely related is the argument made against 
notification requirements by organizations who express the preference to keep 
information about the occurrence of a security breach indoors. This preference is 
in response to the fear of potential reputation damage. Both of these arguments 
focus on the potential damage such a notification can cause to the image of the 
company and the trust of consumers in such an organization.  
 As the researchers conclude, the notification requirement primarily appears to 
be used as a means to stimulate organizations to improve their information 
security practices, which hypothetically occurs due to the earlier mentioned fear of 
reputational damage. Furthermore, the researchers conclude, based on responses 
received from interviewees, how a notification requirement ought to apply to both 
the public and the private sector. But the interviewed experts noted how 
notification is not an appropriate instrument for consumers to reverse the 
potentially negative consequences of data loss.458 In addition, the actual 
supervision and enforcement of such a notification framework is of crucial 
importance for the effectiveness of the requirement. Closely related, the 
researchers also emphasize how the supervisory organs or individuals must 
possess the necessary resources and liberty to carry out their mandate. Due to the 
availability of alternatives, there is not necessarily a need nor a desire for the 
introduction of a new separate organ to supervise and enforce the notification 
requirement. The researchers also conclude how respondents to their questions 
emphasized the favorable nature of harmonized European legislation with regard 
to notification requirements.  
 Other important features which surfaced as a result of the interviews 
conducted in the Netherlands are the need for a more comprehensive approach to 
the problem, which means that in addition to a notification requirement the 
government must also introduce other instruments or improve existing 
instruments. These include a fraud register much like CIFAS has in the United 
Kingdom, along with additional investigate capacity for the police with regard to 
hackers, and additional capacity for OPTA.459 Other additional initiatives 
suggested by the respondents include the introduction of a whistle-blower policy 
or the obligation of an internal privacy officer for organizations.  
 The legislative development process in the Netherlands is strongly influenced 
by the anticipation of parallel developments at the European level. Ross Anderson 
et al. set forth a recommendation for the European Union to adopt a 
comprehensive security-breach notification law. Within their study, Anderson et al. 
aimed to determine which information security issues should be dealt with at the 
Member State level and which issues require the involvement of the European 
Union, either through harmonization or coordination. According to Anderson et 
al., “[t]here has long been a shortage of hard data about information security 
failures, as many of the available statistics are not only poor but are collected by 
parties such as security vendors or law enforcement agencies that have a vested 
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interest in under- or over-reporting.”460 Furthermore, Anderson et al. describe how 
“[c]ompanies are hesitant to discuss their weaknesses with competitors even 
though a coordinated view of attacks could prompt faster mitigation to everyone’s 
benefit.”461 Comprehensive security-breach notification could provide assistance 
with respect to this problem, according to Anderson et al. The authors refer to the 
situation in the United States, where security-breach notification has been an 
instrument since 2003.  
 The issue of notification after a breach had already been proposed in 2006 
during the review of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services.462 Since the proposal was set forth within the specific 
context of Directive 2001/58/EC, its applicability proved limited to telecom and 
Internet Service Providers. As Anderson et al. note, the proposal “…would require 
notification to be made where a network security breach was responsible for the 
disclosure of personal data. This is a very narrow definition…and will only deal 
with a small fraction of cases that a California-style law would cover.”463  
 The proposal for a notification requirement also received significant support 
from the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS). The EDPS believes that 
security-breach notification maintains various significant benefits. In its opinion, 
the EDPS writes how such notification “...reinforces the accountability of 
organizations, is a factor that drives companies to implement stringent security 
measures and it permits the identification of the most reliable technologies 
towards protecting information. Furthermore, it allows the affected individuals the 
opportunity to take steps to protect themselves from identify theft or other misuse 
of their personal information.”464  
 Despite the general support for a comprehensive security-breach notification, 
political disagreements occurred between the various institutions. The main 
disagreement revolves around the actors the obligation ought to apply to. The 
EDPS along with the Article 29 Working Party members requested the 
notification requirement to apply to a wider range of actors, including online 
banks and other service providers. During its first reading, the European 
Parliament also supported such a broadening, but in the end the mandatory 
notification remained rather restrictive. A Directive was passed which inserted in 
Article 2(h) and 4(3) of the ePrivacy Directive “…a mandatory notification of 
personal data breaches by providers of electronic communications services and 
networks.”465 And claims, “[i]t is an important step towards enhanced security and 
privacy protection, although at this stage it remains limited to the electronic 
communications sector.”466 Furthermore, “[t]he Commission takes note of the will 
of the European Parliament that an obligation to notify personal data breaches 
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should not be limited to the electronic communications sector but also apply to 
entities such as providers of information society services. Such an approach would 
be fully aligned with the overall public policy goal of enhancing the protection of 
EU citizens’ personal data, and their ability to take action in the event of such data 
being compromised.”467 This extension, however, remains to be seen.  
 The ultimate legislative proposal in the Netherlands incorporates two separate 
data security breach notification requirements.468 The first concerns breaches of 
personal information. This notification requirement shall be hosted by OPTA. 
The second type of breach which requires notification concerns security and 
network integrity breaches. This type of notification is the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs. The legislative proposal envisions a single central 
point which receives both categories of notifications. This notification center is to 
function as a mailbox and as such is not to interfere or otherwise interact with the 
content of the complaints.469 The notification center shall then forward the 
complaint to the responsible agency, which can be either the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs or OPTA, or both depending on the nature of the complaint.  
 On June 7, 2010, the DPA responded to the legislative proposal, which is a 
proposed amendment to the Telecommunications Act. In its response, the DPA 
stated how the introduction of a single notification center is not in line with the 
decision of the European Court of Justice which requires authorities with 
supervisory tasks to be able to carry out these tasks in an independent 
atmosphere.470 The DPA envisions potential complications because of the 
intricate connection between breach of security and network integrity with the 
compromise of personal information. The detachment of both can also lead to 
inefficiency and unnecessary administrative burdens.  
 Other arguments or points of criticism raised against the legislative proposal 
are the restriction of the proposal to the telecommunications sector, whereas the 
DPA continues to advocate a broad notification requirement which includes all 
companies and government agencies. The DPA specifically refers to the usage of 
the instrument of notification as a means to prevent identity theft and as such 
describes how the restricted nature of the proposal therefore also restricts its 
effectiveness in that area. This is nearly the same criticism as raised at the 
European level, and is valid for the restriction to the telecommunication sector 
handicaps the potential effectiveness of the countermeasure.       
 
3.5 Consumer Complaint Center 
 
3.5.1 United States 
 
When the Federal government criminalized identity theft in 1998, the government 
also introduced the mandate to introduce a consumer complaint center, which was 
to be stationed at the Federal Trade Commission. The data collected by the 
consumer complaint center was briefly discussed in chapter 1. The consumer 
complaint center serves a dual function through its accumulation of data on the 
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prevalence and trends of identity theft next to its function as a source of 
information for (potential) victims of identity theft. Through both of these 
functions, the consumer complaint center aims to add to the body of knowledge 
and assist consumers in their efforts to resolve the problems associated with 
identity theft.   
 
3.5.2 The Netherlands 
 
The introduction of a consumer complaint center in the Netherlands as part of the 
public sector occurred in a vastly different manner in comparison to the United 
States. Discussions about the introduction of a consumer complaint center began 
in 2006, when a working group within the Ministry of Justice supported the idea. 
Actual implementation of the idea was seemingly pressed into the background, 
until a few years later in 2008 when the Ministry of the Interior and the Minister of 
Justice issued a joined press release about the introduction of a complaint center. 
This center was to be a pilot before a permanent center was to be introduced. This 
pilot complaint center commenced its activities in January 2009. Due to the lack of 
extensive human capacity, the existence of the complaint center was kept out of 
the spotlight. Even so, the pilot study managed to capture important information 
through a total of 241 complaints about identity theft or at least a suspicion 
thereof.471 In the preface to the report of the study, it is stated how the 
consequences for victims of identity theft are significant. And that these victims 
are in dire need of government assistance in an effort to correct the errors which 
roam around various databases which have contaminated their good name. This 
assistance can most appropriately come from the central complaint center who 
must then also maintain sufficient power to ensure a level of effectiveness. For the 
complaint center is dependent on the other parties in the overall identification 
chain, namely law enforcement officials, municipalities, ministries, and others, to 
cooperate with the center to contain the problem of the victim to a minimum. 
Other relevant information obtained via the pilot study is the method used to 
conduct identity theft. Most complaints retraced the source of information used 
for the incident of identity theft back to open sources, whereas other main 
categories include phishing, hacking, or another type of cybercrime. The report 
fails to provide more details on its definition of open sources.472   
 In 2010, the pilot became a permanent complaint center. The 
government also installed a chain director, which is an official who receives the 
complaints and tries to contact partners in the identification chain to investigate 
the case.473 When consumers first call the complaint center they reach Postbus 
51.474 This is to filter out the questions and only allow the more complicated cases 
to be transferred through to the chain director. The complaint center requires the 
consumers to have reported the incident to the police before they call the 
center.475 After receiving the complaints, the chain director subsequently contacts 
chain partners in an effort to potentially investigate the case. 
 
                                                
471 Centraal Meldpunt Identiteitsfraude (2010). Jaarrapportage 2009. 
472 Ibid.  
473 Interview Centraal Meldpunt Identiteitsfraude, March 29, 2010, Amstelveen.  
474 Postbus 51 is Dutch government agency which serves as the central point of contact for citizens 
with questions addressed to the national government.   
475 Interview Centraal Meldpunt Identiteitsfraude, March 29, 2010, Amstelveen. 
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3.6 Cooperative Efforts 
 
3.6.1 United States 
 
On May 10, 2006, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13402 to 
‘strengthen federal efforts to protect against identity theft.’476 Section 2 of the 
Executive Order established the Identity Theft Task Force,477 which was to, 
among other things, “…prepare and submit in writing to the President within 180 
days after the date of this order a coordinated strategic plan to further improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the Federal Government’s activities in the areas of 
identity theft awareness, prevention, detection, and prosecution.”478 Nearly a year 
later, on April 11, 2007, the Task Force published its strategic plan. In its 
publication, the Task Force underscores the complexity of the crime, and the 
challenge identity theft presents to contemporary society. Through an overview of 
the problem, the Task Force focuses its strategic plan on improvements in four 
key areas. These include data protection, opportunity reduction, victim assistance, 
and deterrence.479 With regard to the first key area identified, the Task Force 
introduces the following recommendations for data security in the public sector: 
 
• Decrease the unnecessary use of Social Security Numbers in the public 
sector through the development of alternatives strategies for identity 
management; 
• Educate federal agencies on how to protect data;  
• Monitor their compliance with existing guidance; 
• Ensure effective, risk-based responses to data breaches suffered by federal 
agencies. 
 
For data security in the private sector, the Task Force recommends the 
establishment of national standards for private sector data protection requirements 
and breach notification requirements. Furthermore, the Task Force also 
recommends to better educate the private sector on data safeguarding practices 
and to initiate investigations of data security violations. Other recommendations 
include the introduction of a multi-year public awareness campaign by the private 
sector. Unlike for the public sector, the Task Force does not recommend a 
decrease in unnecessary use of SSNs in the private sector and instead recommends 
the development of a comprehensive record on private sector use of SSNs.  
For the second key area, the reduction of opportunities, the Task Force 
recommends to hold workshops on authentication. These workshops are to 
engage academics, industry, entrepreneurs, and government experts on developing 
                                                
476 Executive Order 13402 - Strengthening Federal Efforts To Protect Against Identity Theft (2006).  
477 Members of the Task Force include: the Attorney General, who serves as Chairman of the Task 
Force, the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, who serves as Co-Chairman of the Task Force, 
the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget, the Commissioner of Social Security, the Chairman of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Chairperson of the Board of Directors of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the Office of Thrift 
Supervision, the Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration Board, and the Postmaster 
General.  
478 Executive Order 13402 (2006): 3.  
479 Identity Theft Task Force (2007). Combating Identity Theft: A Strategic Plan: 4. 
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and promoting better ways to authenticate identities. The Task Force issues the 
recommendation in light of its belief in “[e]fforts to facilitate the development of 
better ways to authenticate consumers without burdening consumers or 
businesses—for example, multi-factor authentication or layered security—would 
go a long way toward preventing criminals from profiting from identity theft.”480 
Recommendations to improve victim assistance during their recovery of the 
crime include specialized training for first responders and others who offer direct 
assistance to victims of identity theft. More specifically, the Task Force 
recommends the government to train law enforcement officers, provide 
educational materials to first responders to use when approached by a victim, and 
develop and distribute an identity theft victim bill of rights. Moreover, the Task 
Force also recommends amendments to statutory law in order to ensure the 
monetary compensation of time spent on the recovery of the crime by the victim. 
The Task Force also recommends assessments on the efficacy of available tools 
for victims of identity theft, such as credit freeze initiatives along with the 
remedies offered through FACTA.  
The last key area for improvement relates to the deterrence of future acts of 
identity theft through increased prosecution and punishment of offenders. Due to 
the increased sophistication of perpetrators of identity theft, the Task Force 
recommends the establishment of a National Identity Theft Law Enforcement 
Center. Other recommendations include enhanced information exchange between 
law enforcement agencies and the private sector along with the development of 
universal identity theft report form. With respect to coordination with foreign law 
enforcement, the Task Force recommends the United States to encourage other 
countries to adopt domestic legislation which specifically criminalizes identity 
theft. Just as the United States should encourage other countries to accede to the 
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime as a means to facilitate 
investigation and prosecution of perpetrators of identity theft. Finally, the Task 
Force also recommends increased prosecution of offenders of identity theft. To 
accomplish such an increase, the Task Force specifically recommends the 
designation of an identity theft coordinator for each United States Attorney’s 
Office to develop a specific identity theft program for each district. Moreover, the 
Task Force recommends an evaluation of monetary thresholds for prosecution 
along with an encouragement of state prosecution of cases of identity theft. The 
Task Force also makes recommendations with respect to ‘gaps’ in criminal 
statutes. In particular, the Task Force lists the following aspects: 
 
• Amend the identity theft and aggravated identity theft statutes to ensure 
that identity thieves who misappropriate information belonging to 
corporations and organizations can be prosecuted 
• Add new crimes to the list of predicate offenses for aggravated identity 
theft offenses 
• Amend the statute that criminalizes the theft of electronic data by 
eliminating the current requirement that the information must have been 
stolen through interstate communications 
• Penalize creators and distributors of malicious spyware and keyloggers 
                                                
480 Ibid: 6. 
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• Amend the cyber-extortion statute to cover additional, alternate types of 
cyber-extortion.481  
 
Overall, the Task Force states “…that all of the recommendations in this strategic 
plan—from these broad policy changes to the small steps—are necessary to wage 
a more effective fight against identity theft and reduce its incidence and damage. 
Some recommendations can be implemented relatively quickly; others will take 
time and the sustained cooperation of government entities and the private 
sector.”482 
In September 2008, the President’s Task Force published a follow up report to 
assess the implementation of its previously produced strategic plan.483 In its 
conclusion, the Task Force appears optimistic. “The efforts of the Task Force 
over the past year to implement the Plan’s recommendations have underscored 
the need for a comprehensive and coordinated response from both the public and 
private sectors. These efforts have already made a difference and will continue to 
do so in the coming years.”484 
The concrete implementation of a recommendation set forth by the Task 
Force occurred through the introduction of the Identity Theft Enforcement and 
Restitution Act of 2008 (see section 3.1). This Act implemented the Task Force’s 
recommendation to allow victims to receive compensation for their time needed 
to recover from actual or attempted acts of identity theft through criminal 
statutes.485 Furthermore, “[t]hrough the Identity Theft Enforcement and 
Restitution Act of 2008 (Title II of P.L. 110-326), Congress, among other things, 
eliminated provisions in the U.S. Code requiring the illegal conduct to involve 
interstate or foreign communication, eliminated provisions requiring that damage 
to a victim’s computer amass to $5,000, and expanded the definition of cyber-
extortion.”486  
 Selected other issues remain as of yet unaddressed, Finklea notes how, 
“Congress has not yet addressed the Task Force recommendation to expand the 
identity theft and aggravated identity theft statutes to apply to corporations and 
organizations as well as to individuals, nor has it addressed the recommendation to 
expand the list of predicate offenses for aggravated identity theft.”487  
 
3.6.2  The Netherlands 
 
On May 15, 2008 the Ministry of Justice along with the Ministry of the Interior 
officially introduced the program Versterking Identiteitsketen in de Publieke Sector 
(VIPS), which is a program initiated to strengthen identification in the public 
sector. The program works on a combination of initiatives in an effort to prevent 
and counter identity theft along with identity mistakes in the public sector. 
Through an expert meeting held on November 4, 2009, the program formulated 
four goals.488 These include: 
                                                
481 Ibid: 9.  
482 Ibid.  
483 Identity Theft Task Force (2008). The President’s Identity Theft Task Force Report.  
484 Ibid: viii 
485 Finklea, K. M. (2010). Identity Theft: Trends and Issues. Congressional Research Service: 5.  
486 Ibid: 6.  
487 Ibid.   
488 Programma VIPS (2010). Programmaplan 2010 – medio 2011. Unpublished document.  
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1. Government agencies must improve their acknowledgement of risks and 
incidents of fraud and other mistakes in relation to identities, and they 
must respond in a better way. This requires better registration of 
incidents, but also an increased sense of urgency among government 
agencies, including investigation services. Furthermore, VIPS emphasizes 
the need for clarity about how to respond when incidents of identity 
theft occur. 
2. Registrations and systems which maintain identification information 
must be reliable. The quality of data stored on source systems such as the 
Gemeentelijke Basis Administratie (GBA), or Municipal Personal Records 
Database can be improved along with the exchange of information 
between involved parties. Other areas of improvement include the 
information security of the systems in order to prevent attacks from 
outside. This can occur through the use of privacy enhancing 
technologies, where technology actually enables the improvement of 
information security rather than increase the risk of information 
exposure. 
3. Victims must be able to resolve incidents of fraud or mistakes associated 
with their identities in a simpler manner. The government must support 
victims in their efforts to prevent and reverse mistakes with or incidents 
of fraud related to the victims’ identities. Moreover, citizens must obtain 
more certainty that the government makes a sincere effort to prevent 
repeat victimization.  
4. Citizens must become more aware of the risks of fraud and mistakes 
related to their identities and the actions which they can take to reduce 
the risks of such incidents.  
 
These goals are listed according to the prioritization level of the goal, where 
logically the first goal maintains the highest level of priority. On December 1, 
2009, the Steering Committee officially endorsed the goals as set forth by the 
expert meeting. Furthermore, the Steering Committee noted while the private 
sector currently falls outside of the scope of the program, businesses also maintain 
a viable role in the authentication and verification of individuals and their 
identities. As such a call for the private sector to become involved in the 
program’s efforts seems appropriate according to the Steering Committee.  
 VIPS receives indirect support to accomplish its goals via other projects which 
aim to achieve similar results. To accomplish the various goals, VIPS supervises 
thirteen activities. For financial identity theft, the most relevant activities include: 
 
1. Central Consumer Complaint Center 
2. Tackling Abuse with Identification documents 
3. Vision on Biometrics 
4. Consultation of separate criminal offense for identity theft 
5. Digital Identities 
6. Fundamental research into the identification chain in the public sector 
 
These goals and activities provide a comprehensive approach to the challenge of 
financial identity theft. Several activities are discussed elsewhere, such as the 
central consumer complaint center and the discussion about the introduction of a 
separate criminal provision for identity theft. The added value of VIPS therefore is 
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the anticipated ability of the program to coordinate and facilitate cooperation 
among the various public sector agencies engaged in the fight against financial 
identity theft.  
 
3.7 Computer Emergency Response Teams 
 
3.7.1  United States 
 
The United States introduced its computer emergency response team in 2003 as 
the operational arm of the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) at the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The DHS established NCSD to serve 
as the Federal government’s cornerstone for cyber security coordination and 
preparedness, including implementation of the National Strategy to Secure 
Cyberspace. Within the National Strategy, the government remarks how “[i]n 
general, the private sector is best equipped and structured to respond to an 
evolving cyber threat. There are specific instances, however, where federal 
government response is most appropriate and justified.”489 The US-CERT called 
upon the experience and expertise developed by CERT CC, which has been 
around since 1988. Both of these organizations therefore work in close 
cooperation. The US-CERT “…is charged with providing response support and 
defense against cyber attacks for the Federal Civil Executive Branch (.gov) and 
information sharing and collaboration with state and local government, industry 
and international partners.”490 In 2006, US-CERT began to issue quarterly trends 
and analysis reports to provide a summary and examination of the incident reports 
received by the organization. The US-CERT aimed to increase awareness about 
information security issues and to also reflect on emerging threats. Later on, these 
quarterly reports turned into monthly activity summaries, which the US-CERT 
publishes on its homepage.   
 In addition, US-CERT manages the National Cyber Alert System, which is the 
“…first cohesive national cyber security system for identifying, analyzing, and 
prioritizing emerging vulnerabilities and threats.”491 This system transmits 
computer security updates and warning information to all citizens, and as such 
provides everyone “…with free, timely, actionable information to better secure 
their computer systems.”492 
 
3.7.2 The Netherlands 
 
The Ministry of the Interior introduced the Government Computer Emergency 
Response Team (GOVCERT) in 2002, after the publication of a study in two 
years earlier about the vulnerabilities of the Internet.493 Its main objective is to 
support the government, including all levels of government, in the prevention and 
the treatment of ICT-related security incidents.494 On a yearly basis, GOVCERT 
                                                
489 Department of Homeland Security (2003). The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace: ix.  
490 United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (n.d.). About Us. Available at: http://www.us-
cert.gov/aboutus.html#events (last accessed July 12, 2010).  
491 United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (n.d.). Frequently Asked Questions. Available 
at: http://www.us-cert.gov/faq.html (last accessed July 12, 2010).  
492 Ibid.  
493 Expert Meeting Cybercrime April 13, 2010, Maarsen, the Netherlands.   
494 The original introduction of a CERT in the Netherlands was CERT RO, which exclusively aimed to 
assist the national government. Soon the need and call for assistance at other levels of government 
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takes care of more than 150 incidents. To accomplish this objective, GOVCERT 
plays a vital role in the coordination through its position as central emergency 
point when an ICT-related security incident occurs. These include computer 
viruses, hacking, and the exploitation of other vulnerabilities in applications and 
software.  
 Furthermore, GOVCERT also serves as a source of information through its 
awareness materials and its yearly international symposium. In particular through 
the symposium, GOVCERT facilitates the exchange of information and 
knowledge which aims to benefit both the Dutch government and others across 
the world. Overall, GOVCERT plays a dual function within the role of the state as 
protector. The first is the protection offered by GOVCERT through its incident 
response system, and the second is GOVCERT’s ability to deliver state of the art 
awareness about the most advanced type of threats. The latter function is 
especially crucial with respect to financial identity theft, since the realm of public 
policy needs such a source of information in an effort to determine how to 




This chapter distinguishes itself from the following chapters due to its focus on 
the means of protection exercised by the state to reduce or ideally prevent the 
facilitation and the occurrence of financial identity theft. Its placement is therefore 
perhaps slightly counterintuitive since much of what is discussed within this 
chapter returns in the remaining chapters, especially the relevancy of data 
protection and data security breach notification legislation along with the 
conclusions drawn by the Identity Theft Task Force and its Dutch counterpart. 
Even so, this chapter provides important insights into the response offered to the 
problem by the state as protector. Overall, the versatile nature of financial identity 
theft is reflected in the diversity of applicable instruments used by the state in its 
function as protector. This is also in part due to the connection between identity 
theft and other ‘threats’ to society, such as terrorism and money laundering.  
 To combat the problem, the government in the United States first turned to 
the area of criminal law which insufficiently covered identity theft as a criminal 
offense. The background to the introduction demonstrates the importance of 
policy entrepreneurs to build a strong case in favor of additional legislation. 
Simultaneously, the historical background of the United States within the area of 
criminal law also exposes the use, or perhaps abuse, of identity theft as a means to 
impact other issues of public policy, namely illegal immigration and terrorism. In 
this sense, identity theft is hijacked in order to serve other policy objectives. Or 
perhaps supporters merely try to kill two birds with one stone.  
The government in the Netherlands distinguished itself from the United States 
through its alternative approach, but remains in anticipation of European 
developments which may lead to the implementation of a separate criminal 
offense after all. Interesting to note is how the government in the Netherlands 
plans to amend article 231 of the Criminal Code which concerns fraud with travel 
documents. In the letter which announces the anticipated amendment, the 
Ministry of Justice mentions look-a-like fraud, which is generally used by those 
                                                                                                        
surfaced which allowed the CERT to transform into GOVCERT which provides its services to all 
agencies within the government, regardless of the level.  
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trying to gain illegal entry into the Netherlands. This amendment demonstrates the 
priority granted to look-a-like fraud and its connection to illegal immigration.   
Despite the benefits for law enforcement officials and victims of identity theft, 
additional criminal legislation nevertheless maintains its limitations through the 
challenges which arise as a result of its enforcement. Financial identity theft, in 
particular when perpetrators conduct the crime via means of digital technology, is 
difficult to investigate and subsequently prosecute. Its investigation is also time 
and resource intensive. As Pontell and Geis note, “[t]he ‘band aid, thumb-in-the-
dyke’ approaches that have characterized the American response to identity fraud 
are likely to embolden perpetrators who have an excellent chance to escape 
detection because of the limited capacity of enforcement agencies to respond to 
their crimes.”495 The deterrence aspect of criminal legislation also appears limited, 
especially with regard to perpetrators of financial identity theft, many of which 
must be keenly aware of the relatively low likelihood of being caught by law 
enforcement. As a means of protection, therefore, criminal law is limited. Even so, 
the incorporation of a situational crime prevention perspective in the Netherlands 
through the usage of experimental gardens in an effort to unravel and 
subsequently reduce the opportunity structure for cybercrime proves promising. 
For such an approach surpasses the traditional crime fighting objective of law 
enforcement.  
Still, the criminal arena does not generally attend to the ‘architecture of 
vulnerability’ as Solove notes, when he writes “[t]he traditional legal view of 
identity theft fails to address this architecture, for it focuses on identity theft as a 
series of discrete instances of crime rather than as a larger problem about the way 
our personal information is handled.”496 Other sources also criticize the focus on 
criminal legislation as a means to combat identity theft.497 Certain authors have 
therefore suggested the emphasis ought to be on prevention rather than 
detection.498 
This leads to the importance of data protection and its connection to the 
facilitation of financial identity theft. The challenge of data protection increased 
through the use of computers as the historical backdrop in both the United States 
and the Netherlands illustrates. The difference in approach in both countries 
continues to be a topic of discussion, especially in light of arguments which favor 
the approach taken in the European Union. Even so, both the United States and 
the Netherlands are reaching out to other instruments such as data security breach 
notifications. The mere introduction of such a notification framework indicates 
the inability of current data protection regimes to safeguard personal information. 
This conclusion is strengthened through the emphasis placed on the use of such a 
notification system to provide incentives for the private sector to improve its 
information security practices. The introduction of data security breach 
notification proved to be inherently reactive to incidents which demonstrates how 
personal information is vulnerable to access by those with malicious intent.  
                                                
495 Pontell, H. N. & G. Geis (2007). ‘New Times, New Crimes: “Blocking” Financial Identity Fraud’ in 
F. Bovenkerk & M. Levi (eds.) The Organized Crime Community: Essays in Honor of Alan A. Block. New 
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497 See for example Matejkovic, J. E. & K. E. Lahey (2001). Identity Theft: no help for consumers.  
Financial Services Review, Vol. 10: 210-235.  
498 See for example Laylock, G. (2004). New Challenges for Law Enforcement. European Journal on  
Criminal Policy and Research, Vol. 10: 39 – 53.  
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The conclusions and recommendations of the Identity Theft Task Force and its 
Dutch counterpart strengthen the image of diversity and subsequent complexity of 
the problem. Both of these initiatives play a vital role in the development of a 
comprehensive framework of state action in response to identity theft. This 
precisely because they manage to take stock of the vulnerabilities and as such are 
in a position to issue and implement recommendations for improvement. The 
exposition of vulnerabilities is imperative to understand how the state as protector 






4  State as Provider 
 
 
Besides its function as protector of the people, the state also maintains a function 
as provider, at least since the early modern state (early 19th century). As provider, 
the state is responsible for the establishment of an identification infrastructure to 
serve as a framework for the provision of (social) services, but also to administer 
other aspects of daily life such as taxes, healthcare, education, employment of 
citizens, and others. Paul Schwartz captures the intricate connection between the 
service administration and its need for personal information.499 As Schwartz 
writes, “[t]he state gathers information because distribution of social services is 
impossible without detailed information on the citizen as client, customer, or 
simply person to be controlled.”500 Moreover, the identification infrastructure 
established by the state also becomes the framework used in, for example, the 
financial services sector. This makes the identification infrastructure important for 
both the public and the private sector. This chapter provides an overview of the 
main components of the identification infrastructure in both the United States and 
the Netherlands. The main components include identification information, 
‘identification’ numbers, identification documents, and instruments used for 
electronic identification or authentication.  
 
4.1  Identification information 
 
The accumulation of information, especially identification information, by the 
state is hardly new. As Colin Bennett notes, “[r]ecord keeping on individuals is as 
old as civilization itself. Historical research has traced the notion of a system of 
personal records back to most of the ancient civilizations of the Far and the Near 
East, Central and South America, and the Mediterranean. With few exceptions, 
however, such as William the Conqueror’s renowned Domesday Book, the 
collection and keeping of personal records were localized and unsystematic.”501 
Despite its historical origins, record keeping activities of states changed 
significantly several decades ago as technological advances developed innovative 
opportunities for the maintenance of personal records. Moreover, Bennett 
describes how an increase in information collected from and about citizens 
occurred due to an increase in the number and complexity of policies to be carried 
out by the state.502 Simultaneously, the nature of the information collected for 
record keeping also experienced a transformation. Many of these changes, 
especially the technological advances, led to the introduction of information 
privacy or data protection initiatives as became evident in section 3.3. This section 
aims to shed a light on the actual information maintained by the state and its 
various agencies.   
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4.1.1 The United States 
 
The information collected and maintained by the government in the United States 
both at the State and at the Federal level for administrative purposes is substantial. 
Michael Froomkin provides an overview of several illustrative types of federal 
government data.503 These include Census data, Corporate Tax data, National 
Security Intercepts, Personal Tax Data, Military Records, Law Enforcement Data, 
Health Records (e.g. VA, Medical benefits programs), Passport Applications, 
Federal Employee Records, Immigration Records, Contracting/Purchasing, 
Regulatory Disclosures (e.g. trade secrets, required disclosures, results of 
inspections), Sealed court records, and Transfer program records (e.g. Social 
Security, Food Stamps, Veterans). In addition to the records maintained by the 
Federal government, State and local government agencies also maintain records. 
These include State tax data, State law enforcement data, K-12 & university 
educational records, State transfer program records, State court records, State 
regulatory data, records deposited in relation to Driver’s License applications, 
State prison records, and records relating to foster children and other reports to 
child welfare agencies.504  
 Many of these records maintained include personal information505 used for 
identification purposes which perpetrators desire to obtain to carry out the first 
stage of financial identity theft. The main examples include tax data, health 
records, passport applications, driver’s license applications, and university 
educational records. As Froomkin notes, the government, both Federal and State, 
obtains such information mainly as a result of a legal mandate. As a result, citizens 
and other residents generally lack the right to veto such information accumulation. 
This is an essential observation since the record keeping activities of both Federal 
and State government agencies are in the spotlight as a result of numerous data 
breaches. Whereas Froomkin accurately notes how most attention is devoted to 
the breaches which occur in the private sector, the exceptional nature of the 
records maintained by the public sector also require extensive attention for its 
activities and (lack of) safeguards.   
 Froomkin observes how the public sector faces similar challenges as the 
private sector with respect to the vulnerabilities for data breaches. Even so, 
Froomkin argues “…while the public sector is vulnerable to all the risks that 
bedevil the private sector, there are some additional dangers that are either 
peculiar to the public sector or so different in scale as to amount to a difference in 
kind.”506 Various non-profit organizations have been active in the collection of 
information about data security breaches both in the public and the private sector. 
Such information accumulation demonstrates vital background information about 
the nature and the incidence rate of data security breaches. For the public sector, 
the Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC) provides statistical information about 
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the number of breaches and the number of records exposed as a result of such 
breaches. The ITRC bases its information on data security breaches which manage 
to capture the attention of the media. According to its report published in 2010, 
the government/military part of the report on data security breaches accounted 
for 18.1% of all breaches, but 35.6% of records were exposed as a result of such 
breaches.507 The total number of records exposed was 79,470,963 within one year. 
Whereas certainly not all records are the result of intrusion by perpetrators of 
financial identity theft, these statistics do demonstrate the vulnerability of the 
information maintained by the state as provider and as such the potential for 
facilitation of the first stage of financial identity theft in the United States.  
 
4.1.2 The Netherlands  
 
In an effort to enhance the transparency of databases in the Netherlands, in the 
public as well as the private sector, the Data Protection Authority (DPA) 
commissioned a study to examine in how many databases the average citizen was 
registered.508 The total provided in the conclusion of the study is 250 to 500 
database registrations for the average citizen. For the public sector, Bart W. 
Schermer and Ton Wagemans note how the total number of databases during the 
last twenty years has grown tenfold. According to Schermer and Wagemans, the 
state is the most important processor of personal information in the 
Netherlands.509 This occurs through a variety of databases, both general and sector 
specific.  
The most pertinent database in the Netherlands is the Municipal Personal 
Records Database, or Gemeentelijke Basis Administratie (GBA). During the start of 
the eighties, the government introduced the GBA in response to a growing need 
to better synchronize information flows within the public sector in the 
Netherlands. The government deemed such synchronization necessary as a result 
of the proliferation of information systems. The development of the GBA also 
turned out to be a more acceptable alternative to the introduction of a central 
database of personal information, which the government originally desired.510 
Such a desire stumbled upon fierce resistance from a significant part of the Lower 
House.511 Despite overlap between the original bill and its alternative, the 
government introduced a decentralized system through the GBA, which appeased 
the Lower House and still provided the government with the opportunity to 
develop a more efficient administration of information keeping. This efficiency 
came mainly through the automation of record keeping activities. Each 
municipality maintains its own GBA which includes information, such as name, 
address, marital status, date of birth, etc., about all individuals who reside in the 
municipality. Many different actors use the information maintained in the GBA. 
These include actors in both the public and the private sector.   
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During the last decade, the GBA became a topic of considerable political and 
administrative attention. The government detected a need during the start of the 
millennium to obtain advice about whether and how the GBA needed to be 
modernized. To this end, the Minister of Large Cities and Integration Policy 
established the Committee Snellen in February 2000. The Committee needed to 
answer two central questions. The first question posed by the government 
concerned the possibilities for improvement of the GBA accessibility through the 
usage of modern ICT. The second question focused on how new technological 
developments could also be incorporated as a means to strengthen the position of 
the citizen in society and in particular with regard to the state.  
In its findings, the Committee determined how an increase in mobility, a 
growing anonymity through various forms of electronic communication, and the 
scalability of ICT and web technology provided important influences which 
together developed a need for a modernization of the GBA. 512 Based on these 
influences, the Committee Snellen identified several objectives for the 
government. The GBA, according to the Committee, is to become the pivot of the 
identification infrastructure in the Netherlands in the near future.513 The speed 
and the accessibility of the database must be increased, and the system must be 
available 24/7. This means municipalities and users of the GBA must introduce 
organizational and technical means to ensure direct access to the GBA. As a result, 
the usage of modern ICT is essential for the successful realization of this future 
role of the database. The Committee specifically refers to the application of web 
technology for such success.514 The Committee also calls for a simplification of 
the GBA system, and deems such simplification essential due to the complexity of 
along with the extensive costs associated with the current system. This answers the 
first question posed by the government. 
For the answer to the second question, the Committee calls for a more central 
position of the citizen.515 To accomplish this objective, the Committee suggests a 
digital locker. Through the introduction of a digital locker, individual citizens 
obtain the ability to exercise more control over their personal information. The 
digital locker provides citizens the opportunity to access and request corrections 
of information maintained in the GBA and to control which agency or person 
receives information about them. The use of the digital locker is voluntary.  
While the underlying idea of the digital locker, to make the government more 
transparent and grant citizens the opportunity to correct mistakes, receives 
positive feedback,516 its actual implementation remains controversial. The 
terminology is misleading, according to Bert-Jaap Koops, because the Committee 
describes how the digital locker allows the citizens to become ‘directors’ of their 
personal information and its collection. Yet, the Committee overestimates the role 
of citizens in the overall idea of the digital locker. Citizens are still unable to decide 
what personal information the government collects. Furthermore, citizens are also 
not in a position to alter the personal information or to decide which government 
agencies can access the information. Instead, citizens can ask the government to 
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correct mistakes in their personal information and they can decide which private 
parties have access to their personal information. These citizen ‘rights’ already 
exist. The digital locker serves merely as a facilitator to ease the manner through 
which citizens can exercise these rights.517 To speak of citizens as directors 
therefore is misleading and to claim the digital locker is a means to strengthen the 
position of citizens in society is exaggerated, according to Koops.518      
The recommendations set forth by the Committee Snellen became the 
foundation for the establishment of the program Modernization GBA. The 
government introduced the modernization program of the GBA in an effort to 
ensure the successful integration of the database as part of the broader electronic 
government movement. The modernization program officially started in 2004. 
Four years after the beginning, the government temporarily stopped the program. 
Problems surrounding the budget already caused alarming sounds in 2007 but the 
official stop occurred after problems began to arise about the objectives of the 
program, the realization of these objectives, and the costs associated with the 
program. The audit study determined how the business case developed for the 
program proved insufficient in terms of quality.519 Additionally, the study also 
concluded how the business case played no part in the actual realization of the 
program. In particular the program governance did not match the result oriented 
character of the broad, complex, and risky project.520 As a result, there was 
insufficient direction with respect to functionality, money, time, and risks as well 
as the responsibility associated with these aspects.  
Despite the turbulent history and the negative feedback provided, the 
Modernization program of the GBA experienced a revival after the Deputy 
Secretary of the Interior received the results of various studies which aimed to 
determine the survivability of the program.521 Around the same time, a Gateway 
Review was also conducted. The results of the studies and the Gateway Review 
together provided the foundation for the negotiations between the Ministry of the 
Interior, the Association of Dutch Municipalities, and the representatives of the 
‘customers’ of the GBA which led to the revival of the program.522 The revival 
turned out to offer the most benefits for all parties involved, based on the analysis 
provided by the studies and the Gateway Review. The modernization of the GBA 
is essential according to the national government as well as the individual 
municipalities and its financial savings outweigh the original costs of investment.523 
As a result, the Deputy Secretary signed an official agreement with the various 
stakeholders on March 5, 2009 to revive the program.524   
The modernization of the program consists of various elements which 
demonstrate intricate connections with the overall electronic government 
movement. The modernization incorporates the call for 24/7 accessibility through 
the GBA-V. While the GBA is a decentralized system, the GBA-V adds a central 
touch to the organization. This central component is a virtual copy of all records 
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maintained in the 430 municipalities. This system is online and as such accessible 
24/7. The GBA-V is already a reality and the next step is to develop GBA-V Full 
Service. This additional step shifts the responsibility for the system away from the 
individual municipalities and changes the oversight to a central system. Even so, 
the municipalities remain source owners and they also maintain the responsibility 
to keep the information up to date. After GBA-V Full Service, the government 
aims to realize GBA-V Modern Interfaces which allows for real-time information 
exchange between ‘customers’ and municipalities.  
Other changes to the GBA include its official transformation into a source of 
basic registration information. As a basic registration source, the GBA became one 
of the so-called ‘basic registries’ which provide a unique source of essential and 
reliable information for all official bodies in the Netherlands. This demonstrates 
the increased importance of the GBA. After the legal changes made on April 1, 
2007, the GBA officially became the exclusive provider of authentic personal 
information on citizens and residents in the Netherlands. This change enhances 
the significance of the integrity of the information maintained in the databases at 
all municipalities, especially since there is a legal obligation for all other agencies to 
retrieve their information from the GBA. Moreover, through the usage of the 
GBA, individuals only need to provide their information once. This one time 
information issuance on the side of the individual decreases the administrative 
burdens on the government and also makes the entire operation more efficient. 
The government also anticipates an increase in quality of the information since all 
administrative organs retrieve the reliable personal information from the GBA. 
Improved service delivery is another benefit which the government anticipates as a 
result of the onetime issuance idea.525 
The increased importance of the GBA leads to potential problems with regard 
to the facilitation of the first stage of financial identity theft. First, the increased 
reliance on the GBA enhances its role as a single point of vulnerability. Since all 
organs return to the GBA as a unique source and anticipate a high level of 
reliability and accuracy, the integrity of the information must be high. Any mistake 
or alteration made in the system of information spreads all over the government’s 
administration. This means that criminal entry into the system either through 
hacking or through normal registration provides perpetrators of financial identity 
theft with an important first step.    
Since the integrity of the information in the GBA is of the utmost importance, 
the government has introduced a procedure for the information recipient to report 
back to the municipality. This must occur when the information recipient, or 
rather another administrative body, has reasonable doubt about the accuracy of 
the information. When the municipalities receive such a report about the accuracy 
of the information, they are under a legal mandate to investigate the report and to 
correct any mistakes in the information maintained in the database. When a 
‘customer’ of the information either from the public or the private sector files a 
report, this must be done through the usage of the a-number or the citizen service 
number (see section 4.2.2) of the data subject. The report must subsequently 
indicate what part of the information is outdated, what the updated information is, 
and an explanation as to why this is the case, preferably with a reference to a 
‘source of information.’ The report is received by an automated system which is to 
deliver the information to the municipality in question.    
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Problems, as previously noted, with the GBA can arise as a result of ‘false’ 
registration, where perpetrators of identity theft use false, falsified, or stolen 
source documents to gain entry into the system. Registration in the system 
subsequently provides the perpetrator with the ability to obtain other documents. 
In a quick scan of the identification infrastructure, such a problem is identified and 
categorized as high risk.526 Such a classification is based on the fact that the GBA 
is the main source of identifying information for actors within and outside of the 
government. As a result, false information spreads like an oil stain. Other less 
urgent matters identified in the quick scan refer to the reliability of the 
information maintained in the GBA.527  
The database itself, however, is also an attractive source for perpetrators due 
to its maintenance of personal information which is lucrative to obtain for 
financial identity theft operations. The digitalization of the database through 
GBA-V means an expansion of accessibility which in turn leads to an increased 
vulnerability. Access is no longer restricted to a particular place or time or to a 
particular municipality. As such the developments with respect to accessibility may 
lead to an increased risk of data compromise.  
 
4.2  Identification Numbers 
 
A close link exists between record-keeping practices and the issue of identification 
or administration numbers. This section provides a historical description of the 
developments which have taken place along the way to establish the current 
identification number systems in the United States and the Netherlands. The 
description is subsequently used to identify why and how the systems create or 
could create opportunities for perpetrators to take advantage of to commit 
financial identity theft.  
 
4.2.1 United States 
 
Introduced through the Social Security Act of 1935, the original goal and purpose 
of the social security number (SSN) was to function as a record keeping system. 
The SSN assisted the Social Security Administration to conveniently record work 
and retirement benefits of employees within the system. During the early years, 
individuals did not need to demonstrate any type of identification in order to 
obtain a SSN. Furthermore, Robert Ellis Smith notes how “[f]or many years, the 
3-by-2 inch Social Security card bearing a person’s number had the legend ‘NOT 
FOR IDENTIFICATION’ printed on its face.”528 Smith describes how many 
individuals interpreted this statement on the card as a means to prohibit the use of 
the number for purposes other than social security. He claims, however, that this 
was never the case. Instead, “[t]he purpose of the legend, the Social Security 
officials would say, was merely to notify anyone to whom a card might be 
presented that it should not be relied upon as evidence of identity.”529  
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During the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the SSN began to evolve and 
received a more prominent role in the identification infrastructure of the United 
States. Former President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9397 in 1943 which 
required Federal agencies to use the SSN to identify individuals in any new ‘system 
of accounts.’ Roosevelt states in the Order how “...it is desirable in the interest of 
economy and orderly administration that the Federal Government move towards 
the use of a single, unduplicated numerical identification system of accounts and 
avoid the unnecessary establishment of additional systems.”530  
The system, as envisioned by Roosevelt, was in place for many years and the 
expansion continued when the United States Congress passed legislation which 
required banks and other financial service providers to obtain the SSNs of all 
clients, regardless of the production of taxable income.531  The indirect 
consequences of the law, including the fact that a majority of banks decided to 
print SSNs on the checks of their clients, assisted in the growing availability of the 
number. Smith notes how “[o]ddly, while the Social Security number was 
becoming more and more a public piece of information...people in places of 
authority were treating it as an authenticator of a person’s real identity, as if it were 
a secret identifier known only to the individual.”532  
The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare appointed an advisory 
committee in 1973 to investigate “the proliferating uses of numerical identifiers 
and the implications of personal databanks.”533 The advisory committee 
recommended against the adoption of a nationwide, standard, personal 
identification format.534 The advisory committee furthermore recommended 
“...that use of the Social Security be limited to Federal Programs that have a 
specific Federal legislative mandate to use the SSN, and that new legislation be 
enacted to give an individual the right to refuse to disclose his SSN under all other 
circumstances. Furthermore, any organization or person required by Federal law 
to obtain and record the SSN of any individual for some Federal program purpose 
must be prohibited from making any other use or disclosure of that number 
without the individual’s informed consent.”535   
This recommendation issued by the Advisory committee is based on its 
understanding of the potential dangers associated with excessive use of the 
number. More specifically, the Advisory committee indirectly refers to the threat 
of identity theft, when the committee writes, “[a]s long as the SSN of an individual 
can be easily obtained (some organizations list the SSNs of their employees or 
members in published rosters), both individuals and the organizations that use it 
as a password are vulnerable to whatever harm may result from impersonation.”536 
This important warning influenced the establishment of partial restrictions on the 
usage of SSNs, such as written in the Privacy Act of 1974.537  Even so, only a 
couple of years later in 1976, the United States Congress passed the Tax Reform 
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Act Section 1211 of the Tax Reform Act, which provides agencies with the right 
to require individuals to provide their SSNs for identification purposes in the 
administration of various services.538 
This section appears to contradict the previously initiated restrictions which 
granted individuals the right to refuse the release of their numbers. Moreover, 
Section 1211 also ignored the previously issued warnings by the Advisory 
committee about the potential risks and dangers associated with the extensive 
usage of SSNs, especially for identification purposes. This proved to be merely the 
tip of the iceberg, as throughout the subsequent decades the SSN evolved into a 
general identification number, for both the public as well as the private sector. As 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) notes, “[w]e found that 
information resellers, CRAs, and some health care organizations routinely obtain 
SSNs from their business clients and individual customers and have come to rely 
on SSNs as identifiers that help them verify an individual’s identity and accumulate 
information about that person.”539 The GAO reached a similar conclusion several 
years earlier as well.540 The evolution of the usage and availability of the SSN came 
accompanied by many warnings from the start as the report issued by the 
Advisory committee illustrates.  
During the start of the nineties, the United States Congress held a hearing 
which exposed the existing problems with the availability and usage of the SSN 
through expert testimony.541 Gwendolyn S. King, Commissioner of Social 
Security, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, expressed her concern 
about the potential harm associated with exposure for individuals.542 Smith noted 
during his testimony how the proliferating usage of the SSN in both the public 
and the private sector mainly occurred as a result of laziness.543 Jeffrey Rothfreder 
in turn connects his statements directly to the problem of financial identity theft 
when he states how “[q]uietly, people with checkered motives are turning easy 
access to social security numbers into an epidemic of financial scams, invasions of 
privacy, and unregulated mischief. And it’s only getting worse.”544 The continuous 
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attention devoted to the facilitation of financial identity theft certainly 
demonstrates the escalating character of the problem.  Furthermore, the GAO 
stated in 2004 how the organization previously testified before the Subcommittee 
on Social Security, House Committee on Ways and Means about the problems 
associated with the Social Security Administration enumeration and verification 
processes along with the potential consequences of the aggregation of personal 
information, such as SSNs, in large corporate databases. Moreover, the GAO also 
emphasizes the potential problems associated with the public display of SSNs in 
various public records and how all of these aspects could lead to opportunities for 
perpetrators of financial identity theft.545 Others also anticipated and emphasized 
the same problem.546  
Through the recommendations set forth by the Identity Theft Task Force (see 
section 3.6.1), the problems associated with SSNs finally receive more attention. 
Part of the Strategic Plan issued by the Identity Theft Task Force called upon the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), among other agencies, to examine the usage of 
SSNs by the private sector. Moreover, the Task Force also desired to develop a 
deeper understanding of the connection between SSNs and identity theft. Based 
on this information, the Task Force Strategic Plan requested the agencies, 
especially the FTC, to propose approaches which maintained the beneficial usage 
of the SSN in contemporary society but also decrease its availability and value to 
perpetrators of identity theft.547 Through a cooperative effort with other Task 
Force agencies, the FTC issued a report in 2008 which listed five specific 
recommendations focused on private sector usage of the SSN.548 These 
recommendations include: 
 
• Improve consumer authentication; 
• Restrict the public display and the transmission of SSNs; 
• Establish national standards for data protection and breach 
notification; 
• Conduct outreach to businesses and consumers; and 
• Promote coordination and information sharing on use of SSNs.   
 
In its report, the FTC reemphasizes the pivotal connection between SSNs and 
identity theft. The FTC recognizes how SSNs are often viewed as the “keys to the 
kingdom.” The improved consumer authentication recommendation primarily 
targets the need to increase the effort to use SSNs as an instrument or tool to 
commit identity theft. The restriction on public displays and transmissions, on the 
other hand, aims to decrease the availability of the number in an effort to increase 
the difficulty of obtaining SSNs.  
 Despite the general consensus about the problematic association between SSN 
availability and usage, Fred H. Cate disagrees. He states how “[u]biquitous Social 
Security Numbers help identify people and ensure that information is associated 
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with the correct person. These two critical roles are essential to many valuable 
activities from facilitating national competition to locating heirs and missing 
children to enhancing national security. Accessible Social Security Numbers are 
also critical to preventing, detecting, and remedying identity theft, yet they appear 
to play little if any role in contributing to most cases of identity theft.”549 Cate 
rejects the connection between the facilitation of financial identity theft and the 
usage of Social Security Numbers. But the statements provided against such a 
rejection come accompanied by various other sources which negate the validity of 
his argument.550 He appears to be relatively lonely in his assertions and as such his 
arguments pale in comparison to the opposing evidence.  
 The availability problem of the SSN became exacerbated when Alessandro 
Acquisti and Ralph Gross developed an algorithm to predict existing numbers 
based on information such as place and date of birth. As the authors note, “[t]he 
predictability of SSNs is an unexpected consequence of the interaction between 
multiple data sources, trends in information exposure, and antifraud policy 
initiatives with unintended effects.”551 This demonstrates how the changes made 
to the system in an effort to reduce the facilitation of financial identity theft 
through SSNs must focus on the usage rather than the availability, for the latter 
can no longer be contained by changes in policies due to the predictability of the 
number.   
 
4.2.2 The Netherlands 
 
The usage of personalized numbers as a tool in government administration in the 
Netherlands maintains a diverse background. The ability to issue general 
administration numbers to individuals by municipalities who desired to automate 
their population administrations started in 1967 through the Rijks Computer 
Centrum (RCC).552 After the Committee Westerhout set forth its recommendation 
in 1970, the introduction of a uniform administration number in the Netherlands 
gained momentum.553 The main argument in favor of such a number was the 
ability to efficiently store, process, and subsequently find personal information 
about citizens in the Netherlands. This proved particularly lucrative due to the 
introduction of automated systems. During the installation of the Committee, the 
Assistant Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior specifically speaks of an 
administration number which excludes identifying information such as date of 
birth, gender, or part of the name of the person.554 This choice for a ‘random’ 
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number as opposed to an ‘identification’ number is in part based on the 
recommendations set forth by the Committee Simons.555  
The government planted the seed for the introduction of the administration 
number, or a-number, in 1971. According to Frank Kuitenbrouwer, its 
introduction was done in a rather secretive manner without too much commotion, 
through an amendment to a royal agreement.556 This could mainly be 
accomplished due to the fact that such an amendment does not require the 
approval of the Lower House. The secrecy surrounding the introduction must 
have been the result of the sensitive nature associated with attaching numbers to 
people by governments. Several years later, in 1985, the discussion about the usage 
of administration numbers within the government continued. The Deputy 
Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior provided the Lower House with a 
memorandum which provided a depiction of the situation with respect to the 
usage of administration numbers at that time.557 In the memorandum, the Deputy 
Secretary describes how several numbers exist within various systems since nearly 
each agency uses a special number. This is understandable, according to the 
Deputy Secretary, since each agency aims to meet its own specific needs. The 
usage of a general administration number as introduced in the bill for a central 
population administration receives little attention from individual agencies. As a 
result, the actual exchange of information between agencies still occurs manually, 
according to the Deputy Secretary, and through the usage of rudimentary 
identifying information such as name, address, and place of residence.558 Agencies 
must use this information due to the lack of a general administration number. 
Since the numbers used by various agencies are incompatible, they need to use 
additional information. Such usage of additional information is undesirable and 
the Deputy Secretary therefore aims to demonstrate the attractive nature of a 
general administration number for information exchange among and between the 
various government agencies. The introduction of a general administration 
number leads to internal efficiency and improved performance, according to the 
Deputy Secretary. Moreover, such a number also assists in the prevention of 
mistakes, which is important for citizens.  
Parallel to the developments of the a-number, the government also began to 
discuss changes to other numeric systems. The tax administration agency in the 
Netherlands had been using a landelijk vast nummer for many years for its internal 
administration. Among other things, the number was listed on individual tax 
return forms issued by the agency. During the early eighties, the government 
informed the Lower House about its plans to extend the usage of the number to 
employers.559 These plans proved a response to the publication of a report by an 
interdepartmental steering committee which focused on illegal use of government 
benefits. The Deputy Secretary emphasizes the focus on limited use of the number 
and the continued separation between the usage of the tax administration number 
and the introduction of a general administration number.  
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On January 7, 1983, the government officially launched its plan to implement a 
fiscal number by January 1, 1986.560 Simultaneously, the government also 
expressed a desire to introduce a social security card in an effort to combat and 
reduce abuse of social security services. Through discussions between the 
government and the Lower House, the focus shifted away from a card and onto a 
number, a ‘social’ number. This number was to have close ties to the fiscal 
number. The actual introduction of a combined or social-fiscal number was an 
issue which the government originally hesitated on due to the ambiguity about the 
potential for privacy invasive aspects of such a plan.561 Such a social-fiscal number 
proved a source of reluctance for the government, since a social-fiscal number 
would be a uniform number for the tax and the social security administrations. 
The scalability of such a number certainly seemed an important consideration for 
the government during its decision making process. Even so, the government 
proved determined to venture upon a reluctant path and aimed to introduce 
sufficient safeguards to ensure the privacy of its citizens. This transformation from 
reluctance to determination mainly came as a result of the report published by the 
interdepartmental steering committee which identified the promising potential of a 
combined number as an instrument to combat fraud.562  
The introduction of a social-fiscal number seemed, according to the Deputy 
Secretary, an apparent and logical development due to an intricate connection 
between the tax and the social security administrations. The added benefit of 
revenue as a result of better information processing practices through the usage of 
the social-fiscal number certainly provided another positive stimulation for the 
developments and its speedy implementation.563 Nevertheless, such a number was 
still not to be equated with a general administration number since its usage was to 
remain restricted to the areas of taxation and social security.  
During the discussions on the proposal of an introduction of the social-fiscal 
number, several members of the Lower House issued a motion to unify the social-
fiscal number and the a-number. This seemed like a logical development, as 
expressed in the parliamentary motion. In its response, the government rejected 
the plans to unify both numbers.564 The government based its rejection on a 
variety of reasons. Perhaps the most relevant to mention here are the limits set on 
the usage of both numbers. The a-number is restricted to the public and the semi-
public sector. The Lower House specifically participated in the development of 
these usage boundaries restricted to the public and the semi-public sector. The 
social-fiscal number, in contrast, must be available to the private sector due to the 
legal requirement for employers to use the number in communication with the tax 
administration. This conflict between the boundaries of the usage of the number is 
a major obstacle against integration of both the a-number and the social-fiscal 
number. Moreover, as noted on various occasions, it is not the intent or objective 
of the social-fiscal number to function as a general administration number. This is 
after all why the government introduced its plans to develop an administration 
number.       
On January 1, 1989 the government officially introduced the social-fiscal 
number. The original objective of the number was to serve the needs of executive 
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agencies in the area of taxes and social security. Shortly after the introduction, the 
government agreed to include the number as part of the municipal social services 
administrations. Such inclusion proved desirable due to, among other reasons, the 
verification of personal information provided.565 The government eventually 
extended the usage and circulation of the number to include all municipalities. 
And in 1994, the government officially agreed to the inclusion of the social-fiscal 
number in the Municipal Personal Records Database. Among the primary benefits 
of the inclusion was the ability of social security and fiscal agencies to request 
personal data maintained in the Municipal Personal Records Database. To request 
such personal information, these agencies managed to use the social-fiscal number 
as an ‘access key.’  
The expansion of relevant actors within the social-fiscal circuit demonstrates 
the erosion of original restrictions. As a matter of fact, the continuous resistance 
demonstrated by the government against the conversion of the social-fiscal 
number into a general administration number proved severely weakened by the 
ultimate outcome of the situation. For in 2002, the Interdepartmental Committee 
van Thijn determined how part of the problem was the existence of multiple 
numbers, including the a-number, social-fiscal number, and specific sectoral 
numbers, which were part of a policy framework dating back to 1994 that received 
little compliance.566 The Interdepartmental Committee describes the original intent 
of both the a-number and the social-fiscal number. For the former was to evolve 
into a general administrative number used across agencies within the public sector, 
whereas the latter was to remain restricted to the field of social security. In 
practice, as the Interdepartmental Committee notes, the social-fiscal number 
evolved into a general number since it was used on a broad scale. The a-number, 
in contrast, remained secluded through its exclusive usage within the Municipal 
Personal Records Database. This reality, according to the Committee, led to 
considerable questions about the issue of numeric systems in contemporary Dutch 
society and especially the aspect of privacy.  
The identification of problems in the system leads the Committee to the 
introduction of an alternative plan. The Interdepartmental Committee van Thijn 
introduces the idea of a citizen service number. This number is to be empty in 
terms of identifying information and the number must be known to its holder. 
When the government requires a number during communication with its citizens, 
they can provide the citizen service number. The actual citizen service number is 
to remain identical to the social-fiscal number. The citizen service number differs 
from its predecessor in other respects. For the citizen service number is different 
in terms of its maintenance, legal basis, and usage. The responsibility for the 
maintenance of the number rests with the individual municipalities through the 
Municipal Personal Records Database. Every information exchange must contain 
an explicit legal basis which affirms the usage of the citizen service number in a 
specific situation. The usage, according to the Committee, ought to be divided 
into three separate categories, namely organizational, sectoral, and national.567 
Each user category shall maintain specific arrangements. Every minister must 
introduce a specific sector number which can be the equivalent of the citizen 
service number as long as the Ministry maintains arrangements which implement 
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privacy enhancing technologies. When a Ministry or government agency is 
responsible for the treatment of special information, as identified by the Dutch 
Data Protection Act, the number used shall in principle not be the equivalent of 
the citizen service number. To ensure careful usage, the Committee also details a 
recommendation which introduces the notion of ‘trust functions.’568 These trust 
functions maintain a responsibility for the arrangements of authorization, 
authentication, and integrity at three different levels, namely the previously 
identified categories.  
With respect to the private sector, the Committee specifically states how 
organizations within such a sector ought to only be allowed to use the number in 
service of a public task or when there is a legal requirement for the usage of the 
number during communication with the government.569 An example of such a 
requirement is the need for employers to use the number when communicating 
employee information to the tax administration agency.  
As its final recommendation, the Committee makes a crucial distinction when 
it states how the citizen service number should indicate who someone is rather 
than what the individual in question is entitled to in terms of services. The 
Committee emphasizes the need for practical measures to prevent the citizen 
service number from evolving into a pseudo identity.570  
The plans as introduced by the Committee along with the observations made 
are particularly puzzling with respect to the background sketched above. For the 
continuous resistance demonstrated by the government to prevent the social-fiscal 
number from evolving into a general number used for all governmental and 
business communications failed to materialize, just as its original plan did for the 
a-number. As a result, the implementation in practice managed to accomplish 
precisely what members of the Lower House failed to successfully achieve several 
years ago. The only exception is that integration never occurred since the a-
number continues to exist in its secluded form.   
The background to the plan as published by the Committee also found its 
inspiration from experiences abroad. For the members of the Interdepartmental 
Committee visited Sweden to observe a country which carries many years of 
experience with a general identification number system.571 In contrast to the 
United States, the Swedes and their experiences proved more positive. Still, abuse 
of access to personal identity numbers and other aspects of personal data do 
happen. Lars Regenfeldt from the National Tax Board recognizes how there are 
approximately 20 to 30 cases a year.572 Yet the abuse of identifying information or 
the access to such information is not a reason for the population or the 
government to question the effectiveness and the advantages of the use of a 
personal identity number. Other government officials demonstrate similar views. 
When asked about the tremendous risk of fraud as a result of a unique 
identification number, they did not view this as a problem. There is fraud in 
Sweden, as anywhere else, but, according to representatives from the National 
Social Insurance Board, this has rather little to do with the existence and usage of 
the personal identity number. Despite the fact that the number is extremely 
available, fraud is difficult to commit when a perpetrator only possesses the 
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personal identity number of a potential victim. A perpetrator simply needs a lot 
more personal data to commit any type of identity-related crime. Fraud is hard 
work in Sweden, according to the National Social Insurance Board representatives. 
Yet, despite these comforting conclusions, restrictions have been introduced, 
especially within the private sector. Health insurance agencies are no longer 
allowed to use the number within their internal client administration. 
The plan published by the Interdepartmental Committee van Thijn served as 
the basis for the proposal introduced by the government for a citizen service 
number. The introduction of such a number formed an important pillar of an 
overall program introduced which aimed to establish a ‘different government.’573 
The legal framework for the citizen service number grants all government agencies 
the right to use the number without the need for additional legislative permission. 
The usage of a single number for government operations therefore stimulates 
efficiency and a reduction of administrative burdens. The introduction of the 
citizen service number allowed the government to streamline its information 
systems and also introduce the necessary conditions for efficient information 
exchange between the various government agencies. Furthermore, the 
introduction of the citizen service number also intended to engage in a major clean 
up of the previous social-fiscal number system. This clean up was necessary due to 
the existence of duplicate numbers along with abuse of social-fiscal numbers by 
individuals in an effort to work legally in the Netherlands despite their illegal 
immigration status or to receive government benefits which individuals were not 
entitled to. 
The government specifically focused on introducing a citizen service number 
for public sector usage and states how the usage of the number within the private 
sector is of a different nature.574 As a result, such usage is not discussed by the 
government during its presentation of the proposal. This ambiguity led to critical 
questions from the Lower House.575 As a result, the Ministry of the Interior aimed 
to generate more clarity about private sector usage of the social-fiscal number in 
an effort to make decisions about the connection between the citizen service 
number and potential private sector usage.576 This desire led to a study which 
evaluated usage of the number by semi-public and private parties. The study notes 
how the Dutch Data Protection Act requires a legal foundation in order for an 
organization to use a personalized number. Despite this legal mandate, many 
occasions demonstrate how the number is requested or used without any 
foundation. This includes illegal use by information agencies (see chapter 7) in an 
effort to more easily obtain certain kinds of personal information for a client and 
illegal usage of the number by illegal immigrants to work legally in the 
Netherlands.  
Besides these obvious illegal situations, other organizations also use the 
number as an index mechanism or a search function.577 In their report, the authors 
carefully conclude how there appears to be a general perception within the private 
                                                
573 Actieprogramma Andere Overheid (2003).  
574 Memorie van Toelichting voorstel van Wet BSN (2007). Unofficial version. Available at: 
http://www.bprbzk.nl/BSN/Informatiebank/Juridisch (last accessed July 4, 2010).  
575 TILT (2007). Het gebruik van het sofinummer door private en semi-publieke partijen: feitelijke trends in gebruik en 
normering. Interne notitie ten behoeve van het Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties.  
576 Ibid.  
577 Ibid.  
STATE AS PROVIDER     111 
 
 
and the semi-public sector that possession of the number in their databases also 
provides them with the legitimacy to broadly use this number, or that such usage 
ought to be legitimized.578 Overall, the study demonstrates how the number is 
susceptible to potential function creep, although not to the extent as became 
evident in the United States.    
For the citizen service number, the government aims to limit such function 
creep through describing how the number serves as a means to indicate who 
someone is as opposed to what the individual is entitled to. The number itself 
does not grant individuals the right to certain services or privileges which means 
the mere possession is meaningless, according to the government. This is a 
position which reflects the statements made by the Interdepartmental Committee 
van Thijn.  
Even so, criticism against the introduction of the citizen service number 
proved fierce. The DPA presented ten objections to the government’s original 
proposal.579 According to the DPA, the introduction of the citizen service number 
served primarily as a beneficial tool for the government, while the risks for citizens 
were insufficiently acknowledged. The DPA declared how it is too easy to assume 
that government efficiency is always in the interest of the citizens and that 
therefore the introduction of a general registration number is essential to the 
public. After all, the DPA reasoned, citizens can experience significant 
disadvantages as a result of the ease with which others, especially those with 
malicious intent, can access sensitive personal information. The DPA demanded 
government imposed requirements for the security of ICT systems which maintain 
citizen service numbers and related information.580  
Another objection introduced by the DPA was the danger of the spread of 
mistakes through the use of the citizen service number. When incorrect personal 
information enters the computer or when incorrect processing occurs, citizens can 
experience significant harm as a result of such incorrect information.581 This can 
happen in particular through the exchange of personal information based on the 
citizen service number. The correction of such mistakes poses additional 
challenges for citizens due to the lack of an office where they can request a 
correction. The government responded to this criticism through introducing a 
complaint center where citizens can go when they experience problems with their 
citizen service number. The original proposal also failed to adequately arrange 
situations where government agencies discover mistakes and need to notify the 
citizen. But this criticism also received a response from the government through a 
legal notification duty.  
The most relevant objection posed by the DPA is the potential increase in 
identity theft as a result of the citizen service number. The DPA demonstrates 
little doubt about such a possibility and refers to experiences abroad. Illegal use of 
social-fiscal numbers is already a material fact which allows the DPA to develop 
an argument where such illegal use will suffer an increase due to the broader 
application of the citizen service number.582 The consequences for citizens will 
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also be more severe due to the broader application, but the government’s proposal 
fails to take this concern into account.583  
The citizen service number proposal also received criticism from the academic 
arena.584 Especially its misleading title, citizen service number, proved a source of 
criticism. This criticism stems from the understanding that the citizen service 
number predominantly serves the government through its ability to eliminate 
administrative burdens.585 The notion of the government to combat identity theft 
through the incorporation of the number also receives objections, in particular 
since the introduction of the number also has the ability to lead to a more 
vulnerable identification infrastructure in the Netherlands, as the DPA noted as 
well.   
During the oral discussion of the bill in the Senate, the government also 
received several objections and concerns.586 The Senate appeared in particular 
concerned about the government’s implementation of the number and the 
alternatives offered to citizens when mistakes occur. In addition, the Senate 
expressed its dissatisfaction about the fact that many agencies, predominantly in 
the health care sector, already used the term citizen service number, despite the 
lack of approval granted by the Senate to pass the bill into law. Whereas the 
majority of comments provided by various members of the Senate focused on the 
implementation of the citizen service number, along with opportunities for 
citizens to correct errors made on their behalf due to the usage of the number, at 
least one member referred back to the potential for identity theft as a result of the 
introduction and usage of the citizen service number.587 While the government 
projected the introduction of the citizen service number as a means to reduce 
fraud, others appear to believe the number and its usage can provide opportunities 
for perpetrators to commit identity theft. The representative for the Green Party 
acknowledged how identity theft cannot be prevented or entirely avoided, to 
which the Assistant Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior logically responded: 
“but you can improve the situation.”588 The subsequent comment provided by the 
representative of the Christian Democratic Party, on the other hand, appears 
rather peculiar. He states, “[t]here are of course all different kinds of ways to 
commit identity theft. The number of methods to commit identity theft continues 
to expand and to some extent this is a good thing, because it shows that people 
are intelligent. They continue to think of something new. We can, in turn, also 
think of something new to prevent fraud. That’s how we keep each other busy, 
and that is good.”589  
The State appears to set forth an argument which focuses on the impossibility 
of the complete prevention of identity theft in particular and fraud in general. 
Simultaneously, the State claims how it maximizes its efforts to reduce the 
potential for fraud. Through a study about the ‘good’ use of the citizen service 
number, Het Expertise Centrum (HEC), or the Expert Centre, re-emphasizes this 
notion.590 HEC identifies the potential for identity theft through the introduction 
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of the citizen service number, but also states how the government devoted 
considerable attention to the prevention of such fraud through the design and 
implementation of the number.591 Still, HEC identifies the potential risks 
associated with agencies accepting the citizen service number as a sole means of 
identification used by citizens.592 This potential risk is particularly evident in the 
United States (see section 4.2.1), where the use of a number, and as such the mere 
knowledge of the number, functions as a means of identity verification.  
Whereas originally the government shied away from articulating how the 
private sector could use the citizen service number, developments led to the need 
for more concrete decisions. Ever since the introduction of the idea of a citizen 
service number, the financial services industry has been eager to be involved. In 
2005, the Dutch Banking Association proclaimed both its interest in and the 
necessity for access to the number as an instrument to be used internally by banks 
for identity verification.593 The usage of the citizen service number by the financial 
services sector was projected as a must in the fight against terrorism and money 
laundering.594 Boele Staal claimed how access to the citizen service number and 
the legal duty of care imposed on the financial services sector by the government 
in the fight against terrorism, money laundering, and fiscal fraud maintained an 
intricate connection.595 In an effort to carry out Customer Due Dilligence, banks 
must also receive the possibility to conduct such activities in a comprehensive 
manner, according to Jan Berkvens, who also indicates how the Dutch Data 
Protection Act provides sufficient room for the government to grant banks access 
to the number.596 The former Minister of Finances did indicate in 2005 in the 
Lower House how he planned to grant banks access to the number.  
Several years later, in 2009, the government finally introduced a bill to realize 
the involvement of the financial services sector.597 In particular the increased 
emphasis on identity verification in light of anti-money laundering initiatives along 
with the prevention of terrorist financing provided the government with ample 
motivation to support the involvement of the financial sector. The government 
notes how the usage of the number by the financial sector is not a new 
phenomenon.598 For tax purposes, banks have a legal obligation to use the citizen 
service number when providing the tax administration office with information 
about its clients. The government emphasizes the importance of opening up the 
usage of citizen service numbers to financial service providers in order for them to 
obtain a complete picture of their clients and the government anticipates a 
decrease in errors due to the usage of the number.599  
In its reaction to the legislative proposal for usage of the citizen service number in 
the financial services sector, the DPA proved critical.600 The usage of the citizen 
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service number within any particular sector requires a demonstration of societal 
necessity. This requirement is set forth in Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. According to the DPA, the government failed to establish and 
demonstrate a societal necessity in order for the financial services sector to gain 
the right to access and use the citizen service number.601 The DPA therefore calls 
upon the government to provide a more convincing demonstration of the social 
necessity of the usage of the citizen service number by the industry of financial 
services.   
 Before the financial services sector, the healthcare sector managed to 
successfully obtain access to the usage of the citizen service number.602 This 
happened soon after the passage of the citizen service number. The Dutch DPA 
noted how the Interdepartmental Committee van Thijn stated that when a 
particular sector deals with ‘sensitive’ personal information as defined in the 
Dutch Data Protection Act, such a sector ought not to be allowed to replace its 
sectoral number by the citizen service number.603 Medical information is an 
example of such special personal information. Despite this advice, the Ministry of 
Administrative Innovation still embarked upon a study to investigate the 
possibilities for abandoning the requirement of a separate number within the 
health care sector in an effort to introduce the usage of the citizen service number. 
Such replacement required certain conditions which aimed to ensure the privacy 
of individuals. To ensure the privacy aspects of such a proposal, the Ministry 
called upon the Dutch DPA to provide its assistance. The DPA provided an 
affirmative advice about the implementation of the citizen service number in the 
health care sector, but identified several conditions and safeguards to ensure the 
privacy of individuals.604 The measures introduced and identified by the DPA in 
its memorandum should be in place before the actual implementation of the 
citizen service number in the health care sector. The particular conditions 
mentioned by the DPA include a proposal which specifically states when and 
under what conditions actors within the health care sector may use the citizen 
service number. The DPA also expressed concerns about the manner in which the 
supervision of the usage of the number was regulated within the proposed bill.605 
 Concrete existing problems with respect to the citizen service number and its 
predecessor the social-fiscal number are the usage of the number by illegal 
immigrants for work purposes, as previously noted. As a result, the authentic 
‘owner’ of the citizen service number appears to work multiple jobs and as such 
earn more money which often invites the tax administration office to commence 
an investigation or alter the tax bracket. The consumer complaint center has 
received complaints about perpetrators of identity theft using the citizen service 
number of the victim which leads to problems with the tax administration 
office.606 This type of problem already existed during the era of the social-fiscal 
number. A study published in 2002 concluded how 49% of its investigations 
concerned illegal usage of the social-fiscal number.607 In particular, temp agencies 
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turned out to be involved in many cases of such illegal usage. The incentive for the 
study proved to be the accumulation of complaints from individuals who receive 
status updates from the social security agency and discovered employment 
relations which were not theirs. 
 
4.3 Identification Documents 
 
Personal identity and identification carry an extensive history. Valentin Groebner 
traces the historical roots of the topic in his book Who Are You? Identification, 
Deception, and Surveillance in Early Modern Europe. Through his historical description, 
Groebner illustrates how travel documents, especially the introduction of the 
passport, transformed itself from a privilege to an obligation.608 Initially, travel 
documents such as letters of recommendation and safe conduct carried an air of 
exclusivity because only limited individuals managed to obtain the rather 
expensive documents for their journeys. Letters of safe conduct and 
recommendation became more advanced and represent the origins of the current 
passports used around the globe as a means of identification during foreign travel.  
Groebner acknowledges how the validation of the identification document 
came about through the mark of the sovereign or authority who issued the 
document. The right to produce such a mark or seal of authenticity rests firmly in 
the hands of the government. The issuance of identification documents is, 
according to Groebner, a government monopoly, or at least the government aims 
to make it so.609 Groebner’s eloquent description is both informative and 
intriguing due to the resemblance of challenges between the past and the present. 
The introduction of passports as an obligation rather than a mere privilege made 
its value enormous. Value of a product, especially when its value rests in its ability 
to gain access to monetary benefits, undoubtedly leads to crime. Groebner 
describes how unauthorized access to official seal stamps provided a crucial tool 
to allow fraudsters to reproduce unauthorized documents. This was, according to 
Groebner, a common problem in the late Middle Ages. Obviously, this led to 
authentication problems. The mere reliance on the identification document 
proved problematic because of the production of unauthorized documents which 
were indistinguishable from their authorized counterparts. The following solution 
became common practice, according to Groebner, 
 
“…identification and furnishing proof of a person’s authenticity would no longer 
be rendered possible by the official signs of absent authorities adorning 
documents that an individual produced. Instead, authenticity in identification was 
to be achieved by matching such documents with internal registers, replete with 
information supposedly readily on hand in official archives. In the turn to the 
modern period, identity documents became more and more closely bound up with 
area-wide, exhaustive registration systems, at least in official theory. Such is the 
large historical narrative of expanding control, tightening administration, and 
‘disciplining’ in a period that is said to begin in the fifteenth century and whose 
fruition is commonly dated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.”610  
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This period, according to Groebner, marks the beginning of the modern 
administration, which countries still cling to in contemporary society.  
Other significant international developments increased the importance and the 
value of travel documents and introduced the ‘identification revolution.’611 
Especially the influence of World War I and World War II receive considerable 
attention throughout historical discussions of passports and their role in society.612 
Whereas increased foreign travel and the need for appropriate documents mainly 
focuses on Europe, the developments across the ocean also influenced the United 
States and its decisions.  
The identification documents discussed below are more expansive than merely 
the passport. As a matter of fact, for the United States the focus is exclusively on 
its driver’s license system and in the background on the ‘feeder’ documents 
needed to obtain such a license. The section on the Netherlands, in contrast, 
divides its attention between both the passport and the driver’s license due to the 
significance of both in the national identification infrastructure. Even so, the 
historical description provided by Groebner maintains its relevancy through the 
emphasis on the transformation of documents and the challenges posed by the 
determination of their authenticity and the ability to verify their ownership.   
 
4.3.1 United States 
 
There is no national identification infrastructure in the United States. Instead, the 
identification infrastructure in the United States depends primarily on state-issued 
driver’s licenses. Driver’s licenses in the United States are more than a document 
which grants an individual the legal right to operate a vehicle. The driver’s license 
functions as a proof of identity for various transactions and services throughout 
the country. From a logical perspective, such an expansion of functions is quite 
obvious. The need for a driver’s license in the United States is high, certainly 
higher than in countries where the public transportation system is a realistic 
alternative. Aside from the urban areas, many parts of the United States do not 
have a functional public transportation system. The sheer size of the country 
refutes walking as a viable means of transportation. As a result, the ability to drive 
is an essential aspect of modern life for many, if not most, Americans. The need 
for a driver’s license for many Americans leads to an expectancy that many 
actually hold such a document, which makes it a convenient instrument for other 
purposes, such as identification. Furthermore, the implementation of a separate 
identification document, such as a national identity card, is both a costly and 
politically sensitive option. Passports never became the de facto form of 
identification because Americans only apply for the travel document when they 
can and want to go abroad. For many Americans, travelling is either not a viable 
option or an attractive prospective. As a result, passport possession is less 
common than driver’s license ownership. Serge Egelman & Lorrie Faith Cranor 
express how the driver’s license is the most often used form of government-issued 
identification in the United States.613 Nevertheless, historically driver’s license 
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administrators did not want the document to be used for anything other than to 
grant individuals the right to operate a vehicle.614  
The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution indirectly grants the 
individual States the exclusive authority to issue driver’s licenses. The Tenth 
Amendment states that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”615 Since the right to issue driver’s licenses is not 
expressively delegated to the Federal government in the Constitution, it falls under 
the authority of the States. Each State has a specific department, agency or bureau 
which administers the written and practical exams, and subsequently issues driver’s 
licenses.616 Generally this is the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), but is also 
sometimes called the Motor Vehicle Association (MVA), as in the State of 
Maryland for example. The organization or the agency or bureau is vastly different 
from State to State. According to Egelman and Cranor, in most states the DMV is 
part of the Department of Transportation.617 In a few exceptions, however, it is 
part of the Department of Public Safety or the Department of Revenue. Each 
State has the liberty to determine where the agency is most at home. State 
legislation dictates the powers and function of the DMV, but individual directors 
determine what information applicants need to divulge in order to obtain a 
license.618 Although sometimes statutes or regulatory agreements determine which 
information is required from the applicant.  
Egelman and Cranor provide a thorough analysis of the requirements to obtain 
a license in all fifty States.619 Most States distinguish between primary and 
secondary forms of identification. Primary forms of identification predominantly 
include birth certificates and passports. Ironically, the list of secondary 
identification documents lists items which are normally not used for identification 
purposes  such as marriage certificates, social security cards, immigration 
documents, and even school records. The primary form of identification, 
especially the use of the birth certificate, is also far from bullet proof. According 
to Egelman & Carnor, in all States individuals can obtain a license through 
providing a birth certificate and another document which was obtained through 
the same birth certificate. The authors, as a result, rightfully acknowledge how 
“[t]his is a gaping security hole in the identification process as it is trivially easy to 
obtain a birth certificate.”620  Eight vital records jurisdictions maintain a policy of 
‘open’ records at the State or local level which means individuals without a legal 
right to a birth certificate may still obtain a certified copy of the birth certificate.621 
Other problems associated with the use of birth certificates include the vast variety 
in type of certificates issued within the United States and its territories. In total, 
there are 14,000 variations of birth certificates in 57 United States jurisdictions.622 
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This vast variety complicates the ability of individuals to assess the authenticity of 
the document.  
Stephen T. Kent and Lynette I. Millett recognize how “[t]he integrity of any 
authentication system that relies on a government-issued identifier depends on the 
integrity of a small number of foundation ID documents issued by government 
organizations.”623 The authors furthermore note how circular the process is with 
respect to either obtaining a government-issued form of identification or 
requesting a duplicate, since the birth certificate can easily be obtained yet is used 
as a verification document for other applications. Among their most relevant 
findings is the assertion that “[m]any of the foundational identification documents 
used to establish individual user identity are very poor from a security perspective, 
often as a result of having been generated by a diverse set of issuers that may lack 
an ongoing interest in ensuring the documents’ validity and reliability. Birth 
certificates are especially poor as base identity documents, because they cannot be 
readily tied to an individual.”624 
The driver’s license issue became a greater source of concern after the events 
of September 11, 2001. The 9/11 Commission determined in its report how “[a]ll 
but one of the 9/11 hijackers acquired some form of U.S. identification document, 
some by fraud. Acquisition of these forms of identification would have assisted 
them in boarding commercial flights, renting cars, and other necessary 
activities.”625 The 9/11 Commission used this conclusion to introduce the 
following recommendation “[s]ecure identification should begin in the United 
States. The Federal government should set standards for the issuance of birth 
certificates and sources of identification, such as driver’s licenses. Fraud in 
identification documents is no longer just a problem of theft. At many entry 
points to vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft, sources of 
identification are the last opportunity to ensure that people are who they say they 
are and to check whether they are terrorists.”626  The Federal government 
responded to the recommendation set forth by the Commission and introduced 
the REAL ID Act in 2005.627 The Act specifically states how its primary aim is 
“[t]o establish and rapidly implement regulations for State driver’s license and 
identification document security standards, to prevent terrorists from abusing the 
asylum laws of the United States, to unify terrorism-related grounds for 
inadmissibility and removal, and to ensure expeditious construction of the San 
Diego border fence.”628 Only Title II of the Act, the establishment of regulations 
for security standards of State driver’s licenses and identification documents is 
pertinent to the issue of financial identity theft. To achieve its aim of security 
standards, the Act introduces minimum document requirements and issuance 
standards for Federal recognition. The Act grants States a period of three years 
after its enactment to adhere to the minimum standards set. This means the Act 
prohibits Federal agencies to accept driver’s licenses or personal identification 
cards for any official purpose after May 11, 2008 unless the license or card has 
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been issued by a State that is meeting the requirements set forth in the Act. These 
minimum standards required in order for individuals to use the State issued form 
of identification for Federal purposes, include the person’s full legal name, date of 
birth, gender, driver’s license or identification card number, a digital photograph 
of the person, address or personal residence, and the person’s signature.629 
Furthermore, the Act also requires physical security features designed to prevent 
tampering, counterfeiting, or duplication of the document for fraudulent purposes, 
and the document must contain a common machine-readable technology, with 
defined minimum data elements. In addition to the minimum document 
requirements listed above, the Act also lists minimum issuance standards. The Act 
draws a distinction between general and special requirements.630 The State must 
furthermore adhere to ‘Special Requirements’ which include evidence of lawful 
status of the applicant.631  
In particular these special requirements appear to arouse suspicion about the 
actual motivation behind the introduction of the REAL ID Act. According to Jim 
Harper, “[t]he REAL ID Act was nominally aimed at preventing terrorists from 
entering the country. But this was a rather small fig leaf covering a broader 
attempt to curtail illegal immigration.”632 Harper continues his argument through 
the exposition of a historical path taken by the United States Congress to reduce 
illegal immigration through identification-based surveillance for immigration law 
enforcement. Due to the availability of false identification papers in the United 
States, such surveillance proved rather unsuccessful historically. Michael Froomkin 
echoes a similar conclusion when he writes, “[a]lthough promoted as a way to 
protect against terrorism, the act’s most likely effect will be to make it more 
difficult for undocumented aliens to forge credentials for employment.”633   The 
other aspects of the REAL ID Act, which fall outside of the scope of this analysis, 
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also appear to focus on illegal immigration and the efforts of the Federal 
government to respond to this problem. The application of the Act to the 
reduction of financial identity theft appears to be pressed into the background for 
the primary focus remains on illegal immigration and terrorism. This is strikingly 
similar to the introduction and subsequent execution of the Identity Theft Penalty 
Enhancement Act (see section 3.1).   
Overall, the REAL ID Act remains a source of controversy. Certain sources 
labeled the provisions introduced in the Act as a wolf in sheep clothing. Or a 
national identification card with a different name. Egelman and Cranor argue how 
“[s]ince all of the new licenses will have the same information on them, which is 
then stored in one national database, this basically creates a national ID card.”634 
Several sources, from privacy advocates to individual States, oppose the mere 
existence of a national identification card, which complicates the government’s 
implementation of the REAL ID Act. On January 29, 2008, the Department of 
Homeland Security extended the original compliance date from May 11, 2008 to 
January 1, 2010. This extension only applied to States who filed for an extension 
in a timely fashion. This turned out to be all States, according to the Department 
of Homeland Security.635 Whereas the Department of Homeland Security 
emphasizes the benefits provided through the implementation of the REAL ID 
Act, including an anticipated reduction in cases of and costs associated with 
identity theft, other sources instead emphasize the costs associated with the REAL 
ID Act. The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) has been a pioneer 
against the implementation of the REAL ID Act. In its opposition, EPIC receives 
company from other organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU).636 The objections raised against the national identification card are 
diverse. These objections are part of a broader criticism about the introduction of 
a national identification document system (NIDS). Richard Sobel declares how 
“[t]he creation of a NIDS undermines the basic principles of personhood, 
sovereignty, due process, and federalism in the U.S. Constitution while ultimately 
providing questionable utility.”637 Especially the issue of federalism is a crucial 
aspect of the strong opposition expressed by individual States with regard to the 
implementation of the REAL ID Act. The Federal government, according to the 
States, basically surpasses its constitutional powers and undermines the 
sovereignty of the States. Closely associated with this argument is the lack of 
sufficient Federal funding which accompanies the requirements, despite the costs 
anticipated by States in order to carry out the requirements set forth by the REAL 
ID Act. According to a calculation made by a cooperative effort of the National 
Governors Association, National Conference of State Legislatures, and the 
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) the 
implementation of the REAL ID Act will cost more than $11 billion over a period 
of five years.638 The estimation of DHS is lower at $3.9 billion. Even so, Congress 
only appropriated $200 million for State implementation. This tension between 
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Federal and State governments prevails in the discussion, and from a 
constitutional perspective this appears understandable.  
Nevertheless, for identity theft the focus must be on the other arguments set 
forth by the opponents, as well as the proponents of the Act. In an analysis of the 
Department of Homeland Security’s National ID Program, EPIC states how 
“[t]he REAL ID national identification system would harm rather than protect 
privacy and security, and such a system would exacerbate the country’s growing 
identity theft problem. It decreases security to have a centralized system of 
identification, one ID card for many purposes, as there will be a substantial 
amount of harm when the card is compromised.”639 This foreshadowing of an 
exacerbation of the problem appears to be based on the misguided assumption 
that through the implications of the REAL ID Act the driver’s license increases in 
value. EPIC appears to omit how the driver’s license is already ‘one ID card for 
many purposes’, as noted above. The REAL ID Act fails to inherently change the 
system; instead, the Act streamlines the product and issuance requirements. The 
President of the International Association of Financial Crimes Investigators 
precisely focuses on this point when he pleaded for a national identification card 
as a solution for financial identity theft, at least in the physical world. As he noted, 
“[w]e are already doing it, why wouldn’t you want some integrity to the 
document?”640 He therefore identifies the integrity of the document, or the lack 
thereof, as a crucial vulnerability which requires change in order to reduce the 
problem of financial identity theft.    
 Other arguments against the establishment of a national identification card 
focus on historical events. Sobel writes, “[i]dentity systems and documents have a 
long history of being used for social control and discrimination. Through the Civil 
War, slaves were required to carry passes in order to travel away from 
plantations.”641 This is a legitimate fear in particular with respect to the usage of 
identification documents during World War II (see chapter 3), which Sobel 
describes extensively. Other examples include the requirement of citizens to carry 
internal passports during the 1930s and 1940s by the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republic, and the requirement in South Africa where the government required 
black citizens to carry passes which prohibited their free movement throughout 
the country for over thirty years, starting in 1958.642 Sobel also refers to the system 
of identity cards which assisted in the ability to distinguish between Hutus and 
Tutsis in Rwanda during the civil war. This system played a significant role in the 
genocide, according to Sobel.643 Whereas these horrors certainly ought to serve as 
a pivotal warning, the comparison drawn with regard to the REAL ID Act appears 
to suffer from a certain level of exaggeration. The REAL ID Act sets forth 
requirements about standards of an identification document which already exist 
and is already used as a national identifier. The historical examples depict 
situations which are of such a different nature that the fear expressed by Sobel 
appears unrealistic. This is also evident from the seeming lack of concern 
expressed by civil law countries, especially in Western Europe. As Froomkin 
notes, “[a]lthough I have not seen it stated in quite these terms, one gets the sense 
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the western European answer to common-law paranoia about ID card systems 
would be that if a regime is using ID cards to oppress its people, the problems are 
much more fundamental than the existence of the cards—and their absence will 
not pose much of an obstacle to oppression anyway.”644  
Sobel continues his criticism of NIDS through mentioning practical obstacles 
which complicate the realization of such a system. Sobel states, “[a] federalized 
NIDS presents large-scale problems because a national ID requires a national ID 
number...”645 This is hardly an objection since such a national identification 
number also already exists de facto, the SSN. Both the driver’s license and the 
SSN function as means of national identification. This is a problem, as financial 
identity theft painfully demonstrates.     
The Real ID Act, despite its controversial nature, is not completely without 
support. James Jay Carafano is strongly in favor of the Real ID Act. When he 
refers to both the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 and the Real ID Act of 2005, 
Carafano writes, “[t]hese laws are grounded in common sense. Administrators of 
the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators has long 
recommended similar measures. Requiring more secure documents and 
procedures for issuance and monitoring is not a ‘silver bullet,’ but this strategy will 
help to combat identity theft, fraud, and other crimes.”646  
The future of the REAL ID Act remains rather uncertain. The Department of 
Homeland Security provided States with an additional opportunity to request an 
extension for implementation. This moves the compliance deadline up to May 10, 
2011 and in the meantime efforts to repeal the Act, both at the State as well as at 
the Federal level, continue.   
 
4.3.2 The Netherlands 
 
The main alternatives of documentation used in the Netherlands for identification 
purposes are the passport, national identification card, and the driver’s license. 
The passport system in the Netherlands carries a turbulent history. The period 
after World War II in particular contains various moments of political and social 
controversy. Continuous evidence of the document’s sensitivity to fraud, advances 
in technology, international developments, along with the altering landscape of the 
government in its search of administrative efficiency and effectiveness caused 
considerable conflict on different occasions. The early passport controversy which 
occurred during the eighties was mainly a political affair, whereas the more recent 
disagreement reflects a crucial social dimension. The 1950 passport model became 
the topic of political concern during the early eighties.647 The discussion 
surrounding the introduction of a different passport model maintained two 
distinct origins. The first were international discussions and developments about 
the uniformication and standardization of identification and travel documents. 
This discussion at the international level commenced during the end of the sixties 
and arose as a result of various developments, including increased travel of citizens 
around the world and increased cooperation among various countries around the 
globe.648 The increased prevalence of fraud through the usage of travel documents 
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also factored into the discussions and proved to be a crucial reason for the 
introduction of a European passport. This leads into the second main reason for a 
reconsideration of the Dutch passport. Internationally, the Dutch passport carried 
a negative reputation due to its severe sensitivity to fraud which granted those in 
possession of the document the ability to commit fraud at a global scale. Its 
negative reputation helped the document obtain the unflattering nickname of ‘the 
black rag.’649  
Through the ratification of a European resolution on 23 June 1981, the 
Netherlands officially committed itself to the development of a passport which 
embodied the uniform model introduced in the European community.650 The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs opened the conversation in 1983 with the State 
Publisher about a new passport model. A year later, in 1984, the European Union 
initiated an agreement to design a more fraud resistant passport model at the 
European level for all Member States.651 Especially in the Netherlands the need 
for a more fraud resistant passport appeared eminent. Other issues surrounding 
the design and ultimate production of the passport complicated the matter. The 
privatization of the State Publisher appeared to be a concrete possibility, which 
meant the government gained the liberty to enter an agreement with another 
corporation. Before the possibility of privatization, the government was required 
to grant all relevant contracts to the State Publisher. The release from such a 
requirement led the government to venture elsewhere for the passport production 
process. Instead of the State Publisher, the government entered an agreement in 
1986 with a new corporation KEP, especially established for passport design and 
production.652 The government’s decision to circumvent the State Publisher and 
grant the contract to another corporation became an issue of dispute. Many 
questioned whether the government’s decision was particularly wise.  
The other more prominent issue which caused considerable concern among 
members of the Lower House was the quality of fraud resistance the new passport 
design could offer. The first round of fraud resistance tests came in 1987 and 
1988.653 The Immigration and Naturalization Office (INS) in the United States 
tested the passport model on its ability to resist attempts at possible falsification. 
The INS provided an overall positive response to the passport, but made several 
critical remarks for improvement. When the government sent a letter to the Lower 
House, it mentioned the positive results but kept the areas for improvement as 
mentioned by the INS to itself.654 As political pressure increased, and the 
introduction of the new passport model continuously found itself postponed, the 
Lower House requested a study to investigate whether a fraud resistant passport 
for a reasonable price was actually a viable option.655 The research results were not 
negative, since the study results demonstrated how everything should work out as 
planned. The Lower House, despite the comforting results, required the 
government to conduct various tests to measure the level of fraud resistance 
offered by the new passport model. These tests came out negative and fuelled the 
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political anger on the side of the Lower House.656 The government failed to negate 
the fire when it announced another postponement during a debate in 1988. The 
Lower House initiated a parliamentary research committee to investigate the facts 
and the responsibilities of the decision making process.657 Several government 
officials refused to cooperate with the research project which led the Lower 
House to change the research committee to a parliamentary survey committee 
forcing everyone to cooperate and be questioned under oath during public 
hearings.658  
The Committee came back with its results on August 29, 1988 and its 
judgment was fierce. In its comments on the passport inquiry, Henk van Dongen 
and Abbe Mowshowitz wrote “[t]he story that emerges from the testimony we 
have examined is very nearly a textbook case of how not to introduce an 
information system in a complex organization. Witnesses have discussed the 
passport system as the proverbial blindmen have reported on the elephant. 
Limited parts of the beast have been described with accuracy and precision, but 
these fragments do not add up to a coherent characterization of the whole 
animal.”659 
The ultimate passport failed to receive positive reactions. Its quality 
improvement in comparison to the 1950 model appeared scarce.660 During the 
following years, the passport design remained a sensitive topic and in 1993, five 
years after its introduction, TNO661 offered a negative opinion about the 
document.662 In particular, TNO determined how the photograph included in the 
passport was easily removable. Two years later, the Netherlands issued the first 
passport which incorporated the European model. The government confirmed a 
‘maximum level of fraud resistance’ which included technological aspects to 
successfully prevent falsification.663 Despite this maximization of fraud resistance, 
the following month the Central Investigation Information Service (CRI) declared 
the ease with which the photograph on the passport could be removed and 
replaced. The CRI warned for the fraud sensitive nature of the document which 
led to an emergency debate in the Lower House in October 1995.664 A couple of 
months later, more problems surfaced. Individuals were not required to report the 
loss or the theft of their passport. They could simply apply for another passport 
which meant people had the ability to generally apply and own multiple passports 
in the same name. This reflected the procedural vulnerabilities which often 
remained in the shadow of the product weaknesses. The plagued passport system 
received even more negative publicity when law enforcement arrested an Iranian 
citizen with 110 Dutch passports in his possession ready for falsification.665  
The government introduced yet another passport model in 1997, which aimed 
to prevent the ease of photograph removal and replacement. The removal of the 
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photograph caused the letters to crumble on the page; nonetheless, falsification 
turned out to be possible.666 After all the bad publicity, the government began its 
exploration of biometrics as a means to increase the quality of the document. 
Unlike the previous four passports introduced during the previous decade, the 
passport introduced in 2001 managed to survive its original term of five years and 
receive an additional term. Such a success is the result of the transformation the 
passport experienced as a result of the incorporation of trusted technology.667 
Previously, the government only allowed the incorporation of proofing 
technology, which meant those in charge of developing the travel document could 
only introduce means of technology which had already been introduced by others. 
Such a limitation proved unsatisfactory for those in charge of the new passport 
and as such they introduced the idea of trusted technology, which meant a higher 
level of innovativeness. Trusted technology meant that the provider of the 
technology had to demonstrate and indicate its technological product was highly 
promising.668  
The 2001 passport was a model developed in anticipation of future 
technological advances and potential requirements. The model was ready for 
potential implementation of the RFID chip and biometric data such as the facial 
scan and fingerprints.669 Other signs of authenticity introduced into the model are 
the second photograph and an emblem. Furthermore, the developing team also 
introduced a sign of authenticity which incorporated the usage of another sense. 
On the page which displays the personal information of the passport holder, the 
material contains a pattern which is sensible when touched by the authorities.670 
Discussions about the inclusion of biometric data begin in 1997.671 The 
continuous battle to design a fraud resistant document along with the fight against 
look-alike fraud forced the government to fest all of its hope on the more 
advanced technologies. Particularly the focus on look-alike fraud by the 
government increases the attention devoted to other means of technology. Look-
alike fraud receives considerable government attention in the Netherlands, in 
particular due to its connection with illegal immigration. To explore the biometric 
landscape, the government requested an exploratory study to investigate the many 
aspects of biometrics, including its benefits for travel documents and fraud 
prevention.672 After positive results returned, the government began to envision 
and emphasize the possibilities biometrics could offer in the future for travel 
documents.673 Unfamiliarity with the consequences of implementation of such 
technological elements led the government to embrace a hesitant attitude. 
Especially the privacy implications and the level of societal acceptance remained 
unclear. To move forward, the government initiated additional research projects to 
investigate the appropriateness of biometrics and travel documents.674 Fingerprints 
received the most positive results as a tool to combat look-alike fraud, according 
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to the government.675 And as a result, the inclusion of fingerprints on future travel 
documents appeared merely a matter of time. At the same time, the Lower House 
appeared enthusiastic about the potential of biometrics and stressed the need to 
implement the system in a speedy manner, due to its promising character.  
The events of September 11, 2001 influenced the decision making and 
implementation process. The United States passed the Enhanced Border Security 
and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002.676 And suddenly international developments 
with regard to biometrics entered a rapid pace and became a prominent topic of 
discussion in the fight against terrorism. Nearly everyone turned to the leading 
authority on the matter, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 
The ICAO, which had been conducting research on the inclusion of biometrics in 
travel documents since 1997, became a dominating force in the international 
developments. On May 28, 2003, the ICAO concluded its research and endorsed 
the facial scan as the standard biometric characteristic as part of the ICAO 
directives for travel documents.677 Since the Dutch government previously 
determined the fingerprint to be the most effective type of biometric to combat 
look-alike fraud, it decided to include both types of biometric information in the 
design of the new passport. This became standard procedure after the European 
Union issued a Council Regulation on December 13, 2004 which required all 
Member States to include facial scan and fingerprints on the chip in travel 
documents.678 Ironically, the Dutch government instigated the discussion at the 
European level before the Regulation appeared. The Netherlands organized a 
conference in The Hague, ‘European Conference for Issuing Authorities of Travel 
Documents’ with the theme ‘Exploring the use of biometrics in travel documents.’ 
The conference became the starting point for political decision making about the 
use of biometrics in travel documents at the European level. As a result of the 
Council Regulation, the Dutch government no longer needed to pass a national 
law to legalize the inclusion of biometrics in travel documents. The European 
Union provided the legal basis for implementation.  
To test the practicality of the inclusion of biometrics, the government initiated 
a pilot in six municipalities in the Netherlands.679 The government implemented 
the new passport in 2006. At that time, the passport included a chip which 
contained the photograph included in the passport along with personal 
information including name, date of birth, gender, document number, citizen 
service number, and expiration date. Three years later, the government 
implemented the fingerprint requirement which became effective as of September 
21, 2009. From that moment on, all applicants needed to provide their fingerprints 
for inclusion in the travel document and in a database. Whereas the first 
requirement received justification from the European level, the second 
requirement comes from the Dutch government. The Dutch Data Protection 
Authority emphasized the privacy implications of the collection and storage of 
biometric data. The government acknowledged the privacy implications, but found 
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the counterargument of a more reliable and effective application procedure for 
travel documents an adequate justification for a breach of privacy. Once again, the 
government emphasized the pressing need to combat look-alike fraud and the 
societal value of such a fight. Despite the government’s continuous justification, 
the opposition remained.  
Next to the inclusion of biometrics, the government initiated other changes in 
the overall administration of travel documents. The passport production process 
occurred decentralized through the various municipalities in the Netherlands. 
Each municipality individually applied the personal data including photograph and 
signature to the document. This is a critical aspect of the document production 
process. This decentralized production process and data collection allowed the 
municipalities to become a genuine service provider for all citizens and was in 
place since the late eighties.680 The decentralized process allowed municipalities to 
develop a service where passports became like a one-hour photo service, basically 
ready while you wait. Since 2001, the government began to issue passports in a 
centralized manner and in 2009 the government stated how this centralization 
process provided a strong increase for the overall security of the production 
process.681 The number of false travel documents in circulation decreased as a 
result of the centralization process, according to the government.682  
In addition, the government introduced a central online database. In its 
justification, the government proclaimed how the choice for a central online 
database of travel document administration is primarily introduced as a result of 
the need to make the applicant and issuance process more reliable. A second 
argument in favor of a central database was the diminishing administrative burden 
on the citizen. Due to the existence of a central database, citizens can now apply 
for a passport at any municipality. Previously, citizens were obligated to apply for 
a passport at their municipality of residence. The government furthermore claims 
there is no breach of privacy as a result of a centralization of the travel document 
information administration. 
The Identification Duty Act lists besides eligible travel documents683 also 
driver’s licenses as documents which can be used by individuals in the Netherlands 
for identification purposes. This inclusion is a result of the desire to expand the 
reach of the law, to reduce administrative burdens, and to increase user 
convenience.684 The history of the driver’s license is less extensive and turbulent 
than the passport’s history. Until 1924, individuals did not need to pass an exam to 
confirm their capacity to operate a vehicle and they also did not need to pass a 
medical examination.685 To obtain a license, individuals simply needed to establish 
they were old enough to drive. Legal changes in 1924 introduced the requirement 
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for individuals to pass an exam to determine their capacity to operate the vehicle 
and they also needed to pass a medical exam. Furthermore, the law also 
established an expiration date for driver’s licenses.686 Years later, in 1986, another 
important change occurred when mayors received the legal right to issue driver’s 
licenses, along with the Royal Service for Road Traffic (RDW). The most 
significant change occurred in 1996 when the driver’s license officially became 
accepted as a form of identification. Before 1996, the function of a driver’s license 
was restricted to its main role, which is to serve as a means of proof someone is 
legally permitted to operate a vehicle. When the driver’s license also became an 
official form of identification, it no longer served an exclusive function. This 
‘function creep’ is similar to the development of the passport described in the 
previous paragraph. Due to its change in function, the driver’s license also began 
to contain the social-fiscal number of the individual holder.  
Another ten years passed before the government changed the model of the 
driver’s license. Since 2006, the driver’s license has the size and material of a credit 
card. The change from the ‘pink slip’ to a credit card like document improved 
security of the document and increased its resistance to fraud and falsification.687 
This change in material and size placed the driver’s license at an equal level in 
terms of security with the passport in the Netherlands.688 The RDW also changed 
the application process for a driver’s license. The process has become nearly 
‘paperless.’ The RDW also transferred from a decentralized to a centralized 
process, which meant the end of the ‘ready while you wait’ service.689  
Other aspects are still under consideration. The inclusion of a chip on the 
driver’s license is such a potential aspect. This consideration is the result of 
developments at the level of the European Union. The European Parliament and 
the European Commission introduced a Directive in December 2006 which aims 
to harmonize driver’s licenses among the member states of the European 
Union.690 This Directive also provided member states with the option, rather than 
the mandate, to insert a chip into the driver’s license. The intention of such a chip 
is to strengthen the quality of the document in an effort to improve its resistance 
to fraud, especially lookalike fraud.691 The ‘free space’ on the chip can be used for 
other purposes as long as the member state obtains the permission of the 
European Commission.  The RDW expressed its desire to examine the possibility 
for the implementation of a chip as part of the driver’s license. This is in particular 
because of its potential promise to reduce the driver’s license sensitivity to fraud. 
Due to the extensive usage of the driver’s license for identification purposes, the 
RDW considers the ‘free space’ on the chip to serve as an ideal outlet to function 
as an electronic identity.692 This as a result of the special position of the document 
as a legal means of identification but also due to the exponential growth of usage 
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as a means of identification among the population. According to the RDW, with a 
distribution of 11 million driver’s licenses, the document is the most prevalent 
type of legal identification.693 The development of a chip is in line with an overall 
trend and effort made to strengthen the quality of documents used for 
identification purposes. This is mainly the result of the pressure exerted by the 
United States as a result of its fight against terrorism.694 The RDW refers to the 
inclusion of a chip on passports within the European Union, as extensively 
described above. The inclusion of such a chip on the passport also enhances the 
incentive for the RDW to include a chip on the driver’s license, since this is an 
effort to reduce the potential for displacement of the crime. Since perpetrators 
shall attempt to displace their efforts to a document which is less difficult to 
falsify, and without the chip, the driver’s license is such a document.  
The incorporation of an electronic identity on the free space of the chip also 
aims to fill a void of electronic authentication in the Netherlands. As shall become 
clear later on, a high level of authentication for electronic government services is 
still absent in the Netherlands. The development of an electronic identity on the 
driver’s license therefore manages to accomplish this objective and since the 
driver’s license is the most prevalent type of legal identification used, the RDW 
deems the driver’s license the most likely candidate to serve as an electronic 
identity.695 
The changes made to the quality of the product for both the passport and the 
driver’s license are important with respect to the ability to reduce the risk and 
increase the effort for falsification of identification documents. Even so, these 
changes must also come accompanied by sufficient safeguards for the procedural 
aspects of identification documents. Since a lack of such safeguards might lead to 
a displacement of the problem. As briefly noted above during the historical 
description of the passport, originally individuals did not need to file a police 
report to obtain a replacement for their missing or stolen document.  Whereas 
initially individuals managed to approach the municipality for a replacement of 
their missing document, they must now first visit a law enforcement office in 
order to obtain a report about the missing document.696 This report must 
subsequently be demonstrated at the municipality’s office. The municipality must 
take the report and the law enforcement office must note the missing document as 
missing in a database to prevent potential fraud with such a document. This 
change occurred because after the features of the passport changed, the Board of 
the Attorney General determined how the introduction of the new passport also 
led to an increase in reports of missing and stolen documents.697 This increase is 
worrisome especially since research demonstrates how the number of reports filed 
by citizens in the Netherlands for missing documents proved particularly high.698 
Between 1996 and 2001, a total of 682,000 documents were reported as either 
missing or stolen.699 And in 2001 alone, the total turned out to be 131,000 
passports. There is a lack of investigation into repeat reporters. The Military Police 
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emphasizes the importance of the document for the criminal arena and states how 
the passport is worth thousands of euros. This is due to the key role played by the 
passport for illegal immigration, illegal employment, government benefit fraud, 
and other forms of criminality.700 On a global level, the Dutch passport carries a 
reputation as a valuable and reliable document. Moreover, the ease of replacement 
procedures and the lack of sanctions for the loss of documents proved to be a 
known vulnerability to the system.701 The Royal Constabulary notes how the 
document is especially lucrative for human trafficking purposes. 
The RDW recognized a similar worrisome trend with respect to reports about 
missing and stolen documents. Whereas in 2006, 81,000 documents were reported 
missing this increased to 91,000 and 97,000 in 2007 and 2008 respectively.702 
 Whereas the legal obligation to file a report when an official identification 
document goes missing is a means of situational crime prevention, such a 
requirement places a heavy administrative burden on street police. As a result, the 
municipality of Amsterdam, along with other partners including the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, analyzed potential simplification of the reporting duty.703 The new 
envisioned method is for citizens to directly file a missing document report at the 
municipality office.704 This is in contrast to the original method where citizens first 
had to visit the police station to obtain the report before they could request a 
replacement document at the municipality office. The municipality then continues 
the cooperation with law enforcement who issues a report which is sent to the 
home address of the petitioner. This report is required for citizens to pick up their 
replacement document.705  
Another aspect introduced as a result of the pilot study is a fraud check. The 
municipality conducts this fraud check based on fraud indicators to assess whether 
there is any reason to suspect potential abuse of the system. When there are 
suspicions, the individual in question receives a letter from the municipality which 
requests the individual to make an appointment with their local law enforcement 
office.706 Law enforcement officials shall interview the individual and investigate 
the potential abuse. The law enforcement official subsequently reports back to the 
municipality who in the end decides whether the citizen shall receive a 
replacement passport.707 This procedure is exclusively reserved for missing 
documents. When citizens report a document stolen, a different procedure is 
followed. Since the theft itself is a violation of criminal law, the citizen must first 
file a report with law enforcement.  
 
4.4 Electronic Identification 
 
The construction of the information superhighway during the latter part of the 
previous century also attracted the attention of governments around the globe as 
they began to develop a presence on the Internet.708 Jeffrey W. Seifert questions 
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the usual claims about electronic government (e-government) as a recent 
phenomenon. Seifert describes how certain scholars have traced the antecedents 
of current e-government initiatives, at least in the United States, back to the 1960s. 
He refers to Licklinder’s writings about the potential for computers to move 
beyond mere storage units and to evolve into units with interactive capabilities. 
Despite the significant lapse of time before the actual concretization of these 
writings, the earlier thoughts managed “...to plant the seed of today’s attempt to 
integrate IT into government processes, which we now commonly refer to as e-
government.”709 Peter Hernon and Rowena Cullen describe how initially the 
presence of governments on the Internet was similar to a minor sideroad, whereas 
more recently its presence has evolved into a significant part of the 
superhighway.710  
 The benefits offered to governments through their presence on the Internet 
are apparent and abundant. Especially the efficiency aspect of the online world 
attracts the interest of government officials. The e-government phenomenon 
allows governments to improve the management of government resources and the 
delivery of services.711 Many authors acknowledge the benefits governments 
receive through the implementation of e-government mechanisms. Before the 
evolution of digital technology, governments needed to conduct manual record 
keeping which served as a disincentive for the accumulation of excessive amounts 
of information. Digital record-keeping eliminated such a disincentive. Fred H. 
Cate even speaks of a new and intense pressure on governments to collect and use 
personal data. Cate identifies the origin of such pressure as a reflection of “...the 
conviction that greater reliance on digital data will reduce costs and enhance 
convenience, speed, efficiency, and accountability.”712 This statement embodies 
the changes introduced in identification information maintained by the 
Netherlands as described in section 4.1.2. 
Certain authors surpass the mere recognition of benefits associated with the 
incorporation of electronic aspects and claim how e-government is a necessity for 
contemporary society.713 William Fenwick et al. argue how the increased and 
widespread use of information technology in the private sector established the 
necessity for e-government.714 Both Cate and Fenwick et al. sketch a scene where 
the pressure on governments to implement e-government infrastructures comes 
from outside forces, mainly the private sector and developments in contemporary 
society. Yet, the inherent benefits of e-government for governments certainly also 
deserve partial credit with regard to the motivation for governments to transform 
themselves. Many of the developments surveyed above, in particular for the 
Netherlands, are all part of the move made by the government to introduce a 
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different government which focuses on improved service delivery via the 
electronic superhighway, or at least the incorporation of technological aids.  
But the positives of e-government also come accompanied by various tensions 
and challenges.715 The transformation of government requires the development of 
other means of identification which are compatible to the situation in the online 
world, where the lack of face-to-face contact is a challenge. As Corien Prins notes, 
“…as the use of digital communication and interaction spreads, public sector 
bodies need appropriate mechanisms to meet identification needs. And the 
specifics of electronic communication require the use of other mechanisms than 
those applied in the physical world. In order to be certain in an electronic 
environment that certain rights and obligations are rightfully attributed to citizens, 
it is necessary to implement certainty and transaction security requirements.”716 
The increase in potential opportunities as a result of electronic government 
services is also accentuated by Costas Lambrinoudakis et al. when they write, “[b]y 
allowing users to access services from virtually anywhere, the universe of ineligible 
people who may attempt to harm the system is dramatically expanded.”717  
4.4.1 United States 
 
To discover the historical roots of e-government in the United States a return to 
the first Clinton term is required. Joseph A. Salem Jr. describes how former 
President Clinton embarked upon his political journey as a president with the 
promise to reinvent the Federal government.718 When Clinton entered the White 
House, in 1993, he established the National Performance Review (NPR).719 The 
link between reinvention of the Federal government and the proliferation of 
information technology became evident early on. Former Vice-President Al Gore 
remarked, “[i]nformation technology (IT) was and is the great enabler for 
reinvention. It allows us to rethink, in fundamental ways, how people work and 
how we serve customers.”720 In 1996, Clinton and Gore introduced a new feature 
to the White House Website. This feature, Commonly Requested Services, allowed 
‘customers’ to conduct various activities online. Clinton expanded his share in the 
pioneering of e-government in the United States when in December 1999 he 
released a memorandum to the heads of executive departments and agencies on 
the topic of e-government.721 The memorandum contained several guiding 
principles along with a list of eleven actions which the recipients needed to carry 
out. According to Seifert, “[i]n many ways, the December 1999 memorandum 
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represented the Clinton Administration’s first concrete attempts to begin 
implementing e-government government wide. The actions called for in the 
memorandum reflected the activities and findings learned over the past six years 
through the National Performance Review, as well as the growth of a critical mass 
of citizens now using the internet.”722  
Before the release of the memorandum, legislation aimed to move government 
agencies toward the implementation of e-government already passed. “The 
enactment of the Government Paperwork Elimination Act (GPEA) in 1998”, 
according to Stephen H. Holden and Lynette I. Millett, “has spurred federal 
agencies to move quickly toward electronic government.”723 This is a direct result 
of the GPEA’s mandate to “‘…preclude agencies or courts from systematically 
treating electronic documents and signatures less favorably than their paper 
counterparts’, so that citizens can interact with the Federal government 
electronically.”724 More specifically, the GPEA requires government agencies to 
provide individuals or entities the option to submit information to or transact with 
the agency electronically, and to maintain records electronically, whenever 
possible. Furthermore, the GPEA states that electronic records and their related 
electronic signatures must receive legal effect, validity, or enforceability.725 The Act 
also encourages Federal government use of a range of electronic signature 
alternatives. 
In 2000, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provided Executive 
agencies with the guidance as required under Sections 1703 and 1705 of the 
GPEA.726 The guidance aimed to provide answers about, among other things, 
electronic signatures. This includes the risk factors which agencies must take into 
consideration during the development of electronic signatures. OMB notes how 
the usage of electronic signatures depends on the nature of the relationship 
between the two parties engaged in the transaction. These agency transactions fall 
into six general categories.727 
Moreover, OMB notes how all transactions contain varying levels of risk, but 
emphasizes how “…the highest risk of fraud or repudiation is for a one-time 
transaction between a person and an agency that has legal or financial 
implications.”728 Moreover, OMB also provides guidance on questions related to 
the risk of intrusion based on the type of transaction. These can include one of 
three types of transactions: 
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(1) Regular or periodic transactions between parties are at a higher risk 
than intermittent transactions because of their predictability, causing 
higher likelihood that an outside party would know of the scheduled 
transaction and be prepared to intrude on it. 
(2) The value of the information to outside parties could also determine 
their motivation to compromise the information. Information relatively 
unimportant to an agency may have high value to an outside party. 
(3) Certain agencies, because of their perceived image or mission, may be 
more likely to be attacked independent of the information or transaction. 
The act of disruption can be an end in itself. 
 
The GPEA received a follow up several years later when former President George 
W. Bush signed the E-government Act of 2002 into law.729 Seifert describes the E-
government Act of 2002 as “...the primary legislative vehicle to guide evolving 
federal IT management practices and to promote initiatives to make government 
information and services available online.”730 Other sources appear more reluctant 
to credit the Act with such power. When asked whether the E-government Act of 
2002 served as a framework for e-government services, Paul Jaeger hesitated 
before he politely stated “framework is perhaps a bit of an ambitious word.”731  
The President’s Management Council, in cooperation with OMB, endorsed the 
development of 24 e-government initiatives in October 2001. These e-government 
initiatives carried the goal to significantly improve the delivery of services to 
citizens across government agencies. Part of the e-government initiatives was the 
goal to develop a centralized gateway to verify the identity of the users, through 
several types of credentials. Through the implementation of various means of 
multiple authentication, the gateway was meant to support the diverse levels of 
assurance most likely required for conducting personal and financially sensitive 
government transactions. The gateway should have facilitated a single-sign-on 
capability for government services. In order to accomplish this goal, the gateway 
was to serve as a central point of authentication without actually issuing, 
maintaining or storing credentials. Those tasks were to be part of a network of 
electronic credential providers (ECP), on which the gateway would rely. The ECP 
were to include both government agencies and private sector companies.  
In a progress assessment, however, the GAO issued a rather negative report.732 
GAO reported how the General Services Administration (GSA) failed to meet 
important objectives and milestones during its prepatory phase. GSA was to 
identify the authentication requirements of Federal agencies and e-government 
initiatives, but failed to fully meet this challenge. The GAO demonstrates 
understanding for GSA’s failure when it writes, “GSA’s modest progress can be 
understood in light of significant challenges that the agency faces in attempting to 
build the e-authentication gateway.”733  
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The same issuance year as the report of the GAO, OMB issued a 
memorandum to all heads of all departments and agencies.734 In the 
memorandum, OMB states how “[t]o make sure that online government services 
are secure and protect privacy, some type of identity verification or authentication 
is needed.”735 The memorandum therefore is composed as a guidance document 
for all government agencies and departments. The OMB bases its guidance on 
standards issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
and on comments received from agency Chief Information Officers.736 The 
guidance directs agencies and departments to conduct e-authentication risk 
assessments in an effort to ensure consistency across the government. To conduct 
such assessments, OMB identifies four different assurance levels from low for 
little or no confidence to very high confidence in the asserted identity’s validity.  
In an effort to determine the appropriate assurance level, OMB describes the 
necessity to define potential impact categories of authentication errors for 
particular transactions. The higher the potential impact category the higher the 
assurance level required in order to maximize the prevention probability with 
respect to the occurrence of such errors. The guidance emphasizes the need for an 
assessment both of the potential impact along with the likelihood of the actual 
occurrence of harm.737 Such harm categories include: 
 
• Inconvenience, distress, or damage to standing or reputation 
• Financial loss or agency liability 
• Harm to agency programs or public interests 
• Unauthorized release of sensitive information 
• Personal safety 
• Civil or criminal violations.   
 
Overall, the approach as provided by OMB appears to take into consideration 
important factors in its development of identity authentication for e-government 
services. Even so, the OMB merely provides guidance and as such the actual 
implementation remains within the realm of individual agencies. 
 
4.4.2 The Netherlands 
  
The Netherlands became one of the first European countries to introduce e-
government programs and initiate study groups with regard to e-government 
issues.738 The official start of e-government activities occurred in 1994 when the 
government launched its first ICT policy initiative through the publication of the 
‘National Action Program on Electronic Highways: From Metaphor to Action’ 
issued by the Ministry of Economic Affairs.739 Within the action plan, the 
government recognized a dual role for itself as umpire and player.740  
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During the following years, the government continued its exploration of e-
government developments and also invited the private sector to incorporate its 
views on the opportunities provided through the introduction of the electronic 
superhighway.741 In 1996, the government took its first official step toward the 
delivery of online services when several ministries introduced the OL2000-project 
which was “…one of the early drivers in introducing demand-led services for 
citizens in the Netherlands.”742 The main aim of the OL2000 was the introduction 
of integrated public service delivery through the idea of a one stop shop through 
an electronic venue.743 This online service delivery was not to replace other service 
delivery channels; instead it was to increase the number of channels through 
which citizens could communicate with and receive services from the government. 
The following year, in 1997, the government reviewed the achievements with 
respect to the action lines set forth in the first national action program. From the 
review, the government concluded how there proved to be a need for a 
subsequent action plan which came about in 1998 through the ‘Action Program 
Electronic Government.’744 The Action Program focused its contribution on three 
central themes. These included good electronic accessibility of the government, a 
better public service delivery, and an improved internal operational management 
within the national government.745 Each theme came accompanied by several 
aims. From a transactional perspective, which is the primary focus herein due to 
its relevancy to financial identity theft, the second theme deserves a brief moment 
of reflection. The primary aim of the second theme was to make at least a quarter 
of the services offered by the government available on the electronic 
superhighway.746  In the introduction of the action program, the government 
recognizes yet again its different roles within the realm of e-government. Whereas 
the government originally defined its roles in terms of umpires and players, this 
time the government recognizes a role as umpire and provider, along with a role as 
player. The dual role of umpire and provider coincides to some extent with the 
distinction made within this research project between the government as protector 
and provider.  
The developments continued throughout the following years as the 
government published various documents which outlined the visions on and plans 
for the implementation of e-government services and applications.747 In 2000, the 
government provided a progress reflection through its publication of a 
memorandum ‘The electronic government at the start of the twenty-first 
century.’748 At the start of the century, the government had managed to make 18% 
of its services available online to citizens and 19% to businesses.749 The 
government set as a goal for itself to make 25% of its services available via the 
Internet by 2002.750  
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749 Ibid.  
750 The national government had already surpassed this percentage in 2000, since the national 
STATE AS PROVIDER     137 
 
 
Among the most relevant publications became the introduction of the idea in 
2003 of a different government.751 In yet another action program, the recently 
installed cabinet proclaimed its vision on a ‘different government.’ In particular, 
the action program declares a need for a modernized version of government 
which also reconceptualizes the role of the citizen. As a result, the government 
uses the action program as a means of reflection to encourage the improvement of 
its public service delivery and set a goal for itself to offer 65% of its services 
through the electronic superhighway by 2007.752 This action program also 
introduced the idea of the one time information provision, where the government, 
or rather government agencies, are not allowed to ask citizens for personal 
information when such information is already maintained by the government. This 
ambition in turn also increased the necessity for identity authentication. The action 
program therefore declares how in 2004 the government shall introduce a means 
of authentication for citizens to be used during transactions with the government.  
A year after the publication of the vision on a different government, the 
government also issued a more specified plan in an effort to implement its 
vision.753 This was in response to the pressure exerted by the Lower House to 
make the vision more concrete and result oriented.754 The accompanying letter of 
the memorandum demonstrates the emphasis placed by the government on the 
usage of e-government as an instrument rather than a goal in and of itself.755 The 
memorandum offers its insights on seven domains. Several of these domains have 
returned in previous sections within this chapter. These include the usage of a 
single number for both citizens and businesses along with a system of basic 
registrations. The other domains concern the accessibility of e-government, 
electronic authentication, electronic information exchange, and fast connections 
between government agencies.756    
 The most relevant domain is electronic authentication. The importance of 
identity authentication already became pronounced in the memorandum on a 
different government, especially since the government announced its objective to 
make more than half of its public services available via the Internet. The follow up 
memorandum to the different government vision recognizes how the Lower 
House expressed its desire for a single means of electronic authentication for 
citizens. In the memorandum, the government specifies various levels of security, 
including high, middle, and basic. The highest security level can be met through 
the Public Key Infrastructure standard whereas the middle level of security is met 
by the systems currently used for Internet banking activities.757 The basic level 
merely requires identification number and password as is used for the electronic 
tax administration through DigiD.    
The developments for DigiD officially commenced in 2003. The actual 
introduction of a means of authentication occurred through a merger of two 
separate ventures. After six government agencies came together to develop a 
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manifesto group,758 they introduced the National Authentication Service.759 This 
introduction came as a result of a sense of impatience with the (lack of) 
developments within the national government. Simultaneously, the Ministry of the 
Interior worked on a Government Access Service. When both parties joined 
forces, the official and overarching digital signature became a reality.760 The 
government introduced and implemented DigiD, which citizens use since January 
1, 2005, to use electronic services offered by the government. DigiD stands for 
digital identity and is a system shared between cooperating governmental agencies, 
allowing to digitally authenticate the identity of a person who wants to engage in a 
transaction with or receive information from the government. The government 
agencies which subscribe to DigiD continue to grow and the government itself 
continuous the promotion of the tool in order to encourage citizens to use the 
electronic channel for the delivery of services. In total, 395 municipalities, along 
with 5 provinces, and 8 water board districts are connected to DigiD.761 The 
authentication tool deserves a close analysis to observe its ability to offer citizens a 
sense of security and to prevent potential abuse which might lead to incidents of 
financial identity theft. 
To acquire a personal DigiD, citizens need to use their citizen service number. 
They also need to provide their name, date of birth, address including zip code, 
and e-mailaddress. The latter is optional and only required if citizens want to 
receive updates on developments related to DigiD. Citizens receive their DigiD 
within five days via the post. After citizens receive the code, they must activitate 
the DigiD via the Internet before they can use it. Whereas at first sight this 
appears to be a secure system, since the DigiD also requires separate activation 
after receiving the code via the regular post, hypothetically anyone, from your 
neighbor to your grandfather, can request a DigiD in your name. In fact, the 
Dutch Tax Agency, suggested to citizens, who either lost or failed to activate their 
DigiD, to use the DigiD of their neighbors to authenticate their income tax return 
forms online, for fear that the forms would otherwise not be submitted before the 
deadline762 Afterwards, the government recognized the problematic nature of this 
statement and changed its policy. The recognition of its mistake came after the 
advice caused an uproar by others, including members of the Lower House.763 
One member even claimed how this suggestion offered by the Tax Administration 
was the equivalent of a call for fraud. While certainly this is political rhetoric in 
action, the suggestion provided to citizens is worrisome especially in light of the 
value of the digital signature. The Tax Administration attempted to mitigate the 
uproar through stating how the usage of the DigiD of another person merely 
served as an instrument to send the tax form. The ultimate responsibility remained 
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with the original tax filer. Even so, the Tax Administration indirectly suggests how 
the DigiD itself does not need to remain private or a secret. This is contradictory 
since DigiD is an access key which can assist potential perpetrators of financial 
identity theft with the ability to access government benefits in the name of another 
individual.   
The use of DigiD by numerous government agencies is both a blessing and a 
curse. Its efficiency and convenience is apparent. Citizens use a single 
authentication tool for a broad range of services and transactions for government 
agencies. These include the applications for student financial aid, along with 
applications for healthcare or rent subsidy. Simultaneously, citizens can use the 
instrument to function as a digital signature for their income tax return. The 
application of the instrument to multiple agencies within the government increases 
its value which makes the tool more valuable to perpetrators of financial identity 
theft.   
To use DigiD, citizens use username and password. This constitutes the lowest 
means of authentication. According to the government, “[i]n most cases, this 
means of authentication offers governmental agencies sufficient assurance of your 
identity, in addition to the registered address at your municipality, to which the 
code is send.”764 For more sensitive transactions, there are two other levels of 
transaction security. These include the middle and the higher level of security. The 
government decides which transactions require the incorporation of higher levels 
of security, whether middle or high.  
 The medium level of security constitutes the use of username and password 
and an additional means of authentication. This additional means of authentication 
is an SMS sent to a mobile phone. This medium level of security came as a result 
of criticism voiced by the Gemeenschap Voor Informatie Beveiliging (GVIB) or the 
Community for Information Security, which described how the level of security 
introduced via username and password proved too simple as a means of electronic 
identification for tax returns.765 The mere use of username and password provides 
various potential opportunities for perpetrators of financial identity theft to obtain 
both. The perpetrator can attack the DigiD user through social engineering, 
physical robbery, or spoofing DigiD. The perpetrator can also target the DigiD 
system itself or the browser. Other options include guessing or hacking weak 
passwords or trying to obtain a Digid in the name of someone else.766 The usage 
of SMS authentication became the response to the criticism. Such an instrument 
of security actually originated at the IB-Groep which covers student financial aid 
in the Netherlands.767 The IB-Groep used SMS authentication as part of its 
electronic service application for student financial aid services.  
Public cases about financial identity theft through the use of a DigiD are not 
readily available. The Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research 
(TNO) examined identity criminality in an online setting in 2008 and used four 
different scenarios to demonstrate how cases of identity theft can occur and which 
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parties are implicated as a result of its occurrence.768 Scenario 3 involves identity 
theft in connection to a DigiD. The scenario identifies two brothers, Henk and 
Hans Konijn. The brothers have not spoken to each other in twenty years. Hans is 
ill and Henk works twenty hours a week as a store stock assistant. The scenario 
states how Henk decides to request government benefits in the name of Hans, 
through the use of DigiD. The scenario furthermore claims how Hans is clueless 
as to what a DigiD actually is. This statement makes the rest of the scenario 
confusing and inaccurate, because the authors continue the description through 
writing how Henk goes through the trash of Hans and finds his DigiD username 
in the first envelope and the password in the second envelope. Henk subsequently 
uses this to request government benefits from the unemployment agency. The 
problem with the scenario description and therefore its applicability is the mistake 
made. How can Hans have requested a DigiD if he does not know what it is? As 
the description of the application process above demonstrates, DigiD requires a 
specific request before it is send to the individual. The only value of the scenario is 
the demonstration of what perpetrators of identity theft can accomplish through 
the use of a DigiD, which is, for example, to request unemployment benefits.  
 The authors also remark how the government as provider could develop a 
more secure method of delivery of the DigiD. Instead of merely sending it via the 
post, the government could require citizens to pick up the code at the municipality 
and to demonstrate identification. This suggestion nevertheless also reduces 
citizen convenience which reduces its attractiveness as a means of enhanced 
security. Moreover, the lack of public cases about identity theft through the use of 
Digid also means the urgency for increased security finds its primary basis in 
hypothetical threats rather than practical examples.  
The highest level of security for the electronic highway envisioned was the e-
Nik. The developments of the e-Nik find themselves in the midst of 
administrative and political discussions, which have led to an impasse for many 
years. The plan of the RDW, along with other partners, to use the free space on 
the chip for the development of an electronic identity demonstrates the potential 
plans for the future.      
In the meantime, the government is in anticipation of a renewed version of 
DigiD which is temporarily referred to as DigidX. This DigidX is to be a renewed 
and future proof version of DigiD. The improvements of and renewal made to the 
system primarily concern the modernization of its underlying architecture, but also 
the maintenance and testability of the authentication instrument.769  
Other important developments include the passage and enactment of the Act 
on Electronic Government Communications770 on July 1, 2004. The government 
primarily aimed to establish rules to regulate electronic communication between 
government agencies and citizens, but also among government agencies 
themselves. The Act provides government agencies with the legal right to use the 
electronic highway to communicate with citizens as long as they have indicated 
that they are sufficiently accessible via electronic channels. The same requirement 
is applicable to communication between government agencies. Furthermore, the 
Act requires government agencies to ensure an appropriate level of reliability and 
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confidentiality depending on the content and the nature of the message. Basically, 
the Act aims to ensure that if electronic communication is a viable alternative for 
its more conventional counterparts, then such communication must adhere to the 
same standards and conditions. The Act also refers to electronic signatures, which 
enhance the level of reliability for electronic communication.  
From a service perspective, the government also developed a personal internet 
page which functions as the main portal for citizens to interact with various 
government agencies. This project began in February 2006. The main aim of the 
government was to develop a personal doorway for all citizens in the Netherlands. 
This main portal, which citizens can access through mijnoverheid.nl (literally 
mygovernment.nl), offers citizens the ability to view the personal information 
maintained by agencies subscribed to the site. In addition, citizens can easily find 
and save services offered by government agencies via the Internet. Through the 
site, citizens can also commence transactions and trace progress of previous 
transactions which are in the process of completion. Government agencies, at the 
same time, can send citizens emails when necessary. And the portal functions via a 
single sign-on function, which makes it a one stop shop as envisioned by the 
government during its original plan.771 To access all of these functions, citizens log 
on with their DigiD and develop a personal and unique site. Citizens therefore 
develop a portal which contains only the information pertinent and relevant to 
them. Through this portal, government agencies can notify citizens of issues such 
as passport expiration date. For those without the personal internet page, this is 
generally done via the post.  
Overall, the government continuously reiterates the desire to improve its 
services and also emphasizes the request of citizens for service improvement. This 
is the main driver behind the production of digital services, along with the 
government’s own interest in the establishment of efficiency. Ernst & Young 
investigated the satisfaction of citizens with the service delivery of the 
government, in particular at the municipal level. Citizens proved relatively satisfied 
with the digital services provided by the government. Overall, they provided the 
government with a 6.7. This is a lower grade than granted by citizens with respect 
to services offered in general (non-digital), which is a 6.9. Despite the significant 
time and energy devoted to the development of digital delivery of services, the 
participation of citizens with regard to the digital services appears to be lower than 
expected. This is partially the result of concerns maintained by citizens about the 
security aspects associated with the digital services. Approximately 20% of citizens 
questioned indicated their concerns about privacy aspects and the protection 
offered by the government for their personal information when using digital 
services.772 Perhaps there is a sense of validity to this concern.  
 
4.4.3 Analysis 
The notion of electronic government inspired both the United States and the 
Netherlands to speak in glorified terms about improved service delivery. For the 
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United States, former President Clinton spoke of ‘reinventing government’ 
whereas in the Netherlands the government embarked upon a path which aimed 
to develop a ‘different government.’ Both maintained similar intentions with 
respect to efficiency and improved service delivery. Suddenly, the government, 
including all of its facets and agencies, felt the need to compete with the private 
sector in the area of service delivery. Such a reconceptualization of the role of 
government in contemporary society also led to a redefinition of citizens into 
consumers. The problem with this focus and the transformation of citizens into 
consumers remains the aspect of security which at times becomes the neglected 
stepchild of the debate about opportunities for governments in the field of 
information communication technology. For security challenges convenience and 
efficiency, especially since such security aims to increase the efforts and the risks 
perpetrators must take to penetrate the system. As for the conversion from 
citizens into consumers, the government appears to forget its own status as a 
monopoly. For unlike in the private sector, citizens do not have an alternative to 
the government. Through the conversion, governments potentially find 
themselves attracted to the same pitfalls as others in the private sector. For as shall 
become apparent in the following chapter, to maintain customers, and to keep 
them content, the issues of customer convenience and efficiency receive 
substantial attention, whereas security at times must bite the dust. This unequal 
balance between these various priorities is more problematic for governments due 
to the lack of alternatives for citizens.  
Certain sources favor the transformation from citizen to customer. In 
Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector, 
David Osborne and Ted Gaebler capture the transformation within the 
governmental apparatus. Especially the aspect of a customer-driven government is 
encouraged by the authors, since they proclaim how “[d]emocratic governments 
exist to serve their citizens. Businesses exist to make profits. And yet it is business 
that searches obsessively for new ways to please the American people. Most 
American governments are customer-blind, while McDonald’s and Frito-Lay are 
customer-driven. This may be the ultimate indictment of bureaucratic 
government.”773 The problem with this comparison and the overall argument to 
make government more, if not exclusively, customer-driven is to lose sight of its 
role and responsibility as protector. This detachment or separation between the 
diverse functions of government leads to a conflict of interest, which businesses 
generally do not face until government interjects as protector of the people. The 
answer is obviously somewhere in between since an entire lack of consideration 
for the needs of citizens also leads to situation as described by the Dutch National 
Ombudsman which depicts the situation of the citizen caught in the chains of 
government.774 Osborne and Gaebler specifically refer to government actions and 
behavior which demonstrate active neglect for the needs of citizens. The authors 
summarize the situation as follows, since businesses need customers in an effort to 
make a profit, they learn to operate in a competitive environment and listen to 
their customers. Whereas this is true, businesses in the end act out of self-interest, 
whereas ideally the State is to act in the interest of its citizens. 
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The government as provider is a pivotal actor in the overall establishment of the 
identification infrastructure in both the public and the private sector. This makes 
its role fundamental with respect to the opportunity structure of financial identity 
theft. The identification information maintained by the government is an attractive 
target for the first stage of financial identity theft and as such the means of 
information security invoked by the government are of the essence. The spree of 
data security breaches in the United States plagued both the private as well as the 
public sector. This demonstrates the vulnerability of the identification information 
maintained by various agencies within the public sector in the United States. The 
previous chapter reviewed the evolution of data security breach notification 
legislation which is relevant to these incidents, and as a result demonstrates the 
inherent connection between the government as protector and as provider. 
Michael Froomkin reflects on the exceptional nature of personal information 
maintained by the government when he writes “[p]rivate data held by the 
government is not the same as private data held by others. Much of the 
government’s data is obtained through legally required disclosures or participation 
in licensing or benefit schemes where the government is, as a practical matter, the 
only game in town. These coercive or unbargained-for disclosures impute a 
heightened moral duty on the part of the government to exercise careful 
stewardship over private data. But the moral duty to safeguard the data and to deal 
fully and honestly with the consequences of failing to safeguard them is, at best, 
only partly reflected in state and federal laws and regulations.”775  
 The element of identification information maintained by the government 
increases in importance as its accessibility expands. The developments in the 
Netherlands with respect to the identification information maintained by the 
Municipal Personal Records Database therefore also come accompanied by 
various risks, since the information becomes available through the Internet. Such 
accessibility is a response to the need for more efficiency and convenience, but 
enlarges potential opportunities for perpetrators. The electronic accessibility of the 
GBA-V provides a central point of vulnerability since the previously decentralized 
storage of identification information maintained by the Municipal Personal 
Records Database becomes centralized.   
 Besides the potential issuance of identification information, the government 
also establishes the identification infrastructure which both the public and the 
private sector depend on through the issuance of identification numbers and 
documents. Especially in the United States, the facilitation of financial identity 
theft through the usage of its identification number infrastructure is apparent. The 
function creep which dominates the usage of the SSN is among the most widely 
recognized facilitating factors in the United States. The availability of the number 
paired with its value as an instrument of authentication have played a vital role in 
the facilitation of financial identity theft. This is after all, from a criminological 
point of view, due to the accessibility of the target and its value in transactions. 
This facilitation also demonstrates how the role of government as provider has a 
spill-over effect into the realm of the financial services industry. The 
groundbreaking research conducted by Acquisti & Gross also demonstrates the 
                                                
775 Froomkin, A. M. (2009). Government Data Breaches. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 24: 1019 – 
1020.  
144     FERTILE GROUNDS 
 
 
ineffective nature of attempts to limit the disclosure of the number, since 
perpetrators can predict SSNs based on publicly available data. Moreover, the 
main problem is not the availability but rather the usage of the number as part of 
the identification infrastructure. This is precisely why in the Netherlands the risks 
presently appear to be limited; for the number is available but it does not appear 
to be used as an instrument of authentication in either the public or the private 
sector. Even so, the historical developments in the Netherlands foreshadow 
potential problems. For the original and persistent resistance against the evolution 
of the social-fiscal number into a general number became irrelevant due to the 
actuality in practice. When the government came to terms with these 
developments during the early years of the twenty-first century, the government 
accepted such a state of affairs and officialized it through the introduction of a 
citizen service number. 
 The third aspect of the identification infrastructure discussed in this chapter is 
the collection of identification documents. Much attention has been devoted to 
the quality of identification documents along with the quality of the issuance 
process. This especially since identification documents form such an important 
pillar of the identification infrastructure. This is the aspect where perhaps the 
cultural differences between the United States and the Netherlands are most 
pronounced. The driver’s license system in the United States is vulnerable to 
manipulation. This is in part the result of the reliance on birth certificates as a 
primary source of identity verification whilst such birth certificates are obtainable 
by perpetrators of financial identity theft. The awareness of a problem is widely 
carried but widespread agreement about its solution is absent. The REAL ID Act 
remains a legislative instrument caught in the middle of severe controversy.  
 The situation in the Netherlands is vastly different; for its political system is 
accustomed to national means of identification. Moreover, the influence of the 
European Union also requires the Netherlands to meet certain standards for the 
quality of the document. Despite its turbulent history, the system of identification 
documents seems to have recuperated well. Attention is devoted to various 
aspects of the process including the issuance and the response to missing 
documents. This is an integral aspect since the financial services sector depends on 
the integrity of the issuance process as well as the quality of the document during 
its service delivery and identity authentication of clients.  
The developments with regard to the driver’s license in the Netherlands also 
connect its importance to another aspect of the identification infrastructure 
described in this chapter which is electronic authentication. Whereas the 
description of a layered security architecture by both the United States and the 
Netherlands demonstrates an awareness about the necessity for different 
authentication means depending on the nature of the transaction, the pressure to 
make electronic means of authentication also convenient is important to bear in 
mind, since such a pressure may well compete with the security interest. This 
especially as the result of the transformation from citizens into customers which 
depicts the transforming role governments began to play as e-government 








5  Financial Service Providers 
 
 
The driving force behind financial identity theft is the acquisition of financial 
assets. Money is the main motivator. Perpetrators of financial identity theft 
predominantly acquire these financial assets from financial service providers.776 
This demonstrates the vital value of financial service providers in the overall 
problem of financial identity theft. The significance of financial service providers 
is evident; yet, the role and associated responsibility of financial service providers 
is often a source of conflict and inconsistency. This conflict centers around the 
question whether financial service providers embody the role of victim, villain, or 
both with respect to identity theft. Throughout the literature, especially in the past, 
financial service providers have received empathy due to financial losses suffered 
as a result of identity theft. To many, financial service providers are the true victims 
of financial identity theft. Through the rise of critical academics777 and interest 
groups778, the potential facilitation, or the villain aspect, of financial service 
providers stepped out of the ‘victim’s’ shadow. Since the acknowledgement of the 
facilitation of financial identity theft by financial service providers gained more 
prominence, the business practices used to realize such facilitation also became the 
object of increased scrutiny. Financial service providers predominately include 
banks and credit card companies. Other relevant actors included in this chapter 
are supervisory organs and consumer reporting agencies since their involvement in 
the financial world, and therefore their inclusion in this chapter, assists in the 
development of a more comprehensive image of the relevant interactions in the 
financial services sector. Furthermore, their inclusion is also vital for the 
background descriptions of various developments with regard to business 
practices. This chapter reviews business practices based on three different phases 
including the acquisition of clients, the application process, and account activity of 
existing clients. The first two aspects are particularly relevant for the potential 
facilitation of true name fraud, whereas the last phase predominantly concerns 
account takeover.   
5.1 Acquisition Process 
 
5.1.1 The United States 
 
The historical background of the credit card, especially its origins and subsequent 
evolution, provide important background information for the unfolding story of 
financial identity theft. The history of the credit card portrays its original luxurious 
nature through the story of the Diner’s Club Card. This card established the formal 
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beginning of the credit card industry in New York City in 1950. James B. Rule 
describes how “[i]ts inventor’s original inspiration was to alleviate the need to 
carry large amounts of cash to cover meals in that city by providing a single credit 
card for ‘charging’ bills in a number of restaurants.”779 The Diner’s Club Card 
gained immense popularity and began to spread its wings, both to other cities and 
to other types of transactions. The astonishing success of the Diner’s Club Card 
received recognition and paved the way for two ‘imitators’, the American Express 
Card and Carte Blanche, in 1958.780 The curious aspect of the origins of the credit 
card and its industry is its exclusive appeal and availability to upper-middle class 
clientele. This changed through the growth of the industry and the introduction of 
bank credit card schemes. Corporations desired to extend credit privileges on a 
mass basis to make their practices more profitable and to succeed in a competitive 
environment. As John C. Weistart notes, “[s]ince each issuer of a multipurpose 
card potentially could reach a greater share of the credit card market, competition 
throughout the industry intensified.”781 Such a transformation of the credit card 
and the competitive nature of the industry inherently influenced the acquisition of 
clients. For mass acquisition required credit issuers to turn to marketing schemes 
in an effort to attract clients.  
This marketing occurred through the use of mass mailing lists, where the 
industry distributed unsolicited credit cards to consumers all over the country. The 
‘unsolicited’ aspect of the credit card implies the recipients did not file an 
application nor did they in any other way request the credit card. The unsolicited 
nature of the credit cards introduced problems for the industry. Robert M. Smith 
reported in the New York Times on the National Postal Forum III held in 1969, 
where many industry and postal officials gathered to exchange insights about the 
challenges of these marketing practices.782 Several bankers expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the mass distribution of unsolicited credit cards. This primarily 
due to the theft of the credit cards from mailboxes. Thomas R. Kennedy 
recognizes the essential problem of the marketing instrument when he writes, 
“[t]he lead time given to thieves through the theft of unsolicited credit cards 
makes them valuable to them, not only in providing funds, but in providing 
identification.”783 This is a crucial observation in light of financial identity theft. 
Despite the absence of statistics at the session, the bank security directors in 
attendance at the Forum emphasized the severity of the problem. When an 
audience member inquired about the business practice and declared how she 
threw away all unsolicited credit cards she received, William Thornhill from the 
First National Bank of Chicago responded “[c]ompetitive situations mean that 
sometimes you have to temper what you think is the right thing to do.”784 The 
competition for the acquisition of clients dominated business practices and as a 
result companies felt compelled to introduce marketing instruments with apparent 
security challenges. The distribution of unsolicited credit cards paved the way for 
comical anecdotes which painfully exposed the problematic nature of the 
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marketing instrument. Kennedy describes the story of Tony Benitez, from Tampa 
Florida, who was never able to use either one of his unsolicited credit cards. This 
was a result of the fact that “Tony is five years old and he can’t sign his own name, 
although his credit rating is excellent according to the bank that mailed the credit 
cards to him.”785 Similar stories describe the tale of nine year old Roger Gelpey of 
Marblehead, Massachusetts, who managed to buy a one dollar tie with his 
unsolicited credit card. He completed the tie purchase after he had been turned 
down for a three hundred dollar loan. And then the more relevant complications 
surface, as Kennedy continues his anecdotes. He describes the story of a 96-year 
old widow in Lima, New York who never used her unsolicited credit card, but still 
received a bill for $1,661.786 Someone else managed to capture the card for a 
spending spree.  
Businesses began to experience resistance when the problems associated with 
the distribution of unsolicited credit cards captured the attention of the United 
States Congress.787 Senator McIntyre declared how “[t]he mailing of unsolicited 
credit cards invites theft and fraud, and exposes consumers to unnecessary threats 
against their solvency and credit standing.”788 Previously the regulation of the 
credit card industry was minimal, but the unpopular marketing scheme of the 
industry increased a desire and an urgency for regulation. When Congress began to 
introduce legislation, it stumbled upon opposition from the Federal Reserve Board 
and the credit card industry. Both of these parties objected to all proposals made 
by Members of Congress. The basis of their objection was that there was no major 
problem with the distribution of unsolicited credit cards that could not be 
corrected through a more careful screening of mailing lists.789 Congress disagreed. 
In August 1967, Representative Wright Patman introduced the first proposal in 
the House of Representatives for regulation of the industry.790 The proposal 
focused primarily on the distribution of unsolicited credit cards. The initial 
proposal only captured the marketing practices of banks, but later on other credit 
card issuers also became the subject of regulation. The main initial focus on banks 
appears to be the result of the correlation between the birth and growth of credit 
cards as part of the banking industry and the association with the distribution of 
unsolicited credit cards.791 The proposal for regulation evolved into an amendment 
to the Truth in Lending Act.792 The amendment prohibited the distribution of 
unsolicited credit cards and specifically states “[n]o credit card shall be issued 
except in response to a request or application there for.”793 Exceptions to the 
prohibition include the issuance of a credit card renewal or the replacement of a 
credit card.794  
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Furthermore, the amendment also excludes an associated marketing 
instrument employed by the industry, the ‘negative pre-mailer.’ The negative pre-
mailer consisted of a printed promotion which announced to the recipient that a 
card would be sent unless the recipient took affirmative action to decline the offer 
and inform the credit card issuer. The negative pre-mailer introduced a legal 
predicament in light of the government’s aim to regulate the credit card industry. 
According to Weistart, Congress clearly precluded negative pre-mailers as part of 
the prohibition. The government therefore indirectly expressed its permission with 
respect to all solicitations which require the recipient’s participation in a plan. 
Weistart notes, “[a]s long as affirmative action by the recipient is required to 
trigger the issuance of a card, the contact will not violate the statutory 
prohibition.”795 The single bill introduced in the House of Representatives to 
prohibit negative pre-mailers in addition to the distribution of unsolicited credit 
cards received little attention and failed to gain any prominence. The survival of 
negative pre-mailers also influenced the evolution of negative option marketing. 
Peter Bowal describes a state of affairs where the government displays a 
considerable reluctance to regulate negative option marketing.796 Despite the 
overall idea of a sovereign and autonomous consumer in a market-driven 
economy, consumers fail to attain protection in the area of negative option 
marketing. Bowel defines negative option marketing as the engagement of a 
marketer who tenders to the public a product or service and declares the passive 
acquiescence of the consumer in face of that tender as a form of contractual 
acceptance.797 The use of negative pre-mailers creatively circumvents the 
prohibition set forth by Congress and grants the industry the liberty to continue 
employing marketing tools which potentially endanger consumers. Even with 
negative pre-mailers, there is still an additional exposure to financial identity theft 
because the unsolicited arrival of a credit card forms an opportunity for a 
perpetrator to take advantage. The industry may defend itself through the printed 
promotion which grants recipients the option to opt-out and decline the offer, but 
this places a burden on consumers.  
Besides the survival of negative pre-mailers, the industry also developed 
alternatives to unsolicited credit cards. Such an alternative is the distribution of 
pre-approved credit card applications which anyone over the age of 18 in the 
United States may receive. Credit card companies and banks send out massive 
amounts of these pre-approved applications. These applications already contain 
the name and address of the recipient and merely require the recipient to sign the 
form. The recipient then sends the form back to the bank or credit card company 
to instantly receive the card. The confirmation of the application and the 
subsequent issuance of the credit card occur instantly due to the pre-approved 
status of the application. Many of these pre-approved credit card applications 
provide a limit which is commensurate to the recipient’s credit rating and can be 
relatively low (i.e. 500 or a 1000 dollars), but they can prove to be a stepping stone 
for larger financial damage. Furthermore, for consumers with a particularly 
attractive credit history, the credit limits of pre-approved credit card applications 
may be considerably higher since the risk of late or defiant payments is lower. The 
excessive number of applications often means consumers discard them without, 
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for example, shredding them. These pre-approved applications are an attractive 
tool for perpetrators of identity theft. Just as in the past, perpetrators use these 
marketing instruments to easily obtain a credit card without the knowledge of the 
rightful recipient.  
Unlike the unsolicited credit cards and the negative pre-mailers though, the 
problem with pre-approved credit card applications is magnified due to another 
business practice. As Frank W. Abagnale notes, “[i]n today’s hotly competitive 
financial marketplace, speed is of the essence. Thieves love fast credit approval, 
because haste is the enemy of accuracy. Credit card issuers, for their part, can be 
very sloppy in doling out cards, failing to match Social Security numbers and dates 
of birth and otherwise failing to take basic precautions in their eagerness to get 
cards in circulation.”798 Abagnale, among others, recognizes how many credit card 
companies claim their screening process is ‘tight’ and bullet proof, but that certain 
(media) stories have proven quite the opposite. One of the more famous stories to 
prove the rather inaccurate verification mechanisms of credit card companies is 
the story of Clifford, a dog who managed to apply for a credit card. Clifford’s 
owner, Steve Borba, opened up an email account using his dog’s name. As time 
passed, he received a pre-approved credit card application in his email inbox. For 
Clifford’s social security number, Borba used 9 zeros and he explicitly wrote on 
the application that Clifford was indeed a dog. Despite this comment and the 
seemingly impossible Social Security Number, Clifford received his credit card 
three weeks later.799  
The marketing instrument of pre-approved credit card applications is therefore 
exacerbated due to the inadequate verification of the application. This occurs due 
to the automated reading of the application. The automated system is efficient and 
convenient for the industry and to some extent for its customers, but fails to alert 
the provider to potential errors. The anecdote above, which is merely an example, 
therefore also concerns another business practice, namely the application process 
within the financial services industry. This aspect will be discussed in the following 
section.  
 
5.2.2 The Netherlands 
 
As described above, the United States introduced the credit card into 
contemporary society. Despite its international appeal, the Netherlands never 
became a ‘credit card country.’800 The unpopularity of credit cards in the 
Netherlands occurred mainly as a result of the well functioning payment by giro 
system. This offered citizens in the Netherlands an alternative to cash which 
appealed to them. Simultaneously, the banking industry refrained from any 
involvement in the credit card industry until the end of the 1970s. For the more 
affluent citizens in the Netherlands, Diner’s club and American Express were 
available. The banks in the Netherlands began to demonstrate interest in the 
industry in 1980 and bought the shares of Eurocard Nederland B.V. During the 
early 1980s, there were less than 200,000 credit cards in the Netherlands.801 The 
actual breakthrough for the credit card came in 1988, when the VSB bank bought 
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the rights from the Bank of America to issue VISA cards to a large audience. 
Other banks responded and began to issue relatively cheap Eurocard credit cards 
to the general public.  
According to available data in 2007, there were 6 million credit cards in the 
Netherlands. Actual credit card usage in the Netherlands remains relatively low, 
approximately 1 % of all transactions in the physical world occur through the use 
of a credit card.802 The survey conducted by the Dutch Central Bank concluded 
how 55 % of the consumers surveyed possessed a credit card. Such a possession 
was mainly the result of the need to conduct purchases via the telephone, the 
Internet, and abroad. Many respondents did not express an inherent desire to own 
a credit card. This is mainly due to availability of alternative methods of payment 
and the lack of desire to spend money which they do not have at the time of 
purchase.803 The usage of credit cards via the Internet mainly appears to occur due 
to the restricted alternatives offered by various websites. The increased efficiency 
and speed also plays a role for consumers in the Netherlands, but only marginally. 
In general, Anne Kosse concludes, based on the survey and its results, how 
postponed payments and making purchases based on credit is not in the ‘nature’ 
of the Dutch. Not even loyalty programs, where consumers can collect miles 
through the usage of a credit card, appear to overcome this obstacle. As a result, 
mass acquisition of clients for credit cards never seemed to appear on the horizon 
in the Netherlands and Kosse does not anticipate it for the future. Through the 
alternatives offered within the Netherlands, the credit card fails to demonstrate a 
mass appeal. Furthermore, since the introduction of the Single European Payment 
Era (SEPA) is expected to lead to the acceptance of the Dutch pinpas, or debit 
card, across SEPA the interest in credit cards shall not significantly increase in the 
near future.804  
 
5.2 Application Process 
 
5.2.1 The United States  
  
The application process to acquire a credit card, open a bank account, or apply for 
a loan is a crucial stage for perpetrators of true name fraud. The credit card 
provides direct access to goods and services in the name of the victim, a loan in 
turn provides direct cash, whereas the bank account is a foundation for future 
operations. For the credit card industry, the problems associated with the 
application process became evident in a limited manner through the description 
provided above about the pre-approved applications. The verification mechanisms 
used for those applications proved appalling through anecdotal evidence. The 
problems present in the verification of applications from prospective clients 
contain historical roots which date back to the first bank credit card scheme to 
become successful on a large scale. This was the BankAmericard, which originated 
in 1959. Unlike the other credit card issuers, BankAmericard proved determined 
to extend credit privileges on a mass basis. Through this determination, 
BankAmericard has always made it as easy as possible for prospective clients to 
obtain cards.805 Especially the application process needed to be easy in an effort to 
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accumulate as many clients as possible. The focus therefore was on the mass 
acquisition of clients, regardless of their background. The low threshold for 
approval made the application process and the acquisition of a BankAmericard 
lucrative, both for legitimate as well as illegitimate clients. The emphasis placed on 
the simplicity of the application process as a means to obtain as many clients as 
possible is the result of an ‘endemic dilemma.’ Rule describes how “[a]ny viable 
credit-granting policy must deal with an endemic dilemma: stringent standards in 
the screening of applications can cut losses from bad debts to virtually nil, but 
result in very low sales volume; indiscriminate acceptance of credit applications, 
on the other hand, will generate high volume but also unacceptably great credit 
losses.”806 BankAmericard, according to Rule, “...ran very seriously foul of this 
dilemma when it began its operations in 1959.”807 BankAmericard began to 
allocate a significant number of cards without proper discrimination. The card 
issuer drew wholesale from lists of Bank of America account-holders, consumer 
reporting agency files, and many other sources. According to Rule, the results of 
the BankAmericard practices became disasterous. The ‘irresponsible’ use of the 
cards by the many cardholders led to considerable losses for BankAmericard and 
nearly led to its demise. Other similar efforts which ran bank credit card schemes 
suffered the fate BankAmericard managed to escape.808 
Even so, Peter Burns and Anne Stanley identify the application process for 
credit cards as the first line of risk management defense. According to Burns and 
Stanley, credit card issuers generally confirm an applicant’s information through 
multiple data sources. The specific origin of the data sources used remains unclear. 
Burns and Stanley furthermore state how “[m]any issuers may also do phone 
address/distance calculations to determine if the phone number on the application 
matches the address as defined by the area code on the application. Certain high-
risk applications may be pulled for a detailed review depending upon the channel 
used, the applicant’s geographic location or other special characteristics.”809 The 
credit card issuers also check the information provided on applications with the 
information provided by the consumer reporting agencies to check for 
inconsistencies. This cross-reference mechanism is subject to considerable 
vulnerability due to the inaccuracies present in the information maintained by 
consumer reporting agencies (see section 5.3).  
Burns and Stanley also indicate the presence of additional means of 
verification during the activation process of the credit card. This occurs through 
the assessment of the telephone number used to activate the card. When such 
activation occurs from a telephone number other than the home number listed on 
the application, the credit card issuer may become suspicious. The credit card 
issuer can transfer the client to a customer service representative under such 
circumstances instead of automatically activating the credit card.810 The customer 
service representative then tries to verify the identity of the caller through the 
information listed on the application or the information obtained via consumer 
reporting agencies.  
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Despite the elaboration of Burns and Stanley on the efforts initiated by the 
industry, others emphasize the inadequacy of the means of verification employed 
by credit card issuers. As Chris Jay Hoofnagle argues, “...credit grantors do not 
have adequate standards for verifying the true identity of credit applicants. Credit 
issuers sometimes open tradelines to individuals who leave obvious errors on the 
application, such as incorrect dates of birth or fudged Social Security Numbers.”811 
At the same time, Lynn M. LoPucki states how “[t]he problem is not that thieves 
have access to personal information, but that creditors and credit-reporting 
agencies often lack both the means and the incentives to correctly identify the 
persons who seek credit from them or on whom they report.”812 Both Hoofnagle 
and LoPucki identify the vulnerability present in the application process 
conducted by credit issuers. Moreover, Hoofnagle emphasizes how the credit card 
industry maintains compelling incentives to quickly open a new account which is 
why part of the industry automates the process.813 These compelling incentives 
often lead to a swift process which fails to incorporate ‘basic’ identity theft 
prevention strategies.814  
The endemic dilemma as identified by Rule hence still dominates the business 
model of the credit card industry, for the companies continue to operate in a 
fiercely competitive environment which makes the acquisition and acceptance of 
clients more imperative than the certainty of the applicant’s identity. Jeff Sovern 
confirms this assertion when he describes how the credit industry seems willing to 
assume the losses suffered through bad debts caused by perpetrators of identity 
theft because of the benefits that flow from easily available credit.815 As Hoofnagle 
eloquently summarizes, “[t]he ‘miracle of instant credit,’ the ability of anyone 
almost anywhere to apply for and obtain a new account in seconds, has a dark 
underbelly – the miracle of instant identity theft.”816 Hoofnagle provides an 
empirical basis for his observation through an analysis of credit (card) applications 
completed by perpetrators in the name of the victim. Hoofnagle analyzed 16 
fraudulent applications from six victims. In an overview of the most common 
errors provided on successful applications completed by the imposters, Hoofnagle 
identifies 12 instances of the wrong address, 3 instances of the wrong phone 
number, 4 instances of the wrong date of birth, and one instance of the wrong 
Social Security Number.817 These are errors which the credit issuer failed to notice 
during the application verification process. Other observations made by 
Hoofnagle include significant physical differences between imposters and victims. 
This is relevant since in-person interactions occurred between the imposter and 
the credit issuer, who apparently disregarded the noticeable physical differences.818  
For the banking industry, the Federal government became involved in the 
application process through the introduction of the Currency and Foreign 
Transactions Reporting Act, better known as the Bank Secrecy Act in 1970.819 The 
main motivation behind the passage of the Bank Secrecy Act was the pervasive tax 
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evasion of (certain) citizens. Additionally, the government also introduced the 
Bank Secrecy Act to function as a vehicle against money laundering. Overall, the 
government aimed to require certain reports or records which may have a high 
degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings.820 
Through the passage of the Bank Secrecy Act, the government required all 
domestic banks to maintain records of customer transactions and to obtain an 
identification number from its prospective clients. This identification number 
most often turned out to be a Social Security Number.821 Furthermore, the Act 
also established reporting duties for financial service providers on account activity 
of existing clients. These include the duty for financial institutions to carry out a 
Currency Transaction Report (CTR)822 whenever the institution carries out a 
transaction above $10,000.823 
In part due to legal and bureaucratic challenges, the enforcement of the 
requirements as identified by the Bank Secrecy Act occurred at a very slow pace 
throughout the 1970s.824 The legal challenges concerned the constitutionality of 
the Bank Secrecy Act along with disagreements and ambiguity about the 
definitions of ‘financial institutions’ and ‘monetary instruments.’825 The 
bureaucratic challenges proved quite diverse, but Ethan A. Nadelmann 
emphasizes how “...the ignorance and indifference of financial institutions to the 
requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act, caused in part by the government’s failure 
to publicize them, contributed substantially to the failure in fulfilling the potential 
of the Act.”826  
During the following decade, the Bank Secrecy Act began to receive greater 
attention. The Department of the Treasury along with the Internal Revenue 
Service increased the enforcement and began to prosecute financial service 
providers for violations of the Act.827 This may have been in response to criticism 
voiced by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) which emphasized in 
1979 how both the Department of the Treasury along with the Internal Revenue 
Service needed to make more effective use of the reports as required by the Bank 
Secrecy Act.828 The majority of these violations therefore focused on the reporting 
duties of the financial service providers rather than on the other requirement 
which concerned the identification of prospective clients.  
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Despite the increased attention, the Bank Secrecy Act continued to be a source 
of controversy. Various sources referred to the inadequacies of law enforcement 
efforts to enforce the law, but also to the Act itself.829 GAO claimed in 1981 how 
the Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements failed to meet expectations.830 Five 
years later, GAO concluded how the Department of the Treasury could improve 
the implementation of the Bank Secrecy Act.831  
Many others call into question the effectiveness of the reporting requirements 
as established by the Bank Secrecy Act, including its subsequent amendments.832 
These amendments include the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, the 
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. 
All of these amendments introduced further changes to the reporting duties as 
originally imposed in the Bank Secrecy Act.833  
The most recent amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 occurred after 
the events of September 11, 2001. Megan Roberts describes how “[i]n the wake of 
the hijackings and the massive destruction that ensued, investigators learned that 
some of the terrorists had fake social security numbers and had opened bank 
accounts.”834 The 9/11 Commission, on the other hand, refutes this claim and 
writes “[c]ontrary to numerous published reports, there is no evidence the 
hijackers ever used false Social Security Numbers to open any bank accounts. 
While the hijackers were not experts on the use of the U.S. financial system, 
nothing they did would have led the banks to suspect criminal behavior, let alone a 
terrorist plot to commit mass murder.”835 Even so, Roberts describes how 
according to estimations, the entire plot required less than $500,000 to finance. 
Approximately $110,000 of the money found its way into the United States via 
wireless transfers from Dubai and Saudi Arabia. These transfers came through 
Citibank in New York, which never filed a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR), 
despite the legal reporting duties as noted in the Banking Secrecy Act.836 
Furthermore, Mohamed Atta, among the chief architects of the events of 
September 11, maintained a bank account in the United States with SunTrust and 
received a $70,000 wire transfer. Again, the bank failed to file a SAR. The events 
of September 11, 2001, especially its aftermath directly led to the passage of the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act or Patriot 
Act). This passage occurred only weeks after September 11, 2001, in (stark) 
contrast to other pieces of legislation, which often consume considerable time 
before their enactment. This, along with its contents, led to considerable criticism 
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from various sources.837 The Patriot Act of 2001 contained many provisions 
which aimed to provide law enforcement officials along with intelligence agencies 
the tools to deter future terrorist operations and apprehend terrorists. Part of the 
Patriot Act, specifically Title III, concerns the financial services industry. Title III, 
or rather the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist 
Financing Act of 2001, introduced various regulatory requirements for the 
industry which impacted several common financial transactions. Section 326 
details the requirements introduced by the Act to verify the identification of 
consumers. The Act requires the Secretary of the Treasury to “...prescribe 
regulations setting forth the minimum standards for financial institutions and their 
customers regarding the identity of the customer that shall apply in connection 
with the opening of an account at a financial institution.”838 Furthermore, the Act 
states how “[t]he regulations shall, at a minimum, require financial institutions to 
implement, and customers (after being given adequate notice) to comply with, 
reasonable procedures for— …verifying the identity of any person seeking to 
open an account to the extent reasonable and practicable;…maintaining records of 
the information used to verify a person’s identity, including name, address, and 
other identifying information; and…consulting lists of known or suspected 
terrorists or terrorist organizations provided to the financial institution by any 
government agency to determine whether a person seeking to open an account 
appears on any such list.”839  
 As requested, the Department of the Treasury sets forth a proposed rule for 
the identification of prospective clients in the financial services sector. In its 
proposed rule, the Department states “[r]ather than imposing the same list of 
specific requirements on every bank, regardless of its circumstances, the proposed 
regulation requires all banks to implement a Customer Identification Program 
(CIP) that is appropriate given the bank’s size, location, and type of business.”840 
Further along, the Department notes its mandate to require banks to implement 
and subsequently comply with reasonable procedures for identity verification 
when prospective clients wish to open an account. The Department claims how 
“[t]he proposed regulation implements this requirement by providing that each 
bank must have risk-based procedures for verifying the identity of a customer that 
take into consideration the types of accounts that banks maintain, the different 
methods of opening accounts, and the types of identifying information 
available.”841 The Department only specifies a limited number of requirements 
with respect to the opening of accounts by prospective clients, these include “[a]t 
a minimum, a bank must obtain from each customer the following information 
prior to opening an account or adding a signatory to an account: name; address; 
                                                
837 See for example Breinholt, J. (2005). How about a little perspective: The USA Patriot Act and the 
uses and abuses of history. Texas Review of Law & Politics, Vol. 9: 17 - 62; Rackow, S. (2002). How the 
USA Patriot Act will permit governmental infringement upon the privacy of Americans in the name of 
“intelligence” investigations. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 150: 1651 - 1696; Lilly, J. R. 
(2003). National Security at what price? A look into civil liberties concerns in the information age 
under the USA Patriot Act of 2001 and a proposed constitutional test for future legislation. Cornell 
Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 12: 447 – 472.  
838 31 U.S.C. § 5318. 
839 Ibid.  
840 Department of the Treasury (2003a). 31 CFR Part 103. Available at: 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/staterule.pdf (last accessed July 5, 2010): 6.  
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for individuals, date of birth; and an identification number.”842 This identification 
number must be a taxpayer identification number, such as a Social Security 
Number, individual taxpayer identification number, or an employer identification 
number. For non-U.S. persons, the bank must obtain an identification number, 
such as a taxpayer identification number; passport number and country of 
issuance; alien identification card number; or number and country of issuance of 
any other government-issued document evidencing nationality or residence and 
bearing a photograph or similar safeguard. These requirements coincide with the 
practices already in place at banks in the United States, as the Department of the 
Treasury recognizes. When this verification of identity must occur for prospective 
clients remains up to the financial service provider.843  
 With regard to the documents used for the verification of identities of clients, 
the Department of the Treasury merely mentions the usage of unexpired 
government issued identification which establishes the nationality or residence of 
the client and also bears a photograph or similar safeguard, such as another means 
of biometrics. Despite the relatively general requirements set forth by Treasury in 
the proposed rule, the Department received over 34,000 comments.844 Based on 
the comments, the Department of the Treasury decided to maintain its original 
decisions. Treasury reconfirmed the lack of need to expressly prohibit specific 
foreign issued identification documents.845 Furthermore, Treasury “…reaffirmed 
its original judgment that the maintenance of photocopies in all cases did not 
provide a security benefit that justified the additional record keeping burden.”846      
The interesting aspect of Title III of the Patriot Act is that the main provisions 
had been under consideration for a number of years prior to the September 11 
attacks.847 Mark E. Plotkin and B. J. Sanford reinforce this idea when they describe 
the political momentum generated through the aftermath of September 11.848 The 
original intent to introduce the know your customer provisions date back to 
December 7, 1998 when the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC), along 
with various other agencies including the Department of the Treasury, the Federal 
Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of 
Thrift Supervision (OTS), proposed regulations which codified specific know your 
customer requirements. These proposed rules “…would have required each bank 
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843 As the Department of the Treasury (2003a: 10) concludes, “Treasury considered proposing that a 
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and savings association to develop a program designed to determine the identity of 
its customers; determine its customers’ sources of funds; determine the normal 
and expected transactions of its customers; monitor account activity for 
transactions that are inconsistent with those normal and expected transactions; 
and report any transactions of its customers that were determined to be suspicious 
in accordance with the OCC’s existing suspicious activity reporting regulations.”849 
The proposed regulation received fierce criticism from the financial service 
industry and the public. Overall, the proposed rules received over 16,000 
comments during the comment period. Nearly all those who commented opposed 
adoption of the proposed rule. For private citizens, the opposition was based on 
privacy concerns. Whereas for the financial service industry, the potential 
administrative burden of carrying out the rule seemed to be highly unattractive. 
Subsequently, on March 23, 1999, the various organizations withdrew the 
proposed regulation.850 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
summarized the arguments from the banking sector as follows: “(1) the regulation 
would be very costly to implement, especially for small banks; (2) the Know Your 
Customer program would invade customer privacy; (3) commercial banks would 
be unfairly disadvantaged and lose customers if all segments of the financial 
services industry are not covered; (4) compliance with the regulation would divert 
resources from Y2K preparation; (5) the Agencies lack authority to adopt the 
regulation; (6) public confidence in the banking industry would be harmed by the 
regulation; and (7) the regulation is both unnecessary and redundant, as banks are 
already familiar with their customers and have adequate procedures in place.”851  
There are other objections posed against the implementation of know your 
customer requirements. These generally come from those who fear the expansion 
of the Federal government and its dominance in areas where State and local 
government ought to remain sovereign, according to their interpretation of the 
United States Constitution. Representative Ron Paul referred to the attempt at an 
introduction of know your customer requirement as an example of an 
interventionist approach.852 While the Patriot Act also stumbled upon considerable 
resistance from the public, academics and interest groups, the political arena stood 
firmly behind the expansion of powers granted through the Act. The political 
momentum silenced any political and public resistance.    
Not everyone is critical of Title III. Certain sources support its 
implementation. Ross Quinn Panko writes how contrary to the assertions made by 
critics, “...the administrative burden imposed by Title III is a reasonable extension 
of banks’ pre-existing duties under the BSA and its due diligence provisions are 
consistent with international recommendations. Moreover, Title III’s privacy-
implicating provisions justifiably call upon customers to make a limited sacrifice of 
                                                
849 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (1999). 12 CFR Part 21. Available at: 
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their privacy in response to the documented dangers of poor information-sharing 
and inadequate customer identification verification.”853 There is merit to part of 
the argument set forth by Panko. Certainly the know your customer requirements 
set forth in the USA Patriot Act coincide with international recommendations and 
many aspects of the proposed rule of the Department of the Treasury overlap 
with requirements as identified by the Bank Secrecy Act. The implementation of 
the international recommendations, at least in part, in other areas of the world 
such as Europe surely demonstrates a stark contrast with the controversy 
witnessed in the United States. This returns in the following section on the 
Netherlands.  
Overall, the above demonstrates the resistance of financial service providers to 
engage in increased identity verification, whether for the opening of bank accounts 
or the extension of individual credit via, for example, credit cards. Such increased 
energy and investment of resources decreases potential profits, but also leads to 
slower and less convenient services for consumers, which financial service 
providers abhor. For the government, hesitance appears to be the adjective to best 
describe its approach with respect to involvement in the aspect of (prospective) 
client identification. As a result, the application process in the United States, 
especially with regard to credit cards, leaves ample opportunity for perpetrators of 
financial identity theft. The results obtained by Hoofnagle through his study of 
applications of victims of financial identity theft provide empirical evidence for 
such assertions. Such a situation shall remain the same as long as “[m]ore money 
can be made by tolerating high levels of fraud than by more carefully screening 
against impostors. The market rewards lax authentication practices, because 
market actors risk losing new customers to competitors if they delay transactions 
to prevent fraud. Identity theft is an externality of the instant credit 
marketplace.”854 The endemic dilemma still dominates the application process, just 
as it did several decades ago.    
 
5.2.2 The Netherlands 
 
Identification procedures in the financial services sector began to attain political 
attention during the start of the 1980s. This came mainly as a result of fiscal fraud 
accomplished through the misuse of identification information. After the media 
published various stories about the usage of incorrect names by both clients and 
banks in 1982, banks once again brought their internal guidelines about identity 
determination under the attention of their employees.855 Despite the existence and 
usage of internal guidelines by banks, the Lower House began to express its 
interest in government involvement in the identification process. Instead of 
specific legislation to regulate the identification process of financial services in the 
Netherlands, the government supported the development of a code of conduct 
between the representative organizations of the involved market actors and the 
Dutch Central Bank. This agreement came about in 1986 and maintained as its 
primary objective to develop a uniform code of conduct for banks in the 
Netherlands with respect to the methods of identity determination.856 This code of 
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conduct became a legal framework for the identification process when the 
government transformed the code of conduct into a general rule of administrative 
law in 1988.857  
More significant involvement of the government remained absent until the 
international arena became engaged and began to devote attention to the topic of 
the identification process in the financial services sector.  The topic of client 
identification in the financial services sector became a political issue on an 
international level in light of the increased attention devoted to money laundering. 
The Basel Committee emphasized the importance of client identification in the 
financial services sector in 1988 through its publication of The Prevention of Criminal 
Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money-Laundering. In the paper, the Basel 
Committee “…stipulates the basic ethical principles and encourages banks to put 
in place effective procedures to identify customers, decline suspicious transactions 
and cooperate with law enforcement agencies.”858 During the yearly summit 
meeting between the G7 and the European Commission in 1989, officials decided 
to introduce a Task Force. This Financial Action Task Force was to include 
Summit Participants and other countries interested in these problems. The 
mandate of the intended Task Force was to “…assess the results of cooperation 
already undertaken in order to prevent the utilization of the banking system and 
financial institutions for the purpose of money laundering, and to consider 
additional preventive efforts in the field, including the adaption of the legal and 
regulatory systems so as to enhance multilateral judicial assistance.”859 The first 
report of the Financial Action Task Force was to be published by April 1990, but 
actually came out on February 6, 1990.860 The report focuses on the role of 
financial institutions in connection to money laundering and also returns to this 
role in its recommendations. The forty recommendations provided by the FATF 
are divided into four categories.  
The most relevant of the four is enhancement of the role of the financial 
system. More specifically, the FATF provides recommendations which focus on 
customer identification and record keeping rules. The FATF provides the 
following three recommendations within this category. First, the FATF states 
“[f]inancial institutions should not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in 
obviously fictitious names: they should be required (by law, by regulations, by 
agreements between supervisory authorities and financial institutions or by self-
regulatory agreements among financial institutions) to identify, on the basis of an 
official or other reliable identifying document, and record the identity of their 
clients, either occasional or usual, when establishing business relations or 
conducting transactions (in particular opening of accounts or passbooks, entering 
into fiduciary transactions, renting of safe deposit boxes, performing large cash 
transactions).”861  
Secondly, the FATF states “[f]inancial institutions should take reasonable 
measures to obtain information about the true identity of the persons on whose 
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behalf an account is opened or a transaction conducted if there are any doubts as 
to whether these clients or customers are not acting on their own behalf...”862 
Third, “[f]inancial institutions should maintain, for at least five years, all 
necessary records on transactions, both domestic or international, to enable them 
to comply swiftly with information requests from the competent authorities. Such 
records must be sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions 
(including the amounts and types of currency involved if any) so as to provide, if 
necessary, evidence for prosecution of criminal behaviour. Financial institutions 
should keep records on customer identification (e.g. copies or records of official 
identification documents like passports, identity cards, driving licenses or similar 
documents), account files and business correspondence for at least five years after 
the account is closed. These documents should be available to domestic 
competent authorities in the context of relevant criminal prosecutions and 
investigations.”863  
The last recommendation specifically aims to develop a paper trail which 
assists in the fight against money laundering. The first two, on the other hand, 
specifically focus on the identification of the prospective client during the 
application process.  
The curious aspect about this approach to money laundering is how the 
emphasis placed on the correct identification of the client also places a premium 
on identities themselves. For such requirements increase the necessity for those 
involved in money laundering practices to misuse the identity of another person in 
an effort to prevent potential repercussions. As a result the recommendations set 
forth could potentially lead to a displacement of the problem through the 
commitment of identity related crime in an effort to accomplish the money 
laundering objective. As the definition provided by Koops & Leenes in chapter 2 
stated, identity theft occurs through the commitment of an unlawful activity 
whereby the identity of an existing person is used as a principal tool or target. 
Identity becomes a principal tool for perpetrators of money laundering to 
circumvent the requirements provided through the anti-money laundering 
framework. The evolution of money mules (see chapter 7) appears to support this 
notion.     
 The recommendations set forth by the FATF specifically geared toward the 
identification process of clients in the financial services sector became the 
foundation for the on June 10, 1991, introduced European Union Directive on 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering.864 The Directive incorporated the recommendations introduced by the 
FATF and required Member States to “…ensure that credit and financial 
institutions require identification of their customers by means of supporting 
evidence when entering into business relations, particularly when opening an 
account or savings accounts, or when offering safe custody facilities.”865  
 The existing legal framework in the Netherlands as officially established in 
1988 proved, despite good compliance in practice, insufficient in light of the 
Directive.866 The government deemed an intensification of the identification 
process within the financial services sector of the essence especially in response to 
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the Directive. As a result of such intensification, it was unfeasible to maintain the 
principle of self-regulation. Self-regulation needed to move aside for a stricter legal 
framework with broad applicability.867 Whereas the code of conduct used for 
several years in the Netherlands primarily focused on the fight against fiscal fraud, 
the stricter legal framework needed to focus on both money laundering and fiscal 
fraud. This expanded the scope of applicability. Part of the implementation 
occurred through the Identification for Financial Services Act868 which officially 
became enacted in 1994.869 This law specifically requires financial service providers 
to determine and verify the identity of a client before the client receives the 
financial service from the provider. Such identification must occur through the 
acceptance of a valid identification document. These identification documents 
must be one of the following: a travel document, such as a passport or national 
identification card, a driver’s license, or an immigration document which 
demonstrates the legal right to reside in the Netherlands.  
The other aspect of the Directive which focused on the due diligence 
recommendations as provided by the FATF developed into another law which 
described the requirements for notification with respect to unusual transactions. 
Interesting to note is how the Netherlands is different in its formulation of 
unusual transactions as opposed to suspicious transactions. The concept of 
unusual transactions is derived from the FATF as opposed to the Directive which 
refers to suspicious transactions. According to Stessons, “[t]he Dutch model 
reflects a vision that the sifting of suspicious transactions is a law enforcement 
task which should be carried out by the government and not by private (financial) 
institutions.”870   
The implementation of the Directive by the Dutch government into two laws 
was a conscious choice. This choice was based on the fact that the Identification 
for Financial Services Act was an expansion of an existing framework, whereas the 
notification duty was an entirely new phenomenon.871 Moreover, the Identification 
for Financial Services Act maintained two distinct goals, money laundering and 
fiscal fraud, which meant the law went beyond the Directive’s exclusive focus on 
money laundering. As a result, the government determined it best to introduce 
two separate pieces of legislation which together composed the legislative 
framework in the fight against money laundering.872 
 The existing framework became the topic of additional discussion after the 
events of September 11, 2001. The issue of terrorist financing proved an impetus 
for the FATF to issue nine additional recommendations in October 2001. These 
nine recommendations complemented the previously published forty 
recommendations which specifically focused on money laundering.873 The nine 
recommendations issued in 2001 aimed to provide assistance in the fight against 
terrorist financing and focused on, among other things, freezing and confiscating 
terrorist assets, and reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism. Also in 
2001, the European Union introduced its second anti-money laundering initiative 
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which amended Council Directive 91/308/EEC.874 The original Directive 
exclusively focused on the laundering of proceeds from drug related offenses but 
the amended version notes how there should be a wider range of predicate 
offenses to be included. Moreover, the Directive acknowledges how the 
intensified fight by the financial services sector against money laundering has led 
to a potential displacement of offenders to launder their proceeds via other 
organizations outside of the financial services sector. The Directive specifically 
refers to, among others, notaries, independent legal professionals, real estate 
agents, and casinos.875 This expansion of applicable parties led the government in 
the Netherlands to amend the Identification for Services Act and the Law for 
reporting unusual transactions in 2003. 
 The introduction of the second Directive on money laundering in 2001 might 
lead one to conclude how this Directive proved a response to terrorist financing 
much the same as the additional nine recommendations issued by the FATF. This 
is, however, incorrect. Several years later, in 2005, the European Union issued its 
third directive in the fight against money laundering which also expanded the fight 
to include terrorist financing.876 This was the actual response to the various 
terrorist events, both inside and outside of the European Union.  
 Besides including the issue of terrorist financing in its prevention efforts, the 
Directive also introduced important changes in its approach to client identification 
processes. As stated in the Directive, “[i]t should be recognised that the risk of 
money laundering and terrorist financing is not the same in every case. In line with 
a risk-based approach, the principle should be introduced into Community 
legislation that simplified customer due diligence is allowed in appropriate 
cases.”877 Moreover, the Directive also notes how “[c]ommunity legislation should 
recognise that certain situations present a greater risk of money laundering or 
terrorist financing. Although the identity and business profile of all customers 
should be established, there are cases where particularly rigorous customer 
identification and verification procedures are required.”878     
 All of these developments at the European level logically influenced the legal 
landscape in the Netherlands. Especially the introduction of the third directive 
required amendments to the existing legislative framework. Due to the need for 
amendments, the Ministry of Finance expressed a desire to determine how 
financial service providers and other relevant corporations dealt with the available 
legislation. To achieve such an assessment the Ministry of Finance commissioned 
a study in 2006.879  
The risk based approach developed through the third EU Directive on money 
laundering requires relevant organizations, including financial service providers, to 
develop a framework which identifies risk indicators. This framework takes into 
consideration client as well as service or product aspects which influence the risk 
assessment. When such a framework determines a low risk, organizations can use 
more simplified means of identification and identity verification. The supervisory 
organs, namely the Dutch Central Bank, can play a role when organizations 
require more assistance. The original law for identification of service provision 
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carried a rule based approach, which, according to respondents of the study, led to 
unnecessary administrative burdens.880 Such a rule based approach also prevents a 
much desired flexibility. The interviews conducted by KPMG demonstrate how a 
majority of the respondents favor a risk based approach since such an approach 
affords them the flexibility to develop procedures according to the risk of the 
client, the service, and the institution. Smaller organizations, on the other hand, 
indicated a preference for clarity and specificity in the requirements set out by the 
government for identification procedures. For them, a uniform method is more 
cost effective and also more manageable.881   
The risk based approach set forth by the European Union demonstrates its 
comparable nature to the emphasis placed on a risk based approach by the 
Department of the Treasury as described above. The implementation of the risk 
based approach as introduced through the third directive occurred as part of a 
package deal, which is a rarity in Dutch legislative history. The existence of two 
separate laws which together composed the core of the legislative framework to 
combat money laundering led to practical problems.882 The working group on 
both laws set forth a recommendation to join both acts together in an effort to 
enhance clarity. As a result, the government decided to take the opportunity 
during the implementation stage of the third EU Directive to combine both the 
Identification for Services and Reporting Unusual Transactions Act883 into a single 
piece of legislation. Together they became the prevention of money laundering 
and financing terrorism act.884  
The Act requires service providers to identify the client and verify her identity. 
Moreover, the Act emphasizes the need to verify the identity of the ultimate 
recipient of the service. The third EU Directive also required member states to 
appoint a supervisory administrative body to ensure compliance with the legal 
mandate. Along with the joining of the two previous laws, the government also 
appointed the Dutch Central Bank as the compliance supervisor.885 In addition, 
Article 27 of the law also makes incompliance with the legal requirements 
sanctionable through a fine.   
In contrast to the United States, the aspect of client identification appears less 
controversial. And the changes in the legal landscape overshadow the original 
conclusion set forth based on the code of conduct which demonstrates how there 
was generally good compliance by financial service providers in the Netherlands.  
Limited controversy began when in 2005 banks in the Netherlands began to 
send out letters to their existing clients and required them to visit the bank in 
order to provide them with a copy of their identification document, namely their 
passport or driver’s license, or to send a watermarked copy. Banks claimed this 
was a legal mandate set forth through the Identification for Services Act, which 
requires identity verification and proof for the Dutch Central Bank to demonstrate 
such verification took place. The banks who requested a personal visit therefore 
also made a digital copy of the identification document. The claim, however, was 
misleading as the requirement for a copy of the passport was merely one 
interpretation of the law; it was not an explicit mandate. The Minister of Finances 
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along with the Dutch Central Bank decided the method used by the banks to 
verify the identity of existing clients was not unlawful. To remove the ambiguity 
surrounding the banks’ actions, the Minister of Finances decided to incorporate 
the method as part of the law.886  
Through the introduction of the prevention of money laundering and 
financing terrorism act, the government removed the fiscal obligation to maintain 
a copy of the identification document by financial service providers. The Act 
instead requires financial service providers to obtain and store the information 
maintained on the identification document. In particular the Act requires the 
service providers to store the following information once the service provider has 
identified and verified the identity of the client: name, date of birth, address, and 
the city of residence. Even so, the Act still provides financial service providers 
with the opportunity to request a copy of an identification document since the Act 
states “…or a copy of a document which contains a personal identification 
number and was used for identification of the client.”887  
 In the Netherlands, only anecdotal evidence appears to be available about 
errors committed by financial service providers during the application process.888 
Banks resist the release of information about how such incidents occur, but in 
light of good compliance there is reason to believe such incidents of financial 
identity theft most likely occur through look-alike fraud or falsified identification 
documents. As a result, there is a certain dependency of financial service providers 
on the government as provider. For the quality of both the documents and the 
issuance process also influence the identification of (prospective) clients.  
 
5.3 Consumer Reporting Agencies 
 
5.3.1  United States 
 
The introduction of consumer reporting agencies into contemporary society 
occurred as a result of the need for an institutional response to information 
asymmetry.889 Consumer reporting agencies are a strange species in society, in 
particular in the United States. Historically, their internal operations carry an air of 
secrecy; especially the administrative records and internal correspondence remain 
inaccessible to outside sources. Josh Lauer notes how “[t]he history of consumer 
credit reporting is hampered by a lack of primary source material; there are no 
public archives or obvious concentrations of documentary evidence to consult.”890 
According to Lauer, consumer reporting agencies deliberately remained out of 
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sight to avoid legal action and public condemnation. Lauer managed to trace the 
roots of consumer reporting agencies back to New York where during the 1870s 
the first consumer credit reporting organizations emerged. These organizations 
began to spread throughout the country during the following decades. Lauer 
describes how individuals generally applied for a line of credit in two ways. The 
customer could apply directly or request, upon checkout, that the items be 
charged. Either way, the sales associate needed to refer the customer to the credit 
or office manager. “Here,” writes Lauer, “the social nature of credit reached a 
moment of high drama. Credit, after all, is a measure of social trust. Thus to have 
one’s creditworthiness subjected to judgment is no small matter; it is a referendum 
on one’s morality and social standing. To be refused implies that one is 
undeserving, deficient, suspect.”891 The moral weight associated with the credit 
worthiness of an individual is a reflection of the role credit plays in society, at least 
in the United States. The President of the National Association proclaimed in 
1918 how the industry needed to “...preach the doctrine that credit is character, 
and that a person who willfully abuses his credit and refuses to heed the warning 
must become an outcast in the business and the social world.”892  
As private sector initiatives, consumer reporting agencies developed without 
government involvement. Rowena Olegario described how consumer reporting 
agencies evolved as a result of inter-firm competition.893 For years, consumer 
reporting agencies remained local independently-owned businesses until the late 
1970s when computerization and consolidation, at least for nationwide consumer 
reporting agencies, reduced the number of nationwide corporations to three.894 
These three dominant firms, TransUnion, Equifax, and TRW still exist today, 
although TRW is now Experian.  
Several years before the consolidation of nationwide agencies, critical accounts 
of consumer reporting and its associated activities began to surface, especially in 
relation to the potential privacy intrusions. The usual suspects of critical accounts 
included among others Arthur R. Miller and Alan F. Westin. Besides the critical 
accounts of prominent scholars in the field, the United States Congress also 
opened its eyes. Albeit years later. Robert M. McNamara describes how “[d]uring 
the period of their phenomenal growth, credit bureaus have somehow escaped the 
focus of both state and federal inquiry and regulation in spite of the existence of 
serious abuses.”895 This left consumers unprotected since common law remedies 
proved absent for the harms caused by the consumer reporting industry. The 
business practices of consumer reporting agencies introduced a plethora of 
problems, which required legislative involvement. G. Allan Van Fleet summarizes 
the problems associated with consumer reporting as follows “[i]n addition to the 
questionable relevancy of some of the information contained in consumer reports, 
attacks have been leveled at the promiscuous dissemination of an individual’s files 
without his knowledge, let alone his consent, and at the practice of some bureaus 
of attempting to collect bills by threatening to ruin the debtor’s credit rating.”896 
                                                
891 Ibid: 166.  
892 Qtd. in Ibid: 208.  
893 Olegario (2001). 
894 A fourth, Innovus, joined the ‘club’ at a later stage.  
895 McNamara, R. M. (1973). The Fair Credit Reporting Act: A Legislative Overview. Journal of Public 
Law, Vol. 22: 71. 
896 Van Fleet, G. A. (1976). Judicial Construction of the Federal Credit Reporting Act: Scope and Civil 
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Mike Wallace and Westin conducted experiments to unravel the process through 
which consumer reporting agencies issued credit reports.897 This happened, as 
demonstrated through the experiments, with considerable ease and indicated how 
anyone, regardless of purpose, could obtain the credit reports of other people. The 
other main problem concerned the adoption of erroneous information as part of 
the individual’s credit report, which subsequently caused problems when the 
individual tried to obtain a loan, apply for a job, etc.  
Despite the obvious problems caused by the consumer reporting industry, for 
forty years only one state considered the issue important enough to introduce 
legislation to regulate the industry.898 Ironically, the business practices of the 
consumer reporting industry became a topic of political discussion during the 
consideration of the introduction of a national data bank. To make record-keeping 
more efficient and economical, the Bureau of the Budget commissioned a 
feasibility study in 1961 for the centralization and computerization of all personal 
records maintained by the Federal government and its agencies.899 Several studies 
supported the establishment of a Federal Data Center. The potential for privacy 
invasions as a result of such an establishment also received attention from the 
Special Subcommittee on the Invasion of Privacy of the House Committee on 
Government Operations, which held various public hearings. The Special 
subcommittee published its findings, conclusions, and recommendations in 
‘Privacy and the National Data Bank Concept.’ In the report, members of the 
Special Subcommittee express considerable concern about the potential harm 
inflicted on the privacy of individuals as a result of a National Data Bank.900 The 
proposal for a National Data Bank died in Committee. During the debate about 
the introduction of such a public data bank, the United States Congress finally 
became aware of the existence of a private data bank – the consumer reporting 
agencies.901  
Months before the death of the idea of a National Data Bank, a particular 
Member of Congress already noted the problems associated with the consumer 
reporting industry. Clement J. Zablocki, a Representative from Wisconsin, 
introduced the first ‘Fair Credit Reporting Bill’ after he received a complaint from 
a constituent. Rita B. Collins wrote the Wisconsin Representative on September 6, 
1967.902 In her letter, she described how she had been turned down for a car loan 
because the consumer reporting agency provided the car dealer with erroneous 
information. Specifically, the credit report stated how Collins and her husband 
owed money to a trucking firm. In response to the letter, Zablocki introduced his 
bill which would grant individuals the right to know the identity of the consumer 
reporting agency, the contents of the report, and, in the case of an adverse report, 
the specific facts or allegations upon which the report was based. Zablocki’s bill 
never escaped Committee discussions, but still served a vital function as a source 
of inspiration for similar proposals and significant congressional concern about 
the issue. Consumer reporting agencies no longer managed to escape the attention 
of Congress and on March 12, 1968 the Subcommittee on the Invasion of Privacy 
commenced its hearings on the industry. These hearings became known as the 
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Gallagher hearings. According to McNamara, “[t]he Gallagher hearings were the 
cumulative result of the awareness of the problem caused by the work and the 
study done on the National Data Bank and the thousands of letters and reports of 
cases received by Gallagher.”903  
Upon Gallagher’s recommendation, the consumer reporting industry gathered 
to develop guidelines for self-regulation. These guidelines, submitted to the 
Committee by the industry, received positive feedback from Gallagher. As a result 
of the guidelines, Gallagher considered further legislation unnecessary. McNamara 
describes how the development of the guidelines fulfilled a political strategy for 
the consumer reporting industry. Regulation was in the air and self-imposed 
guidelines proved to be the lesser of two evils. Self-imposed guidelines carried an 
air of industrial ethics and concern. But, as McNamara notes, “[b]eneath this 
‘good industry facade,’ however, was the more subtle benefit, namely, that self-
regulation would impose no legal duties.”904 Further along in his overview, 
McNamara reiterates how “[f]acades of concern and statements of sincerity may 
abate criticism but are easily seen for what they are by investigating daily business 
practices.”905 Despite the praise expressed by Gallagher, the self-imposed 
guidelines failed to appease other Members of Congress.  
Senator Proxmire introduced his version of the ‘Fair Credit Reporting Bill’ 
only two and a half weeks after the industry proposed its guidelines. Gallagher, as 
an industry champion, presented the guidelines to Congress in hopes of avoiding 
legislation. Proxmire again emphasized the uselessness of the guidelines with 
respect to the industry problems and began to hold hearings on S. 823, the Fair 
Credit Reporting Bill, on May 23, 1969. His hearings increased the public and 
political attention on the issue, mainly through the repetition of earlier problems 
identified about the consumer reporting industry. McNamara eloquently exposes 
the politics of the public policy process when he describes how after S. 823 passed 
in the Senate, the House of Representative referred the bill to the House 
Committee on Banking and Currency, where “...it was to be stalled for many 
months.”906 “One of the possible reasons for the apparent lethargy of the House 
Committee”, according to McNamara, “was its self-interest in holding hearings on 
an alternate bill submitted by Congresswoman Leonore Sullivan which she had 
titled the ‘Good Name Protection Bill.’”907 Whereas the Good Name Protection 
Bill died a quiet death in Committee, the Fair Credit Reporting Bill moved along 
and ultimately found itself signed into law on October 26, 1970.  
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) states that “…it is the purpose of this 
subchapter to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable 
procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, 
insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the 
consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper 
utilization of such information in accordance with the requirements of this 
subchapter.”908 The FCRA defines the permissible purposes of consumer reports 
and the circumstances under which consumer reporting agencies may furnish 
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credit reports to third parties.909 The FCRA also grants consumers the right to 
receive a copy of their credit report.910 In addition, the FCRA prohibits the 
inclusion of obsolete information as part of the credit report but also limits 
liability of consumer reporting agencies.   
The FCRA has been subject to severe criticism, especially since the industry 
appeared to maintain significant influence on its ultimate formulation. Arthur 
Miller captures the importance of the industry’s influence when he writes, “[t]he 
original Proxmire bill had been butchered; it was drawn and quartered and its 
vitals were left on the Committee’s chopping block. How that came to pass is no 
mystery. Industry lobbyists and bank-oriented senators engaged in the dissection, 
while advocates of consumer protection quietly relied on the legislative process to 
produce a bill that would respond to the needs of the public.”911 James B. Rule 
claims the FCRA is part of a tradition, which he labels as “the genius of American 
liberalism.” “It is the genius of American liberalism,” Rule writes, “that, when 
faced with a particularly unconscionable practice by some powerful interest, it 
regulates that interest in such a way as both to mitigate the sting of the abuse and 
at the same time to consolidate the position of the perpetrators.”912  
Even so, others recognize the FCRA’s value and provide the Act with 
numerous positive labels. The FCRA is seen as the first ‘breakthrough913, ‘a truly 
significant beginning’914 and ‘a major first step.’915 These positive responses, on the 
other hand, also recognize the need for more work and as such are best 
categorized as constructive criticism.  
Many years later, others still applaud the Act. Fred H. Cate et al. state “[f]or 
more than 30 years, the Fair Credit Reporting Act has deftly regulated the U.S. 
credit reporting system. The product of extensive congressional hearings, the Act 
creates a simple, powerful, and largely self-enforcing regulatory structure. It has 
proven so efficient, flexible, and durable that, with only a single substantive 
amendment, it has guided the world’s most robust credit reporting system and 
overseen exceptional growth in consumer mortgages and other credit 
opportunities for three decades.”916  
The industry itself emphasized the success of the FCRA when new potential 
legislation featured on the horizon. Lawrence D. Frenzel describes how “[t]he 
consumer reporting agencies have consistently, adamantly, and unanimously 
maintained that the FCRA is overwhelmingly successful in fulfilling Congress’ 
express intent. Armed with statistics revealing extremely small numbers of 
consumer complaints–compared to the millions of consumer reports issued—the 
reporting agencies contend that the casualties of consumer reporting abuses are 
negligible.”917 Frenzel describes furthermore how consumer reporting agencies 
                                                
909 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.  
910 15 U.S.C. § 1681g. 
911 Qtd. In Van Fleet (1976): 465.    
912 Rule (1974): 214.   
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Lawyer, Vol. 14: 459 – 490.  
915 Frenzel, L. D. (1977). Fair Credit Reporting Act: The Case for Revision. Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
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FINANCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS     171 
 
 
claim consumer complaints are a result of consumers being disgruntled over 
denied benefits rather than having legitimate grievances toward the consumer 
reporting agency. Ironically, “[t]hese arguments tend to exculpate the consumer 
reporters from responsibility for consumer complaints, and place the blame on the 
consumers themselves.”918 An approach which carries a flavor of familiarity 
throughout the more general problem of identity theft, as will especially become 
evident in chapter 6. Frenzel describes how “[u]nder close analysis, the arguments 
supplied by the information merchants are illusory; they are merely a clever 
alchemization of quantitative data into qualitative conclusions.”919  
Proxmire returned in 1973 in an effort to revive his original efforts. In part 
based on the recommendations set forth by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
Proxmire set forth Senate Bill 2360. According to Proxmire, “[o]ne of the most 
significant provisions of S. 2360 would entitle consumers to physically inspect 
their credit file and to receive a written copy of all the information in the file. The 
present law requires only an oral disclosure and has led to a number of consumer 
complaints and misunderstandings.”920 Another important provision proposed 
through S. 2360 was an increased responsibility on the ‘user’ of consumer credit 
information with regard to informing consumers about the reasons why they were 
rejected credit by the ‘user.’ S. 2360 specifically requires credit providers to tell 
consumers in writing the specific reasons for the rejection of credit and they must 
also provide consumers with a copy of any credit report.  
The hearings illustrate the resistance expressed by the industry toward the 
proposed amendments to the FCRA. The statement provided by John L. Spafford 
captures the industry’s aversion to increased consumer rights. “Mr. Chairman,” 
Spafford stated, “…to put it mildly, the reaction of our membership to some of 
your proposed changes in the FCRA has been one of shock over the severity of 
the proposals. Our members are dismayed that…this industry is now faced with 
some proposals which were discarded after careful study 3 years ago, and new 
ones which would raise costs and seriously hamper the effectiveness of consumer 
reporting agencies.”921 The discarded aspects Spafford refers to are perhaps not 
the result of ‘careful study’ but rather the impact of powerful lobbying capacity 
from the industry which managed to influence the ultimate provisions in the 
FCRA. With respect to the requirement for credit providers to specifically state 
the reasons for credit rejection, Spafford states “[a]lthough ACB defends the 
credit grantor’s right to make a decision without having to identify specific items 
of information that caused a decline, it is true that the present 615 (a) requirement 
has in some cases made the credit bureau the ‘whipping boy’ for credit grantors 
who are too broad and general in their explanation of why credit could not be 
extended.”922  
Even so, Spafford expressed his preference for an alternative route and 
described the industry’s attempt to persuade credit grantors to use a multiple 
choice decline letter. Spafford believed the industry deserved more time to 
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encourage credit grantors to recommend the use of such a letter, which was 
developed by the FTC with the assistance of ABC. Richard M. Davis is more 
forthright about his support for the provision which provides consumers with 
specific reasons as to the rejection of their application for credit. As he stated, 
“[w]e agree that more specific reasons for denial of credit would provide many 
benefits for the consumer and the system. ICBM would like to go on record as 
seeking to protect consumers, and their right to know why they are specifically 
refused credit.”923 Those directly implicated to provide specific reasons for 
rejection proved averse against such a legal requirement.924  
Others before the Subcommittee supported the resistance against the ‘radical 
changes’ proposed by Proxmire. W. Lee Burge, President of the Retail Credit Co., 
believed the amendments introduced were neither needed nor justified. He also 
states how, “[m]ost of the changes now proposed were debated and specifically 
rejected by the responsible subcommittee and the full committee in 1969, and by 
the conference committee in 1970.”925 
Once again, the lobbying capacity of the industry proved fierce and effective. 
Significant changes to the FCRA failed to come about until several decades later 
when the United States Congress passed the Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act (FACTA) in 2003. The primary aim of FACTA is to provide 
amendments to the FCRA which aspire “...to prevent identity theft, improve 
resolution of consumer disputes, improve the accuracy of consumer records, make 
improvements in the use of, and consumer access to, credit information, and for 
other purposes.”926 Most importantly, FACTA establishes the need for red flag 
guidelines and requires the Federal Banking Agencies, the National Credit Union 
Administration, and the Federal Trade Commission to jointly issue such 
guidelines.927 Basically, FACTA requires the Agencies to identify patterns, 
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practices, and specific forms of activity which possibly indicate the existence of 
identity theft. The development of such guidelines concern financial service 
providers in general rather than consumer reporting agencies in particular. This 
section or the discussion of FACTA also applies to other business practices 
discussed throughout the chapter.  
The proposed guidelines of the Agencies which became available for public 
commentary received criticism from consumer advocates. The Agencies described 
how consumer advocates complained about the proposed regulations which 
“…provided too much discretion to financial institutions and creditors to decide 
which accounts and Red Flags to include in their Programs and how to respond to 
those Red Flags. These commentators stated that the flexible and risk-based 
approach taken in the proposed rulemaking would permit ‘business as usual.’”928 
Interestingly, certain small financial institutions expressed similar concerns about 
the flexibility afforded through the proposed guidelines. They called upon the 
Agencies to provide more clarity and more structure as part of their guidelines.929  
Most commentators, on the other hand, criticized the Agencies for the overly 
prescriptive nature of the proposal. Many of these commentators included 
financial service providers who claimed the requirements set forth by the proposal 
surpassed the requirements as mandated by FACTA. Furthermore, those critical 
of the proposal also seemed concerned about the costs involved and claimed how 
the proposal would complicate existing efforts to detect and prevent identity theft. 
Certain businesses even claimed “...the rulemaking was unnecessary because large 
businesses, such as banks and telecommunications companies, already are 
motivated to prevent identity theft and other forms of fraud in order to limit their 
own financial losses.”930 Additionally, a few financial service providers claimed the 
primary cause of identity theft was the lack of care on the part of consumers. 
These financial service providers asserted that consumers themselves should be 
held responsible for the protection of their identifying information. The overview 
of comments received demonstrates the inherent conflict of interest present 
among and between actors, both inside and outside of the private sector.  
The Red Flags Rule published by the Agencies requires certain businesses and 
organizations to develop, implement, and administer identity theft prevention 
programs. The program must include four basic elements which together compose 
a framework to address the threat of identity theft. First, the program introduced 
by the organization must include reasonable policies and procedures which can 
identify red flags. Second, the program must be able to detect the red flags which 
the organization previously identified. The third element requires the organization 
to specify appropriate actions which the organization needs to take to address the 
red flags. And the fourth aspect requires organizations to adopt means of 
evaluation as part of their program, especially since identity theft is a continuously 
evolving threat and new risks arise as time passes.931  
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subparagraph (B).” 
928 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (2007). 12 CFR Part 41. Available at: 
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To make these four core aspects more concrete, the FTC provides examples for 
organizations. For the first step, the FTC describes the following possible red 
flags: alerts, notifications, or warnings from consumer reporting agencies. In this 
sense, the consumer reporting agencies play a crucial role in the realm of 
situational crime prevention. For as an intermediary, they maintain information 
about consumers and victims which can potentially prevent additional or future 
victimization. This aspect is, however, not entirely the responsibility of consumer 
reporting agencies, since the provision of alerts, notifications, and warnings also 
requires financial service providers to adhere to such red flags in an effort to 
accomplish the prevention of financial identity theft. Moreover, the FTC also 
refers to the potential for red flags with regard to suspicious documents, personal 
identifying information, or account activity.932 For detection, the FTC 
distinguishes between new and existing accounts. Especially since both are subject 
to different types of ‘attacks.’ 
The actual implementation of the red flags guidelines remain a subject of 
continuous postponement. The original date of compliance was November 1, 
2008. Since many organizations impacted by the guidelines proved ill-prepared for 
the necessary preparations, the FTC moved the deadline to May 1, 2009.933 The 
compliance data continued to be a subject of negotiation and the FTC extended 
the deadline to November 1, 2009 before offering another extension to move the 
date of compliance to June 1, 2010.934 This date was once again changed and the 
most recent date of compliance is December 31, 2010. As a result, the red flags 
rule is yet to go into effect and as such it is difficult to assess its impact on the 
prevalence of financial identity theft.935  
But the actual effectiveness from the red flags is embedded in both the 
detection of such flags and the response to such detection. As Hoofnagle 
concluded, “[a]utomated fraud detection systems at the consumer reporting 
agencies indicated that fraud could be present in 3 of the 4 mortgage applications 
in X5’s file. One warned, ‘Substantial difference between address submitted in 
credit request and addresses in credit file.’ Two of these red flag warnings 
indicated that the applicant/impostor’s DOB did not match X5’s. It is unclear 
what steps the creditor grantor took to resolve these red flags before extending 
mortgages to the impostor.”936    
Overall, consumer reporting agencies maintain different functions in the 
facilitation of financial identity theft. The release of credit reports to third parties, 
especially financial service providers, is an essential aspect of the credit granting 
process. In this regard, consumer reporting agencies play a vital role in the ability 
for Americans to obtain instant access to credit for large purchases, which is 
arguably a positive effect of their presence in the United States. The problems 
with the release of the information is the presence of errors. Byron Acohido and 
Jon Schwartz describe how “[a] prospective borrower filling out an online loan 
application can submit less than nine correct digits of Social Security number and 
just three matching letters of the first name of someone of good credit standing. 
Often that’s enough to trigger the delivery of a credit report and subsequent 
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approval for a new cell phone account or credit card...”937 These three letters of 
the first name can be out of order or sequence and still trigger the delivery. The 
ease of delivery facilitates financial identity theft in part. For without the delivery 
of a credit report, financial service providers do not possess the credit rating of the 
applicant and this appears to decrease the odds of granting the applicant a new 
line of credit. It must be noted, however, how the consumer reporting agencies 
obviously face tremendous technical challenges to carry out their prime business 
of credit reporting.   
The other mandate for consumer reporting agencies is more relevant to the 
prevention of financial identity theft. The placement of fraud alerts on the credit 
reports of consumers, usually previous victims of financial identity theft, is a 
responsibility of the agencies. These alerts ought to serve as a red flag for the 
financial service provider which requested the report.  
Other similar, albeit arguably more effective, efforts include credit freezes. 
Such a freeze actually prevents access to the file of a consumer and as such also 
prevents the opening of a new line of credit. When a financial service provider 
attempts to gain access to the file, the consumer reporting agency must notify the 
consumer in an effort to unlock her file in order for it to be viewed by the 
financial service provider. In order for consumers to obtain a credit freeze they 
must contact all four consumer reporting agencies and send a letter accompanied 
by a fee. The fees generally range from $5 to $10.938 Many states do not require a 
fee from victims of financial identity theft. Credit freezes are still a State led effort 
which began in California in 2003. As of December 29, 2009, forty-seven States 
had passed a credit freeze law.939 The exceptions are Alabama, Michigan, and 
Missouri.940 The discrepancy between State credit freeze laws leads to 
complications for residents of particular States. Kristan T. Cheng therefore calls 
for Federal credit freeze legislation which “…is available to all consumers and 
includes a quick thaw provision, specific creditor thaw, and reasonable fee 
structure [which] will provide consumers with superior and uniform identity theft 
protection.”941   
The potential for credit freezes to play a significant role in the prevention of 
financial identity theft is recognized by various sources. Hoofnagle discussed the 
idea of a credit freeze several years ago when he made the proposal to change the 
default state of credit reports from a ‘liquid’ to a ‘frozen’ state.942 Such a change is 
necessary since “…our current credit system allows our personal information to 
flow like water to almost anyone who requests it. Once credit information is 
released, credit grantors who are operating in an extremely competitive market 
race to issue new tradelines. This makes it simple for impostors to commit identity 
theft by obtaining new credit accounts.”943 The proposed credit freeze system 
provides consumers with the power to ‘thaw’ the file when they desire to do so. 
And as such, consumers maintain the control of access with regard to the party, 
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place, and the context of access. The core promise of the credit freeze rests in the 
fact that “[c]reditors will not extend tradelines without a credit report, and thus 
under a frozen credit report system, impostors would have great difficulty in 
obtaining new accounts. The frozen system would also prevent businesses and 
others from obtaining credit reports without consumers’ full consent, thereby 
limiting marketing and other impermissible uses of the report.”944 The credit 
freeze therefore manages to address various facilitating factors. These include the 
omission of receiving pre-approved credit card applications along with the 
prevention against other attempts at true name fraud. Unlike many other 
‘solutions’ the idea of the credit freeze actually addresses part of the architectural 
vulnerability945 of financial identity theft. The main challenge is the opt-in aspect 
of the system which requires consumers to take action.  
Moreover, the credit freeze reduces the convenience of instant credit which 
generally goes against the benefits Americans, or those residing in the United 
States, derive from the system. The question, therefore, surfaces whether such a 
reduction in convenience is a worthy investment in light of the potential security 
the countermeasure can deliver.  
 
5.3.2 The Netherlands 
 
Since 1965, the Bureau for Credit Registration, or in Dutch Bureau Krediet Registratie 
(BKR), functions as the primary supervisory organ for credit reporting in the 
Netherlands.946 According to its Statutes, the main objective of BKR is to advance 
the industry of financial services in a socially responsible manner, to minimize the 
risks for financial service providers, and to prevent exceeding on overdraft 
facilities for consumers.947 Initially, the list of participants only included banks and 
financing institutions. Later on, others joined included municipal credit banks and 
saving banks. During the seventies, other parties also became participants. These 
included mail-order firms, mortgage banks, credit card organizations, and more 
recently retail traders who issue member credit cards. All in all, nearly every 
institution which engages in a form of consumer credit is part of the list of 
participants. This is the result of the legal mandate laid down in the Consumer 
Credit Act which states in Article 1 how those who extend credit lines must have a 
license to do so. Such a license also requires the holder to become a participant of 
the credit registration system, or basically to become a participant of BKR.948 The 
Consumer Credit Act also requires license holders to conduct a credit check via 
BKR before extending a line of credit of more than 1000 euros.949  
BKR is a non-profit organization and came about after a research committee 
concluded there was a need for positive registration of consumer credit.950 Positive 
registration means BKR registers all forms of consumer credit rather than 
exclusively ‘negative’ consumer credit accounts. The main intent of positive 
registration is to prevent consumers from encountering potential problems. The 
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credit registration system of BKR does not contain ‘sensitive’ information, 
according to the former director of the bureau, such as race, religion, employer, 
income, or the total financial deficit of a person.951 The credit registration file of 
individuals present in the system contains their name, address, date of birth, and 
the relevant credit information of all participating organizations. This credit 
information includes the amount and the time frame of the contract, including the 
expiration or final payment date. When a delay in payment occurs, BKR uses a 
code to indicate this in the individual’s file.952 The credit registration system of 
BKR is maintained in a centralized and automated system.  
Until the mid-eighties, BKR was a pretty ‘passive’ organization. According to 
Arie Rip, the director at the time, BKR simply registered whatever information the 
banks provided to them and released the requested information upon command 
of its participants.953 The end of the eighties led to a change in the organization. 
BKR transformed itself into a more active organization. This was mainly the result 
of the introduction of the Dutch Data Protection Act which gave BKR more 
responsibility with respect to the correctness of the information maintained within 
its system. Even so, Jan Kabel notes how the duty listed in the Data Protection 
Act is focused on the effort made by the responsible party rather than an explicit 
obligation to verify all information received from the participants.954 This change 
in responsibility, however, also led BKR to have a direct responsibility to the 
consumer.955 To adhere to this responsibility, BKR developed a department within 
the organization to represent the interest of the consumer. The point of departure 
for BKR is that the consumer is allowed to know everything that is listed in her 
name. Former director Rip notes during an interview how BKR has always been 
‘privacy-minded.’ This claim is supported by the fact that in 1973 BKR provided 
consumers the right to view their own file.956 This must be done in person 
through a participant organization and costs 4.95 euros. BKR specifically 
acknowledges the potential risks associated with requests over the telephone and 
via the Internet. Especially since imposters may want to request the copy of a 
credit history of another person. As a result, individuals need to request a copy in 
person and demonstrate an appropriate form of government-issued identification. 
Participants, on the other hand, can request and obtain the information on-line.957   
Besides the right to view their own file, consumers also maintain other rights. 
Consumers maintain the right to request a list of participants who have requested 
to see their file during the previous year.958 As Rip notes, such information is 
particularly interesting for consumers since they can use such information to verify 
that the information is actually requested with the proper objective. This type of 
request or consumer right serves as a warning to financial service providers to 
make sure they use the credit check in a considerate manner. Rip does state how 
the number of requests for such an overview is limited and is usually carried out 
by individuals who suspect something.959 When BKR discovers unacceptable 
                                                
951 Ibid.  
952 Ibid.  
953 Gerards, J. L. & E. J. Snijders (1993). De toekomst van Tiel: Bureau Registratie? Bank-en 
Effectenbedrijf, November 1993: 6 – 11.  
954 Kabel (2002): 247.  
955 Gerards & Snijders (1993).  
956 Ibid.  
957 Kabel (2002): 246.  
958 An overview costs 4.95 euros. 
959 Gerards & Snijders (1993).  
178     FERTILE GROUNDS      
 
behavior with respect to credit file requests by its participants, it can issue a 
warning, monetary fine, or even a suspension.960   
When a financial service provider rejects a credit application, the provider 
must provide the reason for the rejection. This must be done in a way which 
allows the applicant to judge whether the decision is based on complete and 
correct information.961 When disagreements between participants and credit 
applicants occur, and they are incapable of resolving the issue amongst 
themselves, they can turn to the independent BKR arbitration board. The decision 
provided by the arbitration board is binding and appealing is generally not an 
option.962      
BKR is a member of the Association of Consumer Credit Information 
Suppliers (ACCIS) which is an international group where various European credit 
registration bureaus reunite. The idea to develop such an association originated 
after BKR received criticism from the European Commission because its rules and 
regulations stated how only institutions based in the Netherlands could become 
participants of BKR. In response to the criticism, BKR changed its rules and 
regulations but encountered numerous challenges. The most relevant challenge 
was how does BKR determine the legitimacy of organizations which do not reside 
in the Netherlands. Especially due to the sensitive nature of the information, the 
potential for providing illegitimate organizations with such information became a 
cause for concern. As a result, BKR decided to contact partner organizations and 
develop an association with other organizations to discuss the challenges and to 
determine possible responses.963  
 Perhaps the most striking feature of BKR, especially in comparison to its 
American counterparts, is its share in fraud prevention. Besides credit registration, 
BKR began to play a role in fraud prevention after the organization came to the 
conclusion it was in a good position to contribute to such prevention. Even in 
1993, Rip emphasizes the need for good identification due to the continuous 
increase in fraud. He particularly mentions the escalating trend of falsification and 
the theft of identification documents.964 Within that framework, BKR in 
cooperation with the investigation department payment traffic developed the VIS 
system, which stands for verification information system.965 This system allows 
financial service providers to verify whether identification documents presented 
during the (credit) application process are stolen. This verification occurs based on 
the number present on the document. BKR proved to be the ideal distribution 
channel since the organization has an infrastructure which focuses its services on 
all financial service providers. The system was later expanded to include all stolen 
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5.4 Account Activity  
 
The abuse of existing accounts remains an area of discussion from a conceptual 
standpoint. As the discussion in chapter 2 illustrated, many financial service 
providers reject the inclusion of account takeover as a type of financial identity 
theft. This rejection is predominantely motivated by the desire to exclude such 
incidents from statistical overviews. The argument set forth by the industry 
generally states how account takeover supposedly presents less negative 
consequences to the individual victims in comparison to other forms of financial 
identity theft, especially true name fraud. This is because victims of account 
takeover often manage to retrieve the lost funds. As Heather M. Howard notes 
‘true name fraud’ “…takes a greater toll on its victims than does account theft: 
their financial losses are more substantial, more difficult to discover, and take 
considerably longer to resolve.”967 The importance of the incorporation of 
account takeover rests in its exposure of opportunities in the infrastructure of 
financial services. Moreover, whereas often existing clients receive a refund for the 
lost financial assets, there is still an inconvenient and time consuming process 
involved in response to the problem, especially when the victim lives paycheck to 
paycheck.  
 
5.4.1  United States 
 
Credit and payment card fraud are familiar characters and their presence dates 
back several decades. The section on unsolicited credit cards already provided a 
brief insight into the problems associated with credit cards, and this section 
depicts another dimension of the problem. From a physical perspective, credit and 
payment cards have encountered challenges due to the sensitivity of the black 
magnetic stripe on the back of the card to counterfeiting.968 This is a well known 
vulnerability.  
Other means of facilitation of financial identity theft came about through the 
introduction of Internet banking. The introduction of Internet banking in the 
United States occurred during the end of the previous century. According to the 
GAO, approximately 17 per cent of all banks, savings associations, and credit 
unions in the United States, offered some form of internet banking.969 In total, 20 
per cent of these depository institutions maintained fully transactional websites in 
1999.970 The ability to conduct transactions via the Internet introduced novel 
challenges. The GAO identifies how banking via the Internet heightens a variety 
of previously existing risks including security, transactional, strategic, reputational, 
and compliance risks.971 For financial identity theft, the focus remains on security 
and transactional risks. Security risks, according to the GAO, include “...the risk of 
potential unauthorized access to a depository institution’s networks, systems, and 
databases that could compromise internal systems and customer data and result in 
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financial losses.”972 The study of the GAO in 1999 proved relatively premature 
due to the youthful nature of Internet banking in the United States. Despite the 
narrow number of examinations of depository institutions and problems 
associated with their presence on the Internet, the GAO concludes how “...the 
examinations we reviewed revealed that some depository institutions had not 
taken all the necessary precautions to mitigate on-line banking risks.”973  
Whereas the GAO identifies how regulatory agencies provided guidance to 
depository institutions to mitigate the risks of Internet banking, the 
implementation of Internet banking originally occurred without formal 
interference from the Federal government. According to Anita K. Pennathur, 
“[t]he federal government’s position was that it did want to impose regulation 
prematurely and thereby stifle a process that was still in its infancy.”974 Pennathur 
goes on to quote former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan who 
proclaimed in 1996 how “[i]f we wish to foster financial innovation, we must be 
careful not to impose rules that inhibit it.”975 Advice from the five regulatory 
agencies976 therefore proved to be the next best thing. These agencies offered 
additional guidance on August 8, 2001 through their publication of Authentication in 
an Electronic Banking Environment.977 The primary focus of the guidance was “...on 
risk management controls necessary to authenticate the identity of retail and 
commercial customers accessing Internet-based financial services.”978 The 
guidance emphasized its neutrality toward all technologies and instead highlighted 
the importance of customer verification in an electronic banking environment. 
“An effective authentication system” according to the agencies, “...can help 
financial institutions reduce fraud and promote the legal enforceability of their 
electronic agreements and transactions. Strong customer authentication practices 
also are necessary to enforce anti-money laundering measures and help financial 
institutions detect and reduce identity theft.”979 Overall, the guidance merely 
provides a synopsis of the importance of customer authentication mechanisms. 
Through the guidance, the agencies attempt to encourage and persuade depository 
institutions to re-evaluate existing means of authentication, predominantly the 
single factor username-password, used by most banks in the United States.   
Several years later, in 2004, the FDIC published a study on unauthorized 
access to financial service providers and described in its findings how financial 
service providers should consider a number of steps including upgrading from a 
single factor authentication system to a two factor authentication system.980 The 
FDIC states in its study how “[t]wo-factor authentication is significantly more 
secure than single-factor authentication because the compromise of one factor 
would not be enough to permit a fraudster to access the system and the additional 
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factor (usually a token or biometric identifier) is extremely difficult to 
compromise.”981 Multiple factor authentication mechanisms combine at least two 
types of authentication. These types of authentication are generally divided into 
three categories: 
1. Something the consumer knows  
2. Something the consumer has  
3. Something the consumer is  
 
The majority of banks in the United States appear to rely on a single factor 
authentication composed of something the consumer knows. The FDIC 
acknowledges the vulnerability of such a system especially as a result of the 
proliferation of phishing attacks and the vast usage of malicious software which 
manages to capture the keystrokes entered onto the screen. As a result, the FDIC 
encourages the usage of an additional factor for the authentication of bank clients.    
 The following year, in 2005, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council (FFIEC) issued another guidance. The Authentication in an Internet Banking 
Environment guidance replaced the previously issued guidance. Its additional value 
remains difficult to assess. The FFIEC itself justifies the renewed guidance 
through writing “[s]ince 2001, there have been significant legal and technological 
changes with respect to the protection of customer information; increasing 
incidents of fraud, including identity theft; and the introduction of improved 
authentication technologies.”982 Certainly these reasons are both accurate and 
valid; yet, the approach remains the same. The FFIEC attempts to softly push the 
depository institutions in the appropriate direction and identifies the inadequacy of 
single factor authentication mechanisms. Simultaneously, the Agencies appear to 
contradict themselves when they write the following response to a question listed 
in a frequently asked questions document developed to assist banks in the 
implementation of the guidance. The question posed is whether the guidance 
requires the use of multiple factor authentication, to which the Agencies respond, 
“[n]o, the guidance does not call for the use of multifactor authentication.”983  
Guidance combined with self-regulation proved incomplete for the mitigation 
of risks for banking in an online environment. The idea of and the support for 
self-regulation came under pressure after it became evident how the lack of 
advanced means of security granted perpetrators of financial identity theft the 
opportunity to drain accounts of clients. Certainly, the single factor system offered 
convenience for the clients, but introduced vulnerabilities for them as well. The 
main fear on the side of the banking industry appears to be the potential loss of 
clients as a result of the ‘complexity’ involved in multiple factor authentication 
mechanisms. This fear is not unfounded. Jane M. Kolodinsky et al. demonstrate 
how simplicity is a significant positive factor for consumers to adopt internet 
banking.984  
Accordingly, the focus on access to online services became convenience rather 
than security in the United States. Single-factor authentication of clients became 
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the norm. As the FFIEC notes, single-factor authentication, as the only control 
mechanism, is “…inadequate for high-risk transactions involving access to 
customer information or the movement of funds or parties.”985 A growing body of 
literature clearly states the need for multi-factor authentication and claims that the 
majority of current authentication means used by banks within the digital 
environment are inadequate.986 According to results published by Javelin Strategy 
& Research in 2007, multi-factor authentication (MFA) systems in online channels 
are active in 88% of banks.987 This study, however, only takes into consideration 
the 25 top banks in the United States.   
 Even so, as shall become painfully apparent in section 5.4.2, multiple factor 
authentication systems also remain vulnerable and are, as such, not as difficult to 
compromise as the FDIC stated in its study. Several years ago, when the FFIEC 
published its second guidance for internet banking authentication systems, Bruce 
Schneier labeled two-factor authentication as ‘too little, too late.’988 Schneier 
proclaimed how “[t]wo-factor authentication isn’t our savior. It won’t defend 
against phishing. It’s not going to prevent identity theft. It’s not going to secure 
online accounts from fraudulent transactions. It solves the security problems we 
had 10 years ago, not the security problems we have today.”989  
Besides increased authentication mechanisms to prevent unauthorized account 
access and activity, the financial services industry also incorporates software 
intended to detect fraud based on patterns. These fraud detection mechanisms flag 
suspicious transactions. This can occur through the use of behavior models, where 
the development of a pattern arises through all transactions carried out by the 
account holder. When a transaction fails to fit the pattern, the mechanism flags the 
transaction as suspicious. The main problem with the use of behavior models as a 
means for fraud detection is the potential for a change in the behavior of the 
actual account holder, which means certain transactions are flagged as fraudulent 
while they are indeed legitimate.990  
Another means of fraud detection looks at transactions in a more isolated 
manner through observing other aspects of the transaction. As C. Withrow et al. 
note, “[a] transaction might arouse suspicion if, for example, it is for a large 
amount of money and with a particular type of merchant (e.g. online bookmaker) 
at a certain time of day.”991 Whereas the behavior model uses a fraud detection 
strategy at the account level, the other strategy focuses more on the transaction 
level. Still, neither of these approaches is perfect, and understandably so. Vishal 
Vatsa et al. describe how the employment of rule-based schemes suffer from 
“...the limitation that in a repeated game environment, a fraudster can eventually 
learn the defense mechanism adopted by the FDS.”992  
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5.4.2 The Netherlands 
 
The introduction of transferable money (‘giraal geld’) ended the hegemony of cash 
in the Netherlands. Compared to other countries, the Netherlands joined the 
advances in methods of payment relatively late. The main invention became the 
pinpas, or the debit card, which was introduced in the Netherlands in 1982.993 The 
Gemeentegiro Amsterdam issued giropassen in 1961 which contained the same 
function and look as the later more broadly distributed pinpassen. In the media, the 
introduction of the pinpas proved to be a welcomed alternative since consumers 
simply needed to carry the card and retailers received their money faster than 
through the use of credit cards.994 During the mid-eighties the card obtained a life 
of its own. Whereas its original function was to serve as a means of identification 
when cashing a check, due to the black magnetic stripe on the back of the card 
and the usage of a pin number its functionality grew. First, banks introduced 
automatic teller machines for clients to obtain cash. The second application 
became the ability to use the plastic cards in stores to purchase goods. The pinpas 
maintained an attractive character due to its accessibility. Unlike with credit cards, 
clients did not need to meet an income threshold in order to receive and be able to 
use the card.  
Despite the many advantages, the pinpas also came accompanied with various 
concerns and vulnerabilities. In particular uncomfortability and insecurity along 
with worries about the level of fraud resistance implemented in the card 
dominated the debate of disadvantages.995 Newspaper articles during the late 
eighties expressed considerable concern about the vulnerability to fraud inherent 
in the pinpas system. The Association of Consumer Affairs led the movement. 
Nevertheless, banks and other relevant financial service providers, convinced of 
the benefits, continued to expand the system and issue the cards.996  
During the start of the twenty-first century various incidents rekindled the 
debate about the dangers associated with the more recent methods of payment. 
Most of the reported incidents centered around the duplication of the data from 
the black magnetic stripe on the back of the pinpas (also known as skimming) at 
various locations including, restaurants, gas stations, ATMs. Furthermore, 
perpetrators also managed to use stolen cards and disrupt the delivery of cards to 
their rightful owners. In its yearly overview of 2002, the Dutch Central Bank 
briefly refers to fraud with pinpassen, but also mentions how the number of 
incidents in relation to the overall number of transactions seems to be marginal.997 
Even so, banks introduced additional security measures, as a result of 
recommendations set forth by the Dutch Central Bank after having conducted a 
risk assessment due to the various fraud related incidents involving the pinpas. 
Despite the brief remark issued by the Dutch Central Bank, other sources 
indicate how 2002 became the year citizens and banks in the Netherlands first 
began to encounter serious problems with respect to skimming.998 During 2003 
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and 2004, banks armed their ATMs with anti-skimming devices such as a plastic 
mouthpiece.999 This measurement assisted the achievement of a decrease in 
skimming cases in 2005. Even so, the following year skimming returned when 
Equens, the primary payment processor, received incident complaints.1000 In 2008, 
the Dutch Central Bank yet again identified the increase of skimming cases during 
the previous year.1001 The financial damage caused through skimming incidents 
demonstrated an escalating line during the period from 2005 (1.8 million euros) 
until 2007 (12.1 million euros).1002  
In response to the increase, the Dutch Central Bank referred to its anticipation 
of the introduction of EMV technology. EMV technology, which stands for 
Europay Mastercard Visa, eliminates the usage of the black magnetic stripe and 
instead uses an EMV chip. This measure attacks the vulnerability displayed by the 
black magnetic stripe which proved particularly vulnerable for fraud through the 
ability of perpetrators to copy the information stored on the black stripe, which 
they subsequently managed to place on a blank card.  
While the Dutch Central Bank mentions the introduction of EMV technology 
in response to the 2007 increase, the damage continued to escalate. The following 
year, in 2008, the Dutch Central Bank once again identifies an increase in 
skimming incidents, and even speaks of a ‘considerable’ increase in the number of 
cases.1003 This appears to be because the deadline for the issuance of cards 
equipped with an EMV chip is set for the end of 2010.1004 And, more importantly, 
the compliance data for all ATMs is 2011.1005 Moreover, the Dutch Central Bank 
states how the entire payment traffic system shall use EMV technology in 2013 at 
the latest. As a result, the extensive period of transition provides perpetrators of 
financial identity theft with sufficient time to continue their operations.   
The financial loss over 2009 was 36 million euro. This was an increase of 5 
million in comparison to the previous year. Due to the publication of financial 
losses as a result of skimming, the phenomenon generally dominates the debate 
concerning fraud within the financial services industry. The vulnerabilities are 
physical since perpetrators of account takeover manage to make adjustments to 
the ATM which allow them to obtain the data on the black magnet stripe and also 
capture the pin code needed to drain the accounts.   
Simultaneously, problems with Internet banking are also on the rise. This is 
difficult to detect due to the lack of available information on the actual damages 
suffered as a result of unauthorized access via the Internet to bank accounts. In 
2008, the Dutch Central Bank identified an increase in fraud with regard to 
internet banking, but fails to mention actual figures.1006 These did not come about 
until October 2010, when the Dutch Banking Association finally revealed an 
inside peek into the number of incidents and the financial damage caused by 
Internet banking related fraud. The media story about the data release speaks of a 
significant rise in the number of Internet banking related fraud incidents.1007 This 
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headline is the result of a comparison between the number of incidents in 2009, 
which was 154, and the number of incidents during the first half of 2010, which 
was 541. The financial damage also experienced an increase. The financial loss in 
2009 was 1.9 million euros as opposed to 4.3 million euros during the first half of 
2010. The Dutch Banking Association also took advantage of the release of the 
data to introduce yet another public awareness campaign as a means to reduce the 
crime.    
Problems with Internet banking in the Netherlands came as a bit of a surprise 
since the system actually departed from an emphasis on security rather than 
convenience. Unlike the United States, the Netherlands introduced multiple factor 
authentication mechanisms from the start. Whereas the United States contains 
many financial service providers which use single factor authentication 
mechanisms, most often something the consumer knows (i.e. username and 
password), banks in the Netherlands use a combination of something the 
consumer knows and something the consumer has. When several banks desired to 
use the Internet as a channel for communication and transactions with their 
clients, the Dutch Central Bank immediately expressed its concern about the 
security of such a system and required the banks to implement a mechanism 
which surpassed the mere usage of a username and password.1008 Therefore, the 
major Dutch banks introduced a two-factor authentication system from the start 
in anticipation of the vulnerability associated with a single factor authentication 
system. Wim Hafkamp and René Steenvoorden emphasize this decision when they 
write, “[f]rom the early beginning of Internet direct banking in the Netherlands 
which started somewhere around 1997, security played an important role in the 
architectural design. Authentication of the customer and the integrity of the 
transaction are and were key starting points.”1009 Several banks, including the ING 
Bank, ABN Amro, Fortis and the Rabobank all began to use randomizers 
combined with a password. These randomizers are small tokens which look like 
simple calculators. Randomizers generate random numbers for consumers to enter 
when they try to log on to their account online. In order for consumers to log on 
to their accounts they must insert a username onto the screen. Furthermore, 
consumers must enter their passcode into the randomizer and then enter the 
number which appears on the screen into the randomizer. Subsequently, the 
randomizer generates a number which they must then enter onto the screen 
before they can access their account information.  
A variation of this system uses TAN-codes rather than randomizers. The 
Postbank, which is now part of ING bank, uses this system. Certain other banks 
also require consumers to insert their debit card into the randomizer before the 
device is activated. In May 2010, the ING bank removed the need for the 
randomizer for Internet banking and shifted over to the usage of username and 
password for entry into the system. To carry out transactions, on the other hand, 
consumers receive tan-codes via text messages to their mobile phones. When 
consumers are not in a possession of a mobile phone, they receive the TAN-codes 
via regular mail.    
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The security of two-factor authentication mechanisms has been prone to 
skepticism once incidents began to arise. After incidents of identity theft surfaced 
about the use of online banking in Belgium in October 2007, the Dutch 
Association for Banking stated how, “[o]nline banking in the Netherlands is 
safe.”1010 Cases of identity theft through misuse of online banking services only 
happen incidentally. A representative of the Association also states how the Dutch 
online banking system seems to be one of the most secure systems in the world. 
Both the Association and the Dutch Consumer Union claim how many times 
incidents of identity theft occur after successful social engineering attacks which 
manage to fool the consumer, which means the banks do not play a facilitating 
role in the incident.1011  
The occurrence of man-in-the-browser (MITB) attacks exposed the 
vulnerabilities of Internet banking in the Netherlands. As Hafkamp and 
Steenvoorden note, “[d]espite the use of strong authentication banks in the 
Netherlands were faced with serious, sophisticated malware-attacks against their 
Internet direct banking applications since the beginning of 2007.”1012 Despite the 
level of security offered by banks in the Netherlands, sophisticated perpetrators of 
financial identity theft still managed to drain bank accounts of clients. The MITB 
attack circumvents the two-factor authentication means through placing the 
perpetrator between the client and the bank. This occurs through the use of 
Trojan horses. Whereas perpetrators of traditional phishing attacks develop 
fraudulent websites to obtain the credentials of clients, victims of MITB attacks 
actually arrive at the legitimate website of their financial service provider. Yet, 
through interjecting themselves between the client and the bank, perpetrators 
manage to receive the communication from both sides. The threat of MITB 
attacks is strengthened through the ability of perpetrators to manipulate both the 
communication as well as the presentation layer. The feedback option used by 
banks therefore becomes irrelevant since perpetrators also manage to manipulate 
the information provided to the clients. This means clients cannot detect the 
fraudulent transactions through the feedback they receive from the ‘bank.’   
The success of MITB became evident when 200 clients of the ABN Amro 
bank downloaded an executable file which installed a Trojan horse on their 
computers which subsequently compromised the browser to become the man-in-
the-middle. Perpetrators managed to drain the accounts of the clients (see section 
3.2.2).  
To respond to the enhanced threat against the Internet banking system in the 
Netherlands, banks have responded in both an individual and a collaborative way. 
Hafkamp and Steenvoorden categorize these responses into four categories 
including secure the channel, educate the consumer, clean the Internet, and 
monitor transactions. In order to secure the channel, banks have tried to introduce 
variations on the existing authentication mechanisms. This occurs through 
changes in the dialogue. This can come about through additional means of 
verification such as the use of text message via mobile phones or adding 
challenge-response options to the randomizer which asks clients to verify the 
                                                
1010  ‘Internetbankieren is veilig in Nederland’ (2007). Available at:  
http://www.nu.nl/news/1265153/50/rss/%27Internetbankieren_in_Nederland_is_veilig%27.html 
(last accessed on July 5, 2010).  
1011  Ibid.  
1012  Hafkamp & Steenvoorden (2009): 165.  
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amount entered or the account number of the recipient of the transaction.1013 As 
noted above, the ING bank decided to change its system and introduce a  single 
factor authentication for the login process, which means clients who simply want 
to look at their bank account details no longer need an additional means of 
authentication. In order to carry out transactions, on the other hand, the bank 
sends TAN codes via text messages or regular mail, which is a different ‘channel.’  
The second type of response to the increased threat is consumer education 
which is largely the result of a cooperative effort between banks and the Dutch 
Banking Association in the Netherlands. This cooperative effort resulted in the 
consumer awareness campaign 3x kloppen which means knocking three times and 
explains to clients how to check three aspects including the security of their 
computer, the URL of the bank, and the entered payments. The effectiveness of 
this response seems limited due to the inability of consumers to observe the 
presence of Trojan horses and as such the occurrence of MITB attacks.  
The third response is to clean the Internet. This response category includes 
actions such as the attempt to eliminate drop zones. Drop zones are criminal 
owned servers which collect information from infected computers. In the same 
category, Hafkamp and Steenvoorden also note how “[i]n the beginning of 2009 
Banks in the Netherlands jointly developed a service to detect malware threats on 
the Internet and to respond quickly in the event that a bank is hit by malware.”1014 
The last type of countermeasure is transaction monitoring which receives 
substantial attention, especially since the industry believes how such analyses can 
expose unusual patterns in an effort to prevent identity theft before its occurrence 
(see section 5.4.1).1015 
The evolution of other applications also deserves a brief moment of reflection. 
The Rabobank in the Netherlands offers the option to make payments via mobile 
phones.1016 To participate in the mobile banking application of the Rabobank, 
participants need a mobile phone which supports a secure internet connection. 
The mobile phone application provides for electronic transfers with a maximum 
of 300 euros and a maximum of a 1000 euros per week. Payments above 300 
euros in a single transaction can only be completed through the usage of the 
random reader. The combined use of the mobile phone and the random readers 
allows for an electronic transfer with a maximum of 50,000 euros. The mobile 
payments system only allows electronic transfers to accounts which have been 
engaged in transfers during the last fifteen months. If a participant desires to make 
an electronic transfer to an unknown account, the participant must engage the 
random reader for its completion. The mobile banking application also allows 
participants to check their account balance.1017 
Just as the Rabobank allows its clients to engage in mobile banking, the bank 
also provides an application for mobile payments. This application allows 
participants to make payments through the use of the mobile phone number of 
the other person. This service is not restricted to Rabobank clients and is available 
to anyone in the Netherlands with a mobile phone and a bank account. Basically, 
                                                
1013  Ibid.  
1014  Ibid: 167.  
1015  Ibid. 
1016  See for general information: 
http://www.rabobank.nl/particulieren/producten/modern_bankieren/via_mobiele_telefoon/rabo_m
obielbankieren.html 
1017  The first 52 times within one year are free.  
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mobile payments allow participants to install a mobile wallet. The participant then 
deposits money into the wallet and can make payments or purchase goods through 




As indicated in the introduction financial service providers generally play a vital 
role in the facilitation of financial identity theft. This is primarily evident through 
the facilitation of the second stage of the crime by financial service providers. 
Such facilitation can occur during different moments of interaction between the 
perpetrator and the financial service provider. During the acquisition process, 
perpetrator may take advantage of marketing instruments which endanger 
consumers due to the emphasis on convenience rather than security. This became 
evident through the background analysis of the credit card industry in the United 
States. The description of the United States demonstrated the crucial transition of 
the credit card from an instrument of the upper-middle class down to a tool for 
the masses. This transition required the industry to engage in serious competition 
over prospective clients. Such competition occurred through the introduction of 
aggressive marketing techniques involving low-threshold application methods, if 
any, which exposed consumers to vulnerabilities of financial identity theft. The 
apparent focus on competition and financial profit overshadowed the security 
concerns associated with these practices. Whereas officials from the industry 
proved aware of the complications, they prioritized the acquisition of clients and 
the potential for maximization of profits.  
In contrast to the United States and its relationship with credit cards, the 
Netherlands demonstrates an entirely different story. In a country where the 
banking industry provides sufficient alternatives in the area of methods of 
payment, Dutch consumers never appeared to be attracted to the idea of credit 
which meant the credit card failed to obtain a similar level of popularity. This is an 
important distinction between the United States and the Netherlands since the 
exposure of potential dangers due to aggressive marketing techniques introduced 
by the credit card industry remained absent in the Netherlands.  
 Besides the acquisition process, the application process also proved a vital 
business practice with regard to the potential facilitation of financial identity theft. 
For credit cards, the application process, where the credit card companies must 
verify the identity of the prospective clients, has been reduced to a mere formality. 
The importance of the application process for banks extends beyond the potential 
for financial identity theft and also concerns other potential abuses of the financial 
sector. Prime examples include tax evasion, money laundering and terrorist 
financing which have all played a role in the development of the legislation which 
governs the manner through which banks conduct their application processes.  
 The role of consumer reporting agencies in the application process also 
became apparent. The release of a credit report occurs with relative ease in the 
United States which facilitates financial identity theft since financial service 
providers generally consider such a report an essential aspect of the verification 
process. The historical evolution of consumer reporting agencies demonstrates the 
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near neglect for consumers and their rights. This is in contrast to the treatment of 
consumers by the Dutch credit registration bureau which grants consumers rights 
without the need for governmental interference. Moreover, BKR recognized its 
integral position in the credit granting process and voluntarily became part of a 
fraud prevention tool development.   
 On the account activity front, both the United States and the Netherlands 
encountered challenges as a result of the vulnerability to fraud of the black 
magnetic stripe. This vulnerability occupies a dominant place in the debate on 
account takeover in the Netherlands, especially as financial damage continues to 
escalate. Besides the physical vulnerabilities, Internet banking activities also 
increased the presence of suitable targets for account takeover. The banks in the 
United States demonstrated an emphasis on convenience through the 
implementation of single-factor authentication. The Netherlands instead provided 
for a more balanced approach between security and convenience through the 
introduction of a two-factor authentication system. Nevertheless, the arrival of 
MITB attacks exposed vulnerabilities which prove difficult to mitigate. Unlike 
traditional phishing attacks, clients are less likely, if at all, to detect the man in the 
browser. Bruce Schneier anticipated the vulnerabilities associated with the two-
factor authentication mechanisms in 2005 when he wrote, “[e]arly adopters of this 
technology may very well experience a significant drop in fraud for a while as 
attackers move to easier targets, but in the end there will be a negligible drop in 
the amount of fraud and identity theft.”1019 As a result, the continuous 
advancements made by perpetrators with respect to their methods have engaged 
the financial industry into a rat race which challenges banks to maintain an 
acceptable balance between security and user convenience. The best state of affairs 
then to achieve appears to be reasonable insecurity.1020    
                                                
1019  Schneier (2005).  








6  Consumers 
 
 
On July 27, 2009, the Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands launched a large 
public awareness campaign to prevent citizens from falling victim to 
cybercrime.1021 During five weeks, the campaign which features a fictional 
character ‘Sandra’, was seen on television and heard on the radio. In the 
commercial used for the campaign, Sandra reveals all. Her bank account number, 
pin code, log-in name, and video tapes of her holiday at the beach are made 
public. Sandra herself watches and listens as people gather on the street to witness 
the publication of all her information. She appears flabbergasted. She is the perfect 
depiction of the unaware and naïve citizen. Security on the Internet, the campaign 
claims, is in your hands.1022 To consider consumers, or citizens, as facilitators of 
financial identity theft is controversial, especially since such considerations 
maintain the potential to enter a slippery slope into the realm of blaming the 
victim. As a result, this chapter features a different approach from the previous 
three due to its more normative character as a means to make a contribution to 
the ongoing discussion on consumers as facilitators of financial identity theft. The 
ongoing discussion focuses primarily on the degree to which consumers maintain 
both the ability and responsibility to ‘prevent’ or at least reduce the risk of 
financial identity theft. Fred H. Cate describes how the most basic privacy 
protection is personal judgment and how the vital role of consumers in privacy 
protection is mostly ignored in discussions about the topic.1023 Cate uses this 
notion to expand his argument and claims how the actions of individuals may 
provide the best defense against identity theft. “Despite all of the bills that have 
been introduced to combat identity theft, many of the most effective means 
continue to be those that individuals take to protect themselves: keeping a close 
watch on account activity; reporting suspicious or unfamiliar transactions 
promptly; properly destroying commercial solicitations; storing valuable 
documents securely; protecting account names and passwords; and never 
disclosing personal information to unknown callers.”1024 The research results 
provided by Javelin Strategy & Research (see section 1.1.2) are in turn used as a 
means to substantiate this argument.   
The advice offered to consumers and the argument set forth about the ability 
of consumers to reduce the risk of financial identity theft receives resistance. 
Daniel Solove rejects the general advice provided by Cate and others about the 
correlation between individual action and identity theft risk reduction. In 
particular, Solove states how even if individuals did take all steps advised to them, 
significant risk reduction still fails to occur.1025 This lack of significant risk 
reduction is due to the actions of both the public and the private sector, which 
play a more prominent role in the facilitation of financial identity theft, accordinG
                                                
1021  See http://www.nederlandveilig.nl/veiliginternetten/ 
1022  In Dutch the slogan is: “veilig internetten heb je zelf in de hand.”  
1023  Cate, F. H. (2001). The Privacy Paradox. 76th Annual Winter Newspaper Institute North Carolina Press  
Association.  
1024  Ibid: 9.  
1025  Solove, D. J. (2003). Identity Theft and the Architecture of Vulnerability. Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 
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to Solove. Others support this notion.1026 In the overall problem, consumers are 
victims rather than facilitators. Their share in the enablement of the problem is 
minimal, if existent at all. Certain sources even consider the emphasis on 
individual responsibility a mere political strategy to divert the attention away from 
the ‘actual’ facilitators.1027 A similar sentiment is echoed by Marron when she 
states: “[t]he problem becomes pitched not as one of systemic institutional 
culpability, but as lack of awareness on the part of individuals.”1028 According to 
Deborah Stone stories of ‘inadvertent cause’ are common in social policy.1029 
Individuals ‘cause’ many problems such as poverty, malnutrition, and disease, 
because they fail to understand the harmful effects of their willful actions. 
“Inadvertence here is ignorance;” Stone writes, and “the consequences are 
predictable by experts but unappreciated by those taking the actions. These stories 
are soft (liberal) versions of blaming the victim: if the person with the problem 
only changed his or her behavior, the problem would not exist.”1030 This chapter 
aims to provide a more comprehensive perspective on the potential facilitation of 
financial identity theft by consumers in an effort to add another dimension to the 
existing discussion on consumer ability and responsibility. The chapter 
commences with a brief overview of consumers as victims, which is based on 
limited research conducted to evaluate the correlation between demographics and 
the likelihood of victimization. Subsequently, through a categorization of types of 
consumer facilitation, this chapter aims to differentiate and demonstrate how the 
evolution of the methods used by perpetrators has led to a crucial expansion of 
ways to take advantage of consumers, and how the consumer’s ability to actively 
control the facilitation process is slowly, but surely, diminishing. Since this is a 
general, or rather ‘global’ trend, no distinction is made between the United States 
and the Netherlands in contrast to the previous chapters.   
 
6.1 Consumers as Victims 
 
To develop a better understanding about the likelihood of consumers falling 
victim to financial identity theft, previous research aimed to unravel patterns with 
respect to the demographics of victims. These patterns do not imply nor provide 
any information on facilitating factors in themselves, but they do provide, or at 
least could provide, information on what makes certain consumers more 
vulnerable to financial identity theft. Research to explore which demographic 
characteristics make someone more likely to become a victim of financial identity 
theft is comparable to research conducted to unravel which individuals are more 
likely to get cancer or another potentially fatal disease. These risk factors, as a 
result, are not facilitating factors in the traditional sense as discussed throughout 
the chapter. Yet, they do play a role in financial identity theft and as such deserve 
attention. These factors are particularly interesting and relevant for all parties, 
                                                
1026  See for example Hoofnagle, C. J. (2005). ‘Putting Identity Theft on Ice: Freezing Credit Reports to 
Prevent Lending to Impostors,’ in A. Chander, L. Gelman, M. J. Radin (eds.) Securing Privacy in the 
Internet Age. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
1027  Whitson, J. R. & K. D. Haggerty (2008). Identity theft and the care of the virtual self. Economy and 
Society, Vol. 37 (4): 572 – 594.    
1028  Marron, D. (2008). “Alter Reality” Governing the Risk of Identity Theft. British Journal of Crime and 
Criminology, Vol. 48 (1): 29.  
1029  Stone, D. A. (1989). Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas. Political Science Quarterly, 
Vol. 104 (2).  
1030  Ibid: 286.  
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rather than consumers alone. To return to the comparison with fatal diseases, 
doctors are more likely to pay attention to patients with particular characteristics 
which could increase the risk of, for example, cancer. As such governments and 
businesses, including financial service providers, could target the relevant 
consumers and perhaps provide them with more specialized assistance. David 
Adam Friedman, for example, describes various approaches to consumer 
protection one of which is defining a protected consumer group which “...is 
significantly different. Instead of racing to beat the next big scam and attempting 
to solve the fraud problem for the entire population, it carves out a category of 
consumers and provides that group with heightened protection. Policymakers may 
select a group according to any of three criteria: unique vulnerability, reticence to 
report victimization, or susceptibility to specific schemes.”1031 Friedman foresees a 
lot of potential in selecting one group for ‘hyper-protection.’   
Information on the demographics of victims is limited. Keith B. Anderson 
conducted a study to analyze whether certain citizens are indeed more likely to 
become victims of identity theft.1032 For his study, Anderson used the information 
contained in the Consumer Sentinel database maintained by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC). This contains data on consumer victims who filed a 
complaint with the FTC. While Anderson initially acknowledges how “[o]ne does 
not do something to become a victim – it just happens to you”1033, he also 
describes how “…a little deeper reflection suggests that this is really not the case. 
The risks faced by consumers do differ, and these differences may manifest 
themselves in differences across groups with different demographic 
characteristics.”1034  Without trying to blame the victim, Anderson identifies a 
number of factors which may increase the likelihood of identity theft victimization 
for certain consumers. He predicts that factors such as having a good credit 
record, engaging in more transactions, and having a higher income level may make 
a consumer more likely to fall victim to identity theft. Furthermore, Anderson also 
identifies the potential correlation between falling victim to identity theft and the 
place where a consumer does business and the victim’s household composition. 
Anderson concludes in his study that “[t]he likelihood that a person will be a 
victim of identity theft does appear to be related to demographics.”1035 He 
identifies the following relevant demographic characteristics in particular: level of 
income, education, gender, age and household composition. The results 
furthermore indicate how the elderly run a lower risk to become victims of 
identity theft, but that households with only one adult are more likely to be 
victimized.  
Other authors focus on specific groups in connection to identity theft to 
differentiate between vulnerabilities1036, whereas Gina W. Lane aimed to unravel 
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Commission, Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 279. 
1033  Ibid: 11.  
1034  Ibid.  
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demographic and geographical patterns of identity theft. Her results confirm 
previous results which demonstrate higher incidence rates of identity theft in 
Southwestern states and lower incidence rates in New England and the Northern 
Plains States.1037 Moreover, Lane writes how “…identity theft appears to maintain 
the well-documented regional patterns of traditional larceny and theft crimes, thus 
indicating that geographically independent digital opportunities do not appear to 
eradicate the importance of place in criminal patterns.”1038 
 
6.2 Consumer Facilitation 
 
6.2.1 ‘Voluntary’ Facilitation 
  
The term ‘voluntary’ is problematic because its usage within the current context 
can lead to misguided interpretations. Voluntary facilitation here mainly refers to 
information dispersion which is unprompted by the perpetrator. The term is 
mainly used to indicate the distinction between the current and the subsequent 
categories of facilitation, and does not carry any normative implications. The 
voluntary exposure of consumers’ personal information can facilitate the first 
stage of financial identity theft. Perpetrators have developed methods to take 
advantage of such exposure. Among the most infamous methods is dumpster 
diving. Basically, unsuspecting consumers toss out various documents containing 
sensitive personal information. Perpetrators become aware of this and start 
rummaging through garbage cans in search of these documents. Many times, one 
document does not contain all of the necessary information, but perpetrators 
combine different pieces of garbage to complete the picture. Several years ago, 
receipts still contained valuable information including the full credit card and 
account number, which proved to be an attractive source for perpetrators. Overall, 
consumers would unwittingly and voluntarily present perpetrators with their 
valuable personal information. Dumpster diving, as a method, took advantage of 
the voluntary and active participation of consumers. Certain sources reemphasize 
the importance of this type of facilitation due to a marketing interest. Or, as 
indicated in chapter 1, an interest held by the sponsors of select survey 
research.1039   
 More recently, perpetrators have managed to take advantage in similar ways 
from consumers who dispose of old computers, which contain, yet again, valuable 
personal information. Even if consumers believe they have cleared their hard drive 
of all data, they are often wrong. The data erased on their hard drive can easily be 
recovered by perpetrators. Various authors acknowledge this vulnerability.1040 
There are, however, other ways consumers ‘expose’ their personal information. 
Social networking sites such as Facebook and MySpace provide the ideal outlet to 
let everyone know nearly everything about oneself. Perpetrators could exploit the 
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availability of information through these outlets. Howard Rush et al. describe how 
due to their popularity social networking sites have become appealing places for 
perpetrators of cybercrime.1041 This is due to a number of reasons. In addition to 
the vast amounts of personal information available on social networking sites, they 
also offer perpetrators of cybercrime the ability to use the sites to spread malware, 
spam, and scams on a massive scale. Furthermore, social networking sites are 
turning into an attractive marketplace for recruitment.1042 With respect to social 
networking sites, academic researchers have expressed interest in user concerns, or 
rather a lack thereof, with regard to privacy and trust. As Ralph Gross & 
Alessandro Acquisti have concluded “[i]n our study of more than 4,000 CMU 
users of the Facebook…we have shown how unconcerned its users appear to 
privacy risks: while personal data is generously provided, limiting privacy 
preferences are hardly used; only a small number of members change the default 
privacy preferences, which are set to maximize the visibility of users profiles.”1043 
Others also recognize how despite measures of self-censorship, the majority of 
users still share a large amount of personal information on Facebook.1044 This 
willingness to share personal information surpasses the area of social networking 
sites. Through an experiment, Jens Grossklags & Acquisti demonstrate how 
“...most subjects happily accepted to sell their personal information even for just 
25 cents, and virtually all subjects waived the option to shield their 
information.”1045 These various pieces of academic research along with the general 
perception of both the public and the private sector develop an image of the 
‘careless’ consumer.  
Leyla Bilge et al. furthermore add significant insights to the potential 
facilitation of financial identity theft through  users of social networking sites.1046 
Through the presentation of an experiment which includes automated social 
engineering attacks, Bilge et al. demonstrate how perpetrators of financial identity 
theft can access personal information maintained on profiles of users. This occurs 
through, for example, profile cloning where perpetrators ‘clone’ the profiles of 
authentic users and request to be added as a friend. Perpetrators send these 
requests to the social network of the ‘cloned’ individual rather than to random 
strangers. From the experiment of profile cloning, Bilge et al. conclude how “...the 
friendship acceptance rate for the forged profiles was over 60% for all the forged 
accounts (in one case, being as high as 90%). The acceptance rate from unknown 
users was constantly below 30%...These results confirm that by forging profiles, 
an attacker can achieve a higher degree of success in establishing contacts with 
honest users than when using fictitious accounts.”1047 Based on the results of their 
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experimental research, Bilge et al. provide suggestions for improvements of 
security on social networking sites. In their suggestions, the authors acknowledge 
how users continue to be the weakest link but improved security requires the 
involvement of the social networking sites. Bilge et al. provide the 
recommendation for social networking sites to provide more information on the 
authenticity of the friend request and the user who initiated the request.1048   
Whereas Bilge et al. direct suggestions toward the sites as opposed to the users, 
James Grimmelman focuses on the users.1049 Grimmelman states how “[i]t’s 
temptingly easy to pin the blame for these problems entirely on Facebook. Easy—
but wrong. Facebook isn’t a privacy carjacker, forcing its victims into 
compromising situations. It’s a carmaker, offering its users a flexible, valuable, 
socially compelling tool. Its users are the ones ghost riding the privacy whip, 
dancing around on the roof as they expose their personal information to the 
world.”1050 Grimmelman therefore argues in favor of an educational approach 
which specifically targets users of social networking sites in an effort to help 
understand the risks associated with the exposure of their personal information. 
Even so, the usage and retention of personal information, provided by users to 
Facebook, by Facebook is a topic of heated discussion. Especially the original 
ability to delete an account proved problematic for users.1051 Facebook only 
provided users with the ability to deactivate the account rather than complete 
deletion. The alternative for users was to individually delete each profile element. 
Facebook responded to the criticism and eased the account deletion procedure for 
users wanting to part with the social networking site.1052 Other problems 
nevertheless continued since Facebook ‘shares’ information received from users 
with third parties. This occurs when users install Facebook applications or gadgets. 
Adrienne Felt and David Evans write how “[w]hen Jane installs a Facebook 
application, the application is given the ability to see anything that Jane can see. 
This means that the application can request information about Jane, her friends, 
and her fellow network members. The owner of the application is free to collect, 
look at, and potentially misuse this information.”1053 The Canadian Internet Policy 
and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) filed a complaint against Facebook in 2008 
alleging 22 separate violations of Canadian privacy law.1054 These violations 
included Facebook’s failure to inform users of how Facebook discloses their 
personal information to third parties for advertising and other profit-making 
activities, and Facebook’s failure to obtain permission from its users for such uses 
and disclosures of the personal information of its members.1055 The user outrage 
did not occur until the following year when Facebook made changes to its terms 
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of service which led to increased media attention about the practices of the social 
networking site.1056 Facebook changed the terms of service and deleted a provision 
which allowed members to remove their content at any time. Moreover, the new 
language added to the terms of service stated how Facebook would retain the 
content and licenses of users even after they terminated their accounts.1057 
More problems began to accumulate for Facebook when the website decided 
to engage in a round of changes to its privacy policies. The Electronic Privacy 
Information Center (EPIC) filed a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) complaint 
when Facebook redefined much of the information provided by its members as 
‘publicly available information.’1058 Facebook responded to the criticism and 
announced how “[i]n the coming weeks, we will add privacy controls that are 
much simpler to use. We will also give you an easy way to turn off all third-party 
services.”1059 
The importance of the current dispute over Facebook and its treatment of the 
information provided by its members is the distribution of responsibility with 
respect to the ‘exposure’ of personal information. The line between consumer as 
opposed to business facilitation becomes blurry and this in turn also influences the 
judgment about the ‘facilitator.’ For if perpetrators obtain the information from a 
third party which said third party obtained from a Facebook profile page, who 
facilitates? This is an important argument in particular because consumer 
awareness primarily focuses on this type of consumer facilitation, the voluntary 
information dispersion. From the ‘old fashioned’ method of dumpster diving to 
the more innovative method of perusing social networking sites, the argument 
goes that perpetrators cleverly take advantage of both the ‘carelessness’ and the 
‘cluelessness’ of consumers. This is certainly the area over which consumers have 
a sense of ‘control’ and an area in which consumer awareness may at least have 
some success. This category indicates how, especially as consumers become more 
knowledgeable about the dangers present in contemporary society, there is at least 
some room for improvement with regard to reducing consumer facilitation. In 
contrast, the subsequent two categories begin to demonstrate a shift with regard to 
consumer control and the level of voluntary involvement on the part of 
consumers.  
 
6.2.2 Social Engineering  
 
When consumers do not provide the information voluntarily or unprompted, 
perpetrators themselves have to hunt for it. And they have managed to do so 
rather well. In contemporary society, phishing has become a well-known concept, 
especially among those involved in various areas related to digital technology. The 
underlying principle of phishing, which is gaining personal information through 
social engineering techniques, is far from new. As Hiep Dang notes, “[w]hether it’s 
called social engineering, trickery, confidence tricks, cognitive biases, or scams, the 
concept of exploiting a person’s naivety and trust is as prevalent today as it has 
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been since the dawn of time.”1060 The craft of the con artist has always been 
present and used for a variety of criminal activities. Before the Internet 
domination, perpetrators used more traditional means such as calling and ringing 
doorbells trying to obtain valuable information. Kevin Mitnick, one of the most 
‘infamous social engineers’ in the modern era, carefully outlines how con artists 
used more ‘old-fashioned’ social engineering techniques, such as calling, to obtain 
valuable information from businesses.1061 Through the art of persuasion, con 
artists successfully managed to convince employees of various corporations to 
surrender pivotal business information, including passwords.1062 The ultimate art 
used by perpetrators is to convince the target, whether a business or a consumer, 
that they are someone else, someone trustworthy. The Internet provided and 
continues to provide perpetrators with the ideal platform to update their old 
techniques and to more efficiently target consumers. The variety of ways 
perpetrators incorporated social engineering techniques on the Internet is rather 
impressive, even during the early days. Special Agent Riley described how “[o]ne 
of the most popular things to do to get people to give up their personal 
information is to offer credit card accounts at a very, very low interest rate, such as 
4.9 or 5.9 percent.”1063 Perpetrators developed websites to offer credit card 
accounts in search of personal information. Riley offers another example when 
she describes how “[i]n addition to the credit card applications themselves, several 
others of the schemes that are available out there right now include credit rescue 
operations where pages, again, using very high-quality graphics are made to look 
legitimate and offer the ability for you to wipe out any credit problems you have 
simply, again, by providing all of your personal financial information.”1064 
Especially during the early days of the Internet, consumer awareness about 
potential fraud schemes was severely absent. Perpetrators gratefully managed to 
take advantage of this absence.  
The first actual phishing ‘attacks’ differed greatly from their current 
counterparts. The term phishing entered the circuit in 1996 when hackers 
managed to get unsuspecting America On-line (AOL) users to reveal their 
passwords. With their passwords, the hackers could gain free internet access. Since 
then, phishing has become an attractive profit making strategy for various 
individuals involved in financial identity theft. The online banking system became 
a source of revenue for perpetrators. Especially consumers in the United States 
proved both an easy and an attractive target due to universality of the English 
language and the one-factor authentication system most often used for online 
banking. Phishing emails sent to Dutch consumers, on the other hand, appeared 
suspicious from the start. In particular, an infamous email sent by perpetrators 
posing as the Postbank, formerly one of the main Dutch banks. The phishing 
emails sent in name of the Postbank made the mistake of using the opening Lieve 
Postbankklant, which directly translates into “Dear Postbankclient,” except the dear 
used in the phishing emails is reserved for letters written to close friends and loved 
                                                
1060  Dang, H. (2008). The Origins of Social Engineering. McAfee Security Journal: 8. 
1061  Mitnick, K., Simon, W. & S. Wozniak (2002). The art of deception: controlling the human element of security.  
Indianapolis, IN: John Wiley & Sons. 
1062  Ibid.  
1063  Riley, M. (1998). Statement to the U.S. Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government  
Information of the Committee on the Judiciary. The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, Hearing,  
May 20, 1998 (Serial 105 - 779): 7.  
1064  Ibid: 8.  
CONSUMERS     199 
 
 
ones. Furthermore, the email mainly uses the informal “you” (je), similar in 
German du and in Spanish tu as opposed to the more formal and more appropriate 
u, or in German Sie and Spanish usted, which is a direct sign that there is something 
out of the ordinary going on. The initial attack led some clients to click on the link 
and as such the bank was forced to replace usernames, passwords and TAN codes. 
This also occurred in other European countries. As Dirro & Kolberg note, “[i]n 
the early days, messages were composed in a crude German notation that looked 
like it was an English or a Russian text translated by Babel Fish. That’s probably 
what happened.”1065 
As information on phishing attacks began to grow, perpetrators also expanded 
and sophisticated their methods. Ram Dantu et al. describe how the nature of 
phishing attacks changed over time.1066 Whereas initial attacks were passive such 
as password guessing and eavesdropping, more recent attacks are active through 
the employment of Trojans, traffic interception, and the adoption of social 
engineering techniques. The introduction of phishing as a vehicle to commit 
financial identity theft led to research on consumer behavior and phishing 
detectability.1067 Both academic and non-academic researchers aimed to analyze 
the awareness of consumers with regard to phishing attacks and their ability to 
recognize phishing emails. Rachna Dhamija et al. conducted a usability study to 
determine which phishing strategies proved successful.1068 The best phishing 
website managed to fool 90% of the participants through its incorporation of 
padlock in content, Verisign logo and certificate validation seal, and a consumer 
alert warning. As the authors note, “…the indicators of trust presented by the 
browser are trivial to spoof. By using very simple spoofing attacks, such as 
copying images of browser chrome or the SSL indicators in the address bar or 
status bar, we were able to fool even our most careful and knowledgeable 
users.”1069 This is a crucial development with regard to consumer facilitation and 
the perception held by society about such facilitation. The media, along with 
policy makers and business professionals, often refer to popular research 
conducted by, for example, Javelin Strategy & Research.1070 Javelin concluded how 
consumer awareness of phishing is high. Such a conclusion paints a deceiving 
picture of the relationship between phishing awareness and consumer ability. 
Basically, through proclaiming a high consumer awareness of phishing, Javelin 
allows the remainder of society to believe consumers can resist the phishing threat. 
And have the means to do so. This is a misleading conclusion. Awareness may be 
high but actual ability to detect a phishing email, especially of the sophisticated 
kind, appears low as indicated by Dhamija et al.1071  
Overall, perpetrators have successfully managed to eliminate many of the early 
pitfalls including sloppy language and overly obvious signs of unprofessional 
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communication. Instead, they currently manage to imitate businesses and other 
organizations to the point that they can fool many, if not most, consumers. Dantu 
et al. acknowledge how “[t]he major factors in any phishing attack are forgery and 
social engineering. No matter how many authentication techniques we develop, 
phishers always adapt.”1072 Others, however, disagree. Michael Barrett states how 
he believes “...phishing is a completely preventable crime when you combine 
technology with education. Our anti-phishing efforts with Yahoo over a 10 month 
period prevented more than 85 million phishing emails from ever reaching the 
intended victim. And if we can teach end users some simple rules, it will have a big 
impact.”1073 Xun Dong et al., on the other hand, reject the value of user education 
as a means to ‘prevent’ successful phishing attacks or to solve the problem.1074 
This rejection is based on the awareness of Dong et al. that “...to discover the 
mismatches when metadata is spoofed requires extra tools and knowledge which 
most users simply don’t have and should not be expected to have. It is the system 
designers’ responsibility to ensure information displayed on the user interface is 
resistant enough against most spoofing attacks, especially the meta-data.”1075 
Others recognize value in user education, but criticize the ways through which 
such education is currently administered.1076  
 
6.2.3 ‘Involuntary’ Facilitation 
 
The increased sophistication of phishing proved to be a foreshadowing of a 
progression into the ‘involuntary’ state of consumer facilitation. The incorporation 
of social engineering techniques still heavily relied on the voluntary participation 
of consumers to surrender their personal information. Such reliance is far from 
desirable for perpetrators. As a result, perpetrators managed to develop means to 
benefit from consumer facilitation without the need for their active participation. 
While previously introduced methods have not disappeared, the turn to 
sophisticated methods of involuntary and passive facilitation certainly influences 
the means, or lack thereof, of consumer control. As Jennifer Lynch notes, 
“...recent phishing attacks have become more sophisticated and involve 
technological devices that may be beyond the ken of even relatively savvy 
consumers. Some of these attacks, such as those that automatically change a 
recipient’s hostfile, do not even require any action to be taken by the consumer, so 
she would be hard-pressed to educate herself on how best to protect herself from 
this type of attack.”1077 The main drive behind involuntary consumer facilitation is 
the presence of botnets. According to various authors, botnets have become the 
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largest security threat in contemporary society.1078 Phillip Hunter explains how 
“[i]ndeed one of the reasons for the botnet becoming the number one security 
threat lies not in the innovation of its method of recruitment or attack, but in its 
resistance to defence.”1079 Other authors echo similar concerns.1080 Its other main 
attractive feature is its speed. Botnets are “...networks of infected end-hosts, called 
bots, that are under the control of a human operator commonly known as 
botmaster. While botnets recruit vulnerable machines using methods also utilized 
by other classes of malware…their defining characteristic is the use of command 
and control (C&C) channels.”1081 Through these channels, the botmasters can 
send out commands to their ‘botarmies.’ The creation of botarmies is surprisingly 
easy. Nicholas Ianelli & Aaron Hackworth describe how creating a botnet only 
requires minimal technical skill.1082 This is predominantly a result of the assistance 
of the underground community. The community is more than willing to share its 
vast knowledge through a variety of channels. Seasoned perpetrators, for example, 
provide training sessions and advice to newcomers through Internet Relay 
Channels (IRC).1083 Through the spread of knowledge, seasoned perpetrators can 
assist in the increasing growth of botnets around the world. The growth leads to a 
greater challenge for detecting and subsequently taking down botnets.  
 Botnets have various goals which fall into three categories, information 
dispersion, information harvesting and information processing. With regard to 
financial identity theft, information harvesting and information dispersion are the 
most relevant goals. Julian B. Grizzard et al. describe how “…information 
dispersion includes sending out spam, creating denial of service attacks, providing 
false information from illegally controlled sources, etc. The goal of information 
harvesting includes obtaining identity data, financial data, password data, 
relationship data (i.e., email addresses of friends), and any other type of data 
available on the host.”1084  
Botmasters create botarmies through the deployment of malware. Perpetrators 
can manipulate the installation of malware through a variety of channels. They can 
seduce consumers into downloading an executable file through, for example, a 
phishing attack or they can send the malware along with another download. More 
recently, perpetrators have introduced even more undetectable and more 
involuntary means of installing malware. As Niels Provos et al. note “[i]n most 
cases, a successful exploit results in the automatic installation of a malware binary, 
also called drive-by-download. The installed malware often enables an adversary to 
gain remote control over the compromised computer system and can be used to 
steal sensitive personal information such as banking passwords, to send out spam 
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or to install more malicious executables over time.”1085 Drive-by-downloads are 
dangerous because detection of such downloads is extremely difficult for 
consumers. As such these attacks are a significant threat and deserve considerable 
attention. Through the drive-by-download, perpetrators manage to install 
malware, which can include keyloggers. These keyloggers function much like 
cameras and capture all information typed into the computer. This makes the 
collection of personal information easy and convenient for perpetrators of 
financial identity theft. Especially, since consumers are most likely unaware of the 
presence of a keylogger since its installation via the drive-by-download also 
occurred without the knowledge of the consumer. The data obtained via 
keyloggers is subsequently transferred to dropzones. These dropzones are publicly 
writable directories on an Internet server which serves as an exchange point for 
keylogger data.1086 Important to note, is how “[c]ontrary to conventional wisdom, 
the malicious pages weren’t mostly hosted on the seedier parts of the internet such 
as adult and gambling websites. While there were a large number of drive-by 
infections on adult sites, the majority of the malicious data is hosted on sites 
whose categorisation is more mundane such as finance, home and garden, and 
business.”1087 According to Chengyu Song et al., drive-by downloads are currently 
one of the most severe threats for users on the Internet. Moreover, such 
downloads are presently the number one malware vector.1088 According to Frei et 
al., “[t]he tip of the Web browser insecurity iceberg was measured to be 637 
million (or 45.2%) Internet users at risk worldwide due to not running the latest 
most secure browser version. Meanwhile, hidden below the surface, the iceberg 
extends further encompassing users that rely on outdated vulnerable browser 
plug-ins.”1089 This is a disturbing statistic, especially since drive-by downloads 
target these browser plug-ins.1090 The main challenge is to focus on the individual 
yet bear in the mind the individual’s ‘inability’ or rather limited ability to conquer 
the most advanced threats to information security. 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
What is happening is a shift in various aspects of consumer facilitation. In 
previous years, perpetrators appeared to benefit from the ‘carelessness’ or 
‘cluelessness’ of consumers. Especially those individuals who would toss out 
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important documents without in some way destroying the personal information 
exposed. Basically, perpetrators benefited from the unprompted availability of 
personal information. As financial identity theft, however, moved into the online 
realm it appears as though perpetrators smelled the opportunity to hunt for 
personal information, without running a high risk of getting caught. This allowed 
them to gain more control over which information they obtained and from whom.  
There is a subsequent movement from voluntary and active to 
involuntary and passive consumer facilitation. This movement, demonstrated 
through the continuous evolution of methods used by perpetrators and detected 
by those trying to counter the problem indicates a diminishing dependability on 
actual consumer actions. ‘Old-fashioned’ methods are certainly still in circulation, 
but the expansion of opportunities allows especially the sophisticated criminals to 
carry out their operations with the most advanced methods. These perpetrators 
find an easy ‘in’ and they can manage to do everything themselves from there on 
out. Botnets immaculately reflect this current state of affairs. These botnets have 
become the epitome of involuntary and passive consumer facilitation, especially 
through the introduction of ‘drive-by downloads,’ which are according to various 
sources among the most common methods for spreading malware these days.1091 
Whereas with phishing emails, consumers received a prompt to release personal 
information in an active manner, perpetrators have managed to eliminate this need 
for active consumer involvement through the introduction of drive-by downloads. 
The lack of active consumer involvement means consumers facilitate aspects of 
financial identity theft without actually having the ability to prevent such 
facilitation. This is a vital aspect to bear in mind with respect to the overall 
opportunity structure of financial identity theft, especially in light of 
countermeasures and the potential for their effectiveness. Certain sources appear 
to neglect the ability factor when they write “[w]e must realize that we are the 
front line of defense against cybercrime; we must understand that our carelessness 
could facilitate a successful cyberterrorist or information warfare attack on the 
critical infrastructures of our society.”1092 This is not about carelessness anymore. 
Perpetrators have now managed to place their entire operation outside of the 
reach of consumers, which makes the act of crime repression, let alone 
prevention, far more challenging. The technological sophistication of current 
operations requires significant background knowledge which even the savviest 
consumers often do not posses. They, along with their instruments such as their 
computers, are used without their knowledge or influence. This movement creates 
more challenges because old band-aids such as awareness campaigns start to 
become less valuable; yet, the consumer remains a primary target for perpetrators 
of financial identity theft, especially on the electronic superhighway and as such 
requires attention.    
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7  The Others 
 
 
The result of nearly any categorization is a category which groups the left-overs 
together and calls them ‘others.’ This is a familiar concept for survey research, 
where questionnaires inquire about the participants’ age, ethnicity, income, etc. 
and generally provide a category labelled ‘others.’ The group of ‘others’ often 
consists of misfits who fail to claim membership of another category. The 
appealing aspect of the ‘others’ is the gathering of diverse actors. This, however, 
complicates the establishment of overarching conclusions about this category. 
Certain actors included in this chapter demonstrate considerable overlap with 
other actors covered in previous chapters, whereas other actors included 
demonstrate a unique position and original means of facilitation with respect to 
financial identity theft. This chapter is not comprehensive for all of the possible 
members of the ‘others’ category. Instead it aims to capture the most significant 
and influential others in relation to the facilitation of financial identity theft. 
Elucidating the facilitation of the ‘others’ besides the main actors of the previous 
chapters is essential to complete the picture of the opportunity structure of 
financial identity theft.   
 
7.1 Information Brokers 
7.1.1  United States 
 
The events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent ‘War on Terror’ increased 
their popularity1093, but information brokers soared long before then. Mark D. 
Seltzer notes how “[t]he seemingly inexhaustible demand for financial 
information, once thought to be confidential and regulated, has spawned a multi-
million dollar industry of information brokers.”1094 These information or data 
brokers are private corporations which make it their sole business to collect, 
analyze, and sell personal information. In many ways, their presence and value 
represent the embodiment of the information society. Derek J. Somogy describes 
how the information and computer industry developed in a parallel fashion. The 
private sector began to digitize and subsequently store marketable information in 
searchable databases during the 1970s. These developments led to an increase of 
demands and capacities with respect to the computer industry. As a result, the 
scope and the amount of digital information available for sale also increased.1095 
Data brokers, or information resellers, jumped in to take advantage of the new 
market opportunity. The market value of the industry increased during the 
beginning of the twentieth century when the backlash of September 11th placed a 
‘premium value on accurate identification’1096 of individuals in the public as well as 
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the private sector. The prosperity of data brokers is partially a result of their 
usefulness with regard to the law enforcement community. This is due to the
ability of data brokers to “...maintain and organize personal information on 
individuals in a manner that may not be legally available to government actors.”1097  
Despite their value to various actors in both the public and the private sector, 
data brokers remained out of the public eye for a long time. Like an invisible 
shadow the brokers conducted their core activities of obtaining, processing and 
selling personal information, without any interference. This all changed when the 
media discovered and subsequently reported on several major security breaches. 
Suddenly, the spotlight illuminated all of the vulnerabilities data brokers exposed 
individuals to while conducting every day business. These data breaches form the 
core source of information for the analysis of facilitating factors contributed by 
data brokers. Important to note is how the link between data obtained from data 
brokers and financial identity theft is difficult to establish (see chapter 3) but has 
been done in a number of cases, most notably ChoicePoint. 
As a result, ChoicePoint is a relevant object of analysis to examine the role of 
information brokers in the facilitation of financial identity theft. ChoicePoint is 
one of the largest data brokers currently operating in the United States and caters 
its information selling services to three different markets. These include business, 
insurance, and government agencies.1098 In order to serve these different markets, 
ChoicePoint maintains significant amounts of sensitive personal information. Data 
security breaches began to plague ChoicePoint as a result of this. The most 
famous and most damaging data security breach came in 2004.1099 In October of 
that year, law enforcement officials notified ChoicePoint about the ways in which 
individuals within an ‘identity theft ring’ used the data broker to obtain sensitive 
personal information.1100 Perpetrators posed as legitimate clients and opened 
accounts to access personal information held and sold by ChoicePoint. As Robert 
O’Harrow describes, “ChoicePoint Inc. electronically delivered thousands of 
reports containing names, addresses, Social Security numbers, financial 
information and other details to people in the Los Angeles area posing as officials 
in legitimate debt collection, insurance and check-cashing businesses.”1101 
Research following the discovery indicated a total of 50 fake corporations had 
been set up and registered with ChoicePoint to accumulate personal information 
of unsuspecting citizens.1102 Several months later, in February 2005, MSNBC was 
the first to break the news and several newspapers followed up on the 
ChoicePoint breach.  
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) began its investigation against 
ChoicePoint shortly after the breach came to light. In its formal complaint, the 
FTC notes how ChoicePoint ultimately notified 163,000 consumers about the data 
security breach and how “[i]n all cases, the information disclosed by ChoicePoint 
included unique identifying information that facilitates identity theft, such as dates 
of birth and Social Security numbers, as well as nearly 10,000 credit reports. At 
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least 800 cases of identity theft arose out of these incidents.”1103 The fact that 
perpetrators managed to obtain ‘unique identifying information’ puts the affected 
consumers at risk of becoming victims of true name fraud, because the 
perpetrators obtained sufficient information to open new accounts. The FTC’s 
complaint against ChoicePoint mainly focuses on the company’s failure to 
recognize the illegitimate nature of some of their clients and their businesses. 
According to the FTC, “...applications contained false credentials and other 
misrepresentations, which ChoicePoint failed to detect because it had not 
implemented reasonable procedures to verify or authenticate the identities and 
qualifications of prospective subscribers.”1104 More specifically ChoicePoint 
accepted proofs of identification which, according to the FTC, were clearly 
fraudulent or at least demonstrated the applicant was clearly not a legitimate 
business. The FTC provides a plethora of examples about inadequate applications 
including critical information left blank, conflicting business addresses, 
information which indicated businesses were suspended or inactive, and utility 
statements demonstrating delinquent accounts. Furthermore, ChoicePoint’s own 
internal reports linked at least one applicant to possible fraud associated with the 
Social Security number of another individual.1105 
 In addition to the inaccurate way of verifying the identities of prospective 
clients, ChoicePoint continued its line of mistakes and its facilitation of potential 
identity theft cases when it failed to recognize rather suspicious account activity. 
ChoicePoint provided a relatively large number of consumer reports to ‘a 
purported apartment leasing subscriber’, which significantly exceeded the total 
number of apartments owned by the subscriber, over a rather short period of 
time.1106 Furthermore, ChoicePoint disregarded obvious red flags such as a 
disconnected phone line, incorrect business addresses, use of stolen credit card 
numbers, and payments exclusively made through money orders which all 
indicated possible fraud; yet, ChoicePoint continued to provide this particular 
subscriber with various consumer reports. According to the FTC, ChoicePoint 
also failed to monitor the accounts of certain suspicious subscribers, even after it 
received subpoenas from law enforcement agencies which alerted it to the 
presence of fraudulent accounts.1107  
The problem with the ChoicePoint data security breach then is two-fold. The 
first and primary problem is the inability or unwillingness of ChoicePoint to 
implement adequate means to verify the identity of prospective clients. The 
underlying motive could have been the exclusive focus on speed and customer 
convenience rather than an increased effort to ensure the legitimacy of potential 
clients and their requests in order to ensure that unique personal information of 
citizens does not end up in the hands of criminals. This sounds strikingly familiar 
to the vulnerabilities exposed in the application process of financial service 
providers for prospective clients (see section 5.2.1). The second problem, which 
simply enhances the first and the scope at which perpetrators can manage to carry 
out their activities, is ChoicePoint’s way of monitoring accounts.  
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The exposure of ChoicePoint and its business practices also attracted the 
attention of the United States Congress. The breach strengthened the rekindled 
criticism of the information privacy framework in the United States, and certain 
sources of criticism even came accompanied by concrete proposals for 
improvement.1108 The tribute of the ChoicePoint data security breach is the 
exposure of vulnerabilities of the information brokerage industry. Whereas certain 
sources1109 previously recognized the dangers, others appeared in the dark about 
the industry as well as its practices and potential connection to financial identity 
theft. The increased pressure generated by all publicity led ChoicePoint to begin 
implementing enhancements to its privacy and information security framework. 
Such enhancements include the establishment of an Office of Privacy, Ethics and 
Compliance to reinforce the responsible use and protection of information at 
ChoicePoint through such means as policies and procedures, audit and 
compliance, and outreach and education.1110 
The publication of the ChoicePoint data security breach proved to be the tip 
of the iceberg, as later media stories demonstrate. The media needed to divide its 
attention as another breach found its way into the spotlight in 2005. LexisNexis, 
another major data broker, has aggregated news, business, and legal documents for 
a long time, but in 2005 LexisNexis acquired Seisint, which resells public records 
to law enforcement and private investigators. During the same year, LexisNexis 
found itself unfavorably presented in the media after a large data security breach. 
In total, the broker notified at least 310,000 individuals whose personal 
information may have been compromised.1111 The perpetrators in this case started 
out their activities through sending massive amounts of infected emails. Brian 
Krebs reported how “...a police officer in Florida was among those who opened 
the infected e-mail message. Not long after his computer was infected with the 
keystroke-capturing program, the officer logged on to his police department’s 
account at Accurint, a LexisNexis service provided by Florida-based subsidiary 
Seisint Inc.”1112 Through logging on, the police officer provided the perpetrators 
with the necessary information to continue their operations. The group used the 
police department’s name and billing information to create a series of new 
accounts, which helped them to access more data on a larger scale. Additionally, 
Kurt P. Sanford, President and Chief Executive Officer of LexisNexis, also 
indicated how insider theft, where LexisNexis employees illegally obtained 
consumer data, accounted for part of the data security breach. On September 19, 
2008 ChoicePoint became a LexisNexis company and aided in the expansion of 
LexisNexis as a data emporium.    
ChoicePoint and LexisNexis are merely two examples of information brokers 
who experienced data security breaches. The exposure of the breach came as a 
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result of the pioneering data security breach notification law in California (see 
chapter 3). During the last several years, data security breaches, whether in the 
public or the private sector, have become comfortably familiar in the United 
States. As the spread of data security breach notification legislation indicated in 
chapter 3, the majority of States have responded to the problem. When the 
Identity Theft Task Force composed its strategic plan in 2007, the Force described 
how “[i]dentity thieves, however, can steal personal information from data brokers 
who fail to ensure that their customers have a legitimate need for the data.”1113 
The first stage of financial identity theft, therefore, can be greatly facilitated by the 
presence and subsequent practices of the information brokerage industry.   
 
7.1.2 The Netherlands 
 
The industry of data brokers in the Netherlands is limited and rather distinct in 
comparison to the United States. There are list brokers in the Netherlands. These 
list brokers are private corporations who maintain addresses of potential clients. 
These addresses are attractive for other corporations for marketing purposes in an 
effort to approach and subsequently obtain more clients. Listbokers ‘rent’ the 
addresses of prospective clients to the corporations.1114 This means that 
corporations do not actually obtain the information. Instead the list brokers 
forward the marketing materials to prospective clients and when such recipients of 
the materials respond, the corporation manages to obtain their addresses.1115  
 Other types of businesses which fall into the category of information brokers 
are information agencies or informatiehandelbureaus. Despite their lack of overt 
publicity, the potential for problems with this type of business certainly exist. 
Several years ago, in August 2001, the Registration Chamber, the predecessor of 
the Data Protection Authority (DPA), conducted an investigation into the 
business practices of a particular information marketing agency. In the 
introduction of its investigation, the Registration Chamber acknowledges how 
information agencies operate in a legal grey area. This is because there is a clear 
societal need for information about credit defaulters yet simultaneously 
information collection about these defaulters is also subject to privacy and data 
protection restrictions. Investigations into the business practices, in particular the 
methods of information collection, had previously (in 19961116 and 19991117) been 
conducted by the Registration Chamber. These investigations included announced 
visits to examine the methods used for information collection by the agencies and 
to investigate whether such practices coincided with the previous Data Protection 
Act.1118  
The in 2001 published investigation, which began in 2000, came after the 
Registration Chamber received several complaints during the previous years, from 
1998 to 2000. These complaints came from citizens and various organizations who 
received information inquiries from a specific information agency. Citizen 
complainants indicated how representatives of the information agencies had 
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approached neighbors and family members to obtain information about them 
without their permission. Similar complaints came from organizations operating in 
both the public and the private sector such as health insurance corporations, 
municipal social services, and the office for government unemployment 
benefits.1119 When the Registration Chamber confronted the information agency 
with the complaints, the agency claimed others must have used its name in an 
effort to collect information from these organizations. Based on the complaints 
and the response provided by the agency itself, the Registration Chamber decided 
to begin an investigation.  
In its conclusions, the Registration Chamber notes how the information 
agency was aware of the confidentiality mandate of the sources the agency 
approached but still neglected this knowledge in an effort to acquire confidential 
information. When certain organizations refused to provide such information and 
referred to their confidentiality mandate, the information agency placed them on a 
do not contact list for future assignments. Others still remained eligible for 
inquiries. Certain internal documents found at the information agency’s office 
described how employees were allowed to make up information if such false 
stories allowed them to acquire the necessary information from the contacted 
sources.1120 Defaulters, whose information is being collected by the information 
agency, are put under pressure when they refuse to cooperate in the information 
collection activities.  
Moreover, the information agency turned out to have regular access to the 
automated system of a large government benefit database. The previous 
investigations conducted by the Registration Chamber also demonstrated how 
information agencies engaged in illegal information collection practices. A similar 
case returned when the DPA office received a complaint about company X and 
the DPA began an investigation.1121 Initially, the DPA sent written questions to 
company X and found the answers to develop sufficient grounds for further 
action. This occurred via an unannounced visit at the business location of 
company X. The DPA reserves the legal authority to conduct such unannounced 
visits for investigation purposes. The DPA wanted to develop a judgment about 
the modus operandi of the company in order to determine its compliance with the 
Dutch Data Protection Act. 
 The DPA determined how company X primarily caters its services to law 
offices, insurance companies, and the banking sector.1122 Other clients include 
process servers (bailiffs), debt collection agencies, and investigation agencies. The 
main request from clients for company X is to retrieve the credit worthiness of an 
individual and also her bank account number along with the account balance. In a 
tender to a law office, company X describes how for its special research the 
company aims to discover the real estate value of individuals as well as 
information about their income. Moreover, the company also conducts large scale 
bank investigations to determine the account balances of the individuals. This 
includes checking and savings accounts, as well as stock portfolios. All of this 
information is used by the clients of company X to determine whether seizure of 
property is a viable option. Company X maintains standard prices for its services. 
                                                
1119  Ibid.  
1120  Ibid.  
1121  College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens (CBP) (2003). Onrechtmatig, onbehoorlijk en onzorgvuldig. De  
verwerking van persoonsgegevens door een handelsinformatiebureau voor rapportage van verhaalsinformatie. 
1122  Ibid. 
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For bank account information, for example, Company X charges 60 euros and a 
criminal background check costs 350 euros.    
Through the DPA’s investigation of the documents obtained during the 
unannounced visit, it became clear how company X proved successful in its 
delivery of the services mentioned above.1123 To obtain such information company 
X uses various sources. These include outsourcing the requests to private 
investigation agencies, research by its own employees via interviews or 
neighborhood research, and also ‘calling rounds.’ Basically employees from 
company X call various agencies, both public and private. These include social 
services, healthcare insurance companies, the tax administration office, banks, the 
municipal administrative office, and others. Furthermore, company X also uses 
regular contact persons who have access to address information, social-fiscal 
numbers, and background check information. Other sources of information used 
by company X include open or public sources.  
Based on its investigation, the DPA came to several important conclusions 
about the business practices of company X. The information collection practices 
of company X violate data protection legislation in the Netherlands, since 
company X fails to demonstrate a necessary legal mandate to collect such 
information. Moreover, the DPA concludes how there is a lack of evidence which 
demonstrates permission from the party in question for company X to collect 
such personal information. The DPA furthermore determined how company X 
does not contact the party in question nor is there any evidence of an agreement 
between the party in question and company X. Company X also failed to follow 
the notification procedures as identified in the Dutch Data Protection Act which 
require organizations to inform the DPA of its information collection and 
processing activities.  
The most worrisome development is the ability of company X to obtain 
information from sources which are under a legal mandate to maintain the 
information in a confidential manner. Company X manages to obtain such 
information predominantly through social engineering and the DPA managed to 
locate specific conversation strategies which demonstrate how employees of 
company X used false names and employers to obtain confidential information 
from (mainly) government sources. The DPA describes how company X knew or 
should have known how certain sources are under a legal or professional 
obligation to maintain the confidentiality of the information which company X 
requested.  
Other violations include the manner in which company X keeps its records 
stored. During the initial written questions filed by the DPA, company X provided 
false information and claimed how the company destroyed all information of a 
party in question after the case closed. The investigation of the DPA, however, 
revealed how company X maintains a database both electronically and physically 
which contains the previously compiled reports.   
Overall, the investigation of the DPA demonstrates the problematic aspect of 
the business practices of company X, and the industry of information agencies, 
but also the ease of accessibility to information from sources which maintain the 
obligation to keep such information confidential.1124   
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The various investigations conducted by the Registration Chamber and its 
successor the DPA spread demonstrate how information agencies obtain and 
process their information in an unlawful manner. This is problematic, but 
important to bear in mind is how information agencies generally turn to the public 
sector to acquire the necessary information. This leads to the development of an 
overall image which assumes that for potential perpetrators of financial identity 
theft government agencies may generally form a more attractive target to facilitate 
the first stage of financial identity theft. They may use information agencies as an 
intermediary, but this seems far less likely than in the United States, where the 
industry itself actually maintains an important place in the information market.  
7.2 Payment Processors 
 
Besides information brokers, other sources also spark the interest of potential 
perpetrators of financial identity theft. Due to the involvement of multiple parties, 
the chain of a credit card transaction is complex. A credit card transaction can 
require the involvement of five different parties.1125 These include the client, the 
merchant, the ‘issuing’ bank, the ‘acquiring’ bank, and the credit card company. 
The ‘issuing’ bank is the bank where the client maintains her credit card, whereas 
the ‘acquiring’ bank refers to the bank of the merchant. The actual credit card 
process involves all of these parties. The client starts the process through the 
purchase with a credit card. The merchant verifies the authenticity of the credit 
card either electronically or via the telephone to determine whether the credit card 
is valid and sufficient funds are available to complete the purchase. When the 
issuing bank returns with a positive response, the merchant can complete the 
purchase and the client receives the product. After the completed purchase, the 
credit limit of the client is adjusted by the issuing bank but the merchant has not 
received its money. This occurs at the end of the day, when the merchant collects 
all credit card purchases and sends them to the credit card company.1126 The credit 
card company in turn ensures the clearing and settlement of the transactions 
between the issuing and the acquiring bank. The credit card data of the clients 
which the merchant sends to the credit card company are the object of desire for 
perpetrators of financial identity theft. Since certain portions of the transaction 
and the data processing might be outsourced to third parties the already complex 
chain is complicated even further. These third parties are the payment processors.   
  
7.2.1  United States 
 
At the start of 2009, Heartland Payment Systems became the center of attention 
after its public declaration of a data security breach which occurred during the 
previous year. News stories captured the announcement and the breach became 
one of the largest ever.1127 The discovery of the breach came after Heartland 
began to receive fraudulent activity reports from MasterCard and Visa. The credit 
cards had all been used at merchants who use Heartland for the processing of its 
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customer payments.1128 Heartland contacted the United States Secret Service after 
the discovery of the breach. The source of the breach turned out to be “[a] piece 
of malicious software planted on the company’s payment processing network that 
recorded payment card data as it was being sent for processing to Heartland by 
thousands of the company’s retail clients.”1129 The Heartland breach once again 
led to a demonstration of the necessity for even better information security.1130  
 The Heartland breach was not first breach which caught widespread media 
attention. Several years earlier, in 2005, Cardsystems experienced a similar fate. On 
May 23, 2005 Mark Perry, CEO of Cardsystems, notified the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (FBI) about a data security breach, which, after investigation, 
exposed the information of 40 million card holders. Perry notes how, “…an 
unauthorized party placed a script (a sequence of instructions interpreted or 
carried out by another program) on the CardSystems platform (an underlying 
computer system on which application programs run) through an internet-facing 
application that is used by our customers to access data. This script ran on our 
system and caused records to be extracted, zipped into a file, and exported to an 
FTP site (similar to a web address). It was a sophisticated script that targeted a 
particular file type, and was scheduled to run every four days.”1131  Perry goes on 
to explain how forensic investigations demonstrated that there was only one 
confirmed instance, on May 22, 2005, where data was actually exported. The script 
specifically searched CardSystems computer servers for records which contained 
track data (the data retained on the magnetic stripe of a credit card). The most 
complete information any perpetrator could have gathered, according to Perry, 
about cardholders includes the individual’s name, account number, expiration date 
and CVV code (contained in the magnetic stripe).  Furthermore, Perry claims that 
considering the track data does not include social security numbers of the affected 
consumers, identity theft is virtually impossible. Account takeover, however, 
appears very possible.  
 These breaches are merely two prominent examples which have occurred 
during the last several years. Both, however, provide two important observations. 
First, payment processers are an attractive target for perpetrators of financial 
identity theft, since these processors maintain large amounts of sensitive financial 
information. The second aspect which surfaces based on a brief overview of the 
two breaches is the technological sophistication of the attacks. This illustrates how 
perpetrators manage to make significant progress throughout the years to advance 
their attacks in terms of technological sophistication, which complicates 
prevention and detection. This strengthens the trend which was already observed 
in the analysis of the consumer in chapter 6.  
 
7.2.2 The Netherlands 
 
In the Netherlands, the industry of payment processors is tremendously 
influenced by the developments within the European Union. The introduction of 
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the Single Euro Payments Era (SEPA) led to the anticipation of increased 
competition among payment processors in the European Union. This anticipation 
led to the development of the largest pan-European payment processor, Equens. 
Equens came about through a merger between the Dutch Interpay and the 
German ‘Transaktionsinstitut für Zahlungsdienstleistungen’ (TAI) during the fall 
of 2006. The Dutch Interpay had been in existence since 1994 and was brand 
name owner of several payment products including the PIN, Acceptgiro, Incasso, 
and Chipknip. In 2003, Interpay began to focus on the European market as a 
result of the introduction of the Euro and the internationalization of the bank and 
business sector. Due to this shift in focus, Interpay began to reduce its 
involvement in certain activities and the brand name ownership of the payment 
products was transferred to another corporation, Currence. This is when Interpay 
began to exclusively focus on payment processing and expanded its business 
through the merger with the German corporation and the establishment of 
Equens.  
 News about breaches occurring at Equens appear unavailable. Instead, Equens 
is a key actor in the fight against skimming and credit card fraud in the 
Netherlands. For over a year, Equens has incorporated a mixture of techniques, 
including working with neutral networks, in an effort to reduce the financial 
damage caused by skimming.1132 These techniques lead to extremely fast 
detection.1133 In May 2010, a cooperative effort of Equens and the Vrije Universiteit 
of Amsterdam led to the development of a method to decrease skimming in the 
Netherlands.1134 Equens, as a result, appears to primarily play a role in prevention 




The acceptance of various payment products, especially the credit card, in both 
the physical and the virtual world makes merchants a relevant actor to examine 
with respect to the facilitation of financial identity theft. Whereas in the physical 
world merchants face challenges in the usage of payment products, through the 
identity authentication of the owner of the payment product, these challenges are 
exacerbated by the developments in the virtual world, as a result of the lack of face 
to face contact. The introduction of e-commerce changed the landscape for 
businesses and consumers around the globe. The ability to purchase and sell goods 
and services regardless of location or business hours proved to be an attractive 
idea for both parties. The existence of economic incentives through cost reduction 
and creation of innovative means of additional revenue added to the popularity of 
e-commerce for various actors in society.1135 Despite its popularity, e-commerce 
still faces challenges. The altered landscape introduced additional and more 
complicated vulnerabilities for abuse which translate into opportunities for 
perpetrators of financial identity theft. This potential for abuse certainly influences 
the popularity of e-commerce applications for consumers. Chapter 6 provided an 
                                                
1132  De Vrede, T. (2010). Equens bestrijdt skimmen met computerkracht. Automatiseringgids. Available at:  
http://www.automatiseringgids.nl/artikelen/2010/21/equens-bestrijdt-skimmen-met- 
computerkracht.aspx (last accessed July 5, 2010).   
1133  Ibid.  
1134  Ibid.  
1135  Strader, T. J. & M. J. Shaw (1997). Characteristics of electronic markets. Decision Support Systems, Vol.  
21.  
THE OTHERS     215 
 
 
exposition of the various threats consumers presently face on the Internet. The 
main focus herein is on the mechanism implemented to verify the identity of the 
client who conducts the purchase. The distinction between the United States and 
the Netherlands is perhaps less relevant for this actor since consumers can access 
e-retailers from anywhere in the world. Nevertheless, the United States and the 
Netherlands maintain diverse methods of payment for sites or stores which 
originate in both countries.  
 
7.3.1 United States 
 
The usage of credit cards in the physical world in the United States proved 
problematic since merchants generally only authenticated the credit card rather 
than the owner of the card. This meant the mere possession of the card proved 
sufficient for perpetrators of financial identity theft to conduct purchases in the 
name of the actual owner of the card. Since the Truth in Lending Act capped the 
liability costs of credit card owners at 50 dollars the actual damage to the owners 
remained limited. This also provided credit card issuers with the liberty to 
maintain a system which continued to potentially facilitate financial identity theft. 
Throughout years, credit card issuers did make changes such as the inclusion of 
photographs of the owner on the card. Yet, the actual ability to authenticate the 
owner rather than just the credit card remained with the merchant. Since the credit 
card issuer was absent during the actual transaction. Merchants in the United 
States have introduced changes for credit card transactions, albeit in a fragmented 
fashion. Certain stores request to see a driver’s license of the client in order to 
verify the identity whereas others actually compare the signature on the back of 
the card as compared to the signature on the receipt.  
Since the popularity of the credit card in the United States extended into the 
virtual world, so did the accompanying vulnerabilities. The majority of e-retailers 
which originate in the United States accept credit card payments through the 
Internet. From amazon.com to other online websites of stores, credit cards 
provide an efficient and convenient method of payment via the Internet for both 
consumers and businesses. Through the use of the credit card, neither the 
consumers nor the businesses needed to transfer to another system, which meant 
additional costs remained out of sight. The problem with the transfer of the credit 
card from the physical to the virtual world is well-documented. For the 
underground market began to target credit card numbers and subsequently use 
them to purchase goods and services in the name of the victim. This consequence 
is the result of an underestimation of the challenges posed by e-commerce 
payment transactions. 1136 The transition from the physical to the virtual world 
failed to translate into a transition of security for the credit card. The financial 
services sector initially designed the credit card for the physical world and as such 
the instrument proved ill prepared for the virtual world.  
 The e-commerce sector began to respond to the challenges posed by payment 
transactions in the virtual world. At first, e-retailers began to request the CVC 
code printed on the back of the credit card.   Since the underground market 
predominantly traded in credit card numbers without the accompanying CVC 
code, this measure managed to cover part of the problem. To access the CVC 
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code, clients needed to physically possess the credit card. Even so, this measure 
became familiar to perpetrators of account takeover and these perpetrators began 
to provide credit card numbers with CVC codes through the underground market. 
Moreover, through the use of malware perpetrators also manage to obtain all 
information inserted onto the screen which means they can obtain the CVC code 
as well. 
 The rat race continued when the financial services industry returned with other 
alternatives to increase security, but also to transfer the liability of fraudulent 
transactions from the e-retailers onto the financial service provider. This is a 
crucial aspect of the incentives for both the financial service providers and e-
retailers to become involved in the development of increased security for e-
commerce transactions. The Truth in Lending Act states how consumer liability 
for fraudulent transactions carried out by credit cards is capped at a maximum of 
50 dollars. As a result, consumers who contact their credit card company in light 
of a fraudulent transaction receive a refund. Whereas consumers receive the 
money back via their credit card company, retailers or in this case e-commerce 
businesses must refund the financial loss to the credit card company. This is due 
to chargeback liability, which basically states that when a consumer disputes a 
credit card transaction and the credit card issuer sides with the consumer the 
retailer must return the money. This occurs under the rules promulgated by the 
Federal Reserve.1137 The chargeback liability means that even if the retailer did 
nothing ‘wrong’ it must still bear the liability for the costs incurred as a result of 
the fraudulent transaction. Due to the burden imposed as a result of the 
chargeback liability, retailers would logically display an interest in the prevention of 
fraudulent payments via the Internet; yet, the opposite appears true. Todd Pearson 
noted how “...there is little value in being an early adopter and incurring the high 
costs associated with implementing fraud-reduction software without a shift in the 
liability for chargebacks.”1138 As a result, the financial services industry began to 
offer alternatives which aimed to improve security and provide retailers with the 
shift of liability if they subscribed to the ‘system.’ Visa introduced its Verified by 
Visa (VbV) system on April 1, 2003. As Visa notes, “[a] liability shift for any 
participating Merchant protects them against a cardholder denying making the 
purchase. Therefore, VbV results in a reduction in chargebacks and disputes, 
together with a reduction in the related operational costs. The merchant benefits 
from this protection even when the Issuer or cardholder is not participating.”1139 
Jeff King acknowledges the contribution of VISA, and Mastercard, which 
introduced a similar system called Mastercard Secure Code, and claims they have 
been on a crusade to train retailers to practice good security techniques.1140  
Despite the ‘good will’ displayed by Visa and Mastercard, the e-commerce 
business still feeds the bill through its participation to the program which requires 
them to enroll. There are benefits for the retailer because of the shift of liability; 
yet, the system also carries the necessary costs in order to ensure such a shift. 
                                                
1137  Furletti, M. (2004). Prepaid Card Markets & Regulation. Discussion Paper Payment Cards Center.  
1138  Sienkiewicz, S. & M. Bochicchio (2002). The Future of E-Commerce Payments. Available at:  
http://www.phil.frb.org/payment-cards- 
center/events/conferences/2002/FutureECommerce_062002.pdf (last accessed July 5, 2010).  
1139  VISA (n.d.). Verified by Visa: Merchant fact sheet. Available at:  
http://www2.visaeurope.com/documents/vbv/verifiedbyvisa_merchantfactsheet.pdf  
(last accessed July 14, 2010). 
1140  Wales, E. (2003). E-commerce counts cost of Online Card Fraud. Computer Fraud & Security, Vol.  
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Moreover, the actual security offered by the system is difficult to assess, which is 
irrelevant for the retailers since their primary aim is to eliminate the costs 
associated with the chargeback liability, but relevant for consumers and the 
facilitation of financial identity theft. On its site Visa notes how “[t]he 3-digit 
security code shown on the back of your Visa card lets merchants know that 
you’re physically holding the card when you make a purchase online or over the 
phone. It’s yet another layer of protection Visa implements to prevent fraud 
before it happens.”1141 Once entered, however, this code can easily be captured by 
malware which provides perpetrators of financial identity theft with the code. 
 
7.3.2  The Netherlands 
 
The description of the credit card in chapter 5 already demonstrated its limited 
popularity in the Netherlands, and for the e-commerce business the same situation 
seems to apply. In stores in the Netherlands, the majority of clients appear to pay 
for purchases either through cash or through their debit card which always 
requires the input of a PIN code. This still provides for opportunities of criminal 
conduct as the popularity of skimming has indicated. For the e-commerce realm, 
the methods of payment offered to consumers in the Netherlands appear more 
diverse than in the United States. The majority of e-commerce businesses in the 
Netherlands grant consumers the option to pay via their credit cards. Yet, 
consumers can also make an order and request the bill to be send along with the 
product.  
The charm of multiple options also came accompanied by disadvantages for 
Thuiswinkel.org1142 which claimed the existence of various options leads to chaos. 
Several years ago, in 2004, Thuiswinkel.org spoke of a state of financial disorder 
on the Internet with regard to payment methods. Back then, Thuiswinkel.org 
certainly made a valid point since retailers themselves decided which methods of 
payment they wanted to accept and which they cared to reject. This led to 
inconsistent practices and confusion for consumers. This ultimately inspired iDeal. 
Since 2005, iDeal is the Internet banking payment standard which is developed by 
various Dutch banks. iDeal directly connects the consumer to her bank online and 
allows a transfer to be made to the particular e-commerce business, so that the 
security methods for online banking apply (see section 5.4.2). As a result, the 
consumer directly pays for the good or service. The introduction of iDeal 
synchronized the method of verification of clients, since retailers use the online 
banking system. This leads to a synchronization of challenges and benefits. The 
danger of MITM attacks against online banking therefore transfers onto the online 
stores as well. Overall, 47 per cent of transactions occur through the iDeal 
payment system.1143  
Thuiswinkel.org is actively involved and actually refers to the need to pay 
attention to the issue of identity theft.1144 For credit card payments conducted via 
                                                
1141  VISA (n.d.). 3-Digit Security Code. Available at: 
http://usa.visa.com/personal/security/visa_security_program/3_digit_security_code.html  
(last accessed July 14, 2010). 
1142  Thuiswinkel.org is the representative organization for e-retailers in the Netherlands.  
1143  Reijerman, D. (2010). Thuiswinkel.org wil dat meer webwinkels 3D Secure gaan gebruiken.  
Available at: http://tweakers.net/nieuws/67644/thuiswinkel-punt-org-wil-dat-meer-webwinkels-3d-
secure-gaan-gebruiken.html (last accessed July 13, 2010).  
1144  Werkgroep Betalingsverkeer Nederlandse Thuiswinkel Organisatie (2010). Position Paper Online  
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the Internet, Thuiswinkel.org encourages and stimulates the usage of the 3D 
secure system as described above.1145 The director of the organization emphasizes 
the transfer of liability from the retailer onto the credit card company. This is 
especially important since just as their American counterparts, e-retailers in the 
Netherlands also suffer from the rules surrounding chargeback liability. While 
already half of all e-retailers in the Netherlands have joined the system, the 
director aims to stimulate all of them to join.1146 There appears to be resistance to 
the implementation of the system by remaining e-retailers since the additional 
means of authentication also increases the number of actions the consumer must 
take to complete a transaction. Since the 3D secure system is inconsequential in 
the instruments (a self selected password, a pin code, or a randomizer) used for 
the increased security, e-retailers fear consumers shall be surprised by the 3D 
secure prompt and cancel the transaction.1147 This yet again demonstrates the 
contested relationship between convenience and security, where an increase in 
security leads to a decrease in convenience and as such to the potential loss of 
clients. Moreover, the working group of the representative organization also 
recognizes how credit card issuers have failed to update the previously identified 
security problems with the original 3D secure system.1148 Despite the relatively 
small percentage of transactions which occur through credit card payments (9 per 
cent), the damage caused to e-retailers through credit card payments is estimated 
to be in the tens of millions of euros a year by Thuiswinkel.org.1149 Other sources, 
such as the Dutch Central Bank and the individual banks refuse to provide 
indications of the financial damage caused through credit card fraud due to the 
fear of potential damage to consumer trust in the system.1150 Thuiswinkel.org 
therefore continues to encourage the usage of iDeal since according to the 
organization payments via credit cards provide more space for perpetrators of 
financial identity theft to engage in man in the middle attacks, since the e-retailer 
must conduct the identification of the client rather than the bank. The iDeal 
payment system after all relies on identification of the client through the Internet 
banking system, which includes its relatively high level of security in comparison 
to the credit card system.  
 
7.4 Internet Service Providers 
 
The main purpose of an Internet Service Provider is to provide its clients with 
access to the Internet. Yet, Internet Service Providers can also function as host 
provides for content on websites. In both functions, Internet Service Providers 
play a unique role with respect to the facilitation of financial identity theft. This 
dual purpose of providing access and serving as a content host illustrates the 
importance of Internet Service Providers in the overall opportunity structure of 
financial identity theft. This is especially due to the significance of Internet access 
for perpetrators of financial identity theft. To gain such access is vital, but 
perpetrators of the crime also need a host for their activities, such as phishing 
websites. The exclusive position of Internet Service Providers with respect to 
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security in the virtual world forces them to stand in the spotlight. This also leads 
to a discussion about the role and the responsibility that Internet Service Providers 
ought to have. Tyler Moore and Richard Clayton capture the complexity when 
they write, “[i]t is impractical for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to police the 
entirety of the content that their users place upon the Internet, so it is generally 
seen as unjust for ISPs to bear strict liability, viz: that they become legally liable for 
the mere presence of unlawful content.”1151 On the other hand, “…the ISPs are in 
an unrivalled position to suppress content held on their systems by removing 
access to resources – webspace, connectivity, file access permissions, etc. – from 
their customers.”1152 Others instead gravitate toward the outer skirt of the 
problem. Several years ago, in 2004, Doug Lichtman and Eric Posner proclaimed 
how Internet Service Providers “..are today largely immune from liability for their 
role in the creation and propagation of worms, viruses, and other forms of 
malicious computer code.”1153 This is not entirely true for Internet Service 
Providers operating in the European Union, since the Directive on e-commerce 
states “…service providers have a duty to act, under certain circumstances, with a 
view to preventing or stopping illegal activities.”1154 According to Lichtman and 
Posner, they join a “growing chorus of legal commentators” who all argue in favor 
of increased accountability and responsibility for Internet Service Providers. The 
reason for such an increase in accountability and responsibility is to develop 
incentives for Internet Service Providers to improve security. The assumption in 
the argument of Lichtman & Posner therefore revolves around a lack of inherent 
incentives for Internet Service Providers to invest in security. This assumption is 
also found in other sources. The United Kingdom House of Lords Science and 
Technology Committee stated in 2007 how “…although ISPs could easily 
disconnect infected machines from their networks, there is no incentive for them 
to do so.”1155 The Committee instead claims how “…there is a disincentive, since 
customers, once disconnected, are likely to call help-lines and take up the time of 
call-centre staff, imposing additional costs on the ISP.”1156 Others echo similar 
notions. Jennifer A. Chandler writes “[t]he parties best placed to address cyber 
insecurity, including…ISPs…do not face the full consequences of their 
contributions to cyber insecurity. Accordingly, they do not invest time and money 
to the socially optimal level of improved security.”1157 Chandler claims Internet 
Service Providers, along with selected other actors, fail to experience the negative 
consequences of cyber insecurity which leads to lack of incentives to act rather 
than to remain passive. Yun Huang et al.  state this proposition in more general 
terms when they write “…the parties that suffer the most are not in the best 
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position to defend, while the parties in the best position do not suffer enough to 
defend.”1158  
Michel J. G. van Eeten en Johannes M. Bauer call the argument about a lack of 
incentives on the side of Internet Service Providers into question. Internet Service 
Providers may, according to van Eeten and Bauer, “…unwittingly reinforce the 
impression that they have few if any incentives to improve the security of their 
services.”1159 This occurs through the resistance of Internet Service Providers to 
government intervention and the hesitance to surrender self-regulation. The 
resistance to government intervention is interpreted by many as an unwillingness 
to provide more security; yet, this is an incorrect conclusion according to van 
Eeten and Bauer. Based on interviews with officials from Internet Service 
Providers, the authors develop ample evidence to demonstrate both the efforts 
made by the providers and also unravel the incentives behind these efforts. These 
efforts began to escalate around 2003 when Internet Service Providers began to 
understand how improved security turned out to be in their best interest. This is 
due to costs associated with insecurity of their clients. These costs come from 
‘security-related’ customer calls. As van Eeten en Bauer note, “[t]he incentive here 
is that security incidents generate customer calls, thus quickly driving up the costs 
of customer care.”1160 There are other incentives. These include costs associated 
with brand and reputation damage, and infrastructure expansion.  
In addition to ‘negative’ or cost dominated incentives, ‘positive’ or benefit 
oriented incentives also play a role in the decision to engage in improved security. 
According to van Eeten and Bauer, all interviewees mentioned the benefits 
generated through maintaining reciprocity. This refers to the contacts maintained 
with other Internet Service Providers, CSIRTS and other related organizations, 
who can provide assistance during a case. Such assistance and contact is 
reciprocal, but to maintain such reciprocity Internet Service Providers must treat 
complaints of abuse seriously. As van Eeten and Bauer conclude, “[t]he more 
abuse takes place on its network, the more other contacts in the network will ask 
for intervention.”1161 This, in turn, enforces security since threats from other 
Internet Service Providers provide a powerful incentive for the ‘threatened’ 
Internet Service Provider to improve security.   
There appear to be sufficient incentives for Internet Service Providers, at least 
those of a reputable nature to invest in cyber security. Still complications surface. 
Based on the responses offered to the Arbor Network’s fifth annual ‘Worldwide 
Infrastructure Security Report’ (WWIR), a year long industry-wide operational 
security survey, Danny McPherson drew the following conclusion “…while 
attackers increasingly and successfully monetise DDoS, phishing and other illegal 
activities, many providers report struggles with budget and management support 
for security initiatives and investment.”1162 As a result, McPherson notes how a 
growing concern about a range of innovative threats has managed to replace any 
optimism on the site of the Internet Service Provider. In response to the survey, 
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one provider notes how “the bad guys are beating us, badly.”1163 This is a 
worrisome development especially in light of the crucial position Internet Service 
Providers hold with respect to the facilitation of financial identity theft. Access to 
the Internet is a vital instrument for the successful completion of a financial 
identity theft operation. For without the Internet, many of the activities carried out 
as part of the identity theft operation, such as obtaining the relevant personal 
information along with the ability to drain accounts, conduct fraudulent 
transactions, and transfer money would not be possible in such a low risk and 
convenient manner. Moore et al. also underscore the prominent place Internet 
Service Providers can play in detection and how “ISPs are also uniquely placed to 
limit the external impact of an infected computer: they control its Internet 
connection and can disconnect it if need be. Current best practice is less drastic: it 
is to quarantine infected computers into a ‘walled garden’ subnetwork from which 
they can access decontamination and software patches but not much else.”1164 
McPherson also states therefore how many providers reflected on the need for 
better cooperation and coordination between both providers and vendors to meet 
the future Internet security challenges.1165    
The great diversity of Internet Service Providers in the United States may also 
complicate matters. As Moore et al. recognize “[t]he approximately 4,000 ISPs in 
the United States range in size from mom-and-pop firms serving a few hundred 
customers in rural outposts to behemoths such as AT&T, Verizon, AOL, and 
Comcast, which each provide online connectivity to millions of households and 
businesses.”1166 Whereas the large Internet Service Providers maintain the 
resources and staff to engage in detection and clean up of infected machines, the 
smaller providers lack such an ability. 
 
7.5 Money Mules 
 
The paper trail established through the fight against money laundering (see also 
chapter 5) also provides a challenge for perpetrators of financial identity. To 
circumvent the paper trail, perpetrators of financial identity theft solicit the 
assistance of money mules. The purpose of money mules is to use their bank 
account to accept the illicit funds and to transfer them to another account. As 
Brian Krebs notes, “[m]ule recruitment is an integral part of many cyber crime 
operations because money transferred directly from a victim to an account 
controlled by criminals is easily traced by banks and law enforcement. The mules, 
therefore, serve as a vital buffer, making it easier for criminals to hide their 
tracks.”1167 As such, mules decrease the risk of getting caught and losing the 
proceeds of the crime. Money mules are different from all other parties previously 
considered for they are not actors but rather characters. Much like in a play 
individuals take on the role of the money mule. According to Ken Durham, 
money mules “...are individuals unwittingly hired by organized criminals to 
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perform international wire fraud and other illicit operations.”1168 Durham 
describes mules indirectly as innocent or rather as indirect victims of organized 
criminals who are unaware of the illicit aspect of the operation. This is a one-sided 
representation of money mules, for some may be unaware but certainly not all. As 
Krebs notes, “I have interviewed more than 150 money mules in the course of my 
investigations over the last year into this type of fraud. I can safely say that most 
mules fit into one of two camps: Those that are simply not the sharpest crayons in 
the box and really did get bamboozled (at least up to a point); and those who are 
out of a job, laid off, or otherwise in need of money and simply aren’t asking 
themselves or anyone else too many questions about the whole process.”1169 
Krebs furthermore states how most mules actually fit into the latter group. The 
individuals who fall into the latter category generally set up a different bank 
account to use aside from their original checking account. “When pressed as to 
why they did this, if they’re honest most will say they weren’t sure about the whole 
arrangement and wanted to protect their investments just in case their employers 
turned out to be less-than-honest.”1170  
 Even so, there appears to be a grey area especially when mule recruitment 
approaches candidates in desperate need of a job. Krebs describes the story of 
Deena Monroe, an unwitting money mule. Monroe, a single mother who had just 
been laid off as a warehouse supervisor, received a job offer through her email. 
The company found her resume through careerbuilder.com and offered a work-
from-home position in the sales department of a marketing company in Australia. 
Monroe stated that she researched the company before accepting the offer. The 
company first asked her to add an additional e-mail address to her PayPal account, 
which was necessary for her to transfer money on the company’s behalf. Krebs 
describes how “[s]oon after, Monroe received a deposit of $2,601 into her PayPal 
account, with instructions to transfer the money to her checking account, 
withdraw it and wire the bulk of the amount via Western Union to two separate 
addresses in India. She was told to keep 10 percent as her commission.”1171 
Problems started less than two weeks later when an eBay user emailed Monroe 
asking her when he would receive the new computer he had won and purchased 
for $2,601 at the auction. EBay became involved and concluded how the 
fraudulent company, also known as Monroe’s employer, used her PayPal account 
for a fake auction. EBay held Monroe responsible for the ‘stolen’ funds and she 
had to repay the auction ‘winner.’ Unawareness about organized crime operations, 
as a result, can lead to the victimization of unintentional accomplices.  
 More general information on money mules appears limited. A clear perspective 
on the number of money mules currently engaged in criminal operations seems 
unavailable. Yet, sporadically certain statistics do surface. According to the 
Australian High-Tech Crime Centre, “[i]n January 2005, 61 people were arrested in 
Australia for allegedly wiring money to Russia and other undisclosed locations and 
collecting a commission based on the amount of money laundered. Mules 
reportedly earned $200 – $500 per day for moving up to $100,000 per day.”1172 
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According to statistics provided by the Dutch Banking Association in 2010, there 
were 1400 ‘young victims’ of bank fraud who functioned as money mules.1173 
These money mules are viewed as victims because of the repercussions associated 
with their cooperation in the criminal operation. Once the bank discovers the 
involvement of the mule, the bank demands a return of the funds from the mule 
and places the mule on a black list. This black list implies that the mule cannot 
open an account, buy a house, or apply for a loan during the following eight years.   
 In the majority of literature, the presence and role of money mules is 
mentioned in passing without any insightful details about the incidence rate. Yet, 
this is also a particularly challenging task to carry out, since many money mules 
manage to successfully accomplish their task in the overall criminal operation. And 
as a result, if this is the case, many financial service providers may be unwilling to 
share the information publicly for fear of reputation damage. According to Kelly 
Jackson Higgins, money mule recruiters have managed to take advantage of the 
present economic crisis. As Higgins notes, “[a]s the unemployment rate has 
climbed, so has the amount of money-mule recruitment and job-related spam 
scams that prey on people losing their jobs. Job-related spam campaigns jumped 
514 percent between August and October when the economic crisis first began to 
unfold, according to new data released by Panda Labs, including data gathered 
from The Project Honeypot. Even more disturbing is that seven of the world’s 
largest money-mule crime networks have been able to successfully dupe their 
victims into moving their stolen money or assets 30 percent of the time, according 
to research from Panda Labs.”1174 
 While the main red thread throughout this research focuses on the facilitation 
of the first and the second stage of financial identity theft, the money mule plays a 
vital role in the facilitation of the third stage of the crime. This third stage liquefies 
the proceeds which allows the perpetrators to actually obtain the financial assets 
generated through the crime. Money mules are therefore an essential aspect for 





The ‘others’ depict distinct stories. For the facilitation of the first stage of financial 
identity theft, information brokers and payment processors are lucrative targets for 
perpetrators of the crime. The attacks carried out against both actors, through the 
media stories on data security breaches, illustrate how the sensitive information 
maintained by both is wanted by perpetrators. As a result, information brokers 
and payment processors exacerbate an existing vulnerability with respect to the 
availability and accessibility of personal information, which facilitates the first 
stage of financial identity theft. Especially the proliferation of the information 
brokerage industry demonstrates the increasing vulnerability both the public and 
the private sector expose citizens to due to their information obsessive needs. 
Such needs manage to feed the information brokerage industry, at least in the 
United States.  
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For the Netherlands, the industry appears to cater to a smaller market and remains 
limited in terms of scale. Even so, the practices of information collection by these 
information agencies are questionable and in turn demonstrate the potential 
vulnerability of information exposure by those with a mandate to keep such 
information confidential, namely government agencies.  
 Merchants are a key player during the second stage of financial identity theft, 
where perpetrators aim to misuse the previously acquired payment product or 
information. The e-commerce boom increased the pressure for improved means 
of identity authentication. Such an improved means is attempted through the 3D 
secure system but remains uncertain with respect to its effectiveness. In the 
Netherlands, the iDeal option comes accompanied by a higher level of 
authentication due to the reliance of the payment option on the two-factor 
authentication system used for Internet banking activities. This usage of a 
previously existing system, however, also comes accompanied by the same 
vulnerabilities to the Man in the Browser Attack (see section 5.4.2).  
For perpetrators of financial identity theft to carry out fraudulent transactions 
and to acquire personal information, access to the Internet is a vital tool. Internet 
access also increases the pool of suitable targets and decreases the risks associated 
with getting caught. This leads to the prominent role played by Internet Service 
Providers, who provide individuals with access to the Internet and can serve as 
host providers. In this sense, Internet Service Providers can facilitate both the first 
and the second stage, as their contribution to the opportunity structure is 
overarching. As became apparent, however, Internet Service Providers generally 
maintain prime incentives to improve security and attempt to keep illegal content 
removed from the Internet.  
Unlike the other actors, money mules are unique since they facilitate the rarely 
discussed third stage of financial identity theft. To actually profit from the 
proceeds, perpetrators of financial identity theft recruit money mules to 
circumvent audit trails. Such money mules therefore play a role in decreasing the 
risks associated with transferring money away from the victim’s account. As such, 
mules are important intermediaries within the overall operation to successfully 
obtain the proceeds of the crime.   
In contrast to the roles played by information brokers, payment processors, 
and merchants, therefore, Internet Service Providers and money mules are unique 
in their role as which enhances their importance in the facilitation of financial 








8  From Piece to Puzzle 
 
 
The idea of a jigsaw puzzle is a suitable metaphor for the problem of financial 
identity theft. The previous five chapters provide an in-depth and detailed 
overview of the individual pieces of the puzzle, or rather the facilitating factors of 
financial identity theft. This chapter, in contrast, takes a step back to observe the 
entire puzzle, or the broad picture, in an effort to develop an opportunity 
structure. Ronald V. Clarke uses the notion of a crime opportunity structure to 
demonstrate the interdependent relationship between crime opportunity and a 
variety of societal aspects.1175 These include socio-economic structure, including 
demographics and geography, as well as lifestyle/routine activity and physical 
environment. All of these aspects influence the core of the crime opportunity 
structure which contains the victims, targets, and facilitators. Since the opportunity 
structure takes a comprehensive approach to the social context of crime, its 
construction for financial identity theft must contain both the overarching features 
of all facilitating factors as well as an understanding of the underlying mechanisms 
which nurture them. This is precisely why the usage of the process tracing 
approach was appropriate to gain valuable background information on the 
underlying mechanisms which established the (potential) facilitating factors as well 
as the process of facilitation of financial identity theft itself.  
   
8.1 Opportunity Structure of Financial Identity Theft 
 
8.1.1 Information: Abundance, Availability, Accessibility 
 
Information is everywhere and provided by everyone. This is, after all, the 
information society. This abundance of information is mainly the result of the 
developments made in the field of digital technology. Various aspects of 
information collection and processing which hindered the massive character of 
such activities in the physical world are no longer an obstacle in the virtual world. 
The exponential growth of information storage capacity has been closely followed 
by the amount of information stored, processed, and shared. This in turn also 
came accompanied by the escalating importance of information in contemporary 
society, especially as the Internet began to play a more prominent role in daily 
routine activities. The importance of information in the information society 
therefore is apparent. This importance has transformed information itself into a 
hot product.1176 Clarke developed the idea of hot products and used the following 
acronym to describe its criminogenic attributes: CRAVED. This acronym stands 
for Concealable, Removable, Available, Valuable, Enjoyable and Disposable. Hot 
products do not necessarily embody all of these attributes in a similar way and 
variations of degrees certainly exist, as Clarke and Newman recognize.1177 
Information certainly has the ability to embody all of these attributes, but
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especially its value and availability have developed it into a hot product.1178 
Information, according to Newman & Clarke, is a prime ingredient found in all 
products of e-commerce and this ingredient is therefore often the target of crime 
in the virtual world. This finding is directly transferable to the realm of financial 
identity theft, for information is a prime ingredient for perpetrators to carry out 
their activities. This is apparent since the acquisition of information is the first 
stage of any financial identity theft operation. As a result, much emphasis 
throughout the previous chapters is placed on information and its abundance, 
availability, and accessibility.  
 The abundance of information is in part a response to the perception of such 
information accumulation as a means to reduce risks and uncertainties.1179 
According to Richard V. Ericson and Kevin D. Haggerty, “[r]isk society operates 
within a negative logic that focuses on fears and the social distribution of ‘bads’. 
Collective fear and foreboding underpin the value system of the unsafe society, 
perpetuate insecurity, and feed demands for more knowledge of risk.”1180 This 
demand for more knowledge of risk in turn feeds the craving for more 
information collection. For the state as protector, such information collection 
appears vital in an effort to establish collective security. Whereas the overview in 
section 3.4 proved more reflective on the instruments implemented to accomplish 
individual security, the competition between both hovered in the background. The 
objective of collective security considers privacy its enemy rather than its friend. 
This juxtaposition is problematic for privacy, or more specifically data protection, 
is an instrument of individual security. This dichotomy is masterfully subjected to 
scrutiny by the Committee Brouwer-Korf in the Netherlands. This scrutiny 
exposes the potential flaws of reasoning in the portrayal of a dichotomy between 
privacy and security, for information collection and storage can also lead to a 
potential state of insecurity.  
The events of September 11, 2001 and the overall fight against terrorism 
increased the desire of the state to accumulate more information. The passage of 
the USA Patriot Act of 2001 provides a prime example of this cause and effect 
development. Priscilla M. Regan provides a detailed overview of the expansion of 
powers granted to the state through the implementation of the USA Patriot 
Act.1181 Based on her overview she states, “[a]lthough an omnibus approach to 
privacy protection has traditionally been viewed as inappropriate in the United 
States, an omnibus approach to privacy reduction in the face of terrorism appears 
now to be appropriate.”1182 Collective security then trumps individual security.  
 This thrust for more information collection also proved its presence in the 
European Union. In a framework decision proposal, the Council of the European 
Union writes “[s]ince 9/11, law enforcement authorities around the world have 
come to realise the added value of collecting and analysing so-called PNR data in 
combating terrorism and organized crime.”1183 The Council furthermore notes 
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how “[t]he collection and analysis of PNR data allows the law enforcement 
authorities to identify high risk persons and to take appropriate measures.”1184 
This demonstrates the continued connection made between risk reduction and the 
accumulation of information. Besides PNR data, the United States also desires 
information on bank account related matters from the European Union. 
According to the United States government, access to such data is vital for the 
efforts to prevent terrorist financing. Vice-President Biden specifically stated how 
“[t]he longer we are without an agreement on the terrorist-finance tracking 
programme, the greater the risk of a terrorist attack that could have been 
prevented.”1185 Once again, risk prevention dominates the demands.  
The usage of 9/11 as a justification for this information collection is surprising 
especially since the 9/11 Commission makes no mention of a lack of information. 
Instead, the Commission focused much of its attention on problems associated 
with information sharing. “We learned…” the Commission states, “…of the 
pervasive problems of managing and sharing information across a large and 
unwieldy government that had been built in a different era to confront different 
dangers.”1186 The focus is on managing and sharing information, not on its 
collection. In fact, the Commission details the considerable collection of reports 
on the possible threat of a terrorist attack. More specifically, the Commission 
writes how “[i]n the spring of 2001, the level of reporting on terrorist threats and 
planned attacks increased dramatically to its highest level since the millennium 
alert.”1187 By the time the Summer of 2001 arrived, the ‘system was blinking red.’ 
Despite the blinking, “…no one looked at the bigger picture; no analytic work 
foresaw the lightning that could connect the thundercloud to the ground.”1188 The 
lack of connection between individual cases failed to develop the threat into a 
national priority. As noted in section 3.2.1, during the background sketch of the 
FBI and its reprioritization process, the events of September 11 found themselves 
cast as the result of an intelligence failure. The call for more information 
inherently contradicts the conclusions of the Commission on the lead up to the 
events. Moynihan & Roberts describe the significant light September 11 shed on 
the problems of coordination within the United States government. They write 
how, “[t]he September 11 attacks highlighted failures in coordination within the 
intelligence community, between intelligence agencies and federal law enforcement 
agencies, and between the four agencies—INS, Customs Service, Coast Guard, 
and Bureau of Consular Affairs—responsible for border management.”1189 
Problems of coordination originated through technical as well as organizational 
channels, where obstructions to collaboration often occurred due to poorly 
integrated or incompatible information systems. The Commission itself wrote how 
“[t]he agencies are like a set of specialists in a hospital, each ordering tests, looking 
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for symptoms, and prescribing medications. What is missing is the attending 
physician who makes sure they work as a team.”1190  
The Netherlands proves to be hardly any different. The advisory committee on 
data flow security reached similar conclusions to the 9/11 Commission.1191 The 
advisory committee aimed to analyze the systemic approach used by those 
involved in national security with respect to information collection from external 
databases. Such a systemic approach did not exist.1192 Instead the advisory 
committee discovered how all agencies used different approaches to carry out 
their information collection activities. Those involved in the area of security lack a 
common vision on the importance of external databases for the development of 
information and intelligence.1193 Closely related is the lack of cooperation between 
the various parties involved within the security realm. Despite the expansive 
growth of the number of databases and the importance of such databases for 
security, their existence and usage receives insufficient political and administrative 
attention. Simultaneously, strategic attention with respect to the information 
maintained in these databases is also absent. The actual collection of information 
is fragmented and realized through a sectoral approach.1194 
Charles den Tex reflects on the information collection practices of the State 
and describes how Corien Prins previously noted that “[t]he government’s 
approach to cyber crime is insufficient, and what is more, the government actually 
stimulates cyber crime by not trying to curb its own information hunger and that 
of companies.”1195 Den Tex in turn responds and cleverly states: don’t you just 
love the way she calls it information HUNGER. That’s neat, isn’t it. HUNGER. 
By saying it is HUNGER, she is saying that is really a natural drive. You can’t fight 
hunger, you have to eat. It’s natural. Governments,  companies and especially 
large companies, all over the world have this insatiable HUNGER. The poor 
things. It is not Hunger, of course, it is obsession. Pure obsession. What they need 
is therapy. Intensive therapy. Their information hunger has turned into to full 
scale irreversible information obesity. They cannot live without feeding their 
obsession.”1196    
 The obsession expressed by governments is exacerbated by the developments 
in the corporate world. The proliferation of information brokers, especially in the 
United States, demonstrates the profitable nature of catering to the information 
obsession of both the public and the private sector. This availability and 
accessibility in the data brokerage industry also managed to attract the attention of 
perpetrators of financial identity theft. ChoicePoint remains the embodiment of 
this aspect of the opportunity structure. Its existence and its practices nevertheless 
cater to the quest for collective security and as such trump the threat the broker 
poses to individual security. Robert O’Harrow highlights the beneficial impact of 
the events of September 11 on the business of ChoicePoint. For “[s]uddenly 
everyone was uneasy, and not just about terrorists.”1197 Data brokers manage to fill 
a void through providing law enforcement with more information than can be 
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legally obtained via public sector channels. As a result, the usage of information 
brokers by the state, in particular law enforcement, nurtures the existence and 
subsequent survival of the industry.1198 This reliance functions as a facilitation of 
the first stage of financial identity theft. For as the data security breach of 
ChoicePoint demonstrated, perpetrators of financial identity theft target the 
industry for the acquisition of personal information. This is especially due to 
abundance and availability of such information. The reliance of the state itself on 
the existence of the industry also leads to a conflict of interest for the existence 
and the practices of the industry threaten individual security, but the state uses its 
services in an attempt to establish collective security.  
The information brokerage industry in the United States maintains a more 
expansive character than in the Netherlands. As section 7.1.2 indicated, the 
information brokerage industry in the Netherlands is hardly an industry of a 
similar nature for such information agencies cater to a smaller population and 
actually are more carefully scrutinized by the Data Protection Authority office. 
The ‘industry’ remains restricted to the needs of debt collectors, attorneys, and 
others. And as such, it seems as though perpetrators of financial identity theft 
have not identified these information agencies as a suitable target for their 
activities.  
Even so, the abundance and availability of information are not in and of 
themselves the most problematic aspects with respect to the facilitation of 
financial identity theft. The accessibility of such information by perpetrators of 
financial identity theft is. Lawrence E. Cohen & Marcus Felson included access as 
one of the four elements derived from human ecology to determine the suitability 
of targets (see section 1.2), which underscores the importance of accessibility 
within an overall opportunity structure for financial identity theft. Accessibility of 
information increased as a result of advances in digital technology. Such 
accessibility proved a welcomed addition for the state as provider, but also 
introduced a conflict with its role as protector. The digital accessibility of the 
information maintained by the state both as protector and as provider in turn 
hypothetically opens the door to increased intrusion by perpetrators of financial 
identity theft. The developments in the Netherlands with respect to the Municipal 
Personal Records Database offer many benefits in terms of efficiency and 
convenience; yet, the GBA-V which provides for online access to a central version 
of the database requires sufficient security to prevent access by those interested in 
the acquisition of personal information in an effort to carry out acts of financial 
identity theft. The background of the developments surrounding the GBA-V, 
however, demonstrates the focus on efficiency and convenience, along with a need 
for modernization of the system (see section 4.1.1).  
To frame the changes in a sense of modernization also allows the 
transformation to carry an air of progress which is a more general trend in 
contemporary society with respect to technological developments. The complexity 
of interests associated with technological innovation and societal ‘progress’ is 
powerfully captured by Ullrich Beck. He writes how “...the demonstration of side 
effects (at least at an early date) collides with the economic and economic policy 
interests that are invested in the chosen path of technological development. The 
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more the side effects (or public sensitivities to them) grow and the greater the 
interest in economic recovery becomes (also in view of mass unemployment), that 
much narrower becomes the freedom of action for technology policy, which is 
caught between the milestones of a critical public and economic priorities.”1199 To 
resolve the conflict of interest, or to relief the conflict, those in favor of 
technological innovation frame their investments through the idea of progress. 
Beck succinctly captures the essence of the model of progress when he writes, 
“[p]rogress is a blank page as a political program, to which wholesale agreement is 
demanded, as if it were the earthy road to heaven.”1200 The promise of progress 
silences the cries of the critics. The technological promise of efficiency appeals to 
those in the public and the private sector, whereas its convenience attracts the 
permission of the public (see section 8.1.4). This is problematic since the challenge 
of security remains, which finally found itself in the spotlight as a result of the 
media reports on data security breaches. As became evident in section 3.4, such 
stories led to sufficient political pressure to invite the attention of policy makers. 
Simultaneously, the background also demonstrates the shortfall of instruments of 
data protection to fulfil their purpose with respect to individual security. Whereas 
data security breaches prove to be the representation of such a shortfall, its 
occurrence also characterizes the treatment of personal information in 
contemporary society, in both the United States and the Netherlands. The promise 
of progress enhanced through technological advancements often managed to 
overshadow the potential perils of such developments. This changed in part due 
to the involvement of the general public. For the United States, the Watergate 
scandal (see section 3.3.1) generated sufficient attention to accumulate political 
pressure, whereas in the Netherlands the census of 1971 accomplished a similar 
task (see section 3.3.2). Even so, other threats, especially terrorism, manage to 
generate significant momentum to allow the pendulum to swing the other way.   
 The private sector, including financial service providers, also engages in the 
information collection process. Richard J. Sullivan succinctly captures the problem 
when he writes, “[m]ore information will generally lead to a more accurate 
approval decision, which gives card issuers (and merchants) an incentive to 
continuously expand the data on which they rely. Criminals also have strong 
incentives to gather and use this same information to commit fraud. The 
incentives of these two groups results in an escalating cycle that leads to more 
resources on each side to either protect or to compromise data.”1201 This 
demonstrates the presence of double edge swords which plague many aspects of 
the opportunity structure of financial identity theft (see section 8.3.5).  
The provision of information continues as a red thread of facilitation through 
all actors, including consumers. For consumers, the digital world is like a virtual 
playground. Social Networking Sites (SNS) provide the most illustrative example 
of the web 2.0 boom. The popularity of Facebook and Twitter continue to 
skyrocket. The appeal of SNS to share vast amounts of information also increases 
the public availability of such information. Much information is about mundane 
whereabouts and daily activities, but another share of the information is more 
personal and therefore more valuable. The eagerness of consumers to share 
personal information in the virtual world is magnified by the ability of third parties 
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to gain access to such information (see section 6.2.1), since such information is a 
source of profit for SNS. Even so, important to note is how the membership of a 
SNS remains a choice rather than an obligation. The revolution surrounding the 
practices of SNS seems to at times forget this aspect of the debate, especially since 
SNS have managed to evolve into a near necessary element of life in 
contemporary society which raises the stakes for members of the sites.  
For perpetrators, personal information is the key to the kingdom. The 
abundance and availability of personal information is important, but its 
accessibility is vital. This accessibility is mainly achieved via the digitalization of 
information, which is an integral aspect of contemporary society since such 
digitalization comes accompanied by the benefits of efficiency and convenience. 
This is especially so since such access to information is no longer bound by time 
or location which leads to a sense of ‘progress.’ This ‘progress’ is important in a 
society where speed is of the essence since instant gratification has become 
common place. Moreover, the focus on risk assessment and risk reduction, and 
the role of information played to achieve such objectives also enhances the 
importance of instant accessibility and as such requires the implementation of 
advanced means of digital technology. The necessity for improved security 
alongside this increased accessibility, however, remains underacknowledged or 
simply ignored.    
 
8.1.2 ‘Function Creep’ 
 
Information acquires its value due to its purpose in contemporary society. The 
expansion of the purpose of information, especially in the virtual world, therefore 
logically leads to an increase in its value. The above section mainly referred to the 
aspect of the opportunity structure which caters to the first stage of financial 
identity theft, the information acquisition stage. This section instead shall cover 
how the overarching theme of function creep led to the potential and partial 
facilitation of the second stage of financial identity theft.  
Several instruments introduced by governments experience an expansion of 
applicability or ‘functions’ beyond their original intent. This is often referred to as 
function creep, or its more negative alternatives ‘surveillance creep’ and ‘control 
creep.’1202 Whether such a function expansion is positive or negative is based on a 
value judgment,1203 especially since such expansion can maintain both advantages 
and disadvantages. As Dahl and Saetnan write, “[t]he term function creep may in a 
given case refer to the skin-crawling, chilling nature of the latest added function 
and/or the sneakiness of an undemocratic, secretive process of socio-technical 
change…but it may also simply refer to slow, considered, and accepted 
change.”1204 Even so, this section analyzes the increased risk of financial identity 
theft as a result of function creep.  
The most prominent example of function creep is the usage of Social Security 
Numbers in the United States. Former President Roosevelt introduced the Social 
Security Number with a specific purpose, but as became obvious in section 4.2.1 
the original intent is lost in its expansion of uses across both the public and the 
private sector. This state of affairs is difficult to comprehend in light of its 
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historical background, since in the early days no proof of identification was 
required to obtain a social security card. Moreover, the main problem of the 
function creep of Social Security Numbers is the reliance on the instrument for 
verification purposes despite its public availability and accessibility. The problem 
for financial identity theft therefore is the value of the number which makes it an 
attractive object for perpetrators as an instrument to carry out acts of financial 
identity theft. This is a problem familiar to many in the United States and abroad, 
but remains a difficult challenge to respond to by the government. This is mainly 
the result of the advantages associated with the function expansion of Social 
Security Numbers. For such an expansion provided both the public and the 
private sector to benefit from an existing system which meant additional costs 
remained out of sight. In addition, the usage of the number is convenient for the 
public and the private sector as well as citizens and residents.  
The developments with respect to identity numbers in the Netherlands 
demonstrate a vague resemblance to the early days in the United States when 
function creep began to occur. This resemblance is evident through the 
transformation demonstrated by the government from a historical perspective. 
Initially, as became evident in section 4.2.2, the government proved resilient 
against the evolution of the social-fiscal number into a general identity number. 
This resilience in theory failed to translate into practice as the social-fiscal number 
did become the de facto identity number. When the government introduced the 
citizen service number, it demonstrated an acceptance of the state of affairs at that 
time and made it official. The expansion of the citizen service number into the 
health care sector demonstrates its function creep into other sectors. The evidence 
to demonstrate the escalation of function creep also becomes evident through the 
proposal to provide for the usage of the number in the sector of financial services. 
In retrospect, it is interesting to note how during the parliamentary discussions on 
the topic of the introduction of a citizen service number, the government 
refrained from discussing its potential usage by institutions outside of the public 
sector. And as a result, the current developments with respect to the health care 
and financial services sector demonstrate how function creep occurs at a later 
stage and in a more incremental fashion. The comparison to the frog and the pot 
of boiling water is therefore a suitable metaphor. The incremental nature of the 
function creep with respect to the citizen service number manages to fragment the 
potential ‘threat’ which makes the danger of such a threat appear low. The early 
warnings1205 issued against the function creep of the citizen service number 
therefore do not maintain a significant impact on developments in the public 
policy arena.  
Due to the potential for future legal authorization, where additional usage of 
an instrument becomes part of the legal framework during a later stage, Pounder 
calls function creep an inevitability and therefore states how such function creep 
should be anticipated.1206 As such, Pounder states how the focus should be on 
whether the legal framework in place provides sufficient means of protection 
when such function creep occurs. For the United States, the answer appears to be 
negative, since the framework proved ineffective as an instrument of protection 
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for the people against problematic function creep. Furthermore, the situation in 
the United States also demonstrates the challenges introduced as a result of the 
need to restrict the negative consequences of function creep. To restrict the 
negative consequences, a reversal of function creep itself must occur, which often 
implies the introduction of a different system to allow the original system to return 
to a more specific purpose and to reduce its value and its attractive nature for 
perpetrators of crime. This is difficult because of the costs associated with the 
introduction of a different system and because the reversal of function creep is 
more challenging than the actual function creep itself. Metaphorically speaking, it 
is easier to pour the liquid out of a bottle into a glass than vice versa.  
 The existence of function creep in other areas of the identification 
infrastructure enhances its importance in the overall development of an 
opportunity structure for financial identity theft. The usage of ‘identification’ 
documents is another pertinent example. In the United States, the driver’s license 
is the de facto means of identification used for identification purposes and 
accepted by the public and the private sector. This surpasses the original intent of 
the driver’s license, which is to demonstrate someone’s legal capacity to operate a 
vehicle. Once again, from a perspective of convenience and efficiency this is 
understandable; yet, such function creep increases the value of the document for 
perpetrators can use them as means of identification which surpasses the specific 
purpose of the license. In the Netherlands, the driver’s license also carries multiple 
functions, just as the passport. The plan to incorporate a chip onto the driver’s 
license which shall also evolve into an electronic identity demonstrates the 
intention to use an existing system and benefit from its potential to encompass 
multiple functions. Dahl and Saetnan summarize this underlying motivation of 
function creep when they write, “[o]nce a technology is in place, it becomes 
wasteful not to use it to the fullest acceptable limit.”1207  
Even so, there is a vital difference between the situation in the United States 
and the Netherlands. As a member state of the European Union, the Netherlands 
is subject to the decision making at the European level. As a result many 
developments which attempt to both enhance and harmonize identification 
documents in the European Union influence the quality of the document in the 
Netherlands. This transnational influence was a positive one several decades ago 
when the passport in the Netherlands carried a particularly negative reputation as a 
result of its sensitivity to fraud (see section 4.3.2). From a situational crime 
prevention perspective, the standardization requirements led to an increase in the 
effort which had to be made by perpetrators of identity theft to falsify the 
document. This, however, did lead to displacement of the problem to the issuance 
process, which the state has since responded to over the years. Overall, the 
situation in the Netherlands sketches a scene where the importance of 
identification documents, whether passports or driver’s licenses, is reflected in 
efforts to ensure the integrity of both the quality of the product and the issuance 
process. Whereas originally both demonstrate vulnerabilities, the government has 
made changes to improve both the product and the process. This is important 
since such efforts aim to mitigate the potential negative impact of function creep, 
since these efforts complicate the attainment of the document or the falsification 
of such a document.  
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The United States, on the other hand, remains caught in a situation filled with 
tension and resentment. The REAL ID Act aimed to harmonize and enhance the 
quality of driver’s licenses but found itself in the midst of various debates. From a 
perspective of Federalism, the involvement of the Federal government proved 
controversial for the issuance of driver’s licenses is outside of its scope and falls 
under the sovereignty of the states. Other sentiments which focus on the 
connection between the potential abuse of power and the implementation of a 
national identity card also complicate the efforts made by the government in the 
United States. As a result, improvements with respect to both the quality of the 
document as well as the issuance process remain subject to variation based on the 
perspective of the different States.  
The overarching ‘instrumental’ function creep can also be extended to the 
functionality of the computer which, in contemporary society, has significantly 
expanded and as a result also led to an expansion of opportunities. Much like the 
stretch of an elastic band, such an expansion of functionality increases the tension 
and places a higher pressure on the security of the instrument to prevent it from 
‘snapping.’ This is where perpetrators of financial identity theft have managed to 
take advantage of the function creep, since their innovative methods of attack 
have generally surpassed the capacity, or the willingness, of both the public and 
the private sector to resist such attacks. This is problematic since the function 
creep is a continuous process, especially with respect to the delivery of ‘services’ 
by the state via the Internet, as well as private sector activities such as Internet 
banking.      
The spread of applications for the mobile environment also demonstrates 
function creep which in turn expands opportunities and suitable targets. The 
mobile environment did not necessarily feature as an integral aspect of the 
opportunity structure throughout the previous chapters, but instead hovered in 
the background and ought to receive more attention in light of future applications. 
The usage of the mobile phone for transactions (see section 5.4.2) as well as for 
means of authentication (see section 4.4.2) demonstrates its function creep. This 
function creep is the result of both efficiency and convenience (see section 8.1.2). 
Jon Giffin notes how “[m]alware commonly targets personal desktop systems, and 
the rapid changes happening today in personal computing offer new opportunities 
for attackers. Infections are poised to spread to mobile environments. The recent 
emergence of smart phones as viable, full-featured systems provides an entirely 
new collection of attack targets.”1208 
Overall, the most fundamental problem with function creep is the 
development of a single point of vulnerability, which when compromised 
subsequently paves the way for the facilitation of financial identity theft. The 
existence or potential for function creep within the identification infrastructure 
developed by the state as provider is widespread. This is in large part due to the 
efficiency of function creep and its accompanying convenience.   
 
8.1.3 From Elite to Mass 
 
Certain features covered in the previous chapters demonstrate a historical 
progression from an instrument available exclusively to an elitist crowd into an 
instrument of the masses. This transformation is important on two different 
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dimensions. First, such a transformation changes the scale of the feature and 
therefore increases the applicable population. This increase also translates into an 
increase of suitable targets for perpetrators of crime, as the routine activity 
approach recognizes as a crucial element (see section 1.2). The difference between 
MAC and PC users demonstrates this difference of scalability. To this day, the 
majority of end users are PC users which makes the PC, or its users, more suitable 
as a target. This is in contrast to the smaller MAC population. The increase of 
suitable targets for financial identity theft occurred, in part, through the 
transformation of credit cards from an instrument associated with the elite to a 
tool used by the masses to purchase goods on credit. The same goes for the 
transformation of the passport from a privilege to an obligation (see section 4.3).  
Second, a transformation from elite to mass means the population which can 
gain access or entry to a particular tool or feature also increases, which often 
means the entry requirements decrease which changes the overall access control. 
This change in entry requirements is an important aspect of the opportunity 
structure since perpetrators of financial identity theft manage to take advantage of 
this lowered threshold. Credit cards demonstrated their historical progression 
from an elitist product into a means for the masses to purchase goods and services 
on credit. Such a progression increased the interest of financial service providers 
to attract as many clients as possible. This became evident through the marketing 
practices of the mass distribution of unsolicited credit cards (see section 5.1.1). 
Whereas the United States government stepped in to curb these practices, other 
marketing instruments such as the mass distribution of pre-approved credit card 
applications still provide opportunities for perpetrators of financial identity theft. 
And besides the marketing instruments, the application process involved in the 
credit card procedure also demonstrates the decrease in requirements as a result of 
the endemic dilemma, where lower entry requirements lead to more applicants and 
profit but also to more fraud (see section 5.2.1). The absence of such practices in 
the Netherlands along with the absence of mass appeal for credit cards to the 
Dutch population provides for a more limited opportunity structure in this regard. 
The credit card in the Netherlands maintained an exclusive character, only to be 
used when other alternatives proved unavailable (see section 5.1.2). This is hardly 
the case in the United States which is the epitome of a ‘credit card nation.’ Robert 
D. Manning writes how “[a]fter celebrating the arrival of the new millennium, 
American society registered another less publicized millennial milestone: almost 
1.5 billion consumer credit cards. That’s right, 1.5 billion cards held by nearly 158 
million cardholders. That’s an average of ten credit cards per cardholder.”1209 
According to Manning, consumer credit has become the lifeblood of the economy 
in the United States since the early 1980s. As a matter of fact, Manning describes 
how credit cards play such a prominent role “…in influencing domestic economic 
trends (inflation, GDP, and employment) that President Carter in 1980 and 
President Bush in 1991 sought to regulate officially the availability and cost.”1210 
This demonstrates the character of necessity of credit cards in the United States 
and also provides a context for the continuous promotion of the product.      
Another development which resembles a similar historical progression and 
subsequently evolved into an opportunity for perpetrators of financial identity 
                                                
1209  Manning, R. D. (2000). Credit Card Nation: the Consequences of America’s Addiction to Credit. Basic  
Books: 5 – 6.  
1210  Ibid: 6.  
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theft to profit from is the background of Facebook. As section 6.2.1 
demonstrated, perpetrators of financial identity theft target SNS, especially 
Facebook, to acquire personal information or to transmit malicious software. 
Whereas Facebook currently maintains massive appeal and users from all over the 
world, its historical roots demonstrate its elitist nature. Originally, Facebook was 
only available and accessible for individuals, whether students or employees, from 
a select group of universities in the United States. Facebook carried out access 
control through only allowing individuals in the possession of an email address 
from member universities to establish a profile. This meant the right to access 
Facebook was viewed as a privilege. This observation is reinforced through my 
personal experience since Facebook provided the University of Maryland, 
Baltimore County access to its site in 2005. This became headline news for the 
university as the student newspaper covered most of its front page with a story 
about this ‘privilege.’ Much has changed since then, especially since Facebook is 
no longer a privilege. Some might even argue how in contemporary society 
Facebook is a necessity much the same as a passport or a credit card. The most 
crucial aspect of the transformation engaged in by Facebook is the elimination of 
access control which translates into facilitation for perpetrators of financial 
identity theft to gain access to the site and to the personal information posted on 
the profiles. Certainly Facebook introduced privacy options which allowed users 
to guard their profiles, but as Bilge et al. demonstrated through profile cloning, 
perpetrators still maneuver their way to the personal information maintained in a 
profile.1211 
The transformation from elite to mass overall demonstrates an increase in a 
population of suitable targets as well as a reduction in access control which 
negates an opportunity reduction technique as identified by the situational crime 
prevention framework. Through such a decrease in access control, perpetrators 
take advantage of the ability to obtain access to valuable targets such as personal 
information and credit cards.  
 
8.1.4 The Cost (and Profit) of Convenience 
 
Many of the facilitating factors which surfaced throughout the previous chapters, 
especially chapter 4 and 5, illustrate the connection between convenience and the 
facilitation of financial identity theft. As a result, the facilitation of financial 
identity theft is the cost of convenience. This can be observed through several 
facilitating factors. Among the most prominent factors are the acquisition and 
application process used for financial services in the United States. The 
distribution of unsolicited credit cards as a marketing instrument aimed to appeal 
to the convenience craving of consumers. As the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System notes, “[f]or consumers, prescreened solicitations reduce 
search costs by providing them with ready information about product availability 
and pricing tailored more closely to their financial experiences and needs. Such 
screening also increases the likelihood that consumers responding to such 
solicitations qualify for the product or service being offered and thereby reduces 
the possibility that the consumer will be wasting his or her time and effort when 
                                                
1211  Bilge, L., Strufe, T. Balzarotti, D. & E. Kirda (2009). All Your Contacts Are Belong to Us:  
Automated Identity Theft Attacks on Social Networks. Paper presented at the 18th International World 
Wide Web Conference. 
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responding to a mailing.”1212 Simultaneously, the convenience of the application 
process is intended to maintain a smooth path for consumers to apply for a credit 
card or another financial service.  
Such convenience again returns during the account activity of Internet banking 
in the United States. Despite the awareness about the security implications of a 
single factor authentication scheme, such scheme offered the much desired 
convenience which is viewed as a necessity to keep consumers content. As a 
result, while the facilitation of financial identity theft is the cost of convenience, 
the profit rests in the ability of such convenience to maintain and attract clients. 
 This focus on convenience in the financial services industry is less dominant in 
the Netherlands, where the sector itself is the object of more strict regulation but 
where the more limited number of players in the field also provides for a more 
balanced approach to security and convenience. This is apparent through the lack 
of aggressive marketing practices by the industry with respect to the acquisition 
process of prospective clients. The application process, especially the historical 
development, demonstrates how whereas several decades ago problems surfaced 
with respect to the identification of clients and the facilitation of fiscal fraud this 
changed through the introduction of a code of conduct (see section 5.2.2). The 
developments at the international and subsequent European level led to more 
changes and to a greater involvement of the state. The focus as a result remained 
more on security than on convenience. The same in turn applies to the 
introduction of Internet banking activities where security proved an integral aspect 
of the architectural development of such activities (see section 5.4.2). The Dutch 
Central Bank also played an important role as supervisory organ to ensure the 
aspect of security received sufficient attention by the financial service providers. 
While the absence of prevalence data only provides for hypothetical conclusions, 
this difference in approach with respect to the aspect of security and convenience 
in both the United States and the Netherlands appears to maintain a significant 
impact in the potential for facilitation of financial identity theft. This difference 
seems to be the result of scalability which in turn influences competition and 
priorities. The limited number of providers in the Netherlands appears to 
stimulate the development of an understanding, avoid free riders, and as such 
paves the way for a more appropriate balance between convenience and security. 
The interdependency of the problem is more pronounced with respect to 
convenience in the financial services industry in the United States than in the 
Netherlands. The lack of solidarity as a result of the fierce competition also makes 
financial service providers less inclined to improve their means of security since in 
so doing they may increase the threshold and lose clients to competitors.   
 For merchants, on the other hand, convenience plays a role in the adoption of 
improved means of security in the Netherlands. For the introduction of an 
additional hurdle through the 3D Secure system led many to demonstrate a 
hesitant stance due to the fear of losing clients to another online store (see section 
7.3). This is precisely why the introduction of an instrument of security requires 
solidarity among those within the industry, since such solidarity minimizes the 
potential for loss of clients and as such convenience loses its power as an 
argument against security.  
                                                
1212  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2004). Report to the Congress on Further Restrictions 
on Unsolicited Written Offers of Credit and Insurance: 3.  
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 The contested relationship between convenience and security returns with 
respect to the government as provider, and in particular the introduction of e-
government applications. The transformation of citizens into consumers led to a 
focus on service delivery. This became evident in section 4.4 as did the potential 
implications for the connection between convenience and security. Both the 
United States and the Netherlands recognized the need for the existence of 
multiple levels of identity authentication depending on the service and the 
transaction offered via the Internet. Even so, the introduction of DigiD as a 
means of electronic authentication in the Netherlands based its single factor 
authentication system more on convenience than on security (see section 4.4.2). 
For usability proved an important feature for the government in the Netherlands, 
since the government wanted to attract citizens to use the electronic superhighway 
in an effort to reduce the administrative burdens of various operations, especially 
tax returns. DigiD in the Netherlands is convenient and represents the lowest level 
of security. This changed through the addition of a text message as another aspect 
used for the authentication of the citizen. And the plans to revamp the system, 
DigiDX, also demonstrate awareness about the need to adjust the system 
according to the potential proliferation of more electronic services.  
 The importance of convenience as an aspect of the opportunity structure is 
evident through the suggested countermeasures. Certain off hand pieces of advice 
already demonstrate the need to backtrack on convenience as a means to improve 
security and achieve a sense of situational crime prevention. During his inaugural 
address, Sandro Etalle notes how “[t]o start with we can use one computer to visit 
untrusted sites and download untrusted software from the internet, and another 
computer to do business and internet banking.”1213 This might certainly help 
matters; yet, such a suggestion refutes the primary appeal of Internet banking, 
which is its lack of attachment to a particular time or location. So the suggestion 
put forth by Etalle is valuable but its value rests in the willingness to trade 
convenience for security, which emphasizes the overall cost of convenience as a 
means of facilitation of financial identity theft.  
   
8.2 Countermeasures 
 
The second part of this chapter aims to shed light on the existing countermeasures 
and to assess them in light of the above opportunity structure as well as according 
to the opportunity reduction techniques as set forth by the situational crime 
prevention framework. Important to (briefly) reflect upon before discussing 
existing countermeasures is the tension between economics and security. As the 
previous chapters along with the above described opportunity structure 
demonstrate, the facilitation of financial identity theft must be observed within its 
proper (social) context. This context includes the underlying mechanisms which 
nurture the facilitating factors and also illustrate how much facilitation occurs as a 
result of a cost benefit analysis. This same economic perspective returns with 
respect to countermeasures, where the investment of the security measure must 
arguably outweigh its costs in order to be worth the effort. The importance of the 
economical perspective returns in the literature and demonstrates how the 
effective countermeasure share a commonality, which is the ability to influence the 
                                                
1213  Etalle, S. (2008). Nice to know. Inaugural lecture Eindhoven University of Technology, October 3,  
2008.  
FROM PIECE TO PUZZLE     241 
 
 
(economical) incentives of the targeted actor. All four aspects of the opportunity 
structure demonstrate how much of the decision making process to implement 
particular features is based on the ability to work in a more efficient manner and as 
a result generate more profit or in the case of the state lower the costs, which 
especially during the most recent financial crisis, is particularly lucrative. The 
criticism addressed against existing countermeasures must therefore bear in mind 
that viable alternatives are scarce, at least alternatives which manage to provide an 
acceptable cost-benefit balance.   
 To provide a structure for the analysis of existing countermeasures, the 
situational crime prevention framework as briefly discussed in section 1.2 shall be 
used. This framework identifies four different categories of crime reduction 
techniques which each carry four specific types of aims.  This overview shall only 
focus on the first two categories introduced, since these capture most of the 
countermeasures discussed.  
 
8.2.1 Increasing the effort 
 
The major focus of countermeasures introduced against financial identity theft 
appears to focus on increasing the effort. The umbrella category of increasing the 
effort contains four different types of measures which include target hardening, 
access control, deflecting offenders, and controlling facilitators. According to 
Newman & Clarke, the first two types of measures are applicable to the e-
commerce environment whereas the latter two appear less applicable.1214 As a 
result, Newman & Clarke offer two alternatives which are more appropriate for 
the e-commerce environment. These two alternatives are safeguarding data 
integrity and authenticating identity.1215  
The first technique, target hardening, refers to measures introduced to increase 
the effort of obtaining the target. With respect to financial identity theft, the main 
target is the money. Yet, the focus from a situational crime prevention perspective 
must also be on the tools or instruments used to arrive at the money. The main 
target therefore is information in the virtual world and instruments, whether 
identification documents or credit cards, in the physical world. The opportunity 
structure described above reflected on the importance of the accessibility of such 
information and other instruments for the facilitation of financial identity theft.  
Both the United States and the Netherlands have introduced countermeasures 
which relate to target hardening. For information, both countries have engaged in 
public awareness campaigns in an effort to educate citizens about the potential 
misuse of information and as such the need for them to be cautious about 
providing personal information to third parties. The notion of consumer 
education as a means to raise awareness is evident in various sectors of society1216 
as is empirical research on their effectiveness, or lack thereof.1217 While certainly 
                                                
1214  Newman & Clarke (2003): 112.  
1215  Ibid.  
1216  See for example Bruhn, C.M. (1997). Consumer Concerns: Motivating to Action. Emerging Infectious  
Diseases, Vol. 3 (4): 511 – 515; Wood, A.L. & O.F. Wahl (2006). Evaluating the Effectiveness of a 
Consumer-Provided Mental Health Recovery Education Presentation. Psychiatric Rehabilitation Journal,  
Vol. 30 (1): 46 – 53. 
1217  Brown, K., Mcllveen, H. & C. Strugnell (2000). Nutritional awareness and food preferences of   
young consumers. Nutrition & Food Science, Vol. 30 (5): 230-235. 
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consumer education is important in an overall action plan to counter financial 
identity theft, their role and value should not be overestimated.  
Public awareness campaigns emphasize the need for anti-virus software and 
firewalls in an attempt to increase the effort of perpetrators of financial identity 
theft. Newman & Clarke also identify firewalls as an instrument of target 
hardening.1218 Particular problems exist with the advice provided through 
consumer education efforts with respect to financial identity theft. The main 
emphasis on the installation of anti-virus software and anti-malware is problematic 
for various reasons. First, the effectiveness of anti-virus software is limited due the 
ability of perpetrators to circumvent such means of software protection.1219 To 
circumvent detection perpetrators use rootkits. As Francis M. David et al. describe 
“[i]n order to surreptitiously control a compromised computer, an intruder 
typically installs software that tries to conceal malicious code. This software is 
commonly referred to as a rootkit. A rootkit hides itself and some malicious 
payload from the operating system, users and intrusion detection tools.”1220 Other 
options include releasing the malware at such a high speed that it can be installed 
before anti-virus software has the ability to be updated and offer consumers the 
necessary protection.1221 On the positive side, certain security professionals claim 
security software is making significant progress and is becoming more pro-active 
in the detection of new malware threats.1222 Even so, Stan Hegt notes how “...the 
importance of front-end software security solutions is stressed unnecessarily in 
current anti-phishing strategies because of the failure of current two-factor and 
two-channel authentication schemes.”1223 This statement supports the argument 
made in chapter 6 about the decreasing visibility and as such the decreasing ability 
of consumers to defend themselves against attacks from perpetrators of financial 
identity theft.  
Second, the emphasis on anti-virus software also brings along other negative 
consequences. Rather than a means to combat cybercrime, public awareness 
campaigns and especially the emphasis on anti-virus software actually might serve 
to nurture other types of online fraud. The introduction of rogueware 
demonstrates the adaptability of cybercriminals and presents society, especially 
consumers, with yet another considerable challenge. Correll & Corrons define 
rogueware as “...any kind of fake software solution that attempts to steal money 
from PC users by luring them into paying to remove nonexistent threats.”1224 This 
fake anti-virus software looks remarkably professional. GOVCERT, the Dutch 
government computer emergency response team, remarks how the team noted an 
explosive growth in fake anti-virus software.1225 Complaints about the existence of 
fake anti-virus software date back to at least 2000. Such fake anti-virus software 
                                                
1218  Clarke & Newman (2003). 
1219  See Fredrikson, M., Martignoni, L., Stinson, E. & S. J. J. Mitchell (2008). ‘A layered architecture for  
detecting malicious behaviors.’ 11th International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID  
2008). 
1220  David, F. M., Chan, E. M., Carlyle, J. C. & R. H. Campbell (2008). Cloaker: Hardware Supported  
Rootkit Concealment. Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA: 296.  
1221  Ollmann, G. (2008). The evolution of commercial malware development kits and colour-by-  
numbers custom malware. Computer Fraud & Security, Vol. 28: 4 – 7. 
1222  Gold, S. (2009). A Newsworthy year. Infosecurity, Vol. 6: 24 – 28. 
1223  Hegt, S. (2008). Analysis of Current and Future Phishing Attacks on Internet Banking Services. Master  
Thesis Technical University Eindhoven: 95.  
1224  Correll, S-P. & L. Corrons (2009). The Business of Rogueware: Analysis of the New Style of Online Fraud.  
Panda Security: 3.  
1225  GOVCERT (2009). Trendrapport 2009. Digital version available at: http://www.govcert.nl 
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exploits the fear of users and their security conscience, according to 
GOVCERT.1226 The increased fear generated among the public through consumer 
education efforts and the marketing of anti-virus software provides consumers 
with a gentle push into the hands of the criminals. Perhaps soon awareness 
campaigns will also commence to discuss the recognition of rogueware to make a 
complicated affair even more complex.    
Other measures introduced to accomplish target hardening are data security 
breach notification requirements since these aim to increase the incentives for 
organizations to improve information security practices. The focus on incentives is 
important since as Ross Anderson and Tyler Moore note “…people have realized 
that security failure is caused at least as often by bad incentives as by bad design. 
Systems are particularly prone to failure when the person guarding them is not the 
person who suffers when they fail.”1227 This is precisely why Anderson noted 
several years ago in 2001 how the solution to information insecurity rests in 
regulation rather than technology.1228 Data security breach notification embraces 
this regulatory need in an effort to establish improved information security which 
in turn ought to make it more difficult for perpetrators of financial identity theft 
to obtain information, or rather the target.  
Whether such a mechanism is effective is difficult to presently assess, 
especially since the actual implementation of data security breach legislation is still 
in a state of infancy. Moreover, the effectiveness depends more on the specifics of 
the plan rather than the premise itself. From a hypothetical perspective, the 
incentive to produce improved information security focuses on a specific 
facilitating factor of information accessibility through information insecurity. As a 
result, the successful implementation of a data security breach notification 
framework can result in an opportunity reduction, at least for the first stage of 
financial identity theft. For such an effect to occur, however, the incentive must be 
there, which is dependent on the (potential) damage the organization shall 
experience after a breach. This is precisely because of what Anderson and Moore 
refer to when they write about the discrepancy between the guardian of the 
personal information and the party who suffers from the information 
insecurity.1229 Potential intervening factors include desensitization which can occur 
when citizens receive an overload of notifications and as such shall not actually 
respond to the issue. Such a lack of response then fails to provide the incentive for 
organizations to improve their information security, since the potential loss of 
clients and as such profits is eliminated as a result of desensitization.  
Research about the impact of data security breach legislation is limited, but 
available. Based on event study methodology, Kevin M. Gatzlaff & Kathleen A. 
McCullough conclude how they found “…evidence that the stock market 
responds negatively to announcements of breaches of customer and/or employee 
data at publicly.”1230 This negative reaction is enhanced when the affected firm 
refuses to provide details about the breach. Gatzlaff & McCullough furthermore 
                                                
1226  Ibid. 
1227  Anderson, R. & T. Moore (2006). The Economics of Information Security. Science, Vol. 314 (5799):  
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1228  Anderson, R. (2001). Why Information Security is Hard - An Economic Perspective. Proceedings of  
the 17th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference: 358-366.  
1229  Anderson & Moore (2006).  
1230  Gatzlaff, K. M. & K. A. McCullough (2010). The Effect of Data Breaches on Shareholder Wealth.  
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note how the negative reaction proved strongest during the most recent time 
period included in the study. This, according to the authors, might be due to the 
anticipated increase in the perceived costs as a result of legislative initiatives.1231    
In addition to the aforementioned measures, both the American and the 
Dutch government also aimed to introduce measures to increase the effort of 
attaining identification documents. For the United States, the introduction of the 
REAL ID Act of 2005 aimed to function as a vehicle to complicate criminal and 
terrorist operations through the introduction of specific regulations about the 
requirements for the issuance process of driver’s licenses by individual states. The 
REAL ID Act also covered aspects which concerned the quality of the document 
and as such aimed to enhance the resistance of the document against potential 
falsification. This demonstrates the dual approach necessary to improve the 
safeguards of identification documents against potential usage of these 
instruments for the successful completion of a financial identity theft operation. 
The Netherlands, plagued by its turbulent history of the passport, also introduced 
several measures to improve both the quality of the product and the process in an 
endeavor to increase the effort for potential perpetrators. Such an increase in 
effort appears relevant especially in light of the facilitating factor which 
transformed the passport from a privilege into an obligation which made the 
document more accessible and used for a wider range of purposes than in the past.    
The effectiveness of the improvements made to the quality of the document, 
including the incorporation of additional technology such as biometrics remains a 
topic of discussion. Whether biometric technology could actually reduce the 
incidence of identity theft remains questionable, since such technology alters the 
identification rather than the verification process. Jan Grijpink & Corien Prins present 
the important distinction between these two different concepts. According to 
Grijpink & Prins, identification occurs when an individual establishes precisely 
who someone is. Verification, on the other hand, is the process where an 
individual establishes that a person is the same person as expected or basically that 
the person is who he or she claims to be.1232 This distinction is important with 
regard to the introduction of biometric technology because, as Grijpink & Prins 
note, without stronger and more unpredictable verification biometrics will not be 
very effective. As the authors state, “[u]nfortunately, people are often unaware of 
the limitations of the customary forms of personal identification, so that 
verification is often placed on a par with identification. Even if a person can be 
compared on the spot with a photograph on an identity card, the one-off and 
isolated verification can never provide certainty that the person in question is 
actually who he says he is.”1233 Grijpink and Prins observe that, with the exception 
of criminal law enforcement, a personal identification along the lines of ‘he is the 
same as…’ is sufficient for the majority of legal transactions.1234  
For the financial services sector, target hardening of information present on 
the magnetic stripe on the back of debit and credit cards is also an important 
aspect of the situational crime prevention framework. In the Netherlands, the 
                                                
1231  Ibid. 
1232  Grijpink, J. H. A. M. & J. E. J. Prins (2003). ‘New Rules for Anonymous Electronic Transactions?  
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FROM PIECE TO PUZZLE     245 
 
 
introduction of EMV technology represents such target hardening in an effort to 
reduce the opportunities for account takeover (see section 5.4.2). Even so, Ben 
Adida et al. provide an overview of (potential) vulnerabilities in the EMV scheme 
and note “[w]e hope that this whistle-stop tour shows that whilst EMV is 
undeniably a robust and secure payment protocol at heart, there is so much matter 
and complexity around the edges to get wrong that there will be plenty to keep the 
criminals fed and watered in the future; we look forward in particular to phish and 
chips!”1235  
For access control, the most well-known technique is the usage of pins and 
passwords; yet, as has become obvious due to the maturation of malicious 
software neither is able to offer much protection. As a result, the introduction of a 
two-factor authentication mechanism is important; the Netherlands has 
incorporated this aspect of access control. Even so, perpetrators of financial 
identity theft have demonstrated their capabilities of gaining access despite the 
existence of a two factor authentication system. The implementation of another 
means of authentication, the SMS message, then in turn again aims to restrict 
access control by potential perpetrators of financial identity theft. Despite the 
ability of perpetrators of financial identity theft to circumvent the system, 
however, it is important to maintain a balance in light of the tension previously 
identified between economics and security. Much more authentication elements 
inevitably eliminate the added value of online banking altogether, which is 
particularly undesirable in contemporary society.    
The most important type of opportunity reduction technique identified by 
Newman & Clarke for financial identity theft is authenticating identity. Newman 
& Clarke actually advance the position advocating the exclusive acceptance of 
credit cards for merchants since “…opportunities for credit card fraud are rapidly 
decreasing…”1236 This is difficult to assess, especially since credit card fraud, in 
particular account takeover type fraud, continues to remain a dominant category 
of financial identity theft. The industry has, however, made attempts to increase 
the effort and to enhance the means of authentication. This occurred originally 
through the introduction of the CVC codes, and later on through the 3D secure 
option. Both are vulnerable to circumvention, especially as a result of the 
proliferation of malware which can install keyloggers to obtain all information 
entered onto the screen.  
The different measures taken to increase the effort all demonstrate how such 
attempts are often a means to stall for time. Especially for the financial services 
industry, the changes introduced are an illustration of the arms race which 
financial service providers, as well as retailers, are engaged in with perpetrators of 
financial identity theft. Another problem associated with the idea of increasing the 
effort is the specialization of the crime industry. The necessary tools, such as the 
various forms of malicious software as well as personal information, including 
credit card numbers, can be purchased on the Internet, which means the increase 
in effort shall only be effective if such an increase is strong enough to thwart the 
innovators of the attacks. Because when innovative attacks surface, the Internet 
provide access to anyone willing to pay for the instruments to carry out such 
                                                
1235  Adida, B., Bond, M., Clulow, J., Lin, A., Murdoch, S., Anderson, R. & R. Rivest (n.d.). Phish and  
Chips (Traditional and New Recipes for Attacking EMV). Available at: 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/Phish-and-Chips.pdf (last accessed July 14, 2010): 1 – 2.  
1236  Newman & Clarke (2003): 121.  
246     FERTILE GROUNDS 
 
 
attacks which devalues the increase in effort intended to accomplish through the 
countermeasures.     
A glance at the reduction of other crimes provides limited inspiration. Ben 
Vollaard provides empirical evidence for the success of government intervention 
in the Netherlands with respect to high-quality locks and burglary-proof 
windows.1237 Starting in 1999, the government required all new-built homes to 
have these high-quality locks and burglary-proof windows. Through this 
government requirement, the Building Code needed to be adjusted accordingly. 
Vollaard describes how the change in the Building Code reduced the burglary risk 
in newly built homes by 50 percent. Through these results, Vollaard considers the 
government regulation for built-in security an effective means to lower crime and 
also determines how the regulation maintains considerable social benefits. The 
government regulation also proved more effective than other measures taken to 
lower levels of crime such as altering the preferences of potential offenders or the 
preferences of victims for precaution.”1238 Such built-in security may also be an 
attractive option for the threats described in this book. Egele et al. elaborate on 
such a solution when they “...propose to have defense mechanisms built into the 
browser itself to mitigate the threats that arise from drive-by download 
attacks.”1239 Such built-in security takes into consideration the limited ability of 
consumers to protect themselves against the most recent threats in the digital 
world. Perhaps the success of the physical world can be transported into the 
digital realm.  
 
8.2.2 Increasing the risk 
 
Increasing the perceived risk of a criminal act can occur through formal 
surveillance, surveillance by employees, natural surveillance, and exit/entry 
screening. For the e-commerce environment, Newman and Clarke note how this 
category of opportunity reduction techniques appears less relevant.1240 And that 
the last technique of exit/entry screening is difficult to distinguish from access 
control in a digital environment. Even so, since the opportunity structure also 
takes into consideration various aspects of the physical world which facilitate 
financial identity theft this category appears quite relevant to review existing 
countermeasures.  
The introduction of criminal legislation which specifically applies to 
perpetrators of identity theft in the United States provided a legal basis for dealing 
with the phenomenon as a crime. The main drive behind such legislation appeared 
to be the ability to recognize the victim and to provide a legal foundation for law 
enforcement to engage in identity theft investigations. The impact of 
criminalization therefore is more apparent in the periphery aspects of the problem 
rather than the actual ability to increase the perceived risk. This also became 
apparent through the research conducted into the views of convicted identity theft 
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offenders.1241 From a situational crime prevention perspective, criminalization is a 
limited means to function as crime prevention. This especially since the risk for 
perpetrators of financial identity theft is diminished by the ability of perpetrators 
to commit their crime at a safe distance through the Internet. This also leads to 
complications of enforcement as became evident in section 3.2.3.   
Based on the opportunity structure, other measures which attempt to increase 
the risk include the changes made to the treatment of incidents of lost or stolen 
identification documents in the Netherlands (see section 4.3.2). The pilot study 
conducted in the municipality of Amsterdam proves to be the start of such 
changes which aim to increase the risk of individuals who file reports of lost 
identification documents. Through the involvement of law enforcement and the 
potential for an investigation, the risk of filing for a lost identification document in 
an effort to receive a duplicate increases. This countermeasure targets the high 
number of missing identification documents through an increase in surveillance 
during the response procedure of lost documents.  
The government as protector also aims to increase the perceived risk in the 
financial services industry. This occurs primarily through a focus on the 
application process (see section 5.2.1). The United States Congress introduced the 
notion of ‘red flags’ through the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 
2003. These red flags are to serve as an instrument of surveillance by employees of 
financial service providers which is to lead to better detection of incidents of 
financial identity theft. This concerns the application process which, as became 
obvious, demonstrates its impact on the facilitation of financial identity theft 
through the emphasis placed on convenience and efficiency as opposed to 
security. Provisions from the USA Patriot Act also aimed to improve the 
identification procedures incorporated during the application process for financial 
services in the United States and as such increase the perceived risk of financial 
identity theft operations. The motive to introduce the requirement for identity 
theft prevention programs through the incorporation of red flags therefore takes 
into consideration a crucial aspect of the opportunity structure.  
The effectiveness of the red flags approach rests in the simultaneous 
correlation between detection and action. This is because mere detection without 
the appropriate action or response makes the countermeasure ineffective as a 
means to reduce the facilitation of financial identity theft. Hoofnagle’s analysis of 
fraudulent applications (see section 5.2.1) demonstrated how despite the presence 
of red flags, identified by an automated system, financial service providers still 
issued a line of credit. This makes the existence of red flags and its detection lack a 
contribution to the fight against financial identity theft.  
Financial service providers also already use software to detect suspicious 
account activity (see section 5.4). This occurs both in the United States and the 
Netherlands and provides financial service providers with an opportunity to catch 
the act of financial identity theft before the transaction occurs. Through the use of 
such methods, perpetrators see the risk of their operations being unsuccessful 
increased.  
The assessment made by Newman & Clarke about the lack of applicability of 
this category of opportunity reduction techniques within the virtual world appears 
accurate. The perception as well as the reality of risks on the Internet is low, 
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especially in comparison to risks in the physical world. As a result, the increase in 
perceived risks as a deterrent to prevent financial identity theft can only serve as a 




As the above demonstrates, countermeasures introduced against financial identity 
theft are hardly a silver bullet, and understandably so due to the tension between 
economics and security. Moreover, existing countermeasures must also be 
observed in connection to the challenges associated with the general introduction 
of crime prevention or rather crime reduction policy. The introduction of 
countermeasures in the fight against financial identity theft encounters several 
challenges. Certain challenges are particular to the complex character of financial 
identity theft whereas others are more general challenges faced by the public 
policy arena. Besides the challenges associated with the introduction of 
countermeasures, the effect of existing countermeasures also encounters obstacles. 
The list presented below is not meant to be exhaustive or comprehensive. Instead, 
the aspects selected are intended to provide a general indication of challenges 
which must be borne in mind when suggestions for other potential 
countermeasures are considered.  
 
8.3.1 Agenda Setting 
 
In Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, John W. Kingdon asks “[w]hat makes 
people in and around government attend, at any given time, to some subjects and 
not to others?”1242 This question, which Kingdon goes on to answer in the 
remainder of his book, is vital to consider in an effort to develop an understanding 
of the response offered by the state to (financial) identity theft. Kingdon refers to 
the importance and relevance of indicators, focusing events, crises, and symbols. 
Especially indicators of a problem are crucial to its transformation into an issue of 
public policy worthy of political attention. Kingdon notes how there is a need for 
indicators of a quantitative nature. As one of his interviewees stated, “[i]t helps for 
a problem to be countable.”1243 The quest for prevalence data in both the United 
States and the Netherlands immaculately demonstrates this need for quantitative 
indicators. But as described in chapter 1 and 2, identity theft is hardly a ‘countable 
problem.’ Still, the determination to accumulate quantitative means on the 
problem continues and the numbers which surface function as a crucial impetus to 
attract the attention of the public policy arena, especially the statistics which 
originate in the United States.  
 The challenge of ‘counting’ incidents of identity theft also indicates the need 
for other aspects to push the item higher on the political agenda. Kingdon notes 
how indicators are in and of themselves insufficient at times and need the 
assistance of focusing events, such as a crisis or a disaster, a powerful symbol, or a 
personal experience of a policy maker.1244 The rise of identity theft as a topic 
worthy of political attention demonstrates the essence of these aspects. Certain 
focusing events, such as September 11, 2001, placed vulnerabilities in the 
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identification infrastructure in the spotlight and led to the passage of the USA 
Patriot Act of 2001 and the REAL ID Act of 2005. Despite the onset of identity 
theft during the previous years, September 11, 2001 put the issue of identification 
genuinely on the map. This connection between terrorism and the increased 
attention devoted to the topic of identity authentication in both the public and the 
private sector demonstrates the dependency of financial identity theft on 
developments in other policy arenas, such as terrorism, money laundering, and 
illegal immigration. Especially, the know your customer provisions present in the 
USA Patriot Act received the necessary boost to see the light of day since previous 
attempts to implement such provisions failed due to the lack of support of a 
focusing event. Simultaneously, however, identity theft itself has also evolved into 
a vehicle used to target other policy objectives. As the enforcement of the Identity 
Theft Penalty Enhancement Act demonstrates (see section 3.1.1), the main policy 
objective is the ‘punishment’ of illegal immigration through a focus on the usage 
of ‘stolen identities’ by them.     
 Just as September 11, 2001 functioned as a focusing event to provide 
maximum exposure of the vulnerabilities present in the identification 
infrastructure, so did ChoicePoint in 2005 with respect to the practices of 
information brokers. Until then, the existence and practices of data brokers 
managed to remain out of the public eye and the early warnings issued by interest 
groups failed to generate sufficient attention for the problematic nature of the 
industry. When the ChoicePoint story broke in 2005, the protection of personal 
information and the more general issue of information security became a more 
pertinent topic on the political agenda. Suddenly, several states began to follow 
California’s lead, which was, after all, the first state to introduce a data security 
breach notification requirement in 2003.  
 The Choicepoint story is also indicative for the important role played by the 
media as an actor who influences the political agenda and the potential for 
problems to transform into issues of public policy. Kingdon devotes a section to 
the role played by the media in the agenda setting phase. The impact of media 
attention is, according to Kingdon, less powerful than generally expected or 
anticipated. This may be due to “…the press’s tendency to cover a story 
prominently for a short period of time and then turn to the next story, diluting its 
impact.”1245 Moreover, Kingdon considers the media to function merely as 
messengers rather than framers. Michael Hill refutes this marginalization of the 
role of the media during the agenda setting stage.1246 He claims how “…Kingdon’s 
interpretation of the transmission role of the media is just too facile.”1247 Unlike 
Kingdon, Hill specifically refers to the importance of when and how problems are 
reported by the media and their influence on the political attention devoted to the 
topic.   
 Still, the dilution of the impact of the media due to its extensive but brief 
coverage, as Kingdon emphasizes, is noticeable. The media coverage of the stories 
of victims in the Netherlands led to questions in the Lower House, but generally 
failed to receive a follow up in the form of a policy initiative. The Ministry of 
Justice itself noted how there is no direct cause for the criminalization of identity 
theft in the Netherlands. This was in contrast to the developments in the United 
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States, where such criminalization, as became evident in section 3.1.1, occurred 
due to the interaction of a victim with his political representative. The presence of 
a policy entrepreneur therefore became integral to the introduction of a separate 
criminal provision to combat identity theft. 
 Much of the agenda setting process, as a result, is reactive and incident-driven. 
This state of affairs is problematic for such an approach fails to lead to a 
comprehensive response to the problem, if such a response is even possible. In 
the United States, the political pressure on the government to act is evident from 
the combination of factors which provide financial identity theft with its agenda 
status in the arena of public policy. Its connection to illegal immigration and 
terrorism enhance its importance and confirm its place on the political agenda. In 
the Netherlands, the problem is gaining prominence on the political agenda, but is 
hardly in a similar position as it is in the United States. This, however, may merely 
be a matter of time as financial identity theft becomes a more spoken about topic 
at the transnational level. 
 
8.3.2  Crowded Policy Space 
 
In Speaking Truth to Power, Aaron Wildavsky asks, “[w]hy do we feel that policy 
problems never seem to be solved? As knowledge and skill grow in society, why 
do efforts to control public policies lag behind their ability to surprise us? Why 
don’t organizations that promote public policies seem to learn from their 
experience? If they do try, why do their actions lead to ever larger numbers of 
unanticipated consequences?”1248 “Because”, Wildavsky writes, “policy is 
evermore its own cause, programs depend less on the external environment than 
on events inside the sectors from which they come.”1249 Rather than suggesting 
how small solutions are always preferred, Wildavsky attempts to demonstrate how 
large solutions can displace the original difficulty and as a result create additional 
problems. This is due to the impact solutions in a single area can have on other 
policy areas. As Giandomenico Majone notes, “…in an already crowded policy 
space, solutions beget new problems in the form of policy overlaps, jurisdictional 
conflicts, and unanticipated consequences.”1250 Financial identity theft, as an issue 
of public policy, finds itself in the midst of such a crowded policy space. This is in 
part due to the connection of identity theft with other crimes such as terrorism, 
money laundering, and human trafficking which leads to the involvement of a 
myriad of actors. This complicates policy ownership, which in turn influences the 
direction of the response offered to the problem.  
 Financial identity theft is also a crowded policy space due to the actors 
involved in the opportunity structure. While chapter 4 speaks of the state as 
provider, the state is made up of a myriad of agencies, which all maintain a distinct 
function. The membership of the Identity Theft Task Force (section 3.5.1) as well 
as the membership of the steering committee of the Strengthening of the 
Identification chain in the Public Sector (VIPS) effort in the Netherlands (section 
3.5.2) provides an immaculate reflection of the presence of a crowded policy space 
with respect to financial identity theft. The opportunity structure itself also 
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provides a depiction of how certain policies introduced to ‘solve’ or relieve other 
problems have in turn evolved into facilitating factors.  
 
8.3.3 Beyond the State 
 
Traditionally, the state maintained a monopoly in its function as protector of the 
people, especially with respect to the provision of criminal justice. This traditional 
mindset shines through in chapter 3 which extensively covers various instruments 
used by the state as protector with respect to financial identity theft. Yet, crime 
reduction and prevention is no longer an area of society exclusively reserved for 
the state. Protection or security is ever more a collective responsibility. David 
Garland eloquently describes this trend in his book The Culture of Control. Through 
the responsibilization theory, the state aims to relocate and redefine 
responsibilities. As Garland notes, “[i]nstead of addressing crime in a direct 
fashion by means of the police, the courts and the prisons, this approach 
promotes a new kind of indirect action, in which state agencies activate action by 
non-state organizations and actors.”1251 Through this innovative approach, 
Garland states how the state as an actor of criminal justice is shedding its 
sovereignty and approximating the notion, as set forth by Michael Foucault, of 
governmentality. This general approach is apparent in the actions of the state as 
well as non-government organizations. And the limitations of the traditional 
criminal justice approach in relation to the challenges associated with the 
innovative character of financial identity theft in the virtual world certainly 
develop a persuasive justification for this strategy. This limitation of the state as 
sole or primary protector therefore influences the available range of 
countermeasures as well as the state’s ability to take direct action to reduce the 
problem.  
 Various examples demonstrate the reliance of the state on other actors to carry 
out its function as protector of the people. The most prominent example is the 
involvement of the financial services industry in the fight against money 
laundering. The requirement to maintain an audit trail of accounts opened and 
transactions carried out by financial service providers has transformed the 
industry. This transformation, which came as a result of the increased 
responsibility to actively engage in the fight against money laundering, as well as 
fiscal fraud and terrorist financing, also meant financial service providers required 
access to particular instruments, at least in the Netherlands. The push from the 
financial services industry to gain access to the citizen service number receives 
justification through its role as participant in the fight against money laundering 
and terrorist financing. To fulfill a legal mandate, financial service providers, as 
well as other actors, can in turn also make demands to the state, such as access to 
or permission to use an identification number or a database. This leads to function 
creep which is part of the opportunity structure and in turn demonstrates the 
complexity of ‘crime fighting’ in contemporary society.  
Actors can also profit from the reliance of the state on their existence and 
practices, and as such remain out of the regulatory reach. This occurs for 
information brokers, who, as noted in section 8.1.1, cater to the needs of the law 
enforcement community in the United States and as such find themselves in a 
privileged position. The necessity of the state then to use the services of the 
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information brokerage industry in its fight against terrorists and other criminals 
conflicts with the nature of facilitation of information brokers. Such necessity is 
borne out of the restrictions placed on the public sector data gathering practices, 
which lead the law enforcement community to move beyond the state.  
In addition to actors in the private sector, the state also appears to include 
citizens in the group of actors needed to fight crime, or at least financial identity 
theft. The presence of public awareness campaigns demonstrates the call from the 
state to its citizens to play a role in the reduction of risks associated with financial 
identity theft. This also leads to challenges since chapter 6 demonstrates the 
limited nature of consumers’ capacity to protect themselves due to the 
sophisticated nature of attacks used by perpetrators of financial identity theft.   
From a situational crime prevention perspective, the involvement of actors 
outside of the state is logical since the perspective aims to achieve crime 
prevention through opportunity reduction which must focus on the entire social 
context which includes various societal actors. There are, however, limits to the 
ability of certain actors to contribute to the situational crime prevention and such 
limits become problematic when the responsibilization strategy induces a transfer 
of responsibility or liability. Whitson & Haggerty prove critical and state how, 
“[t]he fact that institutions have knowingly created many of the necessary 
conditions for identity theft, refused to rectify glaring problems and established 
bureaucratic structures that give identity theft victimization its characteristic form 
all suggest that responsibilization measures...are themselves part of a political 
strategy whereby institutions are divesting themselves of responsibility for the full 
social and economic costs of the risks they have produced.”1252 This argument 
receives support through measures taken by ASB Bank, a major bank from New 
Zealand. ASB Bank emphasizes the responsibility of its individual clients but also 
changed its terms and conditions in July 2007 to reflect this emphasis. Since July 
2007, Internet banking clients without ‘proper software security controls’ did not 
receive the right to compensation in case of a successful phishing attack. Hegt 
notes how, “[t]his has serious implications that go beyond the installation of a 
virus scanner: ASB Bank enforces their customers to migrate to Windows Vista 
since full support on Windows XP will soon be dropped by Microsoft. Clearly, 
this enforcement has serious usability and cost implications for internet banking 
customers.”1253  
Public awareness campaigns and user education efforts accomplish the 
responsibilization. This is  problematic since the evolution of methods used by 
perpetrators of financial identity theft demonstrate a decreasing visibility. Such a 
decrease in visibility translates into a decreasing ability of consumers to control the 
facilitation of the crime. Herley recognizes the rocky relationship between users 
and user education.1254 He opposes previously presented viewpoints which label 
users as lazy and poorly motivated to act on user education and alter their 
behavior. In his conclusion, Herley writes, “...users are never offered security, 
either on its own or as an alternative to anything else. They are offered long, 
complex and growing sets of advice, mandates, policy updates and tips. These 
sometimes carry vague and tentative suggestions of reduced risk, never 
security...much of this advice does nothing to make users more secure, and some 
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of it is harmful in its own right. Security is not something users are offered and 
turn down. What they are offered and do turn down is crushingly complex 
security advice that promises little and delivers less.”1255  
Even so, the emphasis on consumer responsibility paired with the fear 
generated about the potential occurrence of financial identity theft proved an 
incentive for the market to introduce a new industry.1256 This industry of identity 
theft prevention services is symbolic for the treatment of the problem of financial 
identity theft. The mere existence of identity theft prevention services 
“…acknowledges a significant level of defeat in combating such abuses on the 
part of industry. The insurers have formulated a program to profit from the very 
social problem they have helped to create. In this sense, financial identity theft 
becomes another ‘externality’ created in the pursuit of corporate profits in the new 
electronic frontier, a problem that is to be dealt with by ‘someone else.’”1257 This is 
true for the industry but also for the state, which has indirectly delegated this 
function as protector, especially in the United States, through its seeming 
unwillingness or inability to respond to facilitating factors in the financial services 
industry.  
   
8.3.4 Interdependent Security 
 
Financial identity theft, as the previous chapters as well as the opportunity 
structure above demonstrate, is inherently a problem of interdependent security 
for the involvement of various actors is required in an effort to reduce the 
problem. As a result, the interdependency is evident across different dimensions. 
There is interdependency among but also within a set of actors. Just as there is 
interdependency between states themselves. The latter is best depicted through the 
need for international cooperation in the area of law enforcement. The Council of 
Europe Convention on Cybercrime demonstrates how its effectiveness rests on 
the willingness of states to sign and ratify the Convention. The lack of ratification 
by certain states maintains them as potential data havens and also complicates the 
efforts of other states who are involved in an investigation.  
 As for the interdependency between actors, this is best demonstrated by the 
financial services industry and the comparison between the United States and the 
Netherlands. For the financial services industry, security is an issue which 
competes with other core aspects such as convenience and marketing in an effort 
to maximize profitability. The United States, especially through the opportunity 
structure revealed above, depicts the consequences of interdependent security 
within the financial services sector. The competition among players within the 
sector leads to a focus on convenience and aggressive marketing practices. This is 
because, as previously noted, an increase in security decreases convenience and 
can lead to a potential loss of clients. This loss of clients occurs due to the fact 
that there is no cohesive intention to increase security and such cohesiveness is 
necessary to overcome the challenge of interdependency. The lack of a cohesive 
intention then generally means regulation is the necessary instrument to overcome 
the problem. But this is not always the case. The Netherlands, where the financial 
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services sector is regulated in a more stringent manner, demonstrates the 
possibility for alternatives. The identification procedures established several 
decades ago came about through a code of conduct which received good 
compliance and changed when outside forces, the European Union, issued a 
directive. The embedding of security in the architecture of Internet banking also 
came about in negotiation with the Dutch Central Bank. Certainly, as a 
supervisory organ, the Dutch Central Bank plays an important institutional role, 
but the engagement of the financial service providers also demonstrates how the 
smaller scale of the industry assists in its ability to better respond to the challenge 
of interdependency.   
 
8.3.5  Double Edged Swords 
 
The first part of the opportunity structure provides a brief insight into the 
potential for double edged swords through the description of how information 
accumulation is observed as a means to achieve security through risk reduction but 
can also achieve a state of insecurity. Various instruments introduced in an effort 
to ‘fight’ fraud in general and financial identity theft in particular demonstrate this 
potentially contradictory nature. Jan Grijpink specifically refers to the likelihood of 
problems associated with the citizen service number initiative, as did others.1258 
Grijpink considers the vulnerability in the current identification infrastructure to 
be in the predictability of identity check systems.1259 The current approach to 
increasing the effort for perpetrators of financial identity theft through enhancing 
features of documents or other identification tools therefore fails to respond to 
this vulnerability. And these measures fail to reduce the value of the tools used for 
identification purposes. Grijpink addresses both of these disadvantages of the 
current measures introduced and instead proposes a more fundamental change of 
the infrastructure. Such a fundamental change can come about through making 
identification procedures less predictable in terms of the manner of the procedure 
as well as the time and the place. Grijpink labels the more prevalent approach to 
the reduction of the problem as a choice for simplicity, uniformity, openness, and 
transparency. Such an approach is very evident through the passage of, for 
example, the REAL ID Act of 2005 in the United States as well as the approach 
taken in the European Union which leads to the standardization of identification 
documents across all member states. This is understandable, according to 
Grijpink, from a public administration perspective, which is typified by the need 
for clarity and order; yet, the approach itself is contradictory to the response 
generally offered by other organisms in nature which is to increase complexity in 
response to a more complex environment. This occurs through internal 
differentiation and the diversification of behavior. Better observation is, according 
to Grijpink, in nature a means to arrive at better control or management of the 
situation. 
  Other countermeasures embody the essence of double edged swords. 
Through the collection of initiatives against money laundering, the state calls for 
an intensification of surveillance and information accumulation. This, however, 
leads to the state of information abundance and availability described above as 
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part of the opportunity structure. As does the information intensification in the 
fight against terrorism. Yet, the situational crime prevention identifies surveillance, 
whether natural, official, or employee, as a means of increasing the effort on the 
part of the perpetrator. The double edged swords therefore lead to a vicious circle 
which confirms what Wildavsky states above, that policy is ever more its own 
cause.  
 
8.3.6 Countering Challenges or Challenging Countermeasures? 
 
The above provides a brief overview of a limited selection of a larger range of 
challenges faced by policy makers along the path of introducing countermeasures. 
The place of an issue of public policy on the political agenda invariably colors the 
response offered by the policy arena. For several years, the United States has 
maintained identity theft as a priority on its political agenda. This status, however, 
is in part due to the connection of identity theft to other high level priority items 
such as illegal immigration and terrorism. Even so, financial identity theft as an 
issue of public policy profits from the efforts made at the state level which 
eventually generate sufficient pressure to move into the federal arena. This became 
evident through the criminalization trend which commenced in the State of 
Arizona in 1996 and, through the effective usage of a policy entrepreneur, evolved 
into a federal countermeasure. Data security breach notification legislation appears 
to follow a similar path. As a result, while the agenda status of financial identity 
theft remains reactive and incident-driven, the individual states are more prone to 
react in a rapid manner, which might be the next best thing to a comprehensive 
approach to the problem.  
For the Netherlands, financial identity theft appears to remain in the shadow 
of the importance placed on look-a-like fraud, which is a document driven type of 
identity theft often used by illegal immigrants. The focus on a document driven 
fraud is understandable due to the value of identification documents in the 
Netherlands, which also explains the emphasis placed throughout the last years to 
ensure the quality of the document as well as the integrity of the issuance process. 
Even so, financial identity theft receives more attention through ‘intensification’ 
programs introduced in the law enforcement community which specifically target 
cybercrime, and as such encompass incidents of financial identity theft. The 
release of data on the financial damage caused by account takeover carried out 
through Internet banking activities may also satisfy the political craving for a 
countable problem which can lead to action.  
The agenda status of the problem, however, is merely one challenge. The 
presence of financial identity theft in particular and identity theft in general in a 
crowded policy space places the potential for countermeasures in a bit of a 
straightjacket. In response to the criticism offered against data security breach 
notification, one interviewee responded how other measures might cause more 
damage, which is certainly a valid concern in light of Wildavsky’s notion of policy 
as its own cause.1260 The double edged swords, which despite their intention to 
combat fraud, demonstrate the potential for policy to aggravate rather than reduce 
the problem.  
Moreover, other challenges which influence both the introduction of 
countermeasures as well as their potential effectiveness include the reliance on 
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actors beside the state itself, who do not consider protection of the public as their 
primary concern or who may simply be unable to defend themselves, as in the case 
of consumers. As Martin Woollacott argues, “[t]he generalized association of 
government with the avoidance of risk in wealthy societies is so rooted in 
expectations, so much a part of both right-wing and left-wing political traditions, 
that it will survive any trimming of the welfare state. And it is likely to mean that 
politicians who think that they can rid themselves of responsibility for risk by 
pushing state functions into the private sphere, or creating ‘third party’ authorities 
to carry the can, are going to be gravely disappointed... ‘State shedding’, or the 
process by which a more modest state narrows the range of activities and lets its 
citizens rake risks ‘on their own’, could turn out to be the biggest illusion of the 
turn of the century.”1261  The challenge of the involvement of actors beyond the 
state, namely those in the private sector, is exacerbated by the nature of financial 
identity theft as a problem of interdependent security which greatly impacts the 




Stories of victims, both in an individual as well as in a collective sense, often 
provide a demonstration of the impact of financial identity theft in contemporary 
society. The countermeasures introduced therefore must also to some extent, be 
approached, from the perspective of victims. This is especially important since the 
majority of countermeasures aim to reduce rather than eliminate the problem. This 
is logical since elimination of the problem is an unrealistic, and perhaps also 
undesirable, expectation. Such undesirability comes from the intricate connection 
between the benefits generated from certain facilitating factors, such as efficiency 
and convenience, which also serve important objectives when approached from a 
balanced perspective. The elimination of the problem may in turn also lead to the 
elimination of these benefits. As the brief discussion about the tension between 
economics and security indicates, the investment in security must be worth the 
impact in economical terms.  
 Even so, the achievement of crime reduction as opposed to crime prevention 
or elimination implies that there shall always be victims. As a result, the response 
to financial identity theft must focus both on crime reduction as well as crime 
‘recovery’ during the aftermath. The latter is at times lost in the emphasis placed 
on the former. Through the usage of the fatalistic mantra about how absolute 
security does, per definition, not exist, the financial services industry aims to void 
itself of accountability and responsibility when problems arise.1262 Van Eeten calls 
this fatalism on someone else’s account. This is problematic since the system 
which generates the risks, whether it concerns the debit card or Internet banking, 
actually increases the profits for financial service providers due to the reduction of 
transaction costs. The usage of the system is therefore in the interest of the 
industry, which ought to then also make an investment in risk reconciliation or 
risk recovery. For account takeover this means the compensation of funds lost via, 
for example, a Man in the Browser Attack. Such funds recovery, however, is often 
subject to interrogation as financial service providers evaluate claims on a case by 
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case basis. The initial reaction is to observe the victim as a suspect who has lost 
the funds as a result of her carelessness. The clever usage of public awareness 
campaigns and user education instruments as a result completes this problem, as 




At the end of the road, the conclusion is the moment to stop, turn around, and 
reflect on the path taken to reach the destination. Looking back at the start, the 
introduction sketched a brief portrait of the victim that indicated the realistic 
foundation for the anticipation of identity theft problems in the Netherlands. The 
existence of victims, albeit a limited number, is indicative of the potential for 
problems, or at least the presence of fertile grounds for identity theft in the 
Netherlands. Whether such grounds shall in fact nurture the proliferation of 
financial identity theft remains difficult to determine in a definitive sense, 
especially since the background of the developments in the United States 
demonstrate how years pass before a problem receives official recognition as such. 
Symptoms, much like the individuals pieces of a puzzle, may exist but no one 
might be able to provide an official diagnosis of the problem until the problem has 
become widespread.  
 As a result, the presence of fertile grounds in the Netherlands must be 
observed from the perspective of the available nutrients which the crime of 
financial identity theft needs to escape the soil and reach the surface on its path to 
maturity. The application of the complementary collection of opportunity theories 
provided a theoretical lens to observe the experiences in the United States and 
gage the applicability of such experiences to the situation in the Netherlands. 
Based on a categorization of actors which together develop a social context which 
in turn leads to the evolution of an opportunity structure for financial identity 
theft, there is the start of an understanding about how financial identity theft 
relates to routine daily activities in contemporary society. The opportunity 
structure depicts the differences between the United States and the Netherlands, 
and also demonstrates how the underlying mechanisms carry an ‘explanatory 
power’ to comprehend such differences. A certain share of such differences relates 
to uncontrollable features of both countries such as the distinction in scale and 
size. Other differences prove to be an expression of culture and style of 
governance, which in turn influence the presence of nutrients to facilitate financial 
identity theft. 
The absence of certain facilitating factors in the Netherlands, as opposed to 
the United States, might be interpreted as a promising feature of this research. 
And certainly such an absence ought to put into perspective any potential hysteria 
about the outbreak of financial identity theft across the country. Still, as became 
evident in the United States, early warnings about particular features in society, 
which demonstrate a likelihood to engage in function creep or fall ‘victim’ to the 
enticing nature of convenience, should be observed from a distance. For if we 
remain too close to the individual pieces, we shall never be able to observe the 
entire puzzle. 
 As the 9/11 Commission acknowledged in retrospect, the system was blinking 
red but everyone failed to connect the dots. There is a chance the same might 
happen in the Netherlands, despite the absence of certain facilitating factors which 
nurture financial identity theft in the United States. The importance of attention 
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devoted to early warnings rests in the limited nature of countermeasures 
introduced once the problems actually surface. Countermeasures which increase 
the effort and increase the risk can restrict the provision of nutrients, but will not 
kill the poison ivy that is financial identity theft. For both categories of 
countermeasures are inherently ‘reactive’ which complicates their nature as a 
means to prevent crime. The ‘reactive’ nature of countermeasures comes as a 
result of the neglect offered to early warnings about developments which maintain 
the potential to lead to a facilitating factor for financial identity theft. In retrospect 
such early warnings prove to be a foreshadowing of the problems which surface in 
due time. The general message which must be taken away from the warnings is a 
sense of caution about developments which embrace an unbalanced approach to 
potentially conflicting interests. However much token attention is devoted to the 
notion of balance, an actual balance is rarely achieved in practice. The importance 
of function creep and the cost of convenience, as well as the transformation from 
elite to mass and the obsession with information in contemporary society reflect 
how the aim to balance between the interests of privacy, security, and convenience 
is a thought remembered but an idea unrealized in the enthusiasm of progress. 






When identity theft originally emerged as a problem of public policy in the United 
States, during the last decade of the twentieth century, the rest of the world was 
still vast asleep. This changed several years later as other countries awakened to 
similar problems and a sense of potential urgency surrounding the topic of identity 
theft began to spread. Identity theft, especially as a result of advances made with 
regard to digital technology, became a threat worthy of social and political 
attention. Such interest in the ‘novel’ phenomenon led to many questions. The 
dominant discussions primarily focused on the lack of a standard definition and 
the necessity for prevalence data in an effort to assess the size and subsequent 
importance of the problem. Neither question proved easy to answer. Despite the 
extensive consideration granted to the importance of prevalence data and the 
establishment of a standard definition, other significant and perhaps more 
fundamental questions hovered in the background. The existence of financial 
identity theft in the United States, and its gradual potential spread to other areas of 
the world, increases the need to understand how identity theft occurs and how 
perpetrators of the crime manage to take advantage of developments within 
contemporary society. This book aims to provide such an answer through its 
central research question:  
 
How do states, financial service providers, consumers, and others facilitate the occurrence of 
financial identity theft in the United States and the Netherlands? And what are the implications 
for existing countermeasures and how do these fit into the situational crime prevention 
framework? 
 
The in-depth analysis of each actor provides the basis for the development of an 
opportunity structure, which serves as an overarching framework for previously 
identified facilitating factors. The four elements of the opportunity structure cover 
both the first and second stage of financial identity theft. This distinction is also 
the red threat throughout the book to categorize facilitating factors. The first stage 
of financial identity theft concerns the collection of personal information or other 
identification instruments, whereas the second stage revolves around the actual 
use, or better yet abuse, of the previously collected information or instruments for 
financial gain.  
 
Information: Abundance, Availability, and Accessibility 
 
The first aspect of the opportunity structure logically focuses on the facilitation of 
the first stage of financial identity theft. This is the element of information and its 
abundance, availability, and accessibility. The abundance of information is mainly 
the result of the elimination of ‘physical’ obstacles with respect to storage space in 
the virtual world. The collection and storage of information have as a result 
experienced enormous growth. This is evident in the analysis of both the state, as 
protector and provider, as well as in the examination of other actors such as 
information brokers and payment processors.  
 Besides the sheer ability to increase the collection of information and its 
storage, actors, especially the state as protector, have also expressed an enhanced 
necessity to engage in such record-keeping activities. This is mainly the result of 
the focus on information collection as a means to reduce risks and in turn achieve
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a sense of ‘collective security.’ The events of September 11, 2001 and the overall 
fight against terrorism increased the desire of the state, both the United States and 
the Netherlands, to accumulate more information. This trend to increase 
information collection as an instrument to reduce risks and subsequent crime 
maintains historical roots, as became evident through the comprehensive 
background analysis of anti-money laundering legislation. The perceived necessity 
for information also provides an impetus for the information brokerage industry 
to evolve and subsequently flourish. Whereas much information collection and 
storage occurs as a means to achieve collective security, such activities in turn also 
facilitate a (potential) state of individual insecurity. Such a state of individual 
insecurity can surface when the information collected and stored is accessible for 
perpetrators of financial identity theft. This became especially apparent through 
the onset of media reports about data security breaches such as ChoicePoint in 
2005 which illustrated how the information brokerage industry along with other 
organizations inside and outside of the public sector proved to be an attractive 
target for perpetrators of financial identity theft.    
 Just as the collection and storage of information increased, so did the ability 
for individuals to provide and share information. For consumers such an increase 
is evident through the usage and popularity of social media applications. This also 
made and continues to make information more available, especially via the 
Internet.  
 The abundance and availability of information are important; yet, the 
accessibility of information, in particular personal information, is a vital aspect of 
the overall facilitation of the first stage of financial identity theft. The aspect of 
accessibility has also been greatly influenced through the evolution of digital 
technology. For the state as provider, in particular, the accessibility of information 
became a prime topic of development. The most apparent example originates 
from the Netherlands where the government decided to make a central version of 
the Municipal Personal Records Database available via the Internet. This trend to 
allow access to a database in the virtual world also enhances its vulnerability for 
potential intrusion.  
 The increase in the availability and accessibility of personal information also 
becomes more problematic due to the enhanced value and applicability of such 
information in contemporary society. This is primarily due to the move away from 
face to face and onto digital transactions, where information has become a vital 
aspect of routine activities. This transition or function creep is a recurring feature 
throughout other facilitating factors and as such another aspect in the overall 




Function creep is a phenomenon which collectively captures a number of different 
aspects which lead to the facilitation of financial identity theft. The first example is 
the increasing usage and value of personal information in contemporary society. 
Perpetrators of financial identity theft acknowledge how personal information is 
like the key to the kingdom, since such information opens doors to financial 
assets.  
 Moreover, several (identification) instruments introduced by the state as 
provider experienced an expansion of applicability or ‘functions’ beyond their 
original intent. The most apparent example of function creep with respect to the 
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facilitation of financial identity theft is the usage of the Social Security Number in 
the United States. Its historical background demonstrates how the incremental 
expansion of usage led to a state of affairs where the number is valuable yet readily 
available and accessible. The value of the number rests in its usage by both the 
public and the private sector for verification purposes. A similar pattern, at least in 
terms of availability and accessibility, also surfaced in the Netherlands. The 
historical background of the citizen service number, and its predecessor the social-
fiscal number, demonstrate how the applicable uses of the number expanded 
beyond its original intent and how the desire for increased access by other actors, 
especially the private sector, continues to exist.  
 The emergence of function creep is also demonstrated by the increased 
reliance on identification documents. The introduction of both the passport and 
the driver’s license occurred with a specific intent; yet, this original purpose has 
since been buried by the plethora of situations where individuals can and often 
must use these documents. The function creep raises the value of identification 
documents and as a result enhances the need to strengthen the issuance process as 
well as the quality of the product. Through a historical analysis, it has become 
evident how both of these ‘security’ aspects remain particularly challenging. The 
Netherlands carries a turbulent history with respect to the development of a 
passport which proved resistant to fraud, whereas the events of September 11, 
2001 heightened the awareness in the United States about the problems 
surrounding their issuance process with respect to driver’s licenses.  
 The overarching ‘instrumental’ function creep can also be extended to the 
functionality of the computer and the mobile phone which, in contemporary 
society, have significantly expanded and as a result also led to an expansion of 
opportunities. Much like the stretch of an elastic band, such an expansion of 
functionality increases the tension and places a higher pressure on the security of 
the instrument to prevent it from ‘snapping.’ 
 
From Elite to Mass 
 
The historical analysis of the credit card in particular demonstrates how a 
transformation occurred, at least in the United States, from a product of the elite 
to a product of the masses. This transformation also became evident through the 
historical analysis of the passport, which originally maintained an air of privilege 
but transformed into an obligation. This transformation is important on two 
different dimensions. First, such a transformation changes the scale of the feature 
and therefore increases the applicable population. This increase also translates into 
an increase of suitable targets for perpetrators of crime. Second, a transformation 
from elite to mass means the population which can gain access or entry to a 
particular tool or feature also increases, which often means the entry requirements 
decrease and the acquisition of clients becomes more aggressive. This is especially 
apparent in the historical background of the credit card where the increased 
competition within the industry also increased the need for clients. Through the 
increased desire to gain as many clients as possible, those active in the industry 
reduced the threshold for applications and became more willing to issue credit 
cards on a large basis. Despite the elimination of unsolicited credit cards, the 
application process remains an issue which emphasizes mass acquisition of clients 
through focusing on speed and convenience. This in turn leads to the (potential) 
facilitation of financial identity theft.  
262     FERTILE GROUNDS 
 
 
The Cost (and Profit) of Convenience 
 
Convenience is an issue which is emphasized throughout the decision making 
process of various actors, from states to financial service providers. Convenience, 
however, remains the enemy of security. For consumer or client convenience also 
becomes criminal convenience, which facilitates financial identity theft. For the 
state as provider convenience is an important aspect during the development of 
electronic government applications. It is in the interest of the state after all to keep 
the threshold for enrollment low to ensure as many citizens as possible begin to 
use e-government applications. The mass usage of e-government applications is an 
objective of the state in an effort to reduce administrative burdens and increase 
the efficiency of its operations. Both the United States and the Netherlands have 
started speaking of customers as opposed to citizens, which again enhances the 
emphasis placed on convenience in the delivery of their services. 
 Along similar lines, financial service providers also focus on convenience as a 
means to maximize the number of clients and profits. The acquisition and 
application process of the credit card industry in the United States illustrates this 
emphasis on convenience. Such an emphasis on convenience returned when the 
financial services sector began to use the digital world for its transactions. Despite 
the existing common consensus on the necessity to enhance the security aspect of 
digital transactions, nearly all banks decided to install a mere one-factor 
authentication system, which proved vulnerable to intrusion, but allowed the 
providers to maintain a low threshold, which in turn increased client usage. For 
the financial services sector in the Netherlands the story is different mainly due to 
the existing solidarity among a small number of actors within the industry. As a 
result, the lack of emphasis placed on convenience through the introduction of a 
two-factor authentication mechanism for electronic banking, for example, does 
not carry any negative consequences since the enhanced security features are 
incorporated by all banks, which prevents the potential loss of clients since there 




The development of an overarching opportunity structure can in turn serve as a 
tool of reflection with respect to existing and proposed countermeasures. These 
countermeasures are categorized according to the situational crime prevention 
framework, which provides various types of opportunity reduction strategies. The 
first two, increasing the effort and increasing the risk, appear to be the most 
applicable types of reduction strategies with respect to the facilitation of financial 
identity theft. Both of these categories can apply to the first as well as the second 
stage of the crime. For the first stage, increasing the effort mainly occurs through 
reducing the opportunities for attaining personal information. Applicable existing 
countermeasures include public awareness campaigns which aim to make 
consumers more aware in an attempt for them to better safeguard their personal 
information. Due to the increased sophistication of attacks, the ability of 
consumers to arm themselves against outside infiltration is slowely but surely 
diminishing. The state as protector has also implemented data security breach 
notification requirements which try to increase the effort in two ways. First, 
consumers receive a notification of an organization when their data has been 
(potentially) compromised. This notification and awareness ought to serve as a 
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means for consumers to take action, which is in light of the compromised status 
of the data a complicated feat. The second aim is to provide an incentive for 
organizations to improve their information security practices, and as such reduce 
opportunities for perpetrators of financial identity theft to gain access to the 
personal information maintained by the respective organization. The focus on 
incentives is promising since the potential costs associated with reputation damage 
for an organization as a result of the notification is a powerful instrument to 
improve security.   
 Besides increasing the effort to obtain personal information, both 
governments have also introduced measures to complicate the attainment of 
identification documents. This occurs, for example, through changes made to the 
issuance process of such documents. In the United States, the passage of the 
REAL ID Act aims to improve both the quality of the document as well as its 
issuance process. For the Netherlands, the law enforcement community is working 
with municipalities to strengthen the issuance process and as such increase the 
effort needed from perpetrators of financial identity theft to obtain a passport or 
driver’s license.  
 Other measures aim to increase the effort required to accomplish the second 
stage of financial identity theft. These include changes made to authentication 
schemes for electronic banking, such as SMS authentication and the substitution 
of an EMV chip for the black stripe on the back of debit cards. Attempts by 
merchants to reduce opportunities for financial identity theft include requesting 
the CVC code and using the 3D Secure system.  
 Besides increasing the effort, existing countermeasures also aim to increase the 
risk. This occurs through the incorporation of the criminal justice system as a 
means to increase the risk of being caught which in turn theoretically serves as a 
deterrent. Whereas the United States officially criminalized identity theft in 1998, 
the Netherlands instead decided to rely on existing criminal law in the fight against 
identity theft. Important to note, however, is how the Dutch government 
intensified the fight against cybercrime and financial economic crime which also 




Based on a categorization of actors which together develop a social context which 
in turn leads to the evolution of an opportunity structure for financial identity 
theft, there is the start of an understanding about how financial identity theft 
relates to routine daily activities in contemporary society. The opportunity 
structure depicts the differences between the United States and the Netherlands, 
and also demonstrates how the underlying mechanisms carry an ‘explanatory 
power’ to comprehend such differences.  
 The absence of certain facilitating factors in the Netherlands, as opposed to 
the United States, might be interpreted as a promising feature of this research. 
Still, as became evident in the United States, early warnings about particular 
features in society, which demonstrate a likelihood to engage in function creep or 
fall ‘victim’ to the enticing nature of convenience, should be kept in mind. 
 The importance of attention devoted to early warnings rests in the limited 
nature of countermeasures introduced once the problems actually surface. 
Countermeasures which increase the effort and increase the risk can restrict the 
provision of nutrients, but will not kill the poison ivy that is financial identity theft. 
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For both categories of countermeasures are inherently ‘reactive’ which complicates 
their nature as a means to prevent crime. The general message which must be 
taken away from early warnings is a sense of caution about developments which 
embrace an unbalanced approach to potentially conflicting interests. However 
much token attention is devoted to the notion of balance, an actual balance is 
rarely achieved in practice. The importance of function creep and the cost of 
convenience, as well as the transformation from elite to mass and the obsession 
with information in contemporary society reflect how the aim to achieve a balance 
between the interests of privacy, security, and convenience is a thought 
remembered but an idea unrealized in the enthusiasm of progress. The grounds 





Toen identiteitsdiefstal aan het einde van de twintigste eeuw in de schijnwerpers 
van de Verenigde Staten kwam te staan lag de rest van de wereld nog rustig te 
slapen. Een verontrustend gevoel van urgentie over het fenomeen fungeerde 
enkele jaren later als een alarmsignaal voor andere landen, zowel binnen als buiten 
de Europese Unie. Inmiddels heeft identiteitsdiefstal zich ontpopt tot een 
bedreiging die politieke en maatschappelijke aandacht verdient en krijgt. Deze 
belangstelling heeft tot moeilijk te beantwoorden vragen geleid, over aard en 
omvang van het fenomeen in het bijzonder. Het ontbreken van een standaard- of 
algemeen geaccepteerde definitie en de noodzaak om statistische gegevens over de 
omvang van het fenomeen te krijgen, overheersen daarom vaak het debat. 
Ondanks de aandacht voor het definitievraagstuk en de drang naar statistieken, 
spelen op de achtergrond fundamentelere vragen. Het bestaan van 
identiteitsdiefstal in de Verenigde Staten en de (mogelijke) geleidelijke verspreiding 
van het probleem naar andere delen van de wereld versterken de noodzaak om te 
begrijpen hoe identiteitsdiefstal plaatsvindt en hoe daders misbruik weten te 
maken van maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen. Dit proefschrift beoogt daarom 
antwoord te geven op de volgende centrale onderzoeksvraag: 
 
Hoe faciliteren overheden, financiële dienstverleners, consumenten en anderen financiële 
identiteitsdiefstal? En wat voor implicaties heeft dit voor bestaande maatregelen en hoe passen 
deze binnen het kader van ‘situational crime prevention’? 
      
De uitgebreide analyse van elke actor vormt een goede basis voor het ontwikkelen 
van een overkoepelende gelegenheidsstructuur, waarin alle faciliterende factoren 
terugkeren en gekoppeld worden aan hun bredere sociale context. Bij het in kaart 
brengen van een gelegenheidsstructuur is het goed om een onderscheid te maken 
tussen de eerste en de tweede fase van identiteitsdiefstal. Dit onderscheid loopt 
tevens als rode draad door het gehele boek. De eerste fase van identiteitsdiefstal 
bestaat uit het verkrijgen van persoonsgegevens of instrumenten die gebruikt 
kunnen worden voor identificatie, terwijl de tweede fase betrekking heeft op het 
gebruiken, of beter gezegd misbruiken, van deze gegevens of instrumenten om een 
bepaald voordeel te behalen. In dit boek ligt de nadruk op financieel gewin, 
oftewel op financiële identiteitsdiefstal.  
 
Informatie: Overvloed, Beschikbaarheid en Toegankelijkheid 
   
Het eerste aspect van de gelegenheidsstructuur hangt logischerwijs samen met de 
eerste fase van identiteitsdiefstal. Dit is het aspect van informatie en richt zich 
vooral op de overvloed, beschikbaarheid en toegankelijkheid van gegevens. De 
huidige overvloed van gegevens is voornamelijk het gevolg van het ontbreken van 
fysieke barrières met betrekking tot opslagruimte in de virtuele wereld. Het 
verzamelen en vervolgens opslaan van gegevens heeft daarom een enorme vlucht 
genomen. Dit komt nadrukkelijk naar voren in de analyse van de staat, als 
beschermer en dienstverlener, maar ook bij andere partijen, waaronder 
informatiehandelbureaus. Naast de mogelijkheid om steeds meer gegevens te 
verzamelen en op te slaan hebben partijen, de staat als beschermer in het 
bijzonder, ook de noodzaak hiervan benadrukt. Deze noodzaak komt voort uit de 
overtuiging dat het verzamelen en opslaan van gegevens een geschikt middel is om
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risico’s te verkleinen en om bij te dragen aan ‘publieke veiligheid’, of althans het 
veiligheidsgevoel van burgers en consumenten. De gebeurtenissen van 11 
september 2001 en de algemene strijd tegen terrorisme hebben, zowel in de 
Verenigde Staten als in Nederland, de behoefte aan het verzamelen en opslaan van 
gegevens versterkt. Deze tendens om het verzamelen en opslaan van gegevens in 
te zetten als middel om risico’s te verkleinen en misdaad te verminderen is al enige 
tijd aanwezig, zoals bleek uit een analyse van de achtergrond van anti-
witwaswetgeving. Terwijl het verzamelen en opslaan van gegevens vaak wordt 
ingezet als middel om publieke veiligheid te bevorderen, kunnen deze activiteiten 
echter ook een potentiële staat van individuele onveiligheid faciliteren. Dit kan 
gebeuren als de opgeslagen gegevens toegankelijk zijn voor identiteitsdieven door 
haperende informatiebeveiliging. Dit toont aan hoe de overvloed en de 
beschikbaarheid van gegevens belangrijk zijn, maar hoe de toegankelijkheid van 
gegevens, in het bijzonder persoonsgegevens, tevens een cruciaal aspect is voor 
het faciliteren van identiteitsdiefstal. Deze constatering wordt versterkt door 
berichten in de media over het ‘lekken’ van gegevens bij informatiehandelbureaus, 
zoals ChoicePoint in 2005. De berichtgeving over ChoicePoint geeft aan hoezeer 
de industrie van informatiehandelbureaus in de Verenigde Staten een aantrekkelijk 
doelwit vormt voor identiteitsdieven. Mede omdat het bestaan van deze industrie 
de toegankelijkheid van persoonsgegevens vergroot. 
 Naast de toename in het verzamelen en opslaan van gegevens is ook de 
mogelijkheid om gegevens met anderen te delen gegroeid. Dit is vooral relevant bij 
consumenten, onder andere door de populariteit van sociale netwerken waar 
steeds meer mensen informatie delen en dus beschikbaar maken voor anderen. 
Hierdoor worden persoonsgegevens steeds breder en makkelijker beschikbaar, 
met name via het Internet.   
 Los van de toegenomen beschikbaarheid en toegankelijkheid van 
persoonsgegevens is ook de waarde van gegevens gestegen door de opkomst van 
digitale transacties en activiteiten. De overgang van fysieke naar digitale transacties 
vergt andere middelen om iemands identiteit te verifiëren. Hierdoor stijgt de 
waarde van persoonsgegevens, aangezien deze op meerdere fronten inzetbaar zijn. 
Dat leidt tot uitbreiding van toepassingen die we ook zien bij de analyse van 
andere factoren, en speelt daarom een belangrijke rol binnen de 




Function creep, of het uitbreiden van toepassingen buiten het oorspronkelijke 
doel, is een fenomeen dat meerdere faciliterende factoren verenigt. Ten eerste 
betreft dat het hiervoor geschetste toenemende gebruik en de waarde van 
persoonsgegevens. Identiteitsdieven begrijpen bijzonder goed hoe 
persoonsgegevens in de huidige maatschappij vergelijkbaar zijn met de sleutel tot 
de schatkist. Verder zijn de toepassingen van (identificatie) instrumenten die de 
door de staat als dienstverlener zijn geïntroduceerd, regelmatig uitgebreid. Het 
meest in het oog springende voorbeeld daarvan is het gebruik van het Social 
Security Number in de Verenigde Staten. Een historische schets van dit nummer 
laat zien hoe de geleidelijke uitbreiding van de toepassing ervan heeft geleid tot de 
huidige situatie, waarin het nummer alom beschikbaar en toegankelijk maar ook 
zeer waardevol is. Het nummer wordt gebruikt als verificatiemiddel in de publieke 
en de private sector en heeft daardoor een waardevolle maar ook kwetsbare positie 
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verworven. In Nederland zien we in historisch perspectief een soortgelijk patroon, 
tenminste op het vlak van de beschikbaarheid en de toegankelijkheid van het 
identificatienummer. Een historische schets van het huidige burgerservicenummer 
en haar voorganger het sociaal-fiscaal nummer laat zien hoe de toepasbaarheid in 
de loop der jaren is gegroeid en haar oorspronkelijke functie ver voorbij is 
gestreefd. Daarnaast is ook duidelijk geworden hoe toegang tot het nummer, in 
het bijzonder door de private sector, een gewild object is waardoor de uitbreiding 
in termen van beschikbaarheid en toegankelijkheid in de toekomst nog verder zou 
kunnen gaan.  
 Het fenomeen van function creep is ook te zien in de toenemende 
afhankelijkheid van identificatiedocumenten. Zowel het paspoort als het rijbewijs 
zijn ooit met een specifiek doel tot stand gekomen. Dit specifieke doel – het 
bewijzen van iemands toelaatbaarheid om landsgrenzen over te gaan 
respectievelijk een auto te besturen – is echter in de afgelopen decennia steeds 
meer vervaagd, doordat er uiteenlopende toepassingen zijn bijgekomen waarvoor 
beide documenten gebruikt worden. Deze uitbreiding van toepassingen heeft 
wederom als gevolg dat het document stijgt in waarde en aantrekkelijker wordt als 
doelwit van identiteitsdieven, waardoor er meer druk komt te staan op de kwaliteit 
van het product en het uitgifteproces.  
 Door middel van een historische analyse is duidelijk geworden hoe de 
beveiliging van identiteitsdocumenten een uitdaging blijft voor overheden, zowel 
in de Verenigde Staten als in Nederland. De turbulente geschiedenis van 
Nederland met betrekking tot het paspoort geeft aan hoe de fraudegevoeligheid 
van het document lange tijd fungeerde als plaaggeest voor de overheid. Inmiddels, 
mede onder invloed van de Europese Unie, is het Nederlandse paspoort 
weerbaarder geworden tegen vroegere kwetsbaarheden. Voor de Verenigde Staten 
hebben de gebeurtenissen van 11 september 2001 duidelijk gemaakt hoe 
kwetsbaar het uitgifteproces van rijbewijzen is. Het verband met terrorisme 
vergrootte het bewustzijn van de noodzaak om rijbewijzen, zowel het product als 
het uitgifteproces, beter te beveiligen. 
 Verder neemt de functionaliteit van de computer en de mobiele telefoon nog 
steeds enorm toe. Door de uitbreiding van mogelijkheden met deze instrumenten 
neemt ook de kwetsbaarheid toe, waardoor de beveiliging verder onder druk komt 
te staan om mogelijke aanvallen tegen te houden. Over het algemeen is het meer 
en meer gebruiken van een bestaand instrument een vaak voorkomende tendens, 
aangezien dit meestal het gebruikersgemak vergroot en tevens een grote mate van 
efficiëntie met zich meebrengt.  
 
Van elite naar massa  
 
De in deze studie uitgevoerde historische analyse van de credit card geeft aan hoe 
het instrument, tenminste in de Verenigde Staten, in de loop der tijd een omslag 
heeft gemaakt van een elitair product naar een product voor het bredere publiek. 
Deze vertaalslag komt ook naar voren in een historische analyse van het paspoort, 
wat van oudsher primair een voorrecht was en pas veel later veranderde in een 
verplichting. Deze verschuiving van elite naar massa is belangrijk om twee 
redenen. Allereerst leidt deze verandering tot een schaalvergroting, waardoor de 
hoeveelheid potentiële slachtoffers exponentieel toeneemt. Ten tweede, en dit 
geldt in het bijzonder voor de credit card, heeft het gevolgen voor de 
toegankelijkheid van het product. De standaarden waar potentiële cliënten aan 
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moeten voldoen dalen omdat het een primaire drijfveer is voor financiële 
dienstaanbieders om zoveel mogelijk cliënten binnen te halen om winst te 
maximaliseren. Hiermee gaat het fraudegevoelige karakter omhoog. Dat blijkt 
nadrukkelijk uit verhalen over credit cards die bedrijven hebben verleend aan 
honden, kinderen en anderen waarvan duidelijk had moeten zijn dat deze geen 
credit card hadden moeten kunnen krijgen. In het spanningsveld tussen 
zorgvuldige identificatieprocessen bij de uitgifte van credit cards enerzijds en 
klantenpotentieel in een sterk concurrerende markt anderzijds kiezen 
dienstverleners in de Verenigde Staten vaakvoor het laatste ten koste van het 
eerste.    
 
De bijwerking van (gebruikers)gemak 
 
Gebruikersgemak krijgt bij besluitvormingsprocessen over digitale ontwikkelingen 
veel aandacht, zowel bij overheden als bij financiële dienstverleners. Gemak is 
echter vaak een vijand van beveiliging. Dit wordt in deze studie mede geïllustreerd 
door het feit dat gebruikersgemak zich vaak vertaalt naar gemak voor de criminele 
wereld, omdat laagdrempeligheid voor gebruikers vaak ook misdadige activiteiten 
faciliteert. Voor de staat als dienstverlener is gemak een belangrijk aspect bij het 
ontwikkelen van applicaties voor de elektronische overheid. De overheid heeft er 
per slot van rekening zelf belang bij dat burgers gebruik gaan maken van de 
mogelijkheden van elektronische publieke dienstverlening. Grootschalig gebruik 
van de elektronische overheid is een doel voor de overheid omdat het kan leiden 
tot lastenvermindering en de efficiëntie kan vergroten. De Verenigde Staten en 
Nederland zijn in de context van e-overheid beiden gaan spreken over klanten of 
consumenten in plaats van burgers, wat de nadruk op gebruikersgemak en het 
dienstverlenende karakter van de overheid heeft versterkt.       
 Op een soortgelijke manier hebben financiële dienstverleners ook de nadruk 
gelegd op gemak, om op deze manier zoveel mogelijk klanten te bereiken en winst 
te behalen. De acquisitie van klanten en het aanmeldproces binnen de credit card-
industrie in de Verenigde Staten geeft aan hoeveel nadruk er ligt op 
gebruikersgemak om dit doel te verwezenlijken. Deze afweging zien we terug in 
het systeem van elektronisch bankieren waarbij in de Verenigde Staten veelal is 
gekozen voor een authenticatiemechanisme op basis van één factor (zoals een 
wachtwoord), om de drempel voor toetreding zo laag mogelijk te houden. Dit 
ondanks de breed gedragen mening dat 1-factor-authenticatie bij financiële 
transacties onvoldoende beveiliging biedt. In de financiële dienstverlening in 
Nederland tekent zich een ander beeld af. Daar heeft de kleinschaligheid van de 
sector, in het bijzonder met betrekking tot de betrokken partijen, ertoe geleid dat 
voldoende solidariteit bestond om samen een hoger beveiligingsniveau te 
introduceren, waarbij authenticatie plaatsvindt op basis van meerdere factoren 
(zoals een wachtwoord én een apparaatje of TAN-codes). Door deze collectieve 
benadering bleef het risico van overloop van klanten uit, waardoor het lagere 
gebruikersgemak, anders dan in de VS, geen invloed had op de 
concurrentiepositie.   
 
Samenvattend kan de gelegenheidsstructuur geschetst worden als een omgeving 
waarin de maatschappelijke voordelen van bepaalde ontwikkelingen, in het 
bijzonder met betrekking tot digitale mogelijkheden, tevens kansen heeft geschept 
voor identiteitsdieven. Dit is belangrijk om te benadrukken omdat het aangeeft 
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hoe beperkt wellicht de mogelijkheden zijn voor (effectieve) maatregelen om de 




De ontwikkeling van een overkoepelende gelegenheidsstructuur kan vervolgens 
fungeren als een spiegel voor de maatregelen die diverse actoren reeds getroffen 
hebben ter bestrijding van identiteitsdiefstal. Deze maatregelen kunnen geplaatst 
worden in het theoretische model van ‘situational crime prevention’. De eerste 
twee technieken/strategieën van dit model, het bemoeilijken van de misdaad en 
het verhogen van het risico voor daders, zijn de meest relevante categorieën voor 
identiteitsdiefstal. Beide categorieën zijn van toepassing op de eerste en de tweede 
fase van identiteitsdiefstal.  
 Voor de eerste fase zijn met name relevant de maatregelen die zich richten op 
het reduceren van mogelijkheden om persoonsgegevens te bemachtigen. 
Getroffen maatregelen in deze categorie zijn onder andere 
voorlichtingscampagnes. Deze campagnes hebben als primair doel om burgers 
bewust te maken van het gevaar van identiteitsdiefstal, zodat zij voorzichtiger en 
terughoudender omgaan met hun persoonsgegevens. Door de steeds 
geavanceerdere methodes van identiteitsdieven worden de mogelijkheden van 
burgers om zich te beschermen, echter steeds beperkter. Andere maatregelen die 
de overheid als beschermer heeft getroffen, beogen om persoonsgegevens bij de 
private sector beter te beschermen. Een hippe maatregel is tegenwoordig een 
meldplicht voor organisaties die persoonsgegevens ‘gelekt’ hebben of voorvallen 
kennen waarbij deze gegevens mogelijk gecompromitteerd zijn. Deze meldplicht 
heeft twee doelen. Ten eerste wordt beoogd dat burgers, wanneer zij op de hoogte 
worden gesteld van het incident, zich kunnen wapenen tegen de mogelijke 
gevolgen. Dit doel is moeilijk te verwezenlijken, aangezien burgers nauwelijks 
invloed kunnen uitoefenen op het plegen van identiteitsdiefstal wanneer de 
gegevens inmiddels al in kwaadaardige handen liggen. Het tweede doel is om 
organisaties te motiveren om hun informatiebeveiliging te verbeteren. De theorie 
is dat dit gebeurt omdat het melden van een incident van gegevensverlies kan 
leiden tot reputatieschade, waardoor een investering in betere 
informatiebeveiliging meer voordelen heeft in een kosten-baten-analyse.    
 Verder richten overheden zich op het bemoeilijken van het verkrijgen van een 
identificatiebewijs, onder andere door het introduceren van veranderingen in het 
uitgifteproces. Op dit vlak heeft in Nederland de politie toenadering gezocht tot 
de gemeentes om samen het uitgifteproces te versterken door toezicht te houden 
op de aangifte van vermiste of verloren documenten. In de Verenigde Staten heeft 
de federale overheid geprobeerd om via de REAL ID Act het uitgifteproces van 
officiële documenten te stroomlijnen en versterken.    
 Andere maatregelen spitsen zich meer toe op het bemoeilijken van de tweede 
fase van identiteitsdiefstal. Hieronder vallen verbeteringen in het 
authenticatiesysteem van elektronisch bankieren, maar ook het vervangen van de 
zwarte, magnetische strip aan de achterkant van een pinpas (die kwetsbaar is voor 
‘skimmen’) door een EMV-chip. Verder hebben webhandelaren ook geprobeerd 
identiteitsdiefstal te bemoeilijken door bij transacties op afstand te vragen naar de 
CVC-code op de achterkant van de credit card.  
 Naast het bemoeilijken van identiteitsdiefstal in operationele zin, beogen 
andere maatregelen de risico’s te verhogen voor misdadigers – de tweede strategie 
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in het ‘situational crime prevention’-model. Dit gebeurt aan de hand van een 
betere inzet van politie en justitie, onder andere om de pakkans te vergroten en 
daardoor daders te ontmoedigen om identiteitsdiefstal te plegen. De Verenigde 
Staten heeft in dat licht er in 1998 voor gekozen om identiteitsdiefstal specifiek 
strafbaar te stellen, zodat het probleem in beeld kwam bij de politie en justitie er 
gericht op kon vervolgen. Nederland heeft daarentegen besloten om gebruik te 
maken van bestaande wetgeving binnen het strafrecht, waaronder 
identiteitsdiefstal ook kan worden geschaard, maar heeft daarentegen wel aandacht 
geschonken aan het intensiveren van de aanpak van cybercrime en financieel 
economische criminaliteit.   
   
Conclusie 
 
In deze studie zijn alle partijen beschreven en geanalyseerd die samen de sociale 
context creëren waarbinnen een gelegenheidsstructuur onstaat voor 
identiteitsdiefstal: de overheid als beschermer, de overheid als dienstverlener, 
financiële dienstverleners, overige bedrijven, consumenten en tussenpersonen. 
Daarmee is een begin gemaakt om te begrijpen hoe identiteitsdiefstal zich 
verhoudt tot de dagelijkse activiteiten in de huidige maatschappij. Het zijn immers 
de dagelijke activiteiten van alle actoren die gelegenheden scheppen – of juist 
kansen verkleinen - om identiteitsdiefstal te plegen. De aldus beschreven 
gelegenheidsstructuur geeft verschillen weer tussen de Verenigde Staten en 
Nederland en illustreert ook hoe achtergrondverhalen een verklaring kunnen 
geven voor deze verschillen. Gebleken is dat bepaalde faciliterende factoren die in 
de Verenigde Staten prominent aanwezig zijn, ontbreken in Nederland. Men zou 
dat kunnen interpreteren als een optimistisch vooruitzicht (voor Nederland), maar 
zoals duidelijk geworden is uit de analyse van de Amerikaanse bevindingen, is het 
van wezenlijk belang alert te zijn op bepaalde aspecten binnen de maatschappij die 
een voorbode zijn van veranderingen in de gelegenheidsstructuur. Zulke aspecten 
zijn de neiging tot function creep of het leggen van een overmatige nadruk op de 
aantrekkelijkheid van gebruiksgemak. Dergelijke ‘vroege signalen’ van naderende 
veranderingen in de gelegenheidsstructuur zijn belangrijk om in het achterhoofd te 
houden bij vele besluitvormingsprocessen in de publieke alsook in de private 
sector.  
 Het is belangrijk om aandacht te schenken aan vroege signalen en om 
bevindingen uit andere landen als waarschuwingen voor ogen te houden. Dat 
belang is des te groter omdat tegenmaatregelen maar in beperkte mate invloed 
kunnen uitoefenen op identiteitsdiefstal als het probleem eenmaal aanwezig is. De 
algemene boodschap die voortvloeit uit een vroeg signaleringssysteem is dat men 
bij uitstek moet oppassen bij ontwikkelingen die op een onevenwichtige manier 
omgaan met belangenconflicten. Hoeveel aandacht er ook besteed wordt aan het 
idee dat belangen evenwichtig moeten worden afgewogen, een echt evenwicht is 
zelden terug te vinden in de praktijk. De in deze studie gevonden faciliterende 
factoren, van function creep, nadruk op gebruikersgemak en een verschuiving van 
elite naar massa tot de informatieobsessie in de huidige maatschappij, vormen 
signalen van een gelegenheidsstructuur voor identiteitsdiefstal. Wanneer deze 
signalen genegeerd worden bij complexe belangenafwegingen in 
besluitvormingsprocessen, zal er vruchtbare grond zijn voor identiteitsdiefstal om 
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